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Abstract 
Responses to inefficiency of the state control over forests, has led to the enactment 
of a forest devolution policy to facilitate participation of local people in forest 
management. This thesis examines the processes of the making of forest devolution 
policy and its interpretation in practice through a study in Thua Thien Hue, North 
Central Coast of Vietnam. It analyzes the roles and power of the actors in 
implementing forest devolution. This thesis explores the influence of forest devo-
lution on the distribution of the endowments, entitlements and thus on the live-
lihoods of different socio-economic groups. Through exploring the effects of the 
change in forest property rights, the research aims to contribute to the debates on 
the contributions and limitations of forest devolution to rural poverty alleviation as 
well as forest management practices. 
The study applies both quantitative and qualitative approaches based on a 
household survey, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The theoretical 
underpinnings for the research draws from policy analysis perspectives, the extended 
environmental entitlement approach and property rights analysis.  
The findings indicate that the process of making and implementing forest de-
volution in Vietnam is in the hand of state bodies with limited participation of 
beneficiaries. The forest devolution policy was enacted with expectations of 
increasing the rate of economic growth, reducing poverty as well as forest re-
habilitation. The new institutional arrangement for forest management have 
brought different endowments and entitlements to the different social groups as a  
result of muddle in both policy papers and the interpretations of the external actors 
in implementation of the devolution policy.  
The study suggests that in order to understand the influences of a policy, we need 
to explore a whole process and the dynamics of the policy over time. The study 
raises questions about the contribution of forest devolution to improving livelihoods 
of the rural poor, women and forest management status as well. This thesis suggests 
that in order to improve the contribution of forest devolution to rural poverty 
reduction and forest rehabilitation, it needs to expand the rights to the beneficiaries 
and requires development of a clear mechanism to ensure participation of people in 
making and implementing policy. 
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1. Introduction  
As a teacher and researcher at a university in Vietnam, the author often went 
to the field for research and supervising students. There she heard from local 
people about the differences in forest land holdings among the individual 
households and the conflict in forest land use between state organizations 
and farmers or between the farmers. The author also heard about and 
observed encroachment of and competition for forestry land in the 
communes she visited. 
From different information sources (talking with forestry officers, 
attending workshops, accounts from people in the villages she visited), the 
author also heard that forest allocation in Thua Thien Hue was occurring 
very rapidly with the support of international organizations. This 
encouraged her to do the research to investigate the implications of the new 
institutional arrangements for natural forest and forestry land management. 
What will the implications be for the local people, especially for the poor in 
terms of accessing and gaining rights to land for their livelihood security? 
And, moreover, what will the implications be for future generations? These 
observations and reflections were a strong motivation for the research the 
author conducted and discusses here.  
1.1  Background to the research issue 
1.1.1. Shifts in forest management institutional arrangements on a global scale 
Forests cover about 30 percent of the earth’s area, of which tropical and sub-
tropical forests comprise 56 percent of the world’s forests. The role of forests 
is recognized to include supporting ecological balance, and maintaining 
economic, social and cultural values. The forests are very important material 
resources for people (especially for the poor) in developing countries   16 
through providing foods, medicine, fuel-wood, charcoal, construction 
materials, production tools, traditional music instruments, hunting, cash 
income, and they are also a social and cultural resource for communities, 
especially for minority groups (Sunderlin et al., 2005; Adhikari et al., 2004; 
Saxena, 2003; Mogaka, 2001; Barham et al., 1999; CIFOR, 1997; FAO, 
1995; Jodha, 1995).   
 Vietnam is part of the Southeast Asian region. It has a large tropical 
forest area with high biodiversity. Over 70 percent of the total physical area 
of Vietnam is mountains and hills, with large tracts of forest and land 
devoted to forestry practices. As in other parts in the world, natural forest 
products are also important resources for the rural people, especially the 
ethnic minorities and poor people in terms of food (wild vegetables, meat of 
forest animals), firewood, medicine, construction materials, fodder, as well as 
eco-tourism (Markussen, 2008; Sunderlin & Huynh, 2005; Hoang, 2001; 
Sowerwine, 1999). The mountainous area in Vietnam is also the living space 
for part of the national population (Quy, 1995) containing 50 of the 54 
different ethnic groups whose welfare and livelihoods depend directly on 
forest and forestry land resources.  
In past decades, the forestry sector internationally has put effort into 
forest management through silvicultural technical methods such as forest 
inventory and planning, forest tree variety selection, enriching forests with 
the planting of selected species, bans on logging and re-foresting bare hills. 
However, this has not stopped deforestation and the degradation of forestry 
land (illegal logging, bare hills subject to erosion) remains a critical issue, 
especially in developing countries. The estimated net annual decline in forest 
area worldwide over the past decade (1990-2000) was 9.4 million ha. The 
forest area in Africa lost more than 9 percent in only 15 years from 1990 to 
2005. There was an increase of net forest area in Asia and the Pacific region 
between 2000 and 2005. However, deforestation and forest degradation 
continues in most developing regions. Desertification that is one of results of 
deforestation becomes a global problem (FAO, 2007). The causes of this are 
poverty, wars and poor management as well as limited local empowerment 
(FAO, 2007; FAO, 2001). 
  The traditional forestry approach focused mainly on state production 
forestry, the forest industry and forest protection. It had few concerns for 
social issues and the interests of local communities. Thus local traditional 
users and their preservation capacity experienced in preventing forest fires in 
the community-managed areas in Southeast Asia and parts of Americas and 
Africa were ignored (FAO, 2001; CIFOR, 1997). In the Asia–Pacific region, 
local people were excluded from forest control from 1953 in India and from   17 
1967 in Indonesia through the enactment of Forestry Laws. The 
consequences of central forest control were an increase in deforestation, 
forest degradation and loss of biodiversity leading to resistance by local 
people such as the Chipko movements in India, or resistance to logging by 
the Penan people in Borneo. In response to those problems, many 
governments introduced forest planting programmes and increasing 
protection efforts. However, those measures were still ineffective (Banerjee, 
2000).  
The centralized policies (state property rights in forest) increased the 
difficulties for governments to effectively exercise their authority (Edmunds 
& Wollenberg, 2003). Sustainable natural forest and forestry land 
management for local users is a worldwide concern. This fact is reflected in 
the international commitment made at the United Nations conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) to work towards 
the sustainable management of all types of forests. This conference also 
debated redefining the objectives of forest management (for what and for 
whom). Efforts for forest and forestry land management around the world 
are trying to achieve sustainability, an approach that balances social, 
economic and environmental objectives (FAO, 2001).  
There is increasing recognition of the importance of the management 
process and institutions in the forestry sector. The institutional arrangements 
for forest management are shifting from central management by the state to 
management with involvement of private sector and people as seen, for 
example, with the establishment of “protection forest areas of people”, the 
“joint forest management model” and eco-development in India (Sarin et 
al., 2003; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Badola, 2000; Banerjee, 2000); 
Promulgating laws to recognize local ownership over land and natural 
resources based on historical claims has taken place in ancestral domains 
legislation in the Philippines, native title laws in Australia and indigenous 
land rights laws in a number of Latin American countries (Banerjee, 2000; 
Lindsay, 2000) and provided rights to harvest from 1979 in Thailand 
(Banerjee, 2000).  
CBNRM (community based natural resource management) has been 
considered a new initiative by many governments in response to the 
inefficiency of top-down forest development and management planning of 
state traditional forestry. This approach is increasingly becoming 
mainstreamed through the work of development institutions (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2004; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Decentralization and devolution of 
management of natural resources and forests is a particular focus of national   18 
governments in many developing countries in the world (Springate-Baginski 
& Blaikie, 2007; Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). 
1.1.2. Forest devolution in the Pacific Asia region 
As in other parts of the world, in the Asia-Pacific region, non-timber forest 
products are very important for subsistence and income (Badola, 2000; 
CIFOR, 1997; Jodha, 1995; Jodha, 1990). CIFOR (1997) reported a trend 
towards decentralization and devolution of forest management based on 
recognition of local management systems and the role of civil society in the 
Asia-Pacific region. This change also reflects the widening of objectives of 
forest and forestry land management from simply environmental aspects to 
include sustainable local livelihoods.  
Decentralization and devolution of forest has been initiated by the 
governments in different countries in the Asia-Pacific region using a range 
of approaches.  Reviewing the decentralization experiences in eight 
countries (Australia, Indonesia, Philippine, China, Fiji, Korea, Nepal and 
Vietnam) in the region, Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2005) found that in 
the Philippines steps were taken from 1986 to transfer some conservation, 
management and protection functions to districts and reallocate staff to 
support the districts. In Indonesia, district government has been devolved 
responsibilities to manage forestry activities (except in some areas used for 
special purposes such as national parks, natural reserves, security affairs, etc.).  
Compared with the Philippines and Indonesia, forest devolution and 
decentralization came earlier in Korea (from 1973) and in Nepal (from 
1978). In Korea, the national government empowered village cooperatives 
to make voluntary decisions through carrying out the National Forestry 
Development Programme with technical support and some finance from the 
government. In Nepal, forest management was devolved to village 
government and then to communities (a household group who is dependent 
on forest resources) through the Local Government Act.  
In Papua, New Guinea and Fiji devolution was different and 
implemented through guaranteeing customary landownership by the 
constitution. The government in those countries recognized ownership of 
6,000 communities with a sharing of revenue from the customary 
community ownership’s forest to cover the costs for revenue collection and 
monitoring of the Forestry Department. The revenue passed to the 
community is distributed based on the hierarchy of chiefs and then the 
community’s members. In China, Laos and Vietnam, forest and forestry land 
have been devolved to both household and village levels (Fujita &   19 
Phengsopha, 2008; Sikor & Tan, 2007; Dachang & Edmunds, 2003; Sikor, 
2001).  
Devolution policies for natural resources has occurred in “virtually every 
corner of the globe” (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003) (p. 1). In the Asia-
Pacific region, forest decentralization is considered an experiment for 
negotiating the sharing of power between central government and lower 
levels and is in progress (Capistrano, 2008; Gilmour et al., 2004). Natural 
resources devolution in general and forest devolution in particular has 
occurred on both a regional and global scale. How has forest devolution 
occurred in Vietnam? This is described below.  
1.1.3. Forest devolution in Vietnam  
Vietnam is part of the Southeast Asian region with an area of 32,924,400 ha 
and a population of 81 million people (in 2003) (De Jong et al., 2006). Over 
70 percent of the total physical area is mountains and hills, with large tracts 
of forest and land devoted to forestry practices. The mountainous and hilly 
areas are also home of one-third of the national population representing 50 
of the 54 different ethnic groups, and whose welfare and livelihoods depend 
directly on forest and forestry land resources. 
Because of its range of topography and climate, natural forest in Vietnam 
is evaluated to be very diverse in terms of different types and high value of 
biodiversity. The complexity of topography and climate with high annual 
rainfall (1,300-3,200 mm) is a cause of frequent floods. With a special 
history of more than 20 years of war, the forests of Vietnam were destroyed 
by bombs and dioxin. Deforestation was also the result of overexploitation 
for domestic use and export, as well as for agricultural practices (Vien et. al., 
2005). Forest management in Vietnam, therefore, is a critical issue for both 
social and environmental objectives. 
Traditional forestry approaches to managing forest and forestland are 
different from agricultural land, as all forest and forestry land are managed 
and controlled by state forestry institutions with top-down plans while 
agricultural land has been allocated to individual households. State control of 
large areas in the absence of human and financial resources made the state 
unable to implement forest plans or activities. The traditional forestry 
approach with high financial investment was implemented over a long time 
(from 1975 to 1990) but illegal logging and deforestation continued and the 
forest cover of Vietnam declined until 1999 (Vien et al., 2005).  
Vietnam has followed a socialist political system with a central planning 
economic mechanism. From the end of 1986, Vietnam introduced a 
Renovation policy (Đổi Mới) leading to changes from central planning to a   20 
socialist-oriented market economy with an open door to international 
partnership. The introduction of market mechanisms required the local 
authority to deal with markets independently because the central 
government’s capacity was limited and central government devolved the 
rights to local government (Trang, 2004).  
In line with the renovation, forest management, therefore, has been 
shifting from a traditional approach with central management by the state to 
a social forestry approach with participation of other non-forestry organi-
zations such as the army, schools and involvement of individual households. 
According to Sam and Trung (2001), the trend in forestry policy in Vietnam 
now is increasing the devolution of forest and forestry land management to 
beneficiaries by allocating natural forest to household groups and villages and 
forestry land to individual households or contracting people to plant and 
tend trees and protect forests. This devolution of forest and forestry land 
management occurred with the renovation (Đổi Mới), through setting up the 
first 1987 Land Law. This was then replaced in 1993 and revised and 
amended in 1998 and 2001 by the national assembly with a new objective to 
devolve land to individuals, households and organizations.  
There is only one term for forestry land in the land law. However, there 
are two different terms for land that it intended for planting or reha-
bilitation. Vietnamese foresters or state officers often called them rừng tự nhiên 
(natural forest that is classified as group Ic; IIa,b; IIIa,b and IVa,b) and đất lâm 
nghiệp (forestry land that is bare hills and classified as group Ia and Ib for the 
planting of trees) (Vietnam Forestry Ministry, 1984). Natural forest can be 
devolved to household groups or villages or communities only (it is not 
private property) while forestry land can be devolved to individual 
households or non-forestry organizations such the army, school or 
university.  
From 1993 until 2003, 628,900 land use right certifications were issued, 
of which 515,000 certifications were for households and for a total area of 
3,546,500 ha (35 % of total forestry land area). Although devolution of 
natural forests came later than the forestry land devolution, from June 2001, 
669,750 ha of natural forest has been allocated to the villages for manage-
ment. This devolution occurred through project related mechanisms (the 
devolution activities of natural forest and forestry land were implemented 
through the project or programmes t h a t  w e r e  m a i n l y  f u n d e d  b y  
international organizations) (Du, 2003; Tuan, 2001).  
There is still controversy over the concept of “community forestry” in 
Vietnam. In reality, there are some forest areas that have been collectively 
managed. For example, the areas that were contracted out by the state   21 
forestry organizations or the areas devolved to village or household groups 
with a decision or the land use certification signed by the authority are often 
called formal community managed forest areas. Another type of collective 
management is the areas that were initiated by community themselves and 
maintained for a long time but without recognition by the state (without 
certification paper) and are often called “traditional community forest areas”. 
The amount of community forest area devolved to village or household 
groups by the state with land use certification or decision occupy more than 
a half of total area managed by community (Figure 1.). According to Ngai et 
al. (2005), this type of community management still occupy 56.1 % of the 
total area managed by community in 2005. 
Devolution of forest management to communities has been supported by 
many provincial authorities and it has been disseminated throughout 
Vietnam (Tuan, 2001). However, the areas that were contracted with 
village, co-operatives or communes for protection are often made through 
the national programmes 327 and 5MHRF (programme 5 million ha of 
forest). This type of management is actually not devolution because 
communities have often just been assigned the responsibility of guarding 
forests and in turn they get some cash income; most no longer exist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Type of community forest in Vietnam ( % of total area under community forest) 
Source: Tuan, 2001. 
 
This thesis focuses on exploring only the devolution process of forest and 
forestry land to individual households, household groups and communities 
by the state by providing a certification or decision of the authority. It does 
not examine contract management.  
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1.1.4. Devolution of forest management in Central Vietnam and Thua Thien 
Hue province 
Vietnam has seven ecological regions. The North Coastal Central of 
Vietnam is one of the poorest regions of the country and 74 % of the total 
physical area is forest and forestry land (Bộ Tài Nguyên Và Môi Trường (Ministry 
of Environment and Resources), 2004). There are 188,144.4 ha of forest 
and forestry land managed by the communities in the region (8.01 % of total 
community based management area of the whole country). 
Thua Thien Hue belongs to the North Coastal Central; there are six 
different indigenous ethnic groups that settled a long time ago in the upland 
area of the province. They are very poor compared to the Kinh group (the 
most numerous Viet group) and make a living based mainly on natural 
resources. Forest and forestry land occupies 72.12 % of the total physical area 
of the province (Thua Thien Hue Provincial people Committee, 2001). 
From 1997 to 2002, 14,229 households were allocated forestry land 
amounting to 18,085.2 ha and 4,800.2 ha of natural forest were devolved to 
villages for management. Almost all forest and forestry land area was 
allocated through programme or project funding arrangements such as the 
global Programme on Forests (PROFOR), the Project of Netherlands 
Development Organization (SNV) for Thua Thien Hue province 
(FORHUE-SNV), the United Nations Development Programmeme 
(UNDP), the Finland rural development project and the Social Forestry 
Support Programme. Forestry land (barren hills) was devolved to individual 
households for planting trees.  
In summary, forest devolution to households and villages has been a 
tendency in forestry policy in many countries, both in the Asia Pacific 
region and in Vietnam (Sam & Trung, 2001; Tuan, 2001; CIFOR, 1997).  
Although forest devolution has occurred in many places it is still a policy 
model under development. What is the nature of forest devolution? Is it 
transference of administration functions or power? What powers or rights 
has the state devolved to individual households, household groups or 
villages? Does forest devolution improve local livelihood?  
Studies on the impacts of forest devolution have been carried out in 
different countries (Colfer et al., 2008; Sikor & Thanh, 2007; Edmunds & 
Wollenberg, 2003; Nghi, 2002; Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Sikor, 2001) and 
focused mainly on outcomes of devolution such as changes of forest 
condition, impact on household economies or livelihoods (Tan, 2008; 
Sarap, 2007; Dachang & Edmunds, 2003; Kumar, 2002). The variables used 
in studying impacts of forest devolution are often quantitative. A focus on 
the process aspect of devolution is still limited. The nature of the devolved   23 
property rights and the reasons why states attempt forest devolution are also 
missing in current studies of decentralization (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001).  
In this research, the author looked at the process of making and 
implementing forest devolution policy and explores the changes in 
endowment of forest property rights (changes in statutory rights and 
customary rights) and examines how this change in rights influences 
entitlements (benefits) from the devolved natural forest and forestry land. It 
also examined management practices and the conflicts after devolution of 
forest. Agrawal (2007) stated that the common scholars on a global scale still 
are not concerned with examining the relationship between forest and 
livelihood. This research wants to explore the relationship between changes 
in forest endowment and entitlement and their influence on rural livelihoods 
by using both quantitative and qualitative variables.  
There is controversy over the outcomes of forest devolution to local 
people in the literature on forest devolution programmes in the world. 
Some literature concluded that devolution of forest to community or village 
can contribute to rural poverty reduction while some others said this is 
limited (Markussen, 2008; Sunderlin et al., 2005). Study on impacts of 
community forestry policy in the middle hills of Nepal, Prakash and 
Adhikari (2007) concluded that community forestry has the potential to 
improve household livelihood and empowerment of men and women in 
poor groups but this was not uniform across all sites and depended on 
various factors such as forest condition and type, accessibility to market, 
timber-sharing mechanism, and strategy of forestry department to ensure 
sustainable use of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). In some cases it made 
conditions of poorest and disadvantaged groups worse due to control by 
forest user groups. Kumar (2002) showed that joint forest management in 
India tends to meet the need of rural elite by focusing on accumulation of 
timber and ecological services values but it can not be assumed the gains go 
to all sections of the community. Investigation of the state programme on 
titling forest land to individual in Cambodia, Markussen (2008) found that it 
had a positive effect on agricultural productivity and security of tenure but 
these positive outcomes did not happen in the remote area. This author also 
concluded that the relationship between introducing private land property 
and decrease of common pool resource which is important for poor was not 
a clear relation.  
  In general, the contribution of forest conservation to poverty reduction is 
still a contested issue in the literature. Whether devolution of forest to 
people can help to alleviate poverty and improve forest condition is still a 
question that has not had any clear answer. This research wants to contribute   24 
to knowledge on the relationship between poverty reduction and forest 
conservation. The author argues that forest devolution policy in Vietnam is 
complex and its implementation is not uniform. The outcome of the policy 
(the giving of endowments, changes in management practices, as well as 
effects on entitlements and rural livelihoods) has not been realized because of 
the influence of various factors. 
1.2   Objective 
This research explores processes and outcomes of natural forest and forestry 
land devolution with focus on Thua Thien Hue province, North Central 
Coast of Vietnam. 
Forest and forestry land devolution in Vietnam in general and in Thua 
Thien Hue in particular is the result of institutional changes made by the 
state. This study aims to review the historical background of forest 
devolution policy papers in Vietnam. It was carried out to explore why the 
state formulated the policy to devolve natural forest and forestry land to 
individual household, to village and household groups (termed as bene-
ficiaries). The review of the policy papers also investigates the relationship 
between policy and practice regarding the endowments of forest devolution. 
The relation between policy and practice could not be understood 
without exploring how devolution process happens in practice. Central to 
this thesis is the examination of the process of implementation of the policy. 
It explores the roles, function and power of different actors in implementing 
the policy. Through two case studies in two communes with different 
natural and human ecological conditions, the research investigates how 
different actors interpreted the policy papers and how their interpretation 
influenced the gaining of endowments by different socio-economic groups. 
Both devolution of natural forest and forestry land are considered as test 
models in Vietnam; this research, therefore was interested in looking at both 
forestry land and natural forest allocation implementation processes. 
Forest is considered a common pool resource (Ostrom, 1999). For 
sustainable management of this resource, the quality of the institutional 
building process by collective action can play an important role (Meinzen-
Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). In the case of 
devolution of natural forest to household group or village in Vietnam, a new 
institution for management has been established. This research, therefore 
investigates how the institutions for village or household group based natural 
forest management were established and maintained and how they 
influenced the distribution of endowments and entitlements from allocated   25 
natural forest as well as the efficiency of forest protection. It also investigates 
the involvement of the poor and non poor groups in the process of 
devolution to understand how their engagement in implementation of 
devolution link to their endowments and entitlements. 
Natural forest and forestry land devolution in Vietnam is a change in 
property rights from state property rights to private and common property 
rights. Changes in land rights regimes can challenge equal distribution of 
endowments, inclusion of the poor, security of land tenure or endowments, 
as well as cause conflict in land use (Cotula et al., 2006; Keeley J., 2001). 
Analyzing changes in property rights, therefore, should look at who gains or 
loses from the change (Ellsworth, 2004). A central emphasis of this study is 
to examine how different socio-economic groups gained endowments to 
and utilities (entitlements) from the devolved natural forest and forestry land. 
The author’s concern is to explore who gained and who lost endowments 
and entitlements from these changes and how security of tenure or 
endowments to forestry land and natural forest was influenced in the transfer 
of state property to beneficiaries.   
This thesis explores change in management practice of forestry land and 
natural forest after devolution by examining changes in plantation area, 
preference of investment in land development and forest protection. It also 
examines what types of conflicts were created after forestry land and natural 
forest devolved and the causes of those conflicts.  
An important outcome of forest devolution is the gaining of utilities from 
the devolved forest. This research explores the types of utilities 
(entitlements) people gained from the devolved natural forest and forestry 
land. Entitlements from environmental services depend not only on gaining 
endowments and household resources but also on the process of converting 
those endowments to entitlements - an entitlement mapping process (Leach 
et al., 1999) that is influenced by institutions at macro and micro levels and 
markets also play an important role in this. Understanding how and why 
endowments to devolved natural forest and forestry land were or were not 
transformed to entitlements of beneficiaries (the utilities or benefits from the 
devolved forestry land or natural forest) is another purpose of this research.   
   Improvement in a household’s livelihood needs to look at the linkage of 
entitlements to livelihood activities. The opportunity in gaining entitlements 
creates further influences on a household’s livelihood. The thesis further 
investigates how the opportunity of gaining or not gaining or losing 
entitlements from the devolved natural forest and forestry land through 
changes in property regimes links to livelihood options and maintaining 
livelihood activities of different socio-economic groups.    26 
There are gender differences in roles, responsibilities and interests and 
because of the influence of social customs and norms, these gender 
differences affect the opportunities for men and women to gain endowments 
to forest and forestry land and hence their entitlements. The question about 
gender equity, therefore, should be addressed in assessing environmental 
actions (Agarwal, 2000; Agarwal, 1997b). This research investigates the 
participation of women and men in the process of devolution of natural 
forest and forestry land. It explores the endowments and entitlements they 
gain or lose from changes in the state forest property rights to devolution to 
households and villages.  
1.3. Research questions 
The new institutional arrangements for involving the beneficiaries in natural 
forest and forestry land management in Vietnam by implementation of land 
devolution is being challenged by the concentration, encroachment, and 
competition for land during and after allocation. The research ideas emerged 
from the practical problems observed in the field and this research aims to 
contribute to understanding these problems by examining the relationship 
between the policy and practice of the natural forest and forestry land 
devolution. It also aims to contribute to knowledge on policy analysis, on 
environmental entitlements from devolved forest environment services, as 
well as property rights regime and their gendered dimensions. The following 
questions structure this research:  
1.  What has been the forest devolution policy in Vietnam and how has it been put 
into practice?   
2.  How did forest devolution distribute endowments and how were these 
transformed into entitlements for different socio-economic groups 
3.  How did forest devolution affect management practices, community relations 
and rural livelihoods? 
To answer those questions, the research looked at the whole process of 
devolution of natural forest and forestry land. 
1.4. Research Process  
As mentioned above, the research ideas arose from field observation. The 
author wanted to understand practical problems. These ideas have been 
motivated when the author registered as a PhD. student in SLU. From the 
knowledge the author gained from PhD. courses, she found the theoretical 
frameworks that are relevant for the research. These theoretical frameworks   27 
helped the author to identify which variables and issues she should search to 
understand the practical problems. It seems to the author that this process is 
like a cycle to help her to develop and implement the research.   
The research started with a review of written policy documents on forest 
devolution in Vietnam from the central level to the local level to see what 
the intentions of the state were when issuing the policies. It continued with 
examining how the policy has been implemented by conducting field work 
from the end of 2004. The field work started with searching primary 
information to understand the context of the problems and to initiate the 
process of selecting research sites. From December 2004 to April 2005 
(working just part time), the author went to some different districts of Thua 
Thien Hue province to gain a preliminary understanding about forest 
devolution issues in the province.  
From June to August 2005, she collected secondary data and selected two 
communes in two different districts with contrasting conditions in which to 
do the field data collection. One in the coastal area that is located along the 
main national road and closed to the Chan May Port Economic Zone and 
another one that belongs to the mountainous district is a remote area and 
more than 50 % of population are ethnic people. The reason for looking at 
two different communities that have different natural and human ecological 
conditions was to contrast implementation of the policy in the same political 
system and its outcomes. This also aimed at seeing how different social-
economic groups were involved in and responded to the policy. 
This helped the author to develop and pass defending her procedure 
paper which defined the methods of the research. Based on the methods 
developed, her field works formally started from December 2005 to August 
2006. From January to March 2007, the author continued to search for 
more information after entering the primary data and trying to analyze some 
parts of the data when she was in Sweden from September to November 
2006. She was back in Sweden in the middle of April 2007 to analyze the 
data and write the thesis. However, the author’s strategy was not to stop 
understanding what has been happened after devolution to the year 2007; 
therefore, she went to the field every time she went back to Vietnam.    29 
2. Conceptual and theoretical frameworks  
2.1. Introduction 
This research focuses on examining the transfer of state forestry land and 
natural forest management to individual, village, and household group 
management as evidenced by policy and practice. This change of land use 
rights through devolution by the state is different from the 1953 reform in 
Northern Vietnam, which took the land from the landowners and 
transferred it to the landless. In this case, the forestry land and natural forest 
owned by the state was devolved to the beneficiaries. This study analyzes the 
forest devolution policy papers and then explores what happened in the 
implementation process and the consequences of this. It focuses on issues of 
gaining and losing access to forestry land and natural forest of different 
socio-economic groups. This leads to an analysis of the consequences of the 
devolution and its implementation of security of tenure or endowment, 
management practices and the conflicts.  
The research also examines how gaining or losing endowments to the 
devolved forest affected use of forestry land, entitlements from the devolved 
forest and then rural livelihoods. This chapter describes and analyzes relevant 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks to the study of forest devolution 
policy and its consequence with an emphasis on endowment, entitlements, 
management practice and rural livelihood outcomes.  
The research examines the policy papers and the implementation process 
to understand why, what, to whom and how the state devolved the rights of 
natural forest and forest land management to different beneficiaries. The 
chapter starts with reviewing the concept of forest devolution and then an 
analysis of approaches to policy analysis.     30 
2.2. Concept of forest devolution  
The term decentralization or devolution has been used rather often in the 
literature on natural resource management, especially forest resources. 
“Decentralization can be defined as the relocation of administrative 
functions away from a central location” and “devolution is relocation of 
power” although they are often treated as synonymous (Fisher, 1999) (p. 3). 
This scholar thought that decentralization and devolution can be 
implemented at the same time, but in practice it has often been the transfer 
of administrative functions only with no devolving of powers of making 
decisions.  
Blair (2000) did not mention administrative function or power as 
concepts by Fisher (1999) but he defined decentralization as a transference of 
authority from central government to local government. Bannerjee (2000) 
also pointed out a confusion that considers decentralization as geographical 
division (division of different levels from state into provinces and provinces 
into districts and districts into communes). It seems there is no separation 
between decentralization and devolution for Agrawal & Ostrom (2001) (p. 
487) who state that “decentralization is redistribution of power, resources 
and administrative capacities through the units of government and local 
groups”. Here decentralization refers to redistribution of both power and 
administrative functions.  
In general, there is common ground among the authors who talked about 
decentralization and devolution.They say that it is transference of something 
from the central government to lower management levels. However, the 
key difference between the concepts of those authors is conception of the 
nature of transference as an administrative function or power or authority. 
In  this thesis, the author prefers the concept of Fisher that distinguishes 
between administrative functions and powers. The concept of devolution 
used in this study, adapted from the above authors, is that “devolution is 
relocation or transference of rights from the central government to lower 
government levels and to people”, and it is different from decentralization of 
administrative functions.  
In the literature on decentralization and devolution of natural resource 
management, the authors also summarized different approaches that have 
been applied in different countries. Fisher (1999) identified three types of 
decentralization and devolution approaches in forest management: (1) 
enabling public participation in large-scale programmes by the government 
that gives the participants responsibility and some benefits in return for their 
participation in forest management (for instance the model of Joint Forest 
Management in India). This is an approach of decentralization with little or   31 
no devolution; (2) Decentralization of forest management roles from central 
government to local government units but not to communities (a major 
theme of policy in the Philippines). This is a decentralization approach with 
a degree of devolution although responsibility and power of management 
are still not different; (3) The handing over of a degree of control to local 
communities (for instance the model of community forestry in Nepal). This 
approach includes both decentralization and devolution but the working 
examples are still limited (Ibid.).  
According to Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2005), in the Asia Pacific 
region there were four decentralization approaches: (1) Devolution of forest 
governance from national to district government; (2) Decentralization to 
village government; (3) Decentralization to communities by recognizing 
customary ownership of the communities; (4) Decentralization through pri-
vatization. The different approach types of decentralization and devolution 
of forest management from various sorts are summarized in table 1. 
Table 1. Approach types of forest decentralization and devolution 
Sort and 
author 
Type of approach  Key characteristic  Country 
applied 
1. Devolution from 
national to district 
governance 
- Enabling public participation in 
large-scale programmes 
- Giving some responsibilities & 
benefits  
- Decentralization with little or no 
devolution 
- India 
2. Decentralization 
from central 
government to local 
government, not to 
community 
A degree of devolution although 
responsibility and power of 
management are still not discrepant 
- Philippine 
Fisher 
(1999): 3 
types 
3. Involving amount 
of control to local 
community 
Including both decentralization and 
devolution 
- Nepal 
1. Devolution from 
national to district 
governance 
Transferring functions and 
reallocated staff members to district 
government 
- Philippine 
- Indonesia 
2. Decentralization to 
village government 
Empowering village cooperatives or 
government to make decision with 
supports of techniques and some 
finance  
- Korea 
- Nepal 
3. Decentralization 
involving customary 
ownership 
Guarantying custom landownership 
by constitution 
- Papua New 
Guinea  
- Fiji 
Ferguson 
and 
Chandrasek
haran 
(2005) 
4. Decentralization 
through privatization 
Devolving property rights for forest 
and forestry land to households 
- China 
- Vietnam 
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Fisher (1999) and Ferguson and Chandrasekharan (2005) classified types of 
decentralization based on the subject of devolution (administrative level, 
civil organization or household). In the first approach by Fisher (1999) he 
did not specify the subject of devolution but just labeled them as 
“participants”. “District government” and “village government” were 
treated as the same type (“local government”) in the classification of Fergu-
son and Chandrasekharan (2005). These two researchers also did not separate 
the concept of decentralization and devolution although sometimes they 
presented these two terms in the literature. The terms of decentralization 
and devolution, therefore, are still often confused. This research, 
accordingly, just uses the term of devolution. It does not pay attention to 
decentralization of administrative functions from central to local government 
but just focuses on devolution of powers or rights over forest and forestry 
land to the people (individual household or household group or village – 
collectively called beneficiaries).  
Devolution of forest is a strategy or policy of national government to 
involve people or communities in forest management for achieving both 
development and conservation objectives. To understand the impacts of the 
forest devolution policy, it is important to understand the policy both on 
paper and in practice and to consider approaches to policy analysis which is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.3. Policy analysis approaches 
Policy analysis has emerged in the literature from different disciplines but 
what is policy?  
2.3.1. Concept of policy 
The term of policy is talked about in many places but the answer to the 
question of “what is policy?” is not easy to find. For Cunningham (1963, 
cited in Keeley & Scoones (1999): “Policy is rather like the elephant – you 
know it when you see it but you can not easily define it” (p.4); Paying 
attention to the complexity of policy, Blaikie & Sadeque (2000) stated that it 
is a process often messy and diffuse, while Pasteur (2001) and Apthorpe & 
Gasper (1996) mentioned the complexity of policy with its different aspects 
and features. SLIM  (May 2004) used the concept of “policy term” as being a 
component of regular general agreements or principles that are helpful for 
the need of organized community and it extends from macro to micro level. 
Policy can be considered as a course for action of an organization.   33 
Some scholars are concerned with the political characteristics of policy in its 
attempt to persuade through providing a gloss on events, its use of language 
for attracting and persuading and they see it “as a political process” (Keeley 
& Scoones, 1999; Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996). Others think that there is a 
difference between policy and legislation or regulations and they should be 
separated (Robert & Oberndorf;, 2006; Kerkvliet & Marr, 2004). Dam 
(1996) terms policy as institutionalization of measures of a manager to 
achieve his planned objective.  
 A review of these terms in the literature shows an agreement that there 
is complexity in policy. For the researchers who raised a more specific 
concept, the common thought regards “policy” as making a decision for the 
actions of a political subject or an organization. In Vietnamese, the term 
policy is often called chủ trương or đường lối or chính sách but there is only one 
word “policy” (chính sách) in the Vietnamese- English dictionary. 
What is forest devolution policy? It is difficult to find a normative 
concept for the term. However, there needs to be some understanding in 
order to identify what type of document to analyze what the devolution 
policy said. In the single party system of Vietnam, there is a relationship 
between the party, the state and the government in making decisions on the 
development of the country in general and for management of forests in 
particular. The term policy in this thesis, therefore is understood to be all the 
documents of the party, the national assembly and the government, which 
define and regulate a certain issue. This concept is just used for identifying 
the policy papers related to forest devolution in Vietnam and does not 
exclude the implementation process from being part of policy.  
 Given the agreement that policy is complex, how can forest devolution 
policy be understood? Approaches to policy analysis are discussed in the 
following section, noting Sabatier (1999) who stated that the frameworks of 
the policy process do not provide explanations for outcomes of policy but 
they help to organize inquiry in policy analysis. 
2.3.2. Policy analysis approaches 
The approach of the linear model (or instrumental perspective as termed by 
(Mosse, 2005) that considers policy as a rational tool for solving problems 
has dominated the policy research literature for several decades (Keeley & 
Scoones, 1999). However, this approach has been criticized by many 
scholars for separating the making and implementation process and for not 
taking account of the complexity of social life in policy execution (Mosse, 
2005; Mosse, 2004; Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Sutton, 1999).     34 
Sutton (1999) stated that there were different approaches in policy analysis 
but they generally come from five disciplines: political science, sociology, 
anthropology, international relations and management science. The political 
or sociology scholars have developed five different models of policy 
processes (Incrementalist, Mixed-scanning, Policy as arguments, Policy as 
social experiment and Policy as interactive learning). This also pays attention 
to the analysis of development narratives or policy networks and 
community. Anthropologists are interested in analyzing development 
discourses, looking at use of language in policy making while international 
relations scholars often analyze international regimes, interest groups and the 
interaction between them in the policy process. For management scientists, 
policy analysis needs to focus on barriers to change, power and influences or 
using an open system approach or models of change.  
Unlike from the synthesis by Sutton (1999), Keeley and Scoones (1999) 
proposed three approaches to policy analysis (Linear model, Incrementalist 
perspective and a third approach that pays attention to issues of power that 
remains silent in the two other first). In the book “Cultivating Dev-
elopment”, Moose (2005) classified and discussed two positions in policy 
analysis: an instrumental view (seeing policy as problem solving tools - this is 
labeled as the “linear model” by other scholars) and a critical view (focusing 
on power issues and participation that is the third approach in the literature 
of Keeley and Scoones (1999). Mosse (2005) develops an approach called 
New Ethnographical view that drew from his experience in working in a 
project of British Government in India.  
The different literature on policy analysis discusses the various 
approaches. All agree on the limitations of the linear model. The scholars 
highlight the strength and weakness of each approach. Given the complexity 
of the policy process, a combination of different approaches in analyzing 
policy are needed (Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Sutton, 1999). Looking back at 
the themes in this research, the author followed this idea.  
 “Devolution can be defined as relocation of power away from a central 
location” (Fisher, 1999) (p.3). This research looks at roles and powers of 
different actors in the process of making and implementing forest devolution 
in Vietnam. Two approaches that come from the anthropology field, paying 
attention to power relations, were selected for inquiring about and analyzing 
Vietnam’s policy of forest devolution and are discussed below.    
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¾  Critical perspectives (critical anthropology) 
The critical anthropology approach was developed by anthropology scholars 
who see policy as “political technology”. The approach advocates the 
necessity of analyzing written policy documents by examining the formation 
and use of concepts, working through language (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996). 
This perspective considers that the analysis of language and discourse of 
policy is a key to understanding the architecture of power relations. Policy 
study needs to focus on “norms and institutions, knowledge and power”. 
The critical anthropology approach sees policy as “political phenomena” and 
the use of expert knowledge is central to the policy process (Shore & 
Wright, 1997). 
Critical anthropology criticizes labels of participation or bottom-up 
approach of development projects as in reality it is a concealment of 
outsiders’ agencies (Chambers, 1997; Chambers, 1983). In this view, 
designing and implementing development policy needs to take into account 
the lack of voice and agency of the poor and disadvantaged groups. This 
perspective pays attention to the analysis of the web of power existing 
through practices of different actors in the policy process. It sees policy as 
rational discourse but its nature is political intent and bureaucratic 
dominance (Mosse, 2005).  
Related to the presence of people in the policy process, critical 
anthropology criticized the dominance of high-status professionals who 
often have education, are more powerful and live in the urban area with 
controlled and standard working environments in policy processes that 
create barriers to the presence or agency of people. High-status professionals 
have a tendency to pay attention to things rather than people, see people as 
beneficiaries rather than partners. Programmes and projects dominated by 
professionals, therefore, tend to follow top-down approaches and rarely are 
concerned with people and consider people as beneficiaries who are not 
motivated in development process (Ervin, 2005). 
Comparing the literature of the critical anthropologists in policy analysis, 
which sees power relations as central to their attention, seems to contrast 
with the interactionist view that emphasizes the importance of social 
learning (SLIM, May 2004). For analyzing natural forest and forestry land 
devolution policy in this research, a critical anthropological perspective on 
policy is a guideline to inquire about the agency as well as the nature of 
participation of the poor and disadvantage groups in the policy process. 
Analyzing the written forest devolution policy papers by looking at the use 
of language and concepts following Apthorpe & Gasper (1996) was also used   36 
to understand whose knowledge and interests were reflected or taken into 
account in making policy.  
Power is the capacity or ability of actors to ‘have an effect’ upon the 
context which defines possibilities for others (Hay, 2002). The critical 
perspective on policy analysis is therefore useful for the research to analyze 
which actor has the capacity to influence other actors in the process of 
implementing devolution of natural forest and forestry land endowments to 
beneficiaries.  
A critical anthropology of policy with a power relation centered analysis 
compensates for the silence on power issues in the interactionist view. 
However, Mosse (2005) criticizes both these approaches as they do not pay 
attention to the complexity of institutional practices, the complexity of the 
project’s and organization’s social life and diversity of interests. It seems to 
the author that critical anthropology of policy analysis still pays more 
attention to the policy making process rather that its implementation. It 
spent more time for talking about power of expert knowledge and bur-
eaucratic dominance but pays limited attention to development workers. An 
approach for the analysis of policy that is concerned more with the 
implementers of development work at the field level is found in the “New 
Ethnography of Development” by Mosse (2005). This is also applied to this 
research and it is discussed in the next section. 
 
¾  New Ethnography of Development 
This approach is drawn from the actor-oriented tradition of development 
sociology that focuses on interlinking intentions of development workers 
and those who are influenced by development (being developed). It 
emphasizes the importance of collaboration and compromises in setting up 
and implementing development models. Interactionist approaches emphasize 
the importance of ideas or interests of social groups in the policy process 
while critical anthropology focused on power relations. New Ethnography 
seeks to question the interaction between ideas and power and social 
practice. In his paper Mosse (2004) argued that ideas have to be understood 
in terms of the institutions and social relationships and the relations have to 
be understood in terms of ideas.  
From working experiences in a development project of the DFID for 
eight years, Mosse states that the important issue in project implementation 
is control over interpretation of events, that “development projects need an 
interpretive community”. Mosse concludes that the project can implement 
the plan but it can still fail in terms of interpretation. This author argues that 
the actors groups may have contradictory interests in the policy process but   37 
they compromise them in doing the project because their relationship forces 
them to do that. Therefore, analysis of development policy should not 
question “whether a project succeeds but how success is produced” and 
should examine “the ways of producing policy interpretation” (Mosse, 
2005) (p. 8). In contrast with the critical view, the New Ethnographical 
view focuses on arguments about the policy implementation process but 
rarely discusses the analysis of written policy papers and the process of 
making policy. 
The natural forest and forestry land devolution policy in Vietnam was 
created to transfer forest management rights (endowments to forest) from the 
state to the beneficiaries. Which actors were involved in making the policy? 
Whose knowledge and interests were taken into account in the process of 
making policy? Who had the power in making decisions in the process of 
forest devolution making and implementation? How did different actors, 
especially disadvantaged groups participate in the process? Is it the 
rearrangement of institutions in forest management by involving the 
beneficieries or is it a formality of participation as stated by the critical view?  
However, as argued by the ethnographical view, policy analysis also 
needs to look at the interpretation of policy in the implementation of forest 
devolution. The practical evidence from the implementation process of 
forest allocation links, according to the arguments of the ethnographical 
perspective, to how the success and failure of forest devolution policy in 
practice is produced either through interpretation by different actors.   
According to Agrawal & Ostrom  (2001), current studies on decentraliza-
tion and devolution, especially the studies on natural resource devolution, 
pay less attention to the nature of property rights that devolve to local actors 
by the state. This research analyzes the written policy papers about forest 
devolution and examines how the forest devolution process was 
implemented in practice. It also examines who gets and what types of rights 
or endowments to natural forest and forestry land the local actors got 
through devolution by the state. Moreover, the research wants to explore 
how the devolved rights were exercised in practice to transform to 
livelihood outcomes of the local actors. An approach that is called “extended 
environment entitlements” approach was applied in this research to argue 
about the process of transform of the devolved resources (specifically forestry 
land and natural forest) to outcomes from those resources. It is discussed in 
the next section.   38 
2.4. Community, social difference, poverty – environment linkages 
and the environment entitlement approach   
The extended environmental entitlement approach was developed by Leach 
et al. (1999) based on the entitlement analysis of poverty and famine of Sen 
(1981) and as a response to critiques of and attempts to improve practice in 
the CBNRM. The basic assumption for development of this approach was 
that there was a need to address social differences within communities and 
the ecological dynamics influencing the CBNRM. This approach also draws 
from analysis of the debate in the literature on the relationship between 
poverty and environment conservation. Before discussing the environmental 
entitlement approach, it is necessary to review the concept of community, 
social difference and the question of linking poverty and environment 
conservation.  
2.4.1. Community and social difference 
What the term of community means is still a question that is not clearly 
answered in the literature on natural resource management. There is 
diversity in definitions of the term “community” with geographers 
emphasizing its spatial aspects, economists considered it from a work or 
market perspective and the social interaction and networks aspects focused 
on by sociologists (Kumar, 2005). Lack of specification of the concept of 
community makes the meaning of community participation projects very 
unclear. Early sociology and anthropology scholars (19
th and early 20
th 
century) viewed a community as a unified or organic whole and as static and 
homogeneous entities with common interests and shared norms. Seeing a 
community as an organic whole is appealing for participatory conservation 
programmes in the eyes of conservationists but this view does not pay 
attention to differences within the community. Lack of attention to these 
differences leads to an ignoring of the influences of social differences on 
outcomes and the sustainability of the CBNRM (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; 
Leach et al., 1999; Leach et al., 1997). 
The current literature on natural resource management argues against the 
view of seeing community as a unified entity (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; 
Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1999; 
Leach et al., 1997). These scholars stress that a unified community does not 
exist. A community is heterogeneous and is divided by caste, wealth, 
gender, age and origins. These differences lead to different needs and 
interests in natural resource management. This also creates different local 
actor groups with differences in interests, capacity and resources. These 
affect the opportunity in gaining endowments and the transformation of   39 
them to entitlements. Understanding this social difference is an essential basis 
for effective policy intervention in the natural resource management field. 
Based on this argument, Leach et al. (1999) developed the extended 
environmental entitlment approach for analyzing the CBNRM and it is 
discussed below. 
2.4.2. Poverty - environment linkages 
There are debates in the linkage between poverty and environment in the 
literature on poverty and natural resource management. In research on 
environmental entitlements from pastoral natural resource management in 
Mongolia, Mearns (1996) reported that some studies on the interaction 
between poverty and environment concluded that poverty is linked directly 
to environmental change. This assumed that environmental degradation 
causes poverty and in turn poverty has a negative impact on the 
environment. This researcher also stated that some other researchers have 
questioned the assumption that environmental degradation is a consequence 
of population growth and argue that the poor manage their environments in 
sustainable ways (Ibid.). In Mearn’s paper, he showed that analysis of the 
linkage between poverty and the environment is a vicious circle because of a 
main difficulty in considering environmental problems in terms of 
relationships between the availability and the scarcity of environmental 
resources with total population.  
Agrawall and Gibson (1999) reported that the early approaches to the 
CBNRM see the relationship among community, livelihoods and natural 
resource as one of harmony, equilibrium or balance. Communities were 
considered as homogeneous with common interest so that its members 
would be willing to collectively manage natural resources. People -
environment relationships were seen as linear and simple (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1997). When traditional regulations for natural 
resource management were broken down by various factors, this was seen to 
require rebuilding traditional or collective management institutions. This is 
justification for a CBNRM strategy that is offered by many governments 
(Ibid.). However, recent work views community as composed of different 
social actors and people-environment relationships as dynamic. This 
challenges the perspective of static, linear and equilibrium communities and 
environments. The relationship between people and environment and the 
linkage between poverty and environment, therefore, are complex and 
influenced by a variety of factors that needs to be taken into account by the 
CBNRM (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1997).    40 
In a debate on the linkage between poverty reduction and forest 
conservation, there is a series of articles (in World Development volume 33 
No. 9) that showed different trends on the relationship between poverty and 
forest conservation. Sunderlin et al. (2005) synthesized key knowledge 
related to poverty reduction and forest conservation with a focus on two 
questions: (1) can the forest help to support poverty reduction and (2) can 
the forest resources be used for poverty reduction and conservation at the 
same time? These authors reported that chronic rural poverty is often found 
in locations with an abundance of forests and forest resources can be 
important for poverty reduction even in places where forest cover is low. 
They concluded that research and development activities related to forest-
based poverty alleviation and forest conservation should be continued at site-
level but with informred attention to regional, national and international 
levels. Those researchers also stated that it is impossible to assume that 
economic growth will bring about forest recovery, so it is important for 
research on poverty reduction and forest conservation to pay attention to 
various outcomes. Can forest conservation improve poverty alleviation and 
can economic growth help to conserve the forest and environment? They 
are still questions that are not easy to anwser.   
Dewi et al. (2005) reported that there are different findings on the linkage 
between poverty reduction and forest conservation. Some argue that forest 
resources can help to improve the livelihoods of the poor while some others 
stated that forests have limited potential for poverty reduction. In the case in 
East Kalimantan (Indonesia), those researchers found that the contribution of 
forest conservation to poverty alleviation is clearer in the villages that are 
rather remote with well endowed forests and limited economic alternatives. 
They also concluded that endowments of forests can help people to live well 
at subsistence levels but its contribution to lifting people out poverty is 
limited. Those researchers also showed that the resource exploitation 
projects did not benefit the local people. It is critical that to help people 
improve their well-being, endowments of forests to people need to be 
provided along with efforts to strengthen their capacity to transform these 
endowments efffectivly (Ibid.).  
Discussion about influence of forest law on rural livelihoods, Kaimowitz 
(2003) stated that enforcement of forestry and conservation laws have the 
potential to negatively affect livelihoods of the poor, minority groups and 
women because those laws often prohibit small-scale illegal forestry activities 
such as collection of fuelwood and hunting that are the rural poor’s jobs. 
The conservation programmes, therefore may sharpen poverty of rural 
people.   41 
Analysis 61 cases of comercial NTFPs production in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, Belchera et al. (2005) conluded that NTFPs can be useful to reduce 
poverty if it is commercially produced and traded. However, potential of 
NTFPs comercialization for biodiversity conservation is limited. In the case 
of Mexico, Brandon et al. (2005) concluded that to avoide conflict betweeen 
conservation purposes with human settlements in the reserve, the reserve 
area should be reduced by the amount of land with high agricultural 
potential and provide some compensatory values to the community 
(capturing value of environmental services) such as more investment in 
alternative income sources by government and international organizations to 
achieve both conservation and livelihood improvement at the same time.  
In general, knowledge on linkages between poverty and environmental 
or forest conservation found by the scholars in different parts of the world 
showed that this relationship is not linear or simple. Devolution of forest, 
therefore, can bring about different outcomes (including positive and 
negative consequences) for conservation and poverty reduction and 
attention needs to be paid to them. 
A move towards greater concerns over social differences in communities 
and the controversial debate on linking forest conservation and poverty 
reduction through endowments of forest along with the theory of 
entitlements (Sen, 1981) were the basis for developing the enviromental 
entitlement approach that is discussed in the next section. 
2.4.3. Environmental entitlements 
The discussion on environmental entitlements used in this research is mainly 
drawn from the arguments of Mearns (1996), Leach et al. (1999) and some 
literature applying Leach’s approach including  Sikor and Tan (2007), 
Calamia (2005) and Post & Snel (2003).  
The entitlement approach was initiated by Sen (1981) to explain why 
people can be still hungry even in the context of plenty of food. Sen argued 
that not only does food availability determine access to food but also other 
factors can influence it such as the labour market, market organization and 
price policy. Responding to the limited understanding of the influence of 
dynamic institutional arrangements on efforts in the CBNRM, based on a 
review of relevant theoretical literature (particularly the entitlement analysis 
developed by Sen (1981) and her own earlier work on the notion of 
“environmental entitlement”,  Leach et al. (1999) built a conceptual fram-
ework called extended environmental entitlements.  
   Mearns (1996) who is co-author with Leach et al. (1999) also started to 
come up with this idea through analyzing the approach of Sen (1981) and   42 
developed a framework that he termed a simple entitlement analytical 
framework that included two components (people in place and structuring 
process). This later (in 1999) was developed further by Leach in co-
operation with him and Scoones. In this thesis, the extended environmental 
entitlement approach is discussed mainly based on the paper by Leach et al. 
In her paper, Leach et al. (1999) claimed that understanding the 
relationship between people and the environment needs to appreciate the 
dynamics of the environment as well as of the community in time and space. 
The framework aims to justify the influence of ecological and social 
dynamics on the natural resource management activities of a diverse group 
and how these activities produce different kinds of environments. 
Institutions are considered as mediators of people and environmental 
relationships and are central to this framework. Reviewing case studies in 
Eastern Cape’s Wild Coast in Ghana and India, Leach et al. pointed to the 
influence of formal and informal institutions on access and control of 
resources.  
The “environmental entitlement” approach developed by Leach et al. 
(1999) paid attention to social differences and its implication for the 
CBNRM. Communities are seen to be dynamic with divisions by gender, 
caste, wealth, age, origins. Ecological processes are also considered as non-
equilibrium and as dynamic systems that are disturbed by the events. These 
dynamic and differentiated views are important for analyzing linkages 
between people and the environment. This is a basis for explaining the social 
differences of environmental consequences and access and control of 
resources.  
“Endowment” and “entitlement” are key concepts of this approach. 
Revisiting works of Sen (1981), who defined entitlements as “the set of 
alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society 
using the totality of rights and opportunities that she or he faces” and 
endowment as “a person’s initial ownership”, Leach et al. (1999) stated that 
the term of “entitlement” of Sen did not refer to “normative sense” of 
people’s rights - what they “should have” - but referred to what people “can 
have”. Processes that transfrom from endowments to entitlements are called 
“entitlement mapping”, and according to Sen are “the relation that specifies 
the set of exchange entitlements for each ownership bundle” (p. 46). Sen is 
concerned with explaining how, under a given “legal setting”, people do or 
do not survive through examining how people “gain entitlements” from 
their endowments to improve their capacity or well-being.   
   Leach  et al. criticized restrictions in the environmental context of some 
elements of Sen’s framework: (1) Sen (1981) focused on how to gain enti-  43 
tlements from endowments (entitlement mapping) but he had limited 
concern for how people gain endowments (endowment mapping); (2) Sen 
addressed formal legal property rights only. Leach argued that the ways of 
access to and control over resources of people are beyond formal channels 
and should include kinship, or customary regulations.  
Adapted from Sen’s view, in the “extended entitlement approach” of 
Leach et al. (1999), “endowments” are defined as “the rights and resources 
that social actors have” (p. 223) and “entitlements” refer to “legitimate 
effective commands over alternative commodity bundles”, specifically 
“entitlements refer to alternative sets of utilities derived from environmental 
goods and services over which social actors have legitimate effective 
command and that are instrumental in achieving well-being” (p. 223). The 
relationship between endowments and entitlements, according to Leach et 
al.’s view, is a two way relationship. It means that not only can endowments 
transform to entitlements but in turn entitlements can enhance people’s 
capabilities. For example, from forestry land and other resources, people can 
gain timber from the land (a utility or entitlement that came from the land) 
and timber can enhance the financial capacity of the owner by gaining cash 
income by selling timber. This view leads to a remark that some 
entitlements can become endowments at a particular point in time.  
Leach et al. (1999), also pointed out the challenges for the “effectiveness” 
of command over resources because of contests and the power relationships 
of some actors in claiming resources and because some actors are unable to 
mobilize some endowments. A difference between the Sen and Leach views 
is the meaning of “legitimate”. Sen refers to legitimate as command by a 
statutory system only while Leach refers to it as command from both 
statutory and customary systems. In this framework, changes in the 
ecological landscape are analyzed through processes of both endowment and 
entitlement mapping (processes in which social actors gain rights and access 
to and control over resources and then transform those rights and resources 
to utilities). 
Institutions from the macro to micro level, therefore, are central to their 
frameworks. Different positions and vulnerabilities of social actors are 
analyzed in relation to macro structural conditions. This approach argues 
that a focus on “institutions” highlights power relationships in mapping 
processes (both endowment and entitlement mappings) that are missing in 
Sen’s analysis. The “extended entitlement” approach, therefore, sees 
entitlements as the outcome of negotiations among social actors rather than 
as a simple result of fixed rules in the laws.   44 
Considering institutions as central to the analysis framework, this approach 
conceptualizes “institutions” based on themes emerged from the work of 
different knowledge fields (new institutional economists, new economic 
history and public choice): (1) institutions are “the rules of games in the 
society” which is distinguished from “organizations” as the players existing 
through a “set of working rules”; (2) “transaction costs” are an important 
factor that influences change in institutions; (3) institutions are not “the rules 
themselves” but as “regulated patterns of behaviour”; (4) formal institutions 
are rules enforced by a third party, usually the state, while informal 
institutions are supported by agreement among social actors.  
In summary, the extended entitlement approach analyzes relationships 
between people and the environment through examining the process of 
endowment and entitlement mapping that is influenced by the dynamic 
institutions at different levels. This approach points out the importance of 
people’s capacity to make claims to gain the entitlements. A strong point in 
this approach is an examination of the linkages between endowments (rights 
and capabilities) and environmental outcomes (entitlements) that can help to 
better understand the influences of resource devolution processes on 
environmental outcomes for both ecological and livelihood objectives. 
However, although this approach pays attention to institutions from the 
micro to macro levels, the analysis of the endowment and entitlement 
mapping process seems to focus mainly on the social differences of local 
actors at the micro level. Discussion about the influence of the power 
relationships of external actors in the process of devolving endowments and 
transforming these endowments to entitlements is limited. This approach 
sees entitlements as outcomes of negotiation between social actors.    
Sikor and Tan (2007) applied the “extended entitlement approach” to 
evaluate the effects of forest devolution in the central highland of Vietnam. 
Adapted from this framework, those researchers modified the approach in 
three ways: (1) considering the actors as the center of the approach and 
focusing on social differences of actors to highlight how they have different 
capacities to gain endowments and entitlements; (2) they consider 
“endowment as rights and responsibilities that social actors have with respect 
to multiple goods and services provided by forests” (p. 2012); (3) they define 
entitlements to include “sets of utilities irrespective of whether or not social 
actors have legitimate command over them” (p. 2012). In their research, 
Sikor and Tan developed four sets of variables for analyzing the influence of 
forest devolutions:  
(1) Statutory rights include “a forestry land title holding”, “devolved 
forestry land and natural forest area”, volume of timber devolved with the   45 
assumption that all household members are holding the devolved forestry 
land equally.  
(2) Forest endowments are analyzed through differentiation of types of 
rights to forestland and trees among local households 
(3) Forest entitlements are measured by cultivated land area, values of 
agricultural and timber products from the devolved forestland (both for 
selling and home consumption). 
(4) Resources of the actors are measured by both qualitative and 
quantitative variables, including wealth, number of adult labourers, and 
political position. 
Those authors use both qualitative and quantitative strategies for 
analyzing the collected data. A combination of analyzing qualitative 
information with descriptive and regression analysis were used to examine 
distribution of endowments among households and to investigate 
entitlement patterns. However, there is limited concern in the research in 
exploring the further influence of formality (the state’s regulations) on the 
process of gaining entitlements (timber and agricultural fields in the 
devolved forest areas). In Vietnam, clearing the forest for farming and 
cutting timber are often not allowed to be freely done even in the devolved 
forest areas and this may also be a factor that can influence gaining 
entitlements by the actors. The process of mapping endowments has also 
received limited attention.  
Assessing the impact of decentralized forest management on charcoal 
production, Post & Snel  (2003) also used the environmental entitlement 
framework of Leach et al. (1999). Those authors focused on the influence of 
informal institutions (informal contact between charcoal commercial 
producers and merchants and the forestry service) on the loss of entitlement 
to wood fuel for making charcoal for the rural council and local people. In 
this research, the concept of endowment and entitlement was also adapted 
from Leach et al. (1999). However, interpretation of those concepts in the 
case study of charcoal production was not clear. The endowments in the 
study addressed only the statutory rights of charcoal production passed by 
the 1998 forestry law. The specific variables of entitlements and resources 
and the difference of groups in the local community were hardly discussed.  
Calamia (2005) used the extended entitlement approach to evaluate the 
impacts of establishment of community-based marine conservation areas in 
southern Fiji. This author used qualitative methods to highlight endowments 
and entitlement mapping. However, the case study did not explore the 
specific utilities of the villager groups from the conservation area so the 
entitlement mapping process did not go far enough.    46 
The literature that applied the extended environmental entitlement approach 
of Leach et al. (1999) used the original definitions of endowment and 
entitlement to analyze the impact of natural resource management 
devolution or decentralization. However, specific interpretation of those 
concepts in these case studies was not consistent. The process of endowment 
and entitlement mapping of that research was also discussed in relation to 
institutions at different levels.  
In this research, the author used the concepts of Sikor and Tan (2007) 
adapted from Leach et al. (1999). However, she does not separate the 
variables of “statutory rights”, endowments and resources. In this study, 
there are two sets of variables: endowments and entitlements. The types of 
variables (for each set of variables) may also not be changed to simplify the 
analysis of transformation from endowments to entitlements (entitlement 
mapping). Because of difficulty in collecting quantitative data (the 
devolution process was started long time before the author’s data collection) 
and direct benefits coming from the devolved natural forest areas are still 
limited, qualitative analysis was a major strategy for this research. However, 
some quantitative variables such as land area, cash income from collecting 
NTFPs or selling labour for planting and harvesting, as well as estimated 
timber harvesting values were also examined in the research. Related to 
applying the extended entitlement approach, this thesis mainly focuses on a 
discussion about the entitlement mapping process because the process of 
endowment mapping is discussed based on a policy analysis approach and 
property rights school. Nevertheless, the author will try to analyze the 
entitlement mapping process in relation to the discussions of the devolution 
process in which people gain the endowments.  
2.5. Feminist environmentalist approach  
Examining the influence of forest devolution from a gendered perspective is 
one of the objectives of this research. Therefore, theory in relation to gender 
and resource management is useful for the author to debate how gender 
factors influence participation of the village’s members in the process of 
forestry land and natural forest devolution and how this impacts the 
opportunity of gaining endowments for women and men and then to 
entitlements or utilities from the forest after devolution.  
Gender is one of type of social difference highlighted by the institutional 
scholars in the literature on natural resource management as discussed in the 
section 2.3.1. However, the researchers who are interested in gender analysis 
in natural resource management developed deeper arguments on the   47 
relationship between gender difference and opportunity in gaining access to 
resources and benefits from environmental services. 
Gender is a social construction that shapes the roles and relationships of 
human beings across all dimensions of activity. It is one of the key variables 
defining access to and control over natural resources and sustainability (FAO, 
1997; Quisumbing, 1994). Gender refers to social relationships between 
men and women. Those relationships are influenced by class, race, age and 
other social factors and it can vary with a change of political and economic 
situations.  
The scholars who work with gender or feminism and resource mana-
gement (Rocheleau & Edmunds, 1997; Jommo, 1993; Leach, 1992) argue 
that in many places in the world, both men and women are resource users 
and managers. Because of different roles, responsibility in the household, 
community as well as in society, women and men often have different 
knowledge, interests, opportunities and constraints in managing resources 
(Westermann et al., 2005; Bajracharya, 1993). However, due to influences of 
norms, customs and other social factors there are disparities between men 
and women in participation and their access to benefits and resources 
(including land and forest) (Ahmed & Laarman, 2000; Parpart et al., 2000; 
Toulmin & Quan, 2000). There are some different approaches developed by 
the scholars who work with gender issues. The Feminist environmentalist 
approaches are appropriate, therefore, to discuss gender and natural resource 
management. 
Feminist environmentalists (Agarwal, 2001b; Agarwal, 2000; Agarwal, 
1997b) emphasize the everyday dependence of women and men on natural 
resources. Therefore, their presence in making decisions on natural resource 
management (especially forest resources) is very important for equal cost and 
benefit distribution as well as the efficiency and sustainability of natural 
resources management initiatives. In their research on the devolution of 
water management in South Asia, Meinzen Dick and Zwarteveen (1998) 
pointed out that women were excluded from the water user groups because 
of the formal and informal membership criteria. This led to negative 
influences for women in terms of time cost and social risks. They claim that 
enhancing women’s participation can enable them to bargain as resource 
users and can improve effectiveness of water user organizations. 
In research on joint forest management and community forestry in India 
and Nepal, Agarwal (2001b; 2000; 1997a) argued that common resources 
(for example, forest resources) are important sources for rural people in 
developing countries, especially for the poor and women, in terms of 
providing firewood, fodder and medicinal plants. Dependence of women on   48 
a village’s common land was higher than men because of their limitated 
access to and control over the private land. When the new initiatives of joint 
forest management or establishment of forest user groups were introduced, 
rights to the forest’s resources depended on membership in the local forest 
management organizations with the new institutions. However, women 
were excluded or had limited participation in forest protection committees 
(initiated by the state) or self-initiated groups (Ibid.).  
Excluding women’s participation is the result of different factors as social 
norms and perceptions, which are vary and depend on the specific context. 
This scholar argued that exclusion or limitation of women’s participation led 
to an inequity of benefits and cost distribution between men and women, 
such as increasing the time spent for collection of firewood by women. Also, 
women did not have rights in accessing and controlling the funds of forest 
user groups. Agarwal claimed that lack of women’s participation reduced the 
efficiency of forest protection because women could not prevent illegal 
collectors because they have no rights to that. Moreover, exclusion of 
women’s participation in forest user groups prevented the male guards from 
excluding female illegal collectors due to religion and cultural reasons. 
Agarwal (2001b) also pointed out that efficiency of the conservation or 
forest management programmes may be limited when excluding women’s 
participation because women’s knowledge of the forest’s plants is not used in 
plan making. 
This research investigates the presence of women and men in the process 
of implementation of forest devolution. It also explores the benefits they 
gain from the devolution such as attending the meetings or training 
activities, gaining endowments of forest devolved by the state or direct and 
indirect utilities or entitlements they gain from the devolved forest area. A 
feminist environmentalist approach is a framework used here to argue about 
the presence of women in the process of arranging new institutions for 
household group or village-based natural forest management, how this is 
influenced by the customs and social norms and how this affects the 
distribution of endowments and entitlements for women and men. This is 
used in combination with a gender analysis framework that will be presented 
in the methods section. 
Devolution of natural forest and forestry land in Vietnam is a change in 
management institution from the state’s ownership to devolution to 
beneficiaries at both the individual and community levels. This is also a 
change of property right regime (specifically change of land rights) or 
devolution of forest endowments to beneficiaries by the state for achieving 
improvement of entitlements of people and conservation as well. As   49 
discussed in section 2.4 above, the extended environmental entitlement 
approach focused only on arguments about the CBNRM. The extended 
environmental entitlement approach does not help to analyze the effects of 
introducing private forestry land property. It is necessary for the author to 
look at the theory of property rights. Understanding property rights 
concepts and approaches can help in analyzing enabling conditions for 
sustainable management practices, security of tenure or endowment and the 
conflicts appeared after devolution that were not paid attention to in the 
entitlement approach. This approach is discussed below. 
2.6. Property right and tenure security  
2.6.1. Concept of property right, tenure security 
“Property rights refers to full and despotic dominion over something” 
(Devlin (2001), cited in Ellsworth (2004). The full dominion implies the 
rights to trade, sell, buy, mortgage and inherit. Devlin (Ibid.) terms property 
rights with tenure rights as referring only to “right of use, access and those 
rights’ duration over time and across generations”. Demsetz (1998)  states 
that “property rights are instruments of society” and he also agrees with 
Devlin that they are a bundle of characteristics or rights. However, Demsetz 
points out the relationship of those rights to laws and customs of society that 
are called “enforcement mechanisms” are also included in the concept of 
property rights (Demsetz (1973 cited in Feder & Feeny (1991) and 
(Demsetz, 1998). Different from the thoughts of Devlin,  Meinzen-Dick & 
Di Gregorio (2004) stated that “rights do not necessarily imply full 
ownership and the sole authority”. In reality, bundles of rights are identified 
by the institutions (both legal and customary institutions), so what is the 
meaning of “full dominion”? The implication of a bundle of rights is 
different from place to place.       
There are some overlaps between the concept of “property rights” to 
land and “land tenure rights” within the literature. According to Schlager & 
Ostrom (1992), land tenure is the legal right to access, manage, exclude, 
transfer, get benefits from that land, as well as the responsibility of the 
people who own. This concept is similar to the implication of bundle of 
rights to a resource as mentioned above, except it adds the “responsibility” 
aspect of the resource holder. FAO (2002) sees land tenure as the relationship 
among people (individuals or groups) with respect to land and it is defined 
legally or customarily. However, it also agrees that land tenure is an 
institution that defines how rights to land are allocated in a society. The   50 
distinction between the concept of FAO compared to that of Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) is that FAO recognizes the customary institutions in land 
tenure.  
Reviewing the literature, the author adapted the thought of Devlin 
(2001, cited in Ellsworth, 2004) that “tenure rights” should be understood 
to be narrower than meaning of “property rights”. Property rights implies a 
bundle of rights including rights to use, access, transfer, sell, buy, inherit and 
mortgage and being defined by both legislation and custom while tenure 
rights refers to use or access rights to a resource.   
There is a broad agreement that when the rights to a resource are clearly 
assigned to a holder, tenure rights to that resource will be more secure. 
Tenure security arose from the idea of a deal between a peasant and lord to 
grant a means of life for the peasant. There is a unity among many 
researchers that land tenure security is a defensible claim of rights. It has two 
basic components: “bundle of rights” and the matter of defending those 
rights (Ellsworth et al., 2004; FAO, 2002; Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 1994). 
According to the Leach et al. (1999), endowments are rights and resources of 
social actors. Sikor and Tan (2007) included the variable of statutory rights 
in their case study as one type of endowment. As classified by the scholars 
who work with land right property, tenure is rights of access and use of a 
resource. There is, therefore, an overlap between the meaning of tenure and 
endowment. In this research, security of tenure also is understood as security 
of endowment. 
Meinzen-Dick & Knox (1999) emphasized a central role of property 
rights in natural resource management. Those scholars argue that assigning 
property rights to a holder of a resource will encourage the holders to be 
more confident in investing in its management. Moreover, it gives the 
holders authority and control over the resource and it can reinforce 
collective action.  
There is a common classification of property rights into three types: 
public property (held by the state), common property (held by the 
community or a group) and private property (held by an individual) 
(Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999; Demsetz, 1998). However, in the literature 
of some scholars, there was one more type of property that is called “open 
access” in which the rights are not assigned (Feder & Feeny, 1991) or non-
property in which access is not formally regulated (Kissling-Näf & Bisang, 
2001; Bromley & Cernea, 1996).  
   Forestry land and natural forest devolution in Vietnam is a change of 
property rights regimes from the state property to private property 
(devolution to individual households in the case of forestry land) or to   51 
common property (devolution to household groups or villages in the case of 
natural forests). Did those new property regimes encourage the beneficiaries 
to invest more in managing forest land and natural forest? Did they create 
more security for the holders? The theories of property rights that are 
discussed below are useful for this research.  
2.6.2. Property rights approaches, tenure security and economic development 
2.6.2.1. Private property rights school  
“The Property Right School is an old one in academia” (Ellsworth, 2004; p. 
10). It came from ideas of economists and originated from analyzing the 
influence of population growth and commercialization of hunting products 
on evolution of rights of control over land (Demsetz, 1998). This school 
argues that private property rights encourage credit transactions and promote 
land productivity through the use of m o r e  l a b o u r  a n d  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  
management efforts and investment levels ((Feder & Feeny, 1991). The 
scholars of this school believe that titles to a resource or to land are very 
important to economic growth and development. Based on the literature on 
the history of land use in Europe, it concludes that private property rights 
were the cause of the prosperity of western countries. This school states that 
individual title to land will encourage development of the land market 
(buying, selling as well as leasing land) that leads to better and more efficient 
production. Therefore, this school argues that private rights should be 
devolved to all types of resources and a resource that can not be 
individualized (for example, natural forest), has to become public property 
(holding by the state). It believes that private holding is the best choice and 
no other type of ownership can be better. In the case of natural forest, the 
Property Right School believes that it must be managed by the government 
because other property rights regimes (private, commons regimes, etc.) can 
not produce public good values (Ellsworth, 2004).  
Studies on the influence of private land rights mainly focus on the 
questions of credit transactions, input amounts (fertilizer, labour) invested in 
production, expenditures for production, and output of land (Hare, 2008; 
Do & Iyer, 2003; Lund, 2000; Li et al., 1998; Feder & Feeny, 1991). Almost 
all these studies use quantitative models (regression analysis) to analyze the 
relationship between private land rights and input or output (productivity) 
of production. There is a broad agreement from these studies that security of 
individual land rights will increase incentives of land related investment and 
enhance productivity. This is similar to the conclusion of Deininger (cited in 
Ellsworth, 2004) in his review of the evidence of the Property Right story   52 
from a wide range of data from different countries. However, this relation-
ship was not uniform for some variables such as an increase of productivity 
(Hare, 2008; Do & Iyer, 2003) and this relationship depends on the duration 
of rights (Li et al., 1998).  
What is missing is any qualitative evidence to better understand why 
introducing private property rights encourages investment in land 
development. The literature also does not analyze the relationship between 
private property rights and production input and output in relation to other 
aspects, such as infrastructure or input services, that also contribute to 
decisions of land holders. The literature also does not analyze whether 
security of tenure is ensured after titling. It seems to me that these scholars 
also forgot to mention the influences of the social aspects resulting from the 
introduction of private property rights, such as the creation of conflict.  
Because of the complexity of the investment situation (at different points 
of time and from different sources) in the forest planted on the devolved 
forestry land, this research could not quantify the influence of introducing 
private forestry land rights to investment in forest planting, but it looked at 
only preferences for investment after titling and the proportion of 
households that invested in planting trees. Also, because of the long duration 
of the devolution process (nearly 20 years in the coastal area) and weak 
system of documentation at the grass roots level, previous data (before 
titling) could not be collected. Therefore, this research could not quantify 
the influence of private forestry land rights on the productivity of land and 
just looked at change in planted forest areas after devolving forest land to 
individual households. However, some social aspects, such gender equality 
and conflicts, were integrated into analyzing the influence of introducing 
private forestry land rights. 
As mentioned above, the devolution of natural forest in Vietnam is a 
change from a state property rights regime into a common property regime 
(natural forest was devolved to villages (community) or household groups). 
Common property theory is relevant to this research and is discussed next.  
2.6.2.2. Common property rights school and common pool resource 
theoretical approach 
Studies on common property resource management have been done by 
various disciplines (sociology, anthropology, economics, history and political 
science) (Bromley & Cernea, 1996). The scholars supporting common 
property regimes criticize the confusion between open access and common 
property regime and the confusion between “everybody’s property and 
“nobody’s property” made by planners and administrators, as well as in the   53 
traditional studies of political scientists. These groups consider that in 
common property systems, resource users independently harvest, sell and act 
(Ostrom, 1999; Bromley & Cernea, 1996; McKean & Ostrom, 1995). It is 
argued that common resources can be invested in and managed effectively 
without tradable title and there is a difference between unmanaged, open-
access and managed common resources.  
In their paper, McKean and Ostrom (1995) argue that common property 
is not open access but is limited to groups of users who share rights of a 
resource, and common resources are managed collectively. These two 
scholars also point out “it is erroneousness to consider that common 
property does not share attributes of private property” (Ibid., p. 4). They 
conclude that common property is “shared private property” and with legal 
support from the government, this type of property is secure. Ostrom et. al. 
(1999) also remind us that to avoid confusion, it is necessary to separate the 
concept of “common” resources (which describe the physical or biological 
aspects of a resource) and “common property” (which refers to institutional 
arrangement). Criticizing the view that considers common property regimes 
as open access, Poteete & Ostrom (2004a) concluded that “the data clearly 
indicate that forest users are not all trapped in overuse of forest resources” 
(p. 453).  
The scholars of the common property school pointed out the important 
role of common resources for providing fuel, animal grazing, food and 
medicinal plants that are emergency and back-up sources for the livelihoods 
of the poor in many parts of the world and so should not be privatized all 
(Jodha, 1995; Jodha, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Common property is not a story 
of the past; it has been successfully managed and has a place in the world 
(Potter & Bun, 2008; Baland & Platteau, 2000; Bray, 2000; McKean & 
Ostrom, 1995).  
Common property scholars agreed with the private property rights school 
that well-defined property rights help to promote efficient use of resources 
and long-term responsibility for the resource base, but they argue that 
private property rights does not mean that they must be held by individuals; 
they may also be devolved to groups of individuals (McKean & Ostrom, 
1995). The common property school also advocates that imposing 
individualized tradable title systems can increase inefficiency and inequity in 
resource use, especially where there is existing communal management of 
resources (Ellsworth, 2004).  
The common property scholars pointed out advantages of common 
property regime that the private property rights school does not see. Those 
advantages include:   54 
- Some types of resources such as the sea, forests not only have 
economic value but also the common value of environmental services, 
so they should not be fragmented. Therefore, the common property 
regime can keep the integrity of the resource for managing it collectively 
to achieve common values and the reduction of management costs. 
- Common property regimes can share risks and benefits, so it can avoid 
imposing the total risk on some members. 
- Common property regime can strengthen social linkages among the 
members of a community through creating a physical and cultural space.  
- A commons can reduce risk of livelihoods when other means fail 
through providing wild survival resources such as mushrooms or wild 
bamboo shoots. 
Common property regimes are arranged for the management of common 
pool resources that have the characteristics of high cost for or difficulty of 
exclusion of beneficiaries, and these are dilemmas and problems for 
sustainability of the common property regime. Therefore, restricting access 
and creating incentives for the users to invest in the resource are two critical 
issues for solving the problems of this regime (Ostrom et al., 1999). 
Responding to challenges for sustaining “commons”, some institutional 
economists studying the commons (Ostrom as the first, Poteete, Agrawall, 
Meinzen-Dick) have developed “predictable variables” or “design 
principles” to achieve sustainability of the common property regime. In the 
process of building institutions for management, attributes of user group and 
resources are the central to the “common pool resource theoretical 
approach”.  
According to common pool resource scholars, common property is often 
managed by institutions based on collective action. Collective action can be 
defined as voluntary action taken by a group to achieve common interests 
(Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004). However, how can one build 
institutions for management of common pool resources through collective 
action? Is it possible for all the members of the group to participate in 
collective action to control common pool resources? Because of the 
complexity and heterogeneity of interests, needs and the capacity of different 
actors, the efficiency of common resource management institutions, which 
are constructed by collective action, depends strongly on the quality of the 
process of building the institutions. Varughese and Ostrom (2001) stated that 
the resource governance system is self-organized where actors are involved 
over time in making and adapting rules within collective choice. Those rules 
include achieving the inclusion or exclusion of participants, obligations of   55 
participants, as well as mechanisms for monitoring, sanctioning, and 
resolving conflicts.  
Ostrom (1999) and Varughese and Ostrom (2001) point out that there is 
agreement in the recent theoretical developments that the users may be 
autonomous in making their own access and harvesting rules because they 
rely on the resource and intend to use it long term. However, it should not 
be expected that the users always self-organize to make the rules, especially 
when the common resource is scarce and they may continue to overuse the 
resource unless putting efforts are made to change one or more of the 
variables that affect these costs or benefits of institutional change (Ibid.).  
There is argument about the impact of heterogeneity on the capacity of 
individuals to self-organize and sustain a common pool resource mana-
gement regime. The socio-cultural composition of a user group may result 
in a difference of interests among them and this influences the organization 
of management. Differences in social class and ethnicity can challenge 
building of consensus and norm-enforcement. In that situation, reaching 
agreement with every one of the rules may create conflict. For the groups 
that are of diverse socio-cultural backgrounds, the key question affecting the 
possibility of self-organized solutions is whether the views of the multiple 
groups take into account the structure of the resource, authority and 
interpretation of rules. The difference in the interests of users can challenge 
achieving a self-governing solution to common pool resource problems.  
Explaining the importance of heterogeneity in user groups, Poteete & 
Ostrom (2004) stated that this influences co-ordination and distribution 
problems in setting up the rules. Arguments about the influence of 
heterogeneity on self–organized capacity and maintaining collective action 
for management of this theory are applied when discussing the issue of 
management practice of the devolved natural forest in chapter VI and in 
relation to the process of building village or household group rules in 
chapter V of this thesis.  
Shanmugaratnam (1996) (cited in Varughese and Ostrom, 2001) argues 
that heterogeneity of wealth or power can relate to a difference of interests. 
So, achievement of common pool resource management is more difficult in 
a community that is highly unequal compared to one that has a more equal 
distribution of private wealth. It is argued that to overcome high 
heterogeneity for success of collective action, innovative institutional 
arrangements need to be well matched to their local circumstance. Location 
and socio-cultural differences have to be taken into account in negotiating 
and sustaining agreements regarding to the benefit and cost of those 
involved.    56 
In collective action, if  the members capture the benefits of values and 
monetary resources, they are willing to contribute their efforts. Location 
differences are also considered barriers to continued organization of labour 
for maintenance and protection activities and can not be overcome if rules 
governing membership are incomplete. The differences among users can 
l e a d  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i n t e r e s t s  a n d  then multiplicity of outcomes. This 
difference is difficult to predict if there is lack of knowledge about 
institutional arrangements that manage user behaviour and expectations. 
Users like to organize themselves when they have the autonomy to change 
the rules, as well as when they can obtain substantial net benefits from the 
resource. 
Another issue in the argument of the common pool resource theoretical 
approach is the attributes of user groups with a broad consideration of the 
size of the group. Reviewing the findings and arguments about the size of 
user group by common property scholars, Ostrom (1999) concluded that 
most commons scholars agree that a small size of user group is better, but 
some scholars argued that the problem of small size is that there is less 
capacity for monitoring and moderate size is better. She also shows various 
impacts of the size on other variables, so she suggested that a medium size 
may be a better hypothesis for success of common resource management. 
However, Agrawal (2001) criticized the existing studies of common pool 
resources in their focus on institutions and relative neglect of the effect of 
resource systems, external social, physical, and institutional environment to 
sustainability of internal institutions and long-term management. He 
synthesized the facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and 
Baland and Platteau and then supplemented some aspects of components of 
facilitating conditions (structure and name of the components similar to the 
synthesis of Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau) and he argued that this 
could address the problem of method in existing common pool resources 
studies (see table 2).  
It is a good idea to take into account more variables in the design 
principles for achieving sustainability of common pool resource man-
agement, as argued by Agrawal. However, it is a challenge for an empirical 
study to capture all those variables and also a more challenge for analysis 
because of unclear concepts such as “appropriate level of external aid” or 
“net level of appropriation”. 
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Table 2. Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons 
1.  Resource system characteristic 
(i) Small  size 
(ii) Well–defined  boundaries 
(iii)  Low levels of mobility 
(iv)  Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resources 
(v) Predictability 
2. Group  characteristics 
(i) Small  size 
(ii)  Clearly defined boundaries 
(iii) Shared  norms 
(iv)  Past successful experiences 
(v)  Appropriate leadership: young, familiar with changing external environments, 
connected to local traditional elite 
(vi)  Interdependence among group members on resource system 
(vii)  Low level of poverty 
1.  and 2. Relationship between resource system and group characteristics 
(i)  Overlap between user group residential locations and resource locations 
(ii)  High level of dependence by group members on resource systems 
(iii)  Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources 
(iv)  Low levels of user demand 
3. Institutional  arrangements 
(i)  Rules are simple and easy to understand 
(ii)  Locally devised access and management rules 
(iii)  Ease in enforcement of rules 
(iv) Graduated  sanctions 
(v)  Availability of low cost adjudication 
(vi)  Accountability of monitors and other officials to users 
1.  and 3. Relationship between resource systems and institutional arrangements 
(i)  Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources 
4. External  environments 
(i) Technology: 
(a)  Low cost exclusion technology 
(b)  Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons 
(ii)  Low levels of articulation with external markets 
(iii)  Graduated change in articulation with external markets 
(iv) State: 
(c)  Central governments should not undermine local authority 
(d)  Supportive external sanctioning institutions 
(e)  Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation 
activities 
(f)  Nest levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance 
Source: Agrawal (2001, p. 1659). 
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To sum up, the commons scholars support the importance of CBNRM, 
especially for management of common pool resources. Common property 
regimes are important for both livelihood of the poor and conserving the 
resource base. However, those researchers also point out the challenges for 
sustainability of this property regime and the need to have the enabling 
conditions. There are different arguments about facilitating conditions for 
sustainability of common resource management. However, there is agre-
ement as to the importance of the resource size and user group size and its 
heterogeneity, and especially the importance of institutions for management.  
Devolution of natural forest to villages or household groups for 
management in the North Coastal Central Vietnam with the diversity of 
social, economic and cultural characteristics of the communities who live in 
the mountains near the forest, the common pool resource management 
theoretical approach is useful for the analysis of the process of establishing 
the village’s or household group’s institutions for management of the forest. 
It is also applied to the debate on the organizations, coordinating and 
monitoring of management activities after devolution. Where do the 
institutions come from? Who are involved in the process of institutional 
building? Is the difference among members of the community accounted for 
in the process of institutional building? Do the state foresters and local 
leaders have knowledge about institutional arrangements to help overcome 
heterogeneity in developing the rules? Is there intervention by the state 
organizations in the process of developing the village’s rules and what is the 
quality of the rules and the quality of devolved endowments to natural forest 
resources and then on entitlements and livelihood of the different groups in 
the community? 
This approach also offers a conceptual framework for debating the 
efficiency of the model of village or household-based natural forest 
management introduced by the state. Is the natural forest devolved to a 
village or household group managed better than the one held by the state 
before devolution? What factors influence maintenance of the management 
regime? How are tenure rights or the endowments of people ensured under 
the regime of the village or household group-based natural forest mana-
gement introduced by the state? 
The Common Pool Resource approach is also applied to debate the 
importance of the size of groups and resource sizes for sustainability of the 
management regime. In Vietnam, natural forest devolution is initiated by the 
state and the process for developing the regulations and organizing 
management activities are implemented in relation to local and state policies. 
It means that the political environment may influence the functions of the   59 
village or household groups in natural forest management because almost all 
activities require approval by the authority. So, examining the external 
enabling environment in and after the devolution process is also very 
important in this research. This means that the enabling conditions for 
sustainability of a village or household group-based forest management, 
which are suggested by Agrawal (2001) need to connect with the practical 
evidence from the study sites because they are synthesized from ideas of 
many scholars.  
However, in table 2, some things are not clear and some are missing: for 
example, what is meant by small size of resource or user group (How much 
of the resource area means small one and how many members of the small 
group?). What is considered to be fair in terms of responsible distribution 
among user groups? The research will try to address these issues.  
Another issue is that there are too many variables (31) offered in table 2. 
It is very challenging to look at all of them because of limited the scope and 
time of the research. This study, therefore, pays attention only to the size of 
resource and group, clearly defined boundaries, past experience, location of 
resource and leadership issues. 
Forestry land and natural forest devolution in Vietnam is a change from 
the state property regime to the private property and common property 
regime. Do these endowments of forest create more security for land use 
and forest resources utilization? Does holding the paper granting title to 
forestry land ensure the security of tenure or influence other factors? The 
property rights schools are conceptual frameworks for debating the 
management practice, sustainability of the property rights regimes that were 
introduced by the state, as well as equality in gaining endowments and con-
flicts after devolution. 
2.7. Summary 
This chapter presented a discussion on theoretical and conceptual approaches 
that are used for debating the practical evidence found by the author. 
 It started with a discussion about the concept of decentralization and 
devolution and how it will be used in this research. Two different 
approaches in policy analysis were then discussed. The first, critical 
anthropology, focused on the analysis of power relationships through 
looking at language, forming the concepts in the written policy papers and 
participation of different actors in making and implementing policy. It also 
criticizes imposing expert knowledge in the policy process. The second, the 
new ethnographic perspective, does not focus so much on analyzing the   60 
written policy papers, but it pays attention to interpretations in policy 
implementation. Those approaches are frameworks for the author to debate 
the process of making forest devolution policy and its implementation. 
The “extended entitlement approach” was a second theoretical fram-
ework described and discussed. Before addressing this, the views of the 
scholars on community, social differences and its influence on the CBNRM 
were discussed. The debate on the links between poverty reduction and 
forest conservation as a basis for the development of the environmental 
entitlement approach was then presented. This approach was applied to 
explore how the endowments of devolved forestry land and natural forest 
were transferred to the beneficiaries in the context of state and customary 
institutions. It is also a framework for investigating how the endowments of 
forestry land and natural forests were or were not transformed to 
entitlements and how entitlements from the forestry land and natural forest 
could be gained and lost and the effects of this on rural livelihoods. 
  Gender issues in and after forest devolution were examined under 
conceptual frameworks of the Feminist Environmentalists who argue that 
social differences between men and women, because of the prevailing 
norms, lead to different needs and interests in natural resources and this 
difference needs to be taken into account in the forest devolution pro-
grammes.   
  Devolution of forest in Vietnam is a change in the property rights 
regime. Two property rights schools (Private Property Rights, Common 
Property Rights) were found to be useful for the debate and were presented 
in this chapter. Those schools make claims about the type of property rights 
that they think are good for the owner and for society. Private Property 
Rights think that individual title is best while Common scholars argued that 
common property regime benefits the poor, and it does not fragment the 
resource and this has special value for environmental services. This school 
also shows the challenges for overcoming social differences to achieve 
sustainability of collective management. These approaches provide guidance 
for the debate on efficiency and sustainability of the property rights regimes 
introduced by the state through the forest devolution process 
The next chapter discusses the methods of the research and the study 
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3. Methods and background  
of the study sites 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology used for carrying out the research. 
The reasons for choosing the study sites (two communes in Thua Thien 
Hue, North Central Coast of Vietnam) along with background information 
on them are presented. The evidence used in this thesis is both qualitative 
and quantitative and this chapter describes the methods of data collection as 
well as the difficulties faced in doing the fieldwork. The last section discusses 
the strategy of analyzing the data including some tools for analyzing policy, 
gender issues and livelihood aspects.  
3.2. The study sites 
3.2.1. Selection of the study sites 
There are seven ecological regions in Vietnam. This study was conducted in 
the North Central Coast region. The region is divided into three sub-
ecological zones; mountainous and hilly, plains and coastal zones. Each zone 
has its own forest and forestry land resources. The North Central Coast has 
been considered as the poorest region of the country in terms of both 
natural and socio-economic conditions. This research focused on both the 
coastal and the mountainous and hilly zones of the North Central Coastal 
region in which forest and forestry land are resources for livelihood of the 
local people (See figure 2.).  
The North Central Coast region of Vietnam has five provinces. Thua 
Thien Hue is the narrowest. Although it is a narrow area, the ecology is   62 
very diverse with mountains, hills, plains and ocean. The terrain is divided 
by streams and river systems and it is very steep. The total physical area of 
the province is 505,399 ha of which 337,004 ha are forestry lands 
(occupying 67 % of the land area). Agricultural land is limited (only 70,247 
ha - approximately 14 % of the land area) and is mainly concentrated close 
to the ocean. Forest land is still an important resource for the people as it 
provides timber and non-timber products, grazing land, farming for ethnic 
groups and developing eco-tourism.  
Thua Thien Hue province has eight districts and one city that serves two 
main ecological zones (the coastal and plain zone and the hilly and 
mountainous zone). To choose the study sites for doing the fieldwork, the 
author went to nine communes (located in three districts that have forestry 
land and natural forest) to do the preliminary survey and talk with farmers 
and commune leaders to gain a preliminarily understanding of the issues of 
forest management and devolution. 
Discussions with project officers and leaders at the district and provincial 
levels were also held to gain an overview of forest devolution in practice in 
Thua Thien Hue province. After the preliminary survey, one commune in 
the Phu Loc district (Loc Tien) and another in the Nam Dong district 
(Thuong Quang) were selected for conducting the field work (Figure 2). 
The first reason for selecting two these communes is they both had 
implemented natural forest and forestry land allocation. Another reason is 
that Loc Tien commune has common characteristics of the coastal area zone 
and Thuong Quang is representative of the mountainous and hilly zone 
where the ethnic community resettled a along time ago. The livelihood of 
the people in these two communes still relies on the forestry land and 
natural forest. These two communes have contrasting of natural and human 
ecological conditions as summarized below (table 3):  
Table 3. Basic characteristics of Loc Tien and Thuong Quang communes 
Characteristic  Loc Tien   Thuong Quang 
Ecological zone  Coastal  Mountain and hills 
Number of villages  8  7 
Number of households  1,747  301 
Ethnic group  Kinh (Vietnamese)  Kinh and Ktu 
Distance to district 
town and industrial 
zone 
6 km and 2 km  25 km and 60 km 
Market access  Good  Difficult 
Proportion of natural 
forest and forestry land 
75.1 %  98 % 
Resettlement history  More than 75 years  100 years for Ktu group and 30 years for 
Kinh group 
Source: Secondary data at the communes, 2005.   63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Location of the study sites. 
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Loc Tien is located in the coastal area and Thuong Quang has the cha-
racteristics of a hilly and mountainous zone of Thua Thien Hue province 
and Central Coast of Vietnam. Contrasting the natural and human ecological 
conditions of these two communes is part of the research to compare the 
implementation processes and consequences of the forest devolution policy 
in different contexts with the same political system, but having different 
leading management groups. The contrasting characteristics of these two 
communes can also help to understand the influence of different factors on 
the distribution of the endowments and entitlements from the devolved 
forest. 
The field work in the mountainous commune was conducted in all seven 
villages of the commune while it was only done in one village in the coastal 
area. However, secondary data was collected at the commune level. 
Background information on social and economic conditions of these two 
sites are presented in the next section of this chapter.  
3.2.2. Social and economic contexts of the study sites  
¾  Loc Tien commune 
Loc Tien belongs to the Phu Loc district which is the most diverse 
ecological zone of the province (having ocean, plains as well as natural and 
planted forests) and is located along the national road No.1, about 60 km 
from Hue city. Total physical area of the commune is 5,724 ha, of which 
4,299 ha is natural forest and forestry land (statistic data in December, 2005). 
Occupying 75 % of total physical area, natural forest and forestry land are 
still important resources for the livelihood of the local people. 
The commune has eight villages with 1,747 households (in 2005), and 
has a large population compared to the communes in the mountainous and 
hilly zone of Thua Thien Hue. There are 85 poor households
1 occupying 22 
% of the total households of the commune. All people here are Kinh which 
is the major group in Vietnam.  
Wetland rice is a major crop in the commune and the cultivated area 
exceeds that of other communes of the province. Home gardens are very 
limited with low fertility soil and no high value crops or trees. Buffalo are 
the main animals, but the grazing area is increasingly limited. There is 
ecotourism service from the Elephant stream in the forest of the commune. 
This service was initiated by the Song Thuy cooperative, established in the 
period of collective production in Vietnam. A commune is the lowest 
administrative unit in the political system in Vietnam. The commune 
authority is responsible for managing all the activities with assistance from 
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the heads of the villages. The cooperative’s management boards’ activities 
mainly focus on economic services
2 such as irrigation, seeds or fertilizer 
services.  
This area is part of the Chan May economic zone that is developing with 
the new port and some industrial factories, of which one wood chip 
processing was built in 2003. Because of the influence of Chan May 
economic zone establishment and being located on the national road No. 1 
and close to Da Nang city, access to markets (including markets for planted 
forest timber) seems to be good and there is high competition in land use 
(for both settlement and forestry land). 
This commune is considered by the district Forest Protection Dep-
artment (DFPD) to have experienced serious deforestation. Before 1994, all 
forest and forestry land area belong to management of the DFPD and Phu 
Loc forest enterprise. Forestry land allocation in the commune started from 
1994 to 2004 (but not continuously) through the PAM (World Food 
Programme) and 327 programmes for planting forestry trees and the 
international projects (SNV). However, natural forest was allocated to only 
one village (Thuy Duong) from 2001 (only a part of natural forest area in 
the commune: 511.9ha) through the FROFOR project (funded by UNDP). 
This is summarized in the table 3 in comparison with Thuong Quang 
commune. 
There are 1,747 households in the commune with eight villages, so the 
field work focus was mainly in Thuy Duong village which has 178 
households (2005). This village is poor compared to other villages of the 
commune with 56 poor households (occupying 31 % of total households in 
the village). There are both natural forest and forestry land allocation 
activities in the village. However, to understand influences of the forest 
devolution policy on the livelihood of rural people, qualitative information 
was also collected in Thuy Tu village, which is a neighbour of Thuy 
Duong. 
 
¾   Thuong Quang commune 
Thuong Quang commune is located at the end of the Nam Dong 
mountainous district, which was separated from the Phu Loc district from 
1990 due to its specific social and ecological conditions. The commune was 
ranked as a specially disadvantaged commune of the country (in terms of 
low income, poor social services and infrastructure) and got the support of 
the government through the 135 programme. This is a remote area and 60 
                                                  
2 Selling production inputs to the villagers. 
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percent of the total population is Ktu people (the indigenous ethnic group) 
and the rest are Kinh (Viet group) who moved from the lowland to settle 
there in 1976. Total physical area of the commune is 15,630 ha, of which 
10,301.8 ha are natural and planted forest and 5,025.1 ha are barren hills, 
which is unused land. With more than 90 % of the total physical area of the 
commune as hills and mountain, forestry land and natural forest are a very 
important resource for the livelihood of the local people, especially for the 
indigenous group (Ktu people) who have lived there for a long time and 
have a long history of using and managing forest. 
There are seven villages in the commune with 301 households, which is 
very small compared to LocTien. The number of the poor in the commune 
is 97 households occupying 32 % of the commune’s total household. Most 
of poor belong to the ethnic group (89 ethnic poor occupying 92 % of total 
poor of the commune). The ethnic group has their own culture and 
language. Ktu people can speak Kinh but almost all Ktu people who are able 
to speak the Kinh language are young people. Most older and even Ktu 
people who are at the medium age could not speak Kinh or can speak only a 
little. The customary regulations for forest management and utilization of 
the Ktu people were very strong in the past, but it is affected now because 
of introducing the state management system.  
Wetland rice production in the commune was introduced in 1976 when 
the Kinh people settled. Shifting cultivation is the traditional farming 
practice of the ethnic group. However, it is prohibited by the government at 
present because the state considers it as a cause of deforestation. Because of 
the limitation of flat land, upland cultivation is still continuing and the major 
crops are cassava and upland rice. Cattle are the major domestic animals, but 
the grazing area has been reduced. Because of the isolation and limited 
infrastructure, access to information and markets in the commune is limited.  
Rubber planting was started in Thuong Quang in 2002 through the 
agricultural diversification programme of the government. Rubber 
plantation has been done on the steep land, but it has been planned for the 
lower part of slope compared to forest plantation. Rubber was also classified 
as an agricultural crop (perennial crop) in Vietnam. Therefore, in this 
research rubber plantation was not considered as forest plantation and it is 
used only for discussion about broader livelihood issues. 
Forestry land allocation also had been implemented in the commune 
through the PAM and 327 programmes but it does not have any meaning in 
terms of getting rights to use the land of the villagers at present. Both natural 
forest and forestry land was allocated to the people at the end of 2003 
through the SNV project (funded by the Dutch). The forestry land is   67 
allocated to the individual households and the natural forest is allocated to 
the household groups.  
The field work was carried out in all the villages of the commune 
because the number of households in the commune was only one third of 
that of Loc Tien. It was hard for the author to work with the ethnic group 
because she could not speak the indigenous language and the Ktu have 
limited Kinh. The strategy of the author was to find some resource persons 
in the commune to communicate with Ktu informants. 
The types of forestry land and natural forest devolution projects or 
programmes in Thuong Quang and Loc Tien are summarized in table 4 
below:  
  
Table 4. Types of forestry land and natural forest devolution project or programme 
Commune  Name of project & 
funding 
organization 
Type of forest 
land devolved 
Duration of 
implementation 
Note 
PAM or WFP  Forestry land  1987-1992 
 
1993-1997 
- No basis for 
claiming  
- Used for 
claiming 
Programme 327  Forestry land  1994-1997  Used for 
claiming 
PROFOR project, 
funded by UNDP 
Natural forest  2001  - Formal 
decision 
Loc Tien 
SNV project  Forestry land  2004  Red Book 
PAM or WFP  Forestry land  1992- 1995  - No basis for 
claiming 
Programme 327  Forestry land  1994-1997  - No basis for 
claiming 
Thuong 
Quang 
SNV project  Forestry land & 
natural forest 
2003   Red Book 
 
Process of devolution of these programmes is discussed further in chapter V. 
3.3. Research methods 
3.3.1. Methods of data collection  
¾  Collecting secondary data  
The research was done to understand what Vietnamese forest devolution 
policy is and how it is made. To answer these questions, the written policy 
papers such as resolutions, laws, government decrees, decisions, and sector 
strategy papers related to forest and forestry land management at central and   68 
provincial levels were collected at the Information Center of the National 
Assembly office, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MARD), Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), the archives center of the 
provincial people committee (PPC) and other sources. 
 The objective of this study was not only to understand the content of 
the forest devolution policy papers and the process of making the policy, but 
also to investigate the implementation process. To address this objective, the 
project documents (PAM programme, PROFOR project, project 327, SNV 
project) were collected at the forestry development and forest protection 
departments at both district and provincial levels, at the SNV project office, 
at the commune people committee (CPC) and from the commune and 
village’s heads because all the devolution programmes in the two study sites 
were implemented through projects. 
Some other secondary data such as background information (land area, 
population and labour force, livelihood activities) of the district and 
commune were collected at the district commune people committee (DPC) 
and CPC. 
 
¾  Interview by questionnaire 
The aim of household interviewing by questionnaire was to collect 
quantitative information such as forest land holding, household resources 
and entitlements from planted forest and devolved natural forest, and the 
time women spent collecting firewood. These quantitative variables have 
been used to examine how social-economic status (difference in well being, 
gender and ethnicity) influenced gaining endowments of and entitlements 
from the devolved forestry land and natural forest. However, some 
qualitative variables (such as why the household gained or did not gain the 
forestry land, how they attended the process of devolution, people’s 
comments on situations of forest management after devolution, change of 
livelihood activities and resources used, etc.) were also included in the 
questionnaire. 
 
¾  Sampling methods 
In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune), 30 poor households were 
selected by the quota randomly sampling method from poor
3 group of seven 
different villages of the commune (occupying 30 % of total poor households 
in the commune). For the non-poor
4 group, 29 households were also 
selected by the quota randomly sampling method from better-off and 
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medium groups of the seven different villages of the commune (occupying 
14 % of total non-poor households in the commune).  
In Loc Tien (the coastal commune), because of the population size of the 
commune, the interview by questionnaire was carried out in Thuy Duong 
village only because the natural forest devolution was only implemented in 
this village. The quota random sampling method was also applied to select 
29 poor households from all locations of the village (occupy 51 % of total 
poor households). Thirty non-poor households were also selected by the 
quota random sampling method from all locations of the village (occupying 
25 % of total non-poor households).  
Poverty ranking in this research followed the national poverty line by the 
MOLISA. The sample households were selected from the commune’s 
secondary data. The author intended to select 60 households in each 
commune for doing the survey. However, one poor in Loc Tien and one 
non-poor household in Thuong Quang had to be cancelled because the 
appointment could not be done. 
Of the 118 interviewees in the two communes, there were 50 female 
farmers (24 female interviewees in Loc Tien and 26 interviewees in Thuong 
Quang). Sixty eight interviewees are men. 
 
¾  Focus group discussion 
This type of discussion focused on different topics. It was conducted with 
different groups in the two communes to explore different aspects in the 
process of forest devolution as well as its output and outcomes. The strategy 
for discussion with different groups was to explore their experiences and 
views in different research issues. However, some discussion topics with 
different groups were similar for the objective of cross-checking information 
to understand different comments or points of view of the actors in the 
research issues.   
   Discussions with poor women’s groups  were conducted in both 
communes. The issues were discussed including opportunity in attending 
the devolution process and reasons, time spent for collecting firewood, 
quality and quantity of firewood collected, income generation activities by 
gender before and after forest land devolution; the difficulty of women 
related to living earning activities and the trend of their livelihood activities. 
Discussions with key informant groups (farmers who have experience and 
representatives of the village’s leaders) were also carried out in both 
communes, one group in each commune with seven people for each group. 
The topics discussed with these groups were making a land use sketch, 
devolution process implemented, and income generation activities before   70 
and after forest land devolution, seasonal calendar, risks of flood, drought, 
and diseases of crops and animals, as well as people’s diseases.  
  For discussions with Natural forest protection groups (the groups were 
devolved natural forest or taking care forest protection directly in the case of 
allocating natural forest to the village in Loc Tien), six groups were 
organized (one group in Loc Tien and five groups in Thuong Quang: one 
of Kinh people and four with the ethnic group) to discuss how forest land 
devolution was implemented in the communes, institutions for management 
after devolution, and the activities of the groups after getting the forest for 
protection. 
Commune and village leaders groups (one group in each commune) were 
organized to discuss which state institutions were involved in imp-
lementation of forest devolution and their roles and powers. These groups 
were also asked to give their comments on forest land devolution (difficulty 
in implementing forest devolution at the commune, land use efficiency after 
devolution, current problems in the devolved forest land use). 
 
¾  In-depth interviews 
While focus group discussions were used to get common ideas and views of 
the members in the research issues, in-depth interviews were conducted to 
understand some issues in more depth. They were carried out with five 
commune and village leaders about initiation of allocation, the devolution 
process (monitoring mechanism, way of transferring information, building 
the institutions for devolved forest management). 
This type of interview was also done with some heads of natural forest 
protection groups (four people) about the group’s activities after devolution, 
co-ordination mechanisms, advantages and difficulties of the group and 
conflicts in forest land use. Discussions with village elders were implemented 
to understand the history of the village, as well as the custom of traditional 
land tenure and management (two people in village 1 and three in Thuong 
Quang commune) 
In-depth interviews were also done with 20 farmers in each commune 
about their comments on the institutions for the devolved forest 
management, benefits from and difficulties in forest land allocation, change 
of livelihood activities after devolution, power of making decisions of the 
households on the devolved forestry land and conflicts in forest land use. 
The strategy of the author to select the farmers (who are not involved in 
village or commune management positions) for in-depth interviews was 
based on observation and listening when doing the household surveys to 
understand who the farmers are that have more knowledge on forest   71 
devolution. Their names were recorded in the notebook and then the 
author came back to talk with them later. Some interviewees of the in-
depth interview were introduced by the farmers who spoke with the author. 
Some qualitative questions were included in the questionnaire of the 
formal survey. These questions were either explored or ignored depending 
on the interviews. If the author met the people who had experience with 
the issues and were willing to talk, the author tried to speak with her or him 
as long as possible. 
Along with doing in-depth interviews with people in the communes, 
open discussions were held with some government officers at the districts, 
provincial and national levels to investigate forest devolution processes, their 
roles, or general comments on the policy documents, as well as the process 
of making sector policy papers and developing the legislations (four officers 
at the district level, three people at provincial and three people at national 
level  (One is a member of the National Assembly; two people from 
MARD). 
At the time of doing the field work, only an international organization 
SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) has been running the activity 
in Thua Thien Hue. Therefore, the author could interview only one person 
from the SNV. 
Besides the formal discussions and interviews, the author’s strategy was to 
have informal discussions as much as possible. The author tried to talk with 
people whenever and wherever she met them, in the village or commune or 
district or provincial and national officers, who know forest devolution. The 
table below (table 5) summarizes the types of informants, number of infor-
mants and issues discussed.   72 
Table 5. Type of informants 
Type of 
interview 
Type of 
informant 
Number of 
informant 
Issues of discussion 
Focus group 
discussion 
Poor women  
 
 
 
 
Seven people for 
each group (one 
group in each 
commune) 
Attending meeting of devolution; 
reasons, time spent collecting firewood; 
quality & quantity of firewood 
collected; livelihood activities & 
difficulty 
 Natural  forest 
protection 
groups 
Three to five 
people, five groups 
in Thuong Quang 
& one group in 
Loc Tien 
Implementation of forest devolution; 
institutions for forest management after 
devolution; activities of group 
devolved forest   
 Key  informant 
group 
Seven people 
(including women 
and men) for each 
group (one group 
in each commune) 
Mapping land use sketch; 
implementation devolution; income 
activities, seasonal calendar, risks of 
flood, drought, diseases of crops, 
animals, and human 
 Commune  and 
village leaders 
group 
Five people for 
each group (one 
group in each 
commune) 
Roles & powers of the actors; difficulty 
in implementing devolution; land use 
efficiency & problems in using 
devolved forest  
In-depth 
interview 
Commune and 
village leaders 
Five  Initiation of allocation, devolution 
process (way of transferring 
information, building the institutions) 
 Heads  of 
natural forest 
protection 
groups   
Four people  Group’s activities after devolution, co-
ordination mechanism, advantages & 
difficulties of forest protection group; 
conflict in forest land use 
  Village elder  Two  History of the village, custom of 
traditional land tenure & management 
  Farmer  20  Comments on institutions for devolved 
forest management, benefits from and 
problems in forest land allocation, 
change of livelihood activities after 
devolution, power of making decisions 
on the forest land devolved, conflicts 
after devolution 
 Government 
officers (at 
districts, 
provincial & 
national levels) 
Four officers at 
district level, three 
people at 
provincial & three 
people at national 
level 
Implementation of devolution, roles of 
state institutions, general comments on 
the policy documents, process of 
making policy papers  
 International 
organization 
One officer of the 
SNV 
Principle of the organization, roles, 
authority in forest devolution project   73 
3.3.2. Data analysis 
¾  Data processing 
¾ Quantitative variables 
Descriptive statistics were applied to analyze simple quantitative data such as 
basic information about the households interviewed (land holdings, the 
average income and expenditures, etc.), forest land area allocated to each 
household, average land holdings and decision making on land use by 
gender or socio-economic groups. 
For comparison between forestry land holdings and income from natural 
forest and forestry land allocated between socio-economic groups and by 
gender, data were analyzed through a mean test of difference by using a “t 
test”, specifically following: 
Hypothesis  H0 :  μ1 - μ2 = 0 
   H1: μ1 - μ2 ≠ 0 
Calculating T value 
    T   =   Y1 - Y2 / S(1/ n1 - 1/ n2)
1/2  
Where   + T is calculated t-value. 
+ Y1  and Y2  are two population means, 
+ Where Y1  = 
1
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 yi is the value of the number of observation i 
+ S is standard deviation; n1 and n2 are numbers of observations of first and 
second populations respectively. S is calculated following: 
S = ( S
2 )
1/2 
Where S
2 is variance which is calculated by follow formula: 
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are variances of the first and second population respectively.  
After calculating the T value, by comparing calculated t-value to table t-
value (tα) taken from “t probable distribution table” using the following two 
standards: 
Significant level α = 0.05 and DF (Degree of freedom) = n1 + n2 - 2 
If the calculated t-value is greater than the table tα-value, then H1 hypothesis 
is accepted, and if calculated t-value is smaller than tα then H1 hypothesis is 
rejected and H0 hypothesis is accepted.   74 
The SPSS software was applied to analyze descriptive statistics and test of 
mean difference (using a “t test”). 
 
¾ Qualitative analysis methods  
Qualitative analysis methods  such as data reduction (process of selecting, 
focusing and simplifying raw data), content and thematic analysis were 
applied to analyze qualitative information from focus group discussions, or 
in-depth interviews. 
A theme is a recurrent unit of meaning. Thematic analysis is a way that is 
used to analyze information from unstructured interviews with questions 
that are not standardized. However, Aronson (1994) noted that the outline 
of process of thematic analysis is still insufficient in literature and he sugges-
ted that thematic analysis started with listing the patterns of information.  
In this research, the author identified the pattern of qualitative 
information by reading the notes of the group discussions and in-depth 
interviews to identify the common ideas of the group discussions or in-
depth interviews. Then these patterns are expounded based on all data or 
information related to the patterns.  
The next step is to combine related patterns into sub-themes. The major 
theme is identified from related sub-themes. This type of theme is identified 
from emerging ideas from the information gained from the in-depth 
interviews or focus group discussions or open dialogues (for example, from 
asking informants about how they understand the benefits of forestry land 
allocation, they described how is it difficult for them to listen to the 
presentation of the foresters in the allocation process for different reasons. 
From that the author analyzed and identified that an important reason for 
not understanding the benefits of devolution were because there is a 
problem of information transfer by the foresters due to poor communication 
skills).  
However, some themes were identified from the research. These 
included the role and power of the actors, reasons for attending or not 
attending the meetings or building institution for natural forest management 
in the process of forest devolution implementation, reasons for getting or 
not getting forestry land or natural forest devolved, the conflicts happening 
after devolution, endowment of forestry land and natural forest and forest 
management after allocation. For analyzing these themes, titles of the 
identified themes were used to code the qualitative information of group 
discussions or in-depth interviews to see how the contents of the discussions 
linked to the themes.    75 
For the focus group discussions, the author used not only a thematic analysis 
approach to look at the content of the information given by the members of 
the group but also looked at their interactions and the process of raising their 
ideas to avoid the problem of generalization of the answer to the research 
questions with overlooking the interaction of participants in the discussion as 
suggested by Sim (1998). Analysis of a focus group discussion, therefore, is 
done sometimes in the discussion process, too, not just after finishing the 
discussion.  
However, this challenged the author because of a great number of group 
discussions and in-depth interviews. The qualitative information also used to 
quote as the evidence for proving the author’s claim. 
 
¾ Policy analysis 
Policy and policy making is not the same everywhere but it is conditioned 
and shaped by the specific political, social and economic environment, as 
well as historical factors or bureaucratic and administrative regimes (Pasteur, 
2001; Blaikie & Sadeque, 2000). For its complexity, policy analysis, 
therefore calls for systematic methods of examination (Apthorpe & Gasper, 
1996). Systematic thinking for understanding policy refers to a set of 
questions that need to be answered: how is the policy formulated? Is it 
always put into practice? What is the policy saying? What is included and 
excluded in the policy? How is it informed? How is it implemented and 
monitored? What are its consequences?  
It is important to acknowledge that policy is made and implemented at a 
variety of levels (from central to local levels), so understanding of the 
linkages between these levels is also significant for understanding policy. 
Policy analysis is a complex process and it requires attention to informal 
logic and tactics in argument and it also requires an examination of the 
whole process (from the formulation, informing, implementation, to 
monitoring and evaluation), and a study on the ground to experience 
practice and not only study the statute book (Blaikie & Sadeque, 2000). 
Forest allocation to the beneficiaries in Vietnam is a result of a shift in 
forest management policy of the state. This is an important evolution in 
institutional arrangements for forest management. Why did it appear? What 
are its implications? How was it put into practice and how does it impact the 
efficiency of management as well as the lives of rural people? To understand 
forest devolution policy and its impacts, the author applied a holistic 
approach to analyze it by looking at the whole process: the context for 
formulating the policy, the process of making and informing the policy, 
evidence in the policy papers and its linkage to the practical evidence to   76 
claim or criticize the policy. The author also looked at how the policy has 
been implemented and monitored and how to measure its impacts.  
Besides applying a holistic approach to analyze the policy, the author 
used some general tools that Apthorpe & Gasper (1996) called “informal 
logic” (practical argument analysis) by “specifying the contents and structure 
of a real and untidy position and assessing them” (p. 37). The discourse 
analysis method was also used as a way of looking at the “concepts”, 
“language”, “terms”, and “linguistic structure” used in the policy papers and 
the time line in making policy (Pain, 1996) and some other researchers used 
to analyze policy documents for analyzing the Vietnamese forest devolution 
policy.  
 
¾ Stakeholder analysis 
Stakeholder analysis is a potential tool for analyzing natural resource 
management policy. One of objectives of this study was to examine the 
process of implementing forest devolution policy through analyzing the 
function and roles of the actors who were involved in implementation of the 
policy. Stakeholder analysis is a useful tool to answer this question. 
The stakeholder analysis approach started with identifying the key actors 
(or stakeholders who are defined as having common interests) and then 
assessing their interests or influence on the system (Mayer, 2001; Grimble & 
Wellard, 1997).  
Mayer (2001) developed a series of nine tools for analyzing stakeholders 
in natural resource management policy. In this research, tool three (The Four 
Rs) and tool five (Stakeholder Influence Mapping) were applied to understand 
the role and influence of the actors.  
 
+ The Four Rs (tool three) 
This is a tool to look at the roles of stakeholders by exploring their rights, 
responsibilities, relationships and revenues in the process of implementing 
natural resource management policy.   
 
                   Stakeholder Roles 
Rights Responsibilities 
Relationships Revenues 
  
 
 
+ Stakeholder Influence Mapping (tool five) 
Stakeholder influence mapping is a visual tool so it is very useful in aiding 
discussion among people. For analyzing the influence of stakeholders on   77 
making and implementing natural resource management policy, the 
facilitators map out the figure in which the policy is put at the top and the 
participants who are invited to a meeting to discuss and make agreement and 
then arrange the stakeholders on the map. A closer stakeholder is to the top, 
the more influence on the policy he or she has. The size or diameter of the 
cycle that is used to put a stakeholder in represented the size of the 
stakeholder (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Stakeholder Influence Mapping 
Because of the challenge to organize a meeting of the informants who are 
government officers at the central level, tool three and five for analyzing the 
stakeholders were just used for discussion about roles and influences of the 
stakeholders on the process of forest policy implementation.  
 
¾ Gender analysis 
The research focused mainly on analyzing the gender gap in gaining 
endowments to natural forest and forestry land and some other resources 
such as education, technical knowledge, information, and attending to forest 
devolution implementation and management practice after allocation.  
A gender gap was also investigated using Gender Analysis Framework. 
Gender analysis aims at examining differences between men and women and 
causes that create differences between them for improving sustainability of 
development programmes or activities and policies. 
   According to Moffat et al. (1991) gender and development theory contain a 
number of analytical tools that can help to address gender issues in 
development works: 
Increasing 
policy 
influence  
Increasing 
policy 
influence  
Policy 
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- The sexual or gender division of labour 
- The types of labour: Productive, reproductive, and community 
- Access to and control over resources and benefits 
- Influencing factors 
- Condition and position 
- Practical needs and strategies interests 
- Levels of participation: as participants, as beneficiaries, and as agents 
- Transformative potential 
Related to forest devolution programme, tools no. 3, no. 4 and no. 7 – 
(Access to and control over resources and benefits; Influencing factors; 
Levels of participation) were applied for analyzing gender gaps in the forest 
devolution process. Specification of these three tools is presented below. 
 
* Tool 3: Access to and control over resources and benefits 
- What resources and benefits of the programme do women and men 
each have access to? 
- What resources and benefits of the programme do they each have 
control over? 
- What are the implications for the programme? 
- How to improve access to and control over the resources and benefits 
of the disadvantaged group that has more constraints?  
 
* Tool 4: Influencing factors 
- What key factors influence gender relations and access to and control 
over resources and benefits? 
- How to minimize influencing factors for promoting gender equality? 
 
* Tool 7: Levels of participation 
- What is the nature of women’s and men’s participation in the 
programme? 
- Who are the active agents (planner, manager, organizer, advisor, 
committee member, and educator) in each stage of the programme? 
 
¾ Sustainable livelihood framework 
As discussed in chapter 1, this research does not only look at entitlements 
from the devolved forestry land and natural forest, but also explores how 
forest devolution influences rural livelihood. The sustainable livelihood 
framework is applied as an analytical tool to explore this. 
The livelihood framework is a conceptual or analytical tool. It does not 
describe a reality but focuses on people and what they do rather than what   79 
they produce. It also does not have a single logical point of entry (Pain & 
Lautze, 2002) because all the components in the framework have their own 
relationship to a livelihood.  
The sustainable livelihood frame approach is expressed by many authors 
(Ellis, 2000; Scoones, 1998; Chambers & Conway, 1992) with different 
languages, but the central to all these models are “assets” or capitals of 
people and their capacity to use them as means for making a living. The 
assets are conceptualized in terms of human, social, natural, physical, and 
financial.  
Besides emphasis on the importance of internal assets, the sustainable 
livelihood approach is also concerned with the external environment such as 
the vulnerability context, policy, institutions and processes as well as their 
relationship and interdependences to internal assets and thus to livelihood 
strategies and results. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of rural 
development for improving sustainable livelihood requires looking at all 
aspects in and outside of the rural life.  
Murray (2002) argued that all livelihood research should combine both 
approaches of looking at the present and being retrospective. Rural 
livelihoods are diverse and change overtime, so research needs approaches 
that acknowledge the dynamics of livelihoods. Research on the influence of 
natural forest and forestry land devolution on the livelihood of the rural 
people explored livelihood practices before and after devolution. It also 
examined not only the activities in the forestry sector, but also on all other 
sectors of local rural life to understand the relationship among the sectors 
and their influence on local people’s livelihood practices and sustainability.   
This research does not intend to use the livelihood approach as a 
theoretical framework to discuss the issue because of its limited research 
scope. The livelihood framework, therefore, just be used as an analysis 
framework focusing on analysis of three components: (1) household 
resources (or assets); (2) vulnerability context; (3) livelihood activities; in 
relation to change of forest endowments and entitlements. 
3.4. Difficulty in collecting data and doing fieldwork 
The first challenge faced by the author was finding the policy documents. 
The policy documents are rarely published or sold in a book store, especially 
the new policy documents. At the provincial level, archives of policy 
documents were also poor in both term of type of documents and the way 
of storing and management. There was no electronic system to manage and 
lookup the documents in the archives center of the province. At the national   80 
level, it was very difficult to access to the information center of the Party, 
Government and National Assembly offices. The policy documents in this 
study were mainly found based on help from the author’s colleagues and 
friends who work for the state organizations.  
In the process of doing the fieldwork in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang, 
the author also faced difficulties in arranging the meetings with the state 
officers and leaders because of their busy schedules. This was made more 
difficult because the authors had to work part time for the university in the 
process of doing the research. It was not easy to find the time suitable for 
both the researcher and the state officers to meet together. To overcome 
this, the author had to plan the meetings early and contact the informants 
regularly to catch their plan revisions so that the meetings could be arranged 
again.   
The third difficulty in doing the fieldwork was the sensitivity of the 
information related to the conflicts that occurred after forest devolution. 
This information is often not discussed in public. People know and talk 
about it privately and they were hesitant to tell outsiders, especially the 
outsiders who visited the village for the first time. To be involved in this 
discussion, the author had to build the trust with the informants by carefully 
introducing about the objectives of the discussion and about the position of 
the author as a researcher. 
3.5. Summary  
This chapter presented the methods used for the research. The process and 
reasons for selecting the study sites were also introduced. The background 
information of the two selected study sites were discussed to highlight the 
issues related to the forest devolution practice to be a basis for the discussion 
of the issues in chapters V, VI, and VII. The chapter also presented various 
methods used for collecting data and for triangulating the information 
gathered from the different sources. The qualitative and quantitative 
methods applied to process the data were discussed. The specialization 
analysis tools, such as policy analysis, stakeholder analysis and gender analysis 
that were applied to both processes of collecting and analyzing the data were 
also discussed. The chapter was closed with a presentation on the livelihood 
analysis framework and reflections on the difficulties faced in the process of 
doing the fieldwork.    81 
4. Policy of Vietnamese forest devolution 
and forest administrative system 
4.1. Introduction  
As discussed in the introductory chapter, natural forest and forestry land 
devolution in Vietnam is a result of changes in the forest management policy 
in Vietnam. This chapter discusses the Vietnamese forest devolution policy. 
Given the complexity of the policy as stated by scholars, the author’s 
thought is that it is not so important to have a clear definition of what the 
policy is but rather to consider what types of policy papers we should look 
for to see how they might influence practical action and bring consequences 
for individuals or groups in society. Therefore, in this thesis, the term of 
policy is understood as all the strategies, orientations, or regulations of all 
organizations of a political system that are written to frame practical action 
on a certain issue. 
 In the political system of Vietnam, the state is led by one Party that is the 
leader and directs all the action and ideas of the National Assembly and the 
Government. Although the election process party members and the National 
Assembly members are done separately, many members of the Party are also 
members of the National Assembly and the Government. The Party sets the 
direction for managing and developing the country. The National Assembly 
makes the law while the Government is responsible for formulating the 
papers for guiding the implementation of law. Although the political 
organizations of the Party, National Assembly or government have their 
own mission, they have to follow the lead of the Party (discussed further in 
section 4.3.). In this context, policy in general and Vietnamese natural forest 
devolution policy in particular in this thesis are understood as all the written 
documents of the Party, the Fatherland Front committee or National   82 
Assembly and the Government at both the central and local levels that 
direct, orient or frame forest devolution action in Vietnam. Thus the 
statement of Sam & Trung (2001) that “forestry policy in Vietnam is issued 
by the State (the National Assembly, Government and ministry) only ” does 
not entirely reflect reality.  
This chapter aims to examine why the state formulated the policy of 
forest devolution to the beneficiaries. How was the policy formulated? What 
are its objectives? What are its contents? For whom was the policy made?  
This examination provides the basis to connect the empirical evidence on 
the process of implementing forest devolution to its consequences. The 
evidence used to support the argument in this chapter is drawn from the 
written policy documents related to natural forest and forestry land 
devolution. They have been collected from both the central and local levels. 
At the central level, the documents were collected at the offices of 
Government organizations (as presented in chapter 3). Searches were also 
made on the websites of the Party, Government and National Assembly and 
other sources.  
At the provincial level, the policy documents were collected at the the 
document archives center of the PPC and the peoples’ council office. The 
study is also drawn from some literature on policy issues in general and 
forest policy in particular in Vietnam, as well from interviews with 
government officers at both the central and provincial levels and project 
officers of international organizations.   
The chapter includes seven parts: 
4.1. Introduction 
4.2. The context for issuing Vietnamese devolution policy  
4.3. Political system of Vietnam and central-local relations 
4.4. Process of making the forest devolution policy 
4.5. Objective of the policy  
4.6. Vietnamese forest land allocation policy’s contents and some issues 
of formulation 
4.7. Explicitness of the policy papers and inclusion related to pro-poor, 
gender and ethnic subject 
4.8. Summary 
4.2. The context for the Vietnamese forest land devolution policy  
The key policy papers (resolutions, laws, decrees, decisions, directives and 
circulars) related to devolution of natural forest and forestry land to the 
beneficiaries are summarized in table 6. The earliest paper is the Resolution   83 
of Vietnamese Fatherland Front (December 30
th, 1985) on mobilizing 
people to plant and protect forests and develop economic gardens and the 
Joint Resolution of the Forestry Ministry (termed MARD at present) and 
Central Union of young people (March 3
rd, 1985) on encouraging young 
people to plant, protect the forest and to develop the forest economy. Those 
resolutions expressed the concern of the political organizations in involving 
people and other social organizations in forest land use.  
As noted, the first 1987 Land Law initiated the allocation of land to 
individuals and households (one year after starting Đổi Mới in 1986). In 1993, 
the second Land Law was promulgated (with the decree No. 02, a 
document for guiding implementation of the law) to replace the 1987 Land 
Law after many resolutions of the Party and the National Assembly. This 
1993 Land Law is considered as the keystone for agriculture and rural 
development in Vietnam. This came along with de-collectivization to 
further expand the rights to individuals in the 1987 Land Law by 
introducing official land titles and permitted land transactions for the first 
time since communist rule began (Ravallion & Van de W., 2003).  
   Other policy papers related to forest devolution in Vietnam are the first 
Law on Forest Protection and Development in 1991 and Tropical Forestry 
Action Programme (December, 1991), and the Programme 327, approved 
by the National Assembly in 1992 for putting effort into vegetating waste 
and barren land and developing mountainous areas.  
The above examples showed that the forest devolution policy to the 
beneficiaries was mainly formulated in the renovation period (Đổi Mới) from 
1986 to 1996. Đổi Mới was the result of a response to a long period of central 
planning with a socialist orientation and collective production that made the 
Vietnam economy closed and underdeveloped with high inflation, low GDP 
and poverty. This was an important institutional reform that started in 1986, 
the landmark of which is the Resolution 10 (April 1988) and the Resolution 
22 (1989). This reform shifted the country from a central planning 
mechanism to a market economy with recognition and encouragement of 
the development of the private sector, liberalization and opening to foreign 
investment and international trade. This was a turning point of institutional 
reform in all aspects of the economy including a shift from state forest 
management to involving people and non-forestry organizations.  
Moreover, the liberalization of trade (especially opening to international 
trade) in the first stage of Đổi Mới motivated the export of timber and 
contributed to deforestation. By the end of the 1980s, the forestry sector of 
Vietnam was in crisis and was warned by the Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
that the policy of direct state management had failed (Sikor, 1998). At that   84 
time, State Forestry in Vietnam was not able to manage the forest effectively 
because of a lack of both financial and human resources. A conflict in use 
objectives between the State and local people also occurred. Only from 
1990 was a clear responsibility for local stewardship of forest defined and 
established (Boothroyd & Pham Xuan Nam, 2000).  
The opening of mechanisms for international co-operation brought by 
Đổi Mới, created opportunities for Vietnam’s forestry sector to get finance 
and technical support from some international organizations such as PAM 
(World Food Programme), UNDP, FAO, Australia and Sweden through the 
Project GCP and the Project 3352 (Viet Nam Forestry Ministry, 1991). This 
international co-operative relationship required Vietnam to commit itself to 
conservation of tropical forests and tropical ecosystems at the meeting on 
Tropical Forest Action Programme Round II (Viet Nam Forestry Ministry, 
1991). As a response to the extent of forest degradation linked to the 
weakness of state management and with international commitments to 
environmental protection, some additional policy papers related to forest 
devolution to individual households and communities were formulated. 
These included the Forest Protection and Development Law (August 19
th, 
1991) and Tropical Forestry Action Programme (December, 1991).  
Along with the devolution of forest management was the devolution of 
power to the party at commune level. This overall devolution process 
occurred as a response to failures in centralized management and the need 
for decision making autonomy since entering the global economy (Trang, 
2004). This process was implemented through Decree 29 on “Regulation 
on Exercise of Democracy in Communes” issued in 1998 to emphasize 
people’s rights and the 1996 Ordinance on the ”Tasks and Powers of People 
Councils and People Committees” to clarify the authority, power and 
responsibility of local authority at different levels (Ibid.).  
To sum up, the forest devolution policy papers in Vietnam were 
formulated in the context of important institutional reform (Đổi Mới), a 
shifting from socialist orientation with a central planning mechanism to a 
market economy involving private economic interests including individual 
households. At the same time there was an overall devolution of the party. 
The forest devolution policy was also formulated in the context of 
international concerns with environmental protection and the weakness of 
the state forest management. These contextual changes were important 
drivers for formulating and setting the objectives of the policy. The policy 
papers were issued to address the technical and economic problems (low 
growth of the economy in the pre-period of “Đổi Mới” and serious   85 
degradation of the forest in the late 1980s decade) consistent with an 
instrumental view (Mosse, 2005) or (SLIM, May 2004) of policy making.  
4.3. Political system of Vietnam and central-local relations 
Vietnamese political system including four administrative levels is described 
in the figure below. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Political system in Vietnam 
Notes:  - Some people are members of Party, National Assembly as well as Government 
- Some people are member of both Party and National Assembly 
- Some people are member of both National Assembly and Government 
- Some people are member of both Party and Government  
 
At the central level, the Party has a horizontal relationship with the National 
Assembly and Government, but it is an effective leader. For vertical linkages, 
under the Central Party (Trung Ương Đảng) is the provincial Party (Tỉnh Ủy) 
and then the district Party (Huyện Ủy) and the last level for the Party is the 
commune Party (Đảng Ủy xã). The central Party is in the position of leader to 
all authorities and organizations as well as mass organizations that have a 
vertical linkage with the central Fatherland Front. The central Party directly 
leads the Party at lower levels.  
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The roles of the central Party are as a leader and it develops resolutions to set 
up directions for development of the country in all dimensions. The parties 
at the local levels (from province to commune) have the duty to develop the 
resolutions to direct development for the same level based on the resolution 
of the central Party (for instance, the provincial Party is developed the 
resolution for development of the province based on the resolution of the 
central Party). The local Party is also responsible for disseminating the 
resolutions of the central Party to all its members at the same level for 
implementation. 
 
The National Assembly has the function of approving the laws and the 
national programmes. It also has rights to monitor law enforcement of the 
Government. Kerkvliet & Marr (2004) reported that in Vietnam, 
government refer to the prime minister and national ministries and 
departments. It also includes the National Assembly and local governments 
(local people committees from provincial to commune levels, figure 4). 
However, in Vietnamese there is a difference between the terms National 
Assembly (Quốc Hội) and Government (Chính Phủ). Although the activities of 
the Government are monitored by National Assembly, the Government is 
considered as the body for implementing the laws and has the function of 
approving the documents for specifying the laws. For the vertical 
relationships, the National Assembly is the direct leader of the People 
Councils from provincial to commune levels to implementing their 
monitoring function to Government at the same levels (for example, at the 
national level, the Government is monitored by the National Assembly and 
at the provincial level, the PPC is monitored by the Provincial People 
Council. 
Government has the function of implementing the resolutions of the 
Party and the laws through a vertical linkage to the Peoples Committee and 
the line departments (figure 4). In general, the Government and its line 
People Committees and departments hold the rights of directly coordinating 
social-economic activities of the country based on the resolutions of the 
Party and the laws approved by the National Assembly.  
Kerkvliet & Marr (2004) used the terms government  and  authority to 
include all political institutions of Vietnam (Prime Ministers and ministries, 
National Assembly as well as the Party and Fatherland Front). From the 
meaning of the terms often used by the Vietnamese and different functions 
of those organization, the author did not agree with Kerkliet & Marr. To 
cover all these terms (Prime Ministers and ministries, National Assembly as 
well as the Party and Fatherland Front), she used the term State.    87 
The Fatherland Front is not described in figure 4 because it is too difficult to 
show its relation to other organizations in the system. The Fatherland Front, 
in reality, is a political organization directly implementing the activities that 
are devolved by the Party. It has horizontal linkage with the mass 
organizations (Women’s union, Farmer Associations, Young Union and so 
on) at the same level. Its structure is also set up from central to grass roots 
level (commune). Those organizations have the function of implementing 
political activities to support the members of their organizations in the life 
following directions of the Party. However, the Fatherland Front sometimes 
also develops the resolutions to motivate their members to do something to 
support to social-economic development of the country such as the 
resolution to mobilize people to plant trees for environment protection. 
Although the commune is the lowest management level in the system, 
the village is also recognized as a local representative unit under mana-
gement of the commune authority. However, at this unit there is only a 
head and vice head of the unit who are managers of village. There is no 
committee or council in the village.  
Because of the complexity of structure with three different organizations 
at the same levels along with four levels with vertical linkage, both vertical 
and horizontal relationships are very complex. Shanks et al. (2004) also 
showed these complex relationsships because many officials in the system 
may holding positions simultaneously in two spheres (e.g., the provincial 
Party Secretary may also be the Chairman of the Provincial Council or the 
Chairman of the PPC may also be chairman of the Provincial National 
Assembly Delegation).  
For central-local relationships, it is difficult to say that the nature of this 
relationship is centralized or decentralized (Shanks et al., 2004). Com-
munication of policy ideas between local and central levels is maintained 
through the meetings that can inform some issues to the formulation of 
national policy (Ibid.). In theory, there can be local policy setting up by the 
local Party, People’s Council and People’s Committee. However, in reality, 
the local levels (from provincial to commune levels) often are the bodies to 
implement the central policy with some specifications for local 
circumstances. The central policy is often implemented from provincial to 
commune levels based on the decrees, decisions, directives and the national 
budget distributed and approved by the central level.   88 
4.4. The Process of formulating the forest devolution policy 
Vietnam is a single party state. In this system, the Party decides the 
orientation for development of the country. It often produces resolutions 
that mention general directions for future actions in a period based on the 
discussion and agreement of the Party’s members. The National Assembly is 
the institution that has the function of developing the constitution and 
legislation. The policy papers, which are  approved by the National 
Assembly, include the constitution, codes, laws and these have to be linked 
to the resolution of the Party. To guide implementation of the laws, 
ordinances and resolutions of the National Assembly, the Government 
develops decrees, directives, and decisions that are approved by the Prime 
Minister. Ministries and other institutions at the same level with ministries 
(e.g. the National Mountain and Ethnic Committee) are responsible for 
developing circulars, decisions and directives within their mandate as 
regulated in the Law of Making Legislation Document.  
At the provincial level, the policy papers are developed by the provincial 
party, people’s council and people’s committee (see figure 5). The people’s 
council and committee issue the policy papers (decisions, resolutions) based 
on regulations that are stated in the Law of Organizing People’s Council and 
Committee (Trung tâm thông tin-Văn Phòng QH (Information Center of the 
National Assemblly Office), 2004) and in the Law of Making Legislation 
Document (Quốc Hội Nước Cộng Hòa Xã Hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam (Vietnam 
National Assembly), 1996). Nevertheless, the Party and People’s Council at 
the local level often develop resolutions at the annual meetings (they are 
called resolution producing organizations) and the People’s Committee is 
responsible for developing decisions and directives. 
    Except for the resolutions that are produced from the periodic or 
extraordinary meetings, other policy papers in general or forest devolution 
policy papers in particular are made by the draft writing committees (a 
template committee). This committee is established by the Government for 
developing the land law, the forest protection and development law and 
some decrees or inter-ministry circulars. For the other decrees, decisions and 
circulars, the draft writing committee may be established by appointed 
ministry (e.g., for forest devolution policies, the appointed ministry was 
previously the Forestry Ministry now part of MARD). So almost all policy 
papers (including the laws, decrees, decisions and circulars) related to forest 
management and forest devolution were formulated by a draft writing 
committee. The head of this committee comes from the Forestry Ministry 
and is at ministerial or vice-ministerial position. Its members are scientists 
from the institutions or organizations who have a specialization in forest   89 
management. This ministry is also responsible for organizing formulation of 
policy papers and reporting the activities and progress of writing to the 
government members. As Shanks et al.(2004) stated that this process is 
similar and followed in each sector at the national level.  
  When the draft of the policy is finished, it will be approved by the 
National Assembly (if it is a law). For some laws (the land law, forest 
protection and development law for instance), they will be presented in the 
media for comment before being presented in the meeting of the National 
Assembly. The decrees or decisions on forest devolution or management 
will be examined by the cabinet. This type of paper is often drafted by the 
appointed ministry (MARD) and then presented in the meeting of the 
members of the government for approval (at least 50 % of total members 
have to agree). According to Mr. T. (an official of MARD), some decrees or 
circulars are sent to the professional institutions (such as national forestry 
institution, forest planning and inventory institution or provincial 
Agriculture and Rural Development Department - DARD) for getting 
comments before being presented to the government for approval. This was 
also confirmed by Mr. Tu. (an officer from provincial DARD). 
Shanks et al.  (2004) concluded that interaction and dialogue between 
sectors in making policy in Vietnam is limited, especially in the forestry 
sector. However, the information from a discussion with some state officers 
at the national level (Mr. M. a member of the National Assembly, Mr. T. 
from MARD) indicated that this depends on the type of policy paper. For 
example, inter-ministry or joint circulars or laws are formulated by members 
of different ministries in a joint drafting committee. Shanks (Shanks et al., 
2004) also stated that it is difficult to conclude that the process of making 
policy in Vietnam follows a top-down or bottom up approach. However, 
interviews with some officers who are members of the National Assembly or 
from the MARD and provincial DARD showed that the central government 
appoints the members of the drafting committee at the central level and 
these come usually from the central institutions only.  
The provincial departments are invited to comment on draft documents. 
The drafts of forestry policy papers also get comments from some scientists 
or experts through invited specialists at meetings. The involvement of 
representatives of different social organizations or grass roots level in drafting 
and consultations on policy drafts is limited. 
  The types of forest policy papers that are offered for guiding 
implementation of laws such as the decree of the Prime Minister or 
decisions of the Ministry are also sent to the provincial forest department. 
The laws and national programme (e.g., the programme 327 or the 5MHRP)   90 
are reviewed and approved by the National Assembly with the hope that 
participation of different social groups through their representatives in the 
Assembly will increase participation in making the policy. However, the 
time reserved for discussing the draft by the National Assembly’s members 
before approval is very limited and almost all the representatives are the 
leaders of social and political organizations from the district level only. 
Involvement of the grass roots level is still limited.  
According to a member of the National Assembly, some laws (the land 
law for instance) were presented in the public media such as on television or 
newspapers, but only about one or two weeks before approval. All the 
decrees, decisions and circulars have never been presented in the media. 
Specific local contexts and the interests of different groups in the society, 
therefore, may be excluded from forest devolution policy making. Similar 
comments have been made by contemporary policy analysts in relation to 
the design of regulations to govern and manage common pool resources 
utilizing largely a top-down direction (Ostrom, 1998).  
The process of making the forest devolution policy in Vietnam can be 
summarized as follows:   
 
 
Figure 5. Summary of process of making forest devolution policy in Vietnam 
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Interaction between foresters (especially at the central level) with local actors 
(commune officers and local people) was not found in the process of making 
forest devolution policy. A lack of public participation or extensive 
discussion was not also found in the process of making environmental policy 
in Vietnam (Phuong, 1996). In a study on livestock policy, Vu (2003) stated 
that livestock policy making in Vietnam used a central planning method that 
determines policy issues based on political needs and bureaucratic rationale. 
Although participation at the grass roots level in making forest devolution 
policy is limited, the evidence found in this research showed that the main 
reason for enacting the forest devolution policy was for what were seen to 
be technical objectives (degradation of forestry land and deforestation of 
natural forest) rather than political reasons because the policy makers were 
aware of the importance of conserving forest. However, methods to 
determine the issue of forest devolution policy were found in line with 
comments of Vu (2003). In a case study on the process of making the Law 
on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, McCarty (2002) reported that people‘s 
comments were included in the draft of the law before sending it to the 
National Assembly. This was not found in forest devolution policy making.  
The National Assembly delegates of the province often go to the 
communes for feedback on the general issues on the social-economic life of 
the people. For feedback for the drafts of the laws, the provincial national 
assembly delegate also invites the lawyers and specialists from the provincial 
DARD to a meeting to get their comments to bring to the national assembly 
meeting. The evidence showed a practice of using expert’s knowledge in 
formulating forest devolution policy at both the national and provincial 
levels. This reflected the power of using expert knowledge as a central factor 
for influencing the making of policy that is criticized as “political 
technology” through the use of rational language (Shore & Wright, 1997). 
This is similar to the finding in Nepal that knowledge of local users was not 
taken into account in Join Forest Management policy (Springate-Baginski & 
Blaikie, 2007).  
Devolution of the forest to the beneficiaries in Vietnam is a change of 
property rights that needs to be based on context and the social aspects of 
devolution. Does the use of knowledge of the forestry and land management 
experts who have background in technical fields generate a policy that can 
be implemented effectively? This is discussed further in section 4.6. 
   According to McCarty 2000 cited in Shanks et al. (2004) and Shanks et al, 
(2004)  there is vertical and horizontal consensus building in the policy 
process in Vietnam (internal sector consultation from the central level to the 
provincial level and cross-sector or cross-institutions consultation at the same   92 
level in making policy papers). However, the practical evidence from this 
research showed that the forest devolution policy making process in 
Vietnam still follows a top-down approach rather than the bottom-up. It is 
not denied that involvement of specialists in developing Vietnamese forest 
management policy is very important. However, practical issues at the 
localities are better understood at the grass roots level and from the local 
people. In reality, consulting with local people in making policy on how 
natural forest and forestry land is used and managed effectively or how it 
should be devolved to local community is still limited. As argued by SLIM 
(May 2004), the value of social and human capitals in collective action is 
often not considered in traditional approaches of policy making. The policy, 
therefore, may not take into account the needs and interests of different 
social groups because of lack of understanding of the local situation. And, as 
Mosse (2004) notes, the success of the development programme or model 
depends on the involvement of supporters and beneficiaries. 
 To sum up, Vietnamese forest land devolution policy has been for-
mulated mainly by the specialists at the central level with limited interaction 
among sectors and local levels, especially local people. The practice in 
making forest devolution policy in Vietnam is still top-down. This is similar 
to India where the style of forest policy making procedures is considered 
very top down with a little attention to user groups who might directly be 
influenced by the policy (Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2007). The process 
of policy making is also rather muddled because of the development of too 
many types of paper by the different institutions with varying authority 
depending on the type of policy paper. Use of expert knowledge dominates 
the process of formulation. The role of local knowledge and human resource 
as well as collaboration has still not been considered in formulating the 
policy.  
Why did the state formulate the forest devolution policy? The next 
section (section 4.5.) discusses the objectives of the policy.  
4.5. Objectives of policy documents 
As shown above, the forest devolution policy papers in Vietnam were 
formulated in the renovation (Đổi Mới). What are the objectives of the 
policy? Reviewing the policy papers, it was found that Vietnamese forest 
devolution policy papers contain objectives of improving economic, 
environmental, and social conditions.    93 
4.5.1. Economic objective 
The resolutions of the Party and the National Assembly emphasize the 
critical role of agricultural and forestry development in the economic 
development of the country through using effectively the waste and barren 
land (“...Land, forest and ocean have not been used effectively...., 8 million ha of 
barren hill is not greened yet...focus on the first objective is food production through 
efficient combination of labour and land, forest and ocean in order to exploit theses 
resources with maximum level...” -(the Report at the Sixth Party Congress – 
dated 18
th December, 1986; p. 3.) or “...Protecting and exploiting the existing 
forest area and using 10 million ha of barren hills effectively will be a strength for 
economic development...Development of agriculture and forestry is the first important 
mission for stabilizing economic situation...” - (the Resolution of the Seventh 
Party Congress, dated 27
th June, 1991; p. 2). This reflected an objective of 
improving land use efficiency to increase output of agricultural and forestry 
production to contribute to food security and growth of the economy.  
Policy expectations of using land effectively for improving food output of 
the policy is also reflected in the resolutions of the National Assembly: 
“...using land must link closely to economic and social development, ensuring food 
security, ...ensuring land use to be effective, reasonable and with the right 
objective...”- (The IX National Assembly dated 10
th May, 1997; p. 2) and in 
the land law (dated 14
th July, 1993) : "the state will take back the land if the 
receiver does not use continuously the land in 12 months” or “...encouraging 
organizations and households to use waste land for agricultural and forestry 
production....” (p. 7). This expectation may have resulted from a review of 
the situation of the economy at the time of starting the Đổi Mới when lack of 
food was one of the key problems. 
From 1996 to 2005, although the Party and National Assembly did not 
consider agriculture and forestry development through using land effectively 
as the most important strategy objective they still expected forestry 
production could contribute to mountain development: “... facilitating 
bringing forestry to be a strength for development of the mountainous areas...” with 
an expectation that “...complete allocation of the remained forest land to 
organizations, households and individuals” (The directions and missions for 
economic and social development at the Eighth Party Congress, 28
th June, 
1996- p. 7). The policy expected that offering priority to people who live in 
rural areas will mobilize resources of people to use forestry land effectively 
to contribute to economic growth of mountainous areas. An objective of the 
strategy of forestry sector in the period 2001-2010 is that “...Focusing on 
investment in developing forest with participation of different economic sectors (state, 
people, private sector) to create diverse products of forestry sector for domestic use,   94 
as well as export...” (MARD, September, 2001- p. 17). This statement 
reflected the objective of mobilizing people’s resources for forestry 
development to contribute to national economic development, too. 
4.5.2. Environmental objectives 
Besides the economic objectives of using forest land effectively to gain 
higher output of forestry production, the policy also aimed at improving the 
environment through intensifying forest planting and rehabilitation by 
identifying the forest’s owner and mobilizing human and financial resources 
from people: “mobilizing people and social organizations to plant and protect 
forests” (the Front Fatherland’s resolution- dated 30
th December, 1985- p. 
151) or “Speeding forest planting and rehabilitation,...Ensuring that all forest areas 
and all types of forest have to have an owner...” (the Seven Party Congress’s 
resolution- dated 27
th June, 1991- p. 6). The environmental objective of the 
forest devolution policy is also reflected in the strategy of reserving land in 
the devolved forest area for people to do agro-forestry with the objective of 
getting their interest in protecting forest and contributing finance to forest 
planting: “... in the allocated forest land area have to reserve the plan for the 
household to do agroforestry to get the interest of people in protecting forest and 
contributing financial resource to forest planting...” (The strategy for forestry 
sector development in the period 2001-2010- p. 34).  
Environmental objectives are also shown through encouraging efficient 
use of land in the land laws: “the state encourages investing labour, material, 
capital and techniques in protecting, improving and increasing soil fertility...” (p. 2) 
and “...reward to land users who have good performance of improving soil fertility, 
greening barren land....” and “... the people who destroy land will be punished by 
the state...” (p. 20). This is also reflected in the forest land policy section of 
the forestry sector’s strategy which emphasized ensuring efficient use of 
devolved land and paid attention to environmental issues: “... Ensuring that 
allocated forest land is used effectively and need to set up indicators for assessing 
impact on the environment...” (p. 35). Item 2 of the Article 12 of the decree 
02/CP (dated 15
th January, 1994) stated that “households, individuals who are 
allocated natural forest, planted forest must be responsible to the state for protecting the 
devolved forest or flora” (p. 5). The regulation expressing responsibility for 
keeping the flora in the devolved forest area reflected environmental 
concerns of the policy.  
To sum up, environmental objectives of the forest devolution policy 
papers are reflected in the concerns of the efficiency of using devolved 
forestry land, encouraging investment in improvement of soil fertility and   95 
awarding people who use devolved land effectively. It is also shown by 
giving responsibility to land users and punishing them if the land is damaged. 
4.5.3. Social objectives 
Social concern of the policy is reflected in the direction of integrating forest 
development and mountain development of the Party and the National 
Assembly: The resolution of the Seven Party Congress on 27
th June 1991 
stated that “Using and greening barren hills have to be associated with stabilizing 
settlement and life of people” or “Forest development must accompany with improving 
the life of people in the mountainous area” (resolution of the Seven Party 
Congress) or  in the resolution of the IX National Assembly (Eleventh 
Meeting on 10
th May, 1997- p. 6)) that “... Implementation of land use plan 
must integrate with social development objectives...” (p. 2).  
This concern is also shown in the strategy of the forestry sector through 
paying attention to integration between forest protection and production 
objectives of forest devolution and giving priority to allocation to 
households (especially from ethnic groups): “reserving an area in the allocated 
forest land to household to do agroforestry will contribute to poverty reduction, 
especially poverty reduction in the remote and mountainous areas” and “...the local 
authority have to have a solution to help the households, especially from ethnic group 
who do not have forestry production land to get land to do production for stabilizing 
their life” (The Forestry Sector Strategy in the period from 2001-2010, 
MARD, September 2001- p. 34-35). Even in the period 1991-1995 when 
economic growth was still a critical objective because of the need to address 
food insecurity and inflation, the policy stated concerns with the people 
who live in rural area and do farming: “the state have policy to ensure the people 
who do agriculture, aquaculture and forestry have land to cultivate” (in the 1993 
Land Law - p. 1).  
The most important aspect of social objectives is reflected in the policy 
papers concerned with devolving the rights to land receivers. Although the 
land law ruled that land belongs to all people of the nation and is owned by 
the state, the land users are rewarded with the rights of long term use, 
transferring, lease, inheritability, and mortgage. These rewards are seen to 
create self-control rights of people in making decisions on land use. The 
rights of land users are also protected by the state through providing land use 
right certification. This was expected to contribute to livelihood security of 
people.  
In summary, the forest devolution policy has been formulated with the 
objectives of contributing to the country’s economic development. It is also 
aimed to improve the environment and reduce poverty, especially poverty   96 
in the remote and mountainous areas. Those objectives of the policy 
reflected expectations of sustainable forest management of the state through 
devolution of forest to people. However, the idea of using forestry land and 
conserving natural forest effectively for economic growth after the failure of 
central plan economy and for environmental improvement was a greater 
concern in the policy papers as reflected by the numbers of statements 
related to these issues in different types of policy papers. Paying attention to 
poverty reduction was still limited because there was no regulation that 
defined priority to devolve forests to poor people and poor regions. 
How are those objectives interpreted and implemented in practice? This 
is discussed in chapter V.  
To understand how the forest devolution policy has been implemented 
and interpreted in practice, there is a need to analyze the policy papers to see 
their content and changes over time. The next section (section 4.6) discusses 
about the content of the policy. 
4.6. Vietnamese forest devolution policy’s contents and some 
issues of formulation 
As presented in the introduction, forest devolution policy documents in this 
thesis are all the resolutions, laws, decrees, circulars, decisions related to 
forest land allocation of the party, national assembly, and government at 
both central and local level. Based on the period of the implementation of 
forest land allocation at the research sites (from 1986 to 2003 in the coastal 
commune and from 2003 in the upland community) the author collected 
and analyzed the policy papers that related to forest devolution from 1985 
up to 2003.  
Although the research limited the period of issued policy papers, it took 
considerable effort to find the documents because there are so many types of 
policy documents that have some statements related to forest devolution and 
they could not be found in one single documentation centre.   
4.6.1. Content of the forest devolution policy 
What is the content of the Vietnamese forest devolution policy? Table 6 
summarizes these from the papers that have statements focused on natural 
forest and forestry land devolution to community or village and households. 
Because the latest devolution activities in the two study sites were 
implemented by the middle of the year 2003, this research analyzed the 
policy papers issued before 2004. 
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Table 6. Content of Vietnamese forest devolution policy 
Time line  Name of paper and 
source 
Content 
1985-1990 
Dec., 1986  Resolution of the 
Six Party Congress  
 
Encouraging people to plant & protect forests and develop garden 
economics by prioritizing investments for using forestry land 
effectively to improve environment & people’s lives. 
Dec., 1987  Resolution of the 
National Assembly 
on development 
plan for period 
1986-1990 
Encouraging use of land and autonomy in production 
Dec., 1987  The first land law 
approved by the 
national assembly  
 
- Allocating land to enterprises, co-operatives, army units, state, 
mass organizations, and individuals for stable and long term use 
- Encouraging investment in land use and prohibit fallowing or 
destroying devolved land  
- Devolving rights of harvest, use and sell the products that are 
produced on the land.  
March, 
1989 
Decree 30 of the 
Cabinet Council ( 
renamed to 
government) 
Specifying some regulations of the land law for implementing 
such as procedure for getting devolved land (application, land use 
plan…) or term of devolved land use  
1991-1995 
June, 1991 
 
The resolutions of 
the party on the 
strategy for social 
and economic 
stability and 
development at the 
Seven Congress 
- Continuing to emphasize role of agricultural & forestry 
production & warn of deforestation  
- Offering an opinion about sustainable development: “Economic 
growing must accompany with social equity and environmental protection” 
(p. 3).  
- Continuing to emphasize mission of protecting and developing 
the forest and importance of identifying forest’s owners: “Ensuring 
that all forest areas and all types of forest have to have owners.” (p. 6) 
August, 
1991 
The Forest 
protection and 
development law 
approved by the 
VIII national 
assembly 
 
Promoting participation of people and non-forestry organizations 
in forest protection and development for improving efficiency of 
forest management by: 
- Devolve forest & forestry land to organizations & individuals for 
protection, development and long-term use based on the state’s 
plan 
- Ensure legal rights of forest’s owner 
- Encourage investment in use of devolved forestry land and in 
forest protection  
- Limit waste of devolved forestry land by offering regulation of 
taking back the devolved land if it is not used after 12 months of 
allocation 
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January, 
1992  
The decree No. 
17/HDBT of the 
minister council on 
implementing 
forest protection 
and development 
law 
Guiding implementation of the forest protection and 
development law with specific regulations of rights and functions 
of forestry sector and provincial committee in planning forest 
protection and development areas and devolving forest land to 
people, co-operatives and other organizations 
July , 
1992 
Decision No. 264-
CT on encouraging 
investment in forest 
development by 
Chairman of 
Minister s’ Council 
Encouraging people to plant forest by policy of providing credits 
with free interest or low interest to forest planters  
 
 
Dec., 1991  The resolution of 
the VIII National 
Assembly on the 
Mission of Social 
and Economic 
Development for 
the period 1991-
1995 
- Giving instructions for implementing the forest devolution 
policy: “...Implementing policy of allocating land including water surface, 
forest land to households...” (p. 3)-  
 
Dec., 1992  The resolution of 
the VIII National 
Assembly on 
revision & addition 
to the 1987 land 
law 
Giving reasons for revising and adding to the land law 1987: For 
improving efficiency of land use and for solving the conflict in 
land use  
 
July 1993  The Second land 
law by the national 
assembly (replacing 
the first 1987 land 
law) 
 
- Expanding the rights of land user: giving rights of transfer, 
exchange, lease, inherit and mortgage  land use right 
- Grant certification of land use right to ensure legal rights of the 
users  
- Exempt land use tax for agricultural and forestry production 
- Giving opportunity of getting land to producers by setting up 
some regulations to ensure devolution of land to producer: 
“...The state has policy to ensure the people who do agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry have land to cultivate…” (p. 1) 
January, 
1994 
The decree No. 
02/CP of the 
government on 
devolving forest 
and forestry land 
 
- Guiding implementation of the second land law in 1993 with 
specific regulations of objectives, foundations, budget source, the 
objects and terms for forest devolution 
- Giving investment policy to land user for motivate use of the 
devolved land effectively.  
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1996-2000 
July 1996  The resolution of 
the VIII Congress 
of the Party on 
directions and tasks 
of the 5 years 1996-
2000 
 
- Identify forest economics is one of major directions of the 
country in the period 1996-2000 
- Emphasizing in balance of environmental and social purposes in 
forest development: speeding greening bare hills and waste land 
along with stabilizing and improving the life of people in the 
mountainous areas  
- Motivate devolution of forest to farmer households: Completing 
devolution of forest and forestry land to farmer households  
May, 
1997 
The resolution of 
the IX national 
assembly on the 
plan of land use for 
5 years 1996-2000 
 - Setting indicators for achieving planted and rehabilitation forest 
areas to get forest cover rate of 40 %. 
- Mention in ensuring devolution forestry land to farmer and 
encourage investment in using the bare land for planting forest 
Dec., 1998  The Revised and 
Amended Land 
Law approved by 
the X National 
Assembly  
 
- Complementing some new regulations to specify some issues in 
allocation and lease of land in the 1993 land law .  
- One important amendment regulation supported to farmers is 
that “people who directly do agricultural and forestry production do not 
have to pay fees for using devolved forest and forestry land....”. (Article 
22, P. 2) 
Nov., 
1999 
The Decree 
163/1999/NDCP 
of the government 
on allocating and 
leasing forest land 
of the government 
- Replacing Decree 02 (1994) with only a new regulation that 
those who are devolved forest land without payment for land use 
(Article 4). 
- Another new issue was a regulation on devolving land to people 
who do agricultural and forestry production only (limited the 
objects for devolving land) 
Feb., 2000  The decree 
04/2000/NDCP of 
the government on 
implementing the 
1998 revised and 
amended land law 
- Regulating state institutions who have right to allocate and lease 
land 
- Regulating foundations for providing land use right 
certification. 
- Did not specify who are allocated forest land with payment for 
land use 
June, 2000  Joint Circular No. 
62/2000/TTLT of 
MARD & National 
land management 
Department 
 on guiding for 
forestry land 
allocation, lease and 
provision of use 
right certification 
- Continuing to encourage household to get bare hills for doing 
forestry production (Item d. of article 10) 
- Encouraging farmers who do agriculture and forestry directly by 
exempting tax of devolved land use 
- Regulations on procedure of forest devolution & responsibility 
of the state institutions in allocation process (Devolution of land 
to household is coordinated by the DPC with participation of the 
DLAD & DFPD) 
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2001-2005 
April, 
2001 
The resolution of 
the party in the IX 
Congress on the 
Directions and 
Missions for socio-
economic 
development for 5 
years (2001-2005)  
 
- Recording progress of forest planting, rehabilitation and 
protection which increase the forest cover rate from 28.2 % in 
1995 to 33 % in 2000.  
- Concluded that there were still many critical social and 
environmental problems, especially poverty of the people in the 
remote areas.  
- The resolution reconfirmed the sustainable development 
objective of the country as the period before (1995-2000).  
- Forest protection and development along with poverty 
reduction and stabilizing the life of people in the mountainous 
area was still a development direction in the five year plan 2000-
2005 for both objectives of agri. and rural development & 
environmental protection 
Dec., 2001  The resolution of 
the X National 
Assembly on the 
plan for five years 
2001-2005  
 
- Specifying the directions of the party by setting up the 
indicators and implementation measures for the 5 years plan 
- One of the key solutions of the plan is developing based on 
potential of the regional natural resources to reduce the 
development gap between major and minority groups 
- Mentioned in forest protection and development for reducing 
damages by natural calamity, but not mentioned in poverty 
reduction based on forest.  
June, 2001  The second 
revising and 
amending Land 
Law approved by 
the national 
assembly  
- This law mainly complemented the regulation on who are 
responsible for valuing land (Article 12)  
- Adding some terms such as lease land (Article 23 and 24) or 
replacing the term of economic and technical plan with Investment 
project (Article 19, 63 and 81). 
Sep., 2001  Decree No. 
66/2001/NDCP by 
the government for 
revising & 
amending some 
articles of Decree 
04/2000/CP 
- Amending some regulations related to rights of some state 
institutions in land allocation and lease or rights of household and 
individuals when changing the objectives of using the land  
Nov., 
2001 
 
Decision 178/2001 
of Prime Minister 
on benefits and 
rights of household 
and individual who 
are devolved and 
leased forestry land  
- Specify & expand benefits to forest’s owners to motivate people 
participating in forest protection and development (especially for 
watershed protection and special use forest):  
- Giving benefit of getting timber to people who are devolved 
forest with a rate that depended on type of forest 
- Providing capital for planting & rehabilitating forest & allow to 
use a part of devolved forestry land for agricultural  production  
  
A review of the collected documents showed that the resolutions seeking to 
encourage involvement of individual households in forest land management 
or related to forest devolution are often formulated by the Party or the 
National Assembly or the Fatherland Front who often do not directly   101 
implement the policy. These include the Resolution of the central Fatherland 
Front (December 30
th, 1985) on mobilizing people to plant and protect forests and 
develop garden economic or the Resolution of the National Assembly (December 12
th, 
1991) on Economic and Social Development Plan for 5 years: 1991-1995 or the 
Resolution of the second Congress of Party Central Committee of term VIII (Dec. 
25
th, 1996).  
The decrees, decisions, directives or circulars are developed by the 
Government or ministry or inter-ministry, for example the Decree No. 163 of 
the Prime minister on Guiding implementation of the 1998 revised Land Law of the 
Prime minister or Decision No. 327 (Sep. 15
th, 1992) on Some Policies for using 
barren hills, coastal land & waster surface or the Cross- ministers Circular No. 62-
TT/ LB (June, 6
th, 2000) of MARD and Central Land Management Department 
on guiding land allocation, lease and providing forestry land use certification or 
Directive No. 18/1999/CT-TTG on measures to speed up providing land use right 
certifications (Jul. 1
st, 1999). A decree and decision of a national programme is 
often signed by the Prime Minister while decisions are signed by the 
ministers. It is difficult to consistently attach weight or significance to these 
different policy documents because it depends on the objective and position 
and authority of the signatory.  
At provincial and district levels, the resolutions are developed by the 
Party and People’s Council and the decisions or directives are conceived by 
People Committee. There are not any decrees and circulars made at local 
levels (from province to commune). This is consistent with the law of 
formulating legislation documents (Quốc Hội Nước Cộng Hòa Xã Hội chủ nghĩa Việt 
Nam (Vietnam National Assembly), 1996) and comments of the Information 
Center of the National Assembly Office that province and district levels just 
issue the decisions (Trung tâm thông tin-Văn Phòng QH (Information 
Center of the National Assemblly Office), 2004). 
 The summary of the key policy papers shows that the statements in the 
resolutions talked about general issues such as: “Strengthen propaganda and 
explanation to make people understand benefits of forest planting” (The Resolution 
on mobilizing people to plant and protect forests and develop economic 
gardens of the Fatherland Front and Forestry Ministry dated December 30
th, 
1985- p. 150) or “Implementing policy of allocating forest land to households for 
long term use” (Resolution of the National Assembly on Economic and social 
development for 5 years: 1991-1995 dated 12
th  December, 1991- p. 3). 
These statements are often presented in the resolutions without explaining 
the reasons why they were offered and without specific measures for 
implementation. Therefore, this type of policy document just develops the 
overall direction or orientation for forest devolution action. The language   102 
used for this type of document seems to contain political intention rather 
than framing practical action (propaganda and explanation, or try all effort, etc.).  
For the laws, they mention the regulations for implementing forest land 
allocation with the order of chapter, article, and item. The decrees and 
circulars are the documents under the laws for specifying some articles or 
items in some chapters of the laws or for emphasizing some issues in the 
implementation of the law. The decrees and circulars are often offered for 
the same law to guide implementation. The directives are also types of 
instructions under the law to offer some more regulations to force the actors 
or beneficiaries to implement, but are just related to a specific issue like the 
directive for speeding up land use rights certification (the Instruction No. 
18/1999/CT-TTG of Prime Minister on measures to speed up providing land 
use rights certifications dated 1
st July, 1999). 
The collected forest devolution policy papers reflected the concern of the 
Party, National Assembly and Government on devolving rights to the users. 
The rights were expanded according to the time line from the benefits of 
getting the products that are produced on the devolved land to rights of 
transfer, inheriting, mortgage and lease in the long term (50 years). Besides 
devolving rights of use and management to the users, the state also 
formulated some support policies to encourage them to effectively use the 
devolved forest and forestry land. These included providing capital or credit 
at low or no interest, exempting land use tax, or the benefits of getting 
timber of forest’s owners even for watershed protection and special use 
forests. Devolution of the rights along with other supports implied 
encouraging people in forest and forestry land management to improve the 
environment and their lives.   
4.6.2. Some issues in formulating the policy 
¾   Complexity of policy paper type 
Reviewing the time line and contents of the key policy papers revealed a 
complex mix of policy paper’s types (many different types of paper even 
though they were developed at the same level). For example, the Revision 
& Adding Law from land law 1993 was enacted on 2
nd December, 1998 and 
along with this the government issued the Decree 163/CP (Nov. 16
th, 1999) 
on forestry land allocation and lease and the Decree 04/2000/NDCP dated 
11
th February, 2000 on implementing the 1998 revised and amended Land 
Law. Moreover, the Instruction No. 18/1999/CT-TTG on measures to 
speed up providing land use right certifications (July 1
st, 1999) and the Joint 
Ministry Circular No. 62/2000/TTLT on guiding forestry land allocation, 
lease and use rights certification provision (June 6
th, 2000) were also issued to   103 
enhance forest devolution. These multiple layers of policy made even the 
state officers confused. This was also raised by people in a direct dialogue on 
line with the Vice chairman of the National Assembly Nguyen Van Yeu on 
3
rd May, 2007, that “why issuing the law must offer more decisions, decrees, 
circulars, etc. How can I access and understand when we have too many types of 
policy papers like that?”, a person raised the question for the vice chairman of 
the National Assembly (TuoiTreonline, 2007). 
The character of decisions is more complex: some decisions are 
documents for guiding implementation of laws through regulating some 
issues related to forest devolution as Decision No. 264-CT on Encouraging 
investment in forest development (Jul. 22
nd, 1992). Some decisions are not 
documents for guiding the laws but are under national programmes to 
specify the tasks of the programmes (e.g., the Decision  No. 327 on Some 
Policies for using barren hills, coastal land & water surface dated 15
th Sep. 1992). 
The structure and statements in the decisions are also complex. Some 
decisions combine both general statements and specific measures such as the 
Decision  No. 327  in 1992 or No. 661 in 1998 (under two of the biggest 
national programmes on forest protection and development) but some others 
have a simple structure (only the regulations for implementation) such as the 
Decision No. 178 on Regulating benefits of forest managers or the Decision No. 145 
on policy for managing and using the planted forest by the PAM. 
The complex mix of policy documents are also reflected through the 
formulation of many different types of decrees and circulars that guide 
implementation of a law. For example, to guide implementation of the 1998 
revised and amended Land Law, there were two decrees (Decree 163 and 
Decree 04) and the cross ministries Circular No. 162 to provide guidance in 
allocating and leasing land. All these guidance papers were longer than the 
amended law. How could the state organizations that are responsible for 
devolving forest spend time to understand the policy papers to implement 
them without confusion? How do the people, especially rural people and 
people from ethnic groups, who are directly influenced by the policy but 
have limited access to education and information, understand these policy 
papers? 
 
¾  Slow formulation of documents for specifying law  
Another remarkable issue is that the decrees and circulars are formulated for 
guiding implementation or for specifying the content of the law but they 
were developed at least six months later after the announcement of the law 
because the government institutions do not have enough time to make 
them. For example: the first Land Law was promulgated on 29
th December,   104 
1987 but the Decree No. 30/HDBT for guiding implementation was issued 
on 23rd March, 1989-nearly one and a half years later; the second Land Law 
was issued in July, 1993 but the Decree 02/CP for guiding implementation 
this law was issued six months later (January 1994) and the Revision & 
adding Land Law from the 1993 Land Law was announced in December, 
1998, but the Decree 163/CP for guiding this law was issued in November, 
1999 (11 months later). 
One member of the National Assembly told the author that at present the 
Government has not yet developed a big pile of documents for guiding 
implementation of the laws. This is similar to the comment of Mr. Nguyễn Sỹ 
Dũng (09:03' 16/10/2006 ) that “Many laws which are issued by the National 
Assembly have been not implemented yet (Treo) because the Government has not  
made one hundred decrees for guiding implementation of the laws”. The question is 
how will the law be implemented and interpreted in six months or one year 
without the guiding decrees? This problem may lead to confusion or 
different interpretations in implementation in case of practicing without 
published guidelines or delays in implementation in the case of waiting for 
the decree or circular guiding implementation.  
 
¾  Changes over time 
Another interesting fact is that the legislation has changed over time. The 
revision or addion or replacement is often carried out after five years. The 
first Land Law, for example was issued in 1987 and was replaced in 1993 
and then revised and added to in 1998 and 2001. However, even for the 
replacement, the policy was developed based on the previous one, in both 
terms of structure and content of the article or item. The duration for 
revising or replacement is often about five years. This duration is rather 
short so it may create complexity and challenges for implementing because 
the implementers do not have enough time to understand the documents 
(the interviewed officers at both provincial and district levels complained 
that: “Oh they are changed too fast we can not follow”). This also reflected that 
the contents of the policies are not appropriate to practice so they have to be 
revised. However, this may also showed the effort of the State to make the 
policy be more suitable in practice.  
Shank et al. (2004) concluded that everyday resistance at the grass roots 
level was a cause that led to changes in land policy in Vietnam. This appears 
not to be the case with respect to forestry land. Changes in the forest 
devolution policy originated from the ideas of policy makers when practical 
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Revision and Amended Land Law was a result of reducing the forestry land 
after a period of implementing the 1993 Land Law). 
  In brief, the forest devolution policy documents in Vietnam are a very 
complex mix of type, structure, and change over time. The documents 
under the law for specifying the contents and guiding implementation are 
often developed some time after the law. In general, the policy reflects the 
intentions of the state to encourage participation of the people in developing 
and protecting the forest by devolving a bundle of rights along with other 
support (providing capital, allow to use for agricultural production) for using 
the forest land effectively. Development of the different types of policy 
papers, the detail structure and the revision over time for fitting with the 
new circumstances confirms an effort of the state to encourage people to get 
forest land. However, too many types of papers, complex documents and 
changes over time create difficulties for policy implementers leading to 
different interpretations. How is the policy interpreted in the 
implementation given the poor specifications and complexity, and how does 
it influence endowments, entitlements and management practices after 
devolution? 
  As Kerkvliet & Marr (2004) (p. 1) said: “Bad policies equal bad 
governance and good policies mean good governance”. Policy papers are 
formulated to frame practical actions so good policy documents should be 
clear, specific with thorough enough explanations to provide actors clear 
regulations for implementation. Proper policy documents should also be 
linked together (Robert & Oberndorf, 2006) and accountable to achieve 
their objective. The next section of this chapter discusses explicitness and 
inclusion of the forest devolution policy papers. 
4.7. Explicitness
5 of the policy papers and inclusion
6 related to 
key concepts of pro-poor, gender and ethnic subject 
As mentioned earlier, the development of the forest devolution policy in 
Vietnam started alongside Đổi Mới in 1986. Based on the time line of forest 
allocation policy papers and the time of implementing the policy in the two 
study sites, the arguments here are also drawn out from the policy papers 
written from 1986 to 2003.  
Examining the formation and use of concepts in a policy paper is one of 
the aspects needed for analyzing policy (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1996). One of 
the objectives of forest devolution policy, which is repeated in the 
                                                  
5 Clear meaning of the terms and language used in the policy papers. 
6 Mention of poor, ethnic group and gender issue in the policy papers.   106 
resolutions of both the Party and the National Assembly, is to stabilize the 
life of people in the mountains. These are the homes of ethnic groups and 
are evaluated as being poor and difficult compared to other areas. So, 
analysis of explicitness and clarity of the terms and concepts used in the 
forest devolution policy papers, and in particular the concept of poor and 
gender and ethnic subjects to see what and who is included, ignored or 
excluded in the policy, is crucial to understand the policy (Apthorpe & 
Gasper, 1996). 
As discussed in section 4.3, it is a challenge in terms of time to look at 
the terms and concepts used because of so many types of forest devolution 
policy papers. Therefore, in exploring explicitness and inclusion related to 
pro-poor, gender and ethnic subjects of the policy, the analysis focuses on 
some key papers that are concerned directly with the regulation of forest 
devolution. These are the land laws, the forest protection laws and the 
decrees or decisions and circulars related to the laws. The following analyzes 
terms and concepts that were used in the policy papers.  
The terms “households and individuals” are used and repeated in many 
resolutions, decrees, laws and decisions related to forest devolution including 
in the 1993 Land Law and the Decree 02 (1994) for guiding implementation 
of this law. This reflects recognizing them as subjects for devolving natural 
forest and forestry land. However, in the regulation of who will be entitled 
in the certification, the subject in the decrees and circulars is always said to 
be Chủ hộ, the head of the household. Who is this person? Is this husband or 
wife? Mother or father? Boy or girl? This is not clear and in the context of 
traditional culture in Vietnam, the head of household often is male. This 
may lead to different interpretations by policy implementers and may limit 
opportunities for women to gain endowments of the devolved forest.  
The terms “households and individuals” are also not specific in terms of 
social and ethnic identity. Who are they? Are they the poor or better-off? 
Do they belong to the majority or minority group? Are they farmers or 
officers in the city? So everybody (even if they are officials or officers or 
people who live in the city and do not make living from forest production) 
can receive devolved forest. How can policy implementers interpret these 
terms? This lack of clarity may limit the opportunity for farmers, especially 
the poor, in receiving forest. It also does not support the claims in the 
resolutions or decrees, for instance: “ensure that the farmers have land for 
agriculture and forestry production” (the Resolution of the National Assembly 
on National Land Use Plan for five years: 1996-2000 dated 10
th May, 1997- 
p. 2). The policy therefore may not bring endowments and entitlements to 
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The concept of agricultural land in the land laws is “the land which is 
identified to be used for agricultural production such as crop farming, 
livestock raising and aquaculture or use for doing research on crops and 
livestock” (Article 23 of the 1987 Land Law and article 42 of the 1993 Land 
Law- p. 7 and p. 8). Article 25 of the 1987 Land Law or article 43 of the 
1993 land state that “forestry land is the land which is identified to use for 
forestry production such as forest planting, forest exploitation, rehabilitation 
or doing research on forestry....” (p. 8). Who is responsible for identifying 
the land as use for agricultural or forestry production? It is difficult to classify 
which area is agricultural land or forestry land in the mountainous areas 
where people do farming on the upland or grazing cattle in the forest, so this 
land area can be called both agricultural or forestry land as the concepts in 
the land laws.  
The concept of forestry land in Article 1 of the 1991 Forest Protection 
Law (“forestry land is land which have forest and land without forest but is planted 
for forest planting”- p. 1) is more confused because many land areas without 
forest have been used for farming by people in the mountains, especially 
ethnic minorities. So, whose plan and knowledge is accounted for in this 
regulation or concept? What is the meaning of “without forest” because even 
forest is an abstract word? How can policy implementers interpret this 
concept? 
One of the criteria for devolving forest land mentioned in the land laws 
and also in the decrees is based on the “need” and “capacity” of the household 
or individual. What is the “need” and “capacity”? This concept is also 
unclear. How do the state institutions that have responsibility for approving 
the applications of the households and individuals assess who has “need” and 
“capacity” in order to decide whether to devolve forest land to them? How 
can the policy implementer measure need and capacity of households? This 
may lead to approval by the state organizations who implement forest land 
allocation based more on influences of power and social relationships. It may 
also lead to the exclusion of the poor because they often are considered as 
the people who do not have capacity (very few labours, no financial 
resources, lack of skills, etc.). This is similar to the arguments of Shank et al. 
(2004) that the land policy may not be pro-poor because of the regulation of 
allocation based on criteria of having more labour and capacity to use land 
effectively.  
Questions of power relationships may occur in the regulation of 
providing forest land use right certification: “The organizations, households, 
and individuals who are using the forestry land that is not allocated or leased before 
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will be considered for allocation of this land and will be provided the land use right 
certification” (Decree 163/CP, p. 6). What is the concept of “appropriate land 
use purpose”? The forestry land allocation policy also emphasizes the purpose 
of land use but it seems there is a contradiction in identifying forest land use 
purpose. In almost all parts of the policy papers it is said that the forestry 
lands that are devolved to households and individuals are planned for 
forestry production and it will be taken back if that allocated land is used for 
the wrong purpose. However, sometimes (example in Article 15 of the 
Decree No. 163/ CP) it is stated that the allocated bare land can be used for 
planting perennial crops. So, it is not clear what the right or wrong purpose 
is for devolved forestry land. The slope of the forestry lands that are planned 
for forestry production purpose in the policy papers is greater than 25
0 but 
according to the tradition of the ethnic groups, the sloping lands are often 
used for crop cultivation. So, the customs of ethnic people were not taken 
into account in the policy. This may prevent land use by ethnic groups for 
cultivating food crops. 
An important requirement of the policy papers for applicants to get 
natural forest or forestry land is have to have an “economic and technical plan” 
(luận chứng kinh tế kỹ thuật) to justify effective use of the devolved forest land. It 
is very difficult to understand this term even for officers. This term was 
replaced by the term of “investment project” (Dự án đầu tư). However, the 
word of project is still very strange for people, especially for ethic people. 
How can the poor and ethnic people who are often illiterate or limited in 
education understand this to meet the requirements of land allocation? The 
land laws regulated that one of the conditions receiving land is that the 
household or individual must submit a plan or project to the state institutions 
that are responsible for land allocation for approval. How can people, 
especially the poor and ethnic group make a plan or project to get the land? 
The laws also require that households or individuals can be devolved land 
only when the plan or project is approved by the functional institution. 
Without clear explanation of this term, which one can be approved? 
The resolutions of the Party and the National Assembly in all periods 
mentioned that forest protection and development along with the allocation 
of forest land to households are to contribute to poverty reduction and 
stabilizing the life of the people. However, all the land laws and decrees or 
decisions that set up regulations for forest devolution did not mention 
anything about these vulnerable groups. The poor and ethnic people, 
therefore, may be excluded from the policy because no priorities in the laws 
and decrees or decisions are given to them and because of their limited 
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Vietnam because there are few service providers to help people follow the 
procedures to get land.  
4.8. Summary 
The forest devolution policy papers in Vietnam have been mainly 
formulated in line with the Đổi Mới. This was a very important change in the 
development orientation of the country shifting from state forest 
management to involving individual households and villages. It was 
expected that the natural forest and forestry land will be managed better and 
the forest cover will be increased through mobilizing human and financial 
resources from non-state sectors, especially the private sector, for protecting 
and developing the forest. The policy is also expected to contribute to the 
economic development and poverty reduction of the country. 
The process of making the forest devolution policy papers indicated 
limited interaction among sectors and among different social groups. Similar 
to making the environmental and livestock policy, extended public 
participation in making the policy is also limited. There was a tendency to 
use experts’ knowledge (through involving mainly specialists and experts in 
policy making and the use of scientific terms and concepts in the policy 
papers). This process showed the power of the central Government in 
making the forest devolution policy.  
The policy papers are muddled because of many different types and 
revisions overtime. It is different from the comment of Shank et al. (2004) 
that everyday resistance or informal negotiation influenced the pro-poor 
policy change on land as the change of the forest devolution policy overtime 
was the result of ideas pushed by policy makers. The muddle was also 
reflected through complexity of the institutions involved in the policy 
making process that is also found in the health sector policy by Shank et al. 
(2004). This may create confusion and different interpretations of imple-
menters giving room for inequalities in allocation. 
The policy indicated the intents of the state in devolving different rights 
to everybody for using natural forest and forestry land effectively to improve 
economic growth, poverty reduction and environment as well. However, 
economic and environmental objectives were still rather dominant. There 
are terms and concepts that relate to the opportunity of getting forest land 
are imprecise and may lead to exclusion. These may also lead to different 
interpretations, allow informal power relationships to influence the 
implementation of devolution and may limit the opportunities for women,   110 
the poor and ethnic groups to gain endowments to the devolved natural 
forest and forestry land.  
To examine these claims, it is necessary to explore not only the papers 
but also the implementation process. This issue is analyzed in the following 
chapters based on practical evidence from the study sites. 
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5. Implementation of forest devolution:                        
Process and nature  
5.1. Introduction 
There is a view of policy analysis that is critical of the linear model with its 
focus on policy making processes and its emphasis on solving technical 
problems. This view argues that there i s  a  n e e d  t o  l o o k  a t  b o t h  p o l i c y  
making and the implementation process (Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 
2007; Keeley & Scoones, 1999; Sutton, 1999). Understanding outputs and 
consequences of policy is seen to require not only analysis of the written 
policy papers but also an examination of the implementation process 
including monitoring and implementation (Blaikie & Sadeque, 2000).  
 Forest devolution in Vietnam has been ongoing since 1987 and was 
implemented in different stages. To understand how natural forest and 
forestry land devolution influences endowments, management practices and 
entitlements of rural people, this research not only looked at the policy 
making process but also examined how it was implemented in practice.      
 Chapter IV presented an overview of the forest devolution policy. This 
chapter examines how the devolution process was implemented and who 
was involved in this process. It also explores the roles and functions of the 
state organizations, local authority, and donors as well as the role of local 
people in devolution implementation. Examining roles and powers of the 
different actors relates to gaining endowments of social groups in chapter VI. 
 The forest devolution policy in Vietnam resulted from both the 
government's intention and international interests as almost all the allocation 
activities were implemented through support of international organizations. 
Frameworks of policy process do not provide explanations for outcomes of 
policy but they help to organize inquiry in policy analysis (Sabatier, 1999).   112 
The implementation process of forest devolution in this research is discussed 
based on conceptual frameworks of the critical anthropological scholars and 
the new ethnographical view. The critical anthropological view was applied 
to look at how different social groups (poor and non-poor, women and 
men) participated in the implementation of devolution and what the nature 
of their participation was and asked “Who had the power or made decisions 
in the implementation process?” Implementation of forest devolution is an 
interpretation of policy in practice and an ethnographical perspective was 
used to inquire into how different actors produced their interpretations and 
what relationships, compromises and concessions were made in imp-
lementing the policy. Discussing interpretations of the policy implementers 
and people’s participation in implementation of forest devolution can help 
to highlight the process of mapping the endowments of forest of the 
beneficiaries. 
Implementation of forest devolution in Vietnam is a process of transfer-
ring policy into practice by the state organizations. The chapter discusses the 
ways of disseminating policy information used by the state officers in the 
devolution process and then it argues how these ways influenced the 
effectiveness of informing people about the policy and how this may link to 
the opportunity for gaining endowment of different social groups.  
There is agreement by many scholars on the importance of collective 
action for developing institutions for common pool property management 
(Agrawal, 2001; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 1999).  In the case of 
devolving natural forest to village or household groups, the new regulations 
were developed for forest management after devolution. This chapter 
explores how the institution was established, who was involved and the 
nature of their involvement. The structures and roles of the established 
institutions are also discussed.  
Practical evidence discussed in this chapter was found in reports collected 
at the DFPD of Phu Loc and Nam Dong districts and the CPC of Loc Tien 
and Thuong Quang, as well as in Thuy Duong village, and some project 
reports on the national level searched on the internet. Discussions with 
groups of forest protectors or key farmers and in-depth interviews or open 
discussion with some local leaders and farmers were also important sources 
of material. Some quantitative and qualitative data about involvement and 
the reasons for attending the allocation activity by local people came from 
the household survey in Thuy Duong village (Loc Tien commune) and 
Thuong Quang commune. 
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This chapter includes 5 sections: 
Section 5.1. Introduction 
Section 5.2. Implementation processes and the involvement of the entities or 
stakeholders present in the steps of devolution, the roles, functions and 
powers of the state organizations, the international donors in the 
implementation process of devolution, as well as interpretation of the policy 
implementers. 
Section 5.3. Involvement of local people and the nature of their participation 
discusses how different social groups (poor and non-poor, women and men) 
were involved in the forest devolution process, their roles and the nature of 
their participation.  
Section 5.4. Institution building for village or household group based natural 
forest management: It reflects on how the new institutions for village or 
household group based natural forest management was established and how 
it works and is maintained.  
Section 5.5. Summary of the chapter 
5.2. Implementation processes and the involvement of the entities 
or stakeholders 
After unification of the country, all natural forest and forestry land in 
Vietnam were managed by the state. All activities related to exploiting, 
protecting, planting and rehabilitating forest and forestry land were 
implemented by state forestry organizations. People were allowed to exploit 
some NTFPs. However, in reality, illegal logging occurred in many places in 
the country including Thua Thien Hue province because agricultural 
production of the country and for households was not enough for the full 
year. The economy was also underdeveloped at that time, so the state 
budget was not able to invest in greening the bare land area.  By the late 
1980s the Vietnamese forestry sector was estimated to be in crisis and the 
policy of excluding local people from forest management of the state had 
failed (Sikor, 1998). Since the end of 1980s, the state has paid attention to 
involving people in forest management (Minh and Warfvinge, 2002; 
Phuong, 2000). Both natural forest and forestry land (bare land) have been 
devolved to household or household groups or villages (generally termed 
beneficiaries). This research examined both the processes of devolving 
natural forests and forestry land (barren land area for planting forests).  
There is no policy paper in Vietnam that describes the process of forestry 
land and natural forest allocation (FLNFA). The policy papers related to 
forest devolution also do not separately regulate for devolving natural forest   114 
and forestry land (bare land). The field work in the two study communes 
showed that the initiation and implementation of allocation activities were 
very different in terms of reasons, time, financial sources, and methods of 
allocation. 
5.2.1. Implementation process of forest devolution  
Studies of the influence of forest devolution on management practice and 
people’s livelihood have been carried out in many countries of the Asian 
Pacific region such as Korea, India, Nepal, China, Indonesia, Philippine, 
Laos and Vietnam (Colfer et al., 2008; Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2007; 
Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003). However, exploring the implementation 
process of forest devolution was found only in the study in Laos by Fujita & 
Phengsopha (2008). Almost all of the other studies focused on analysis of the 
outcomes of devolution (change of forest condition, change of household 
economy, social and economic implications, etc.). How can one discuss the 
outcomes without connecting these to the implementation process of 
devolution? This sub-section presents the steps and activities of forest and 
forestry land devolution in the two study sites in Thua Thien Hue province.  
Gaps between the designed process and implementation in practice are also 
discussed to highlight how the policy was interpreted in practice and the 
power of different actors involved in the process. This discussion is a basis 
for raising the questions and interpreting how they link to gaining 
endowments of forest and forestry land in chapter VI. 
5.2.1.1. Implementation process of forestry land devolution  
¾  In Loc Tien (the coastal commune) 
Before 1987 when forest devolution had not been implemented in Loc 
Tien, all the natural forest and forestry land areas belonged to the 
management of the state forestry organizations. A part of the forest area was 
managed by Phu Loc forestry enterprise and tasks of timber exploitation and 
development of forest on the bare hills were assigned by the provincial 
DARD. The part of forest area that belongs to the buffer zone of Bach Ma 
national park has been managed by the park for environmental protection. 
The remaining areas not assigned to the park and Phu Loc enterprise had 
been managed by the Phu Loc DFPD. However, the DFPD was also assigned 
the task of controlling all the activities of forest exploitation and only the 
DFPD had the right to punish illegal logging even in the forest areas that 
were assigned to Phu Loc enterprise or Bach Ma national park.   115 
The activity of forestry land allocation (FLA) in Loc Tien (the coastal 
commune) was started in 1987 and implemented separately from the natural 
forest allocation (NFA).  
 
- Forestry land allocation through the PAM and 327 programmes 
The first FLA in Loc Tien was initiated in 1987 through the support of the 
World Food Programme (abbreviated to PAM in French), and was called the 
PAM programme. This activity started with a top-down project plan from 
the central level to the district level. Donor funding was provided food (rice) 
and input (seedlings) for planting the forest in the PAM programme. These 
were sent to the programme management board at the central level and 
were distributed to the province and then to the district level. The DFPD 
was appointed as project manager and was assigned to manage and use this 
funding.  
The rule of the donor was to give priority to the poor to attend to 
planting and tending forest to get food based on the amount of the working 
day spent in the programme. The donor also required that planted forests be 
allocated to the households to ensure a long term benefit. The benefit 
sharing mechanism was that 70 % of the total value of the product would be 
paid to the planters and 30 % reserved for management fees of the state 
organization in terms of support to the farmers. However, the 1987 land law 
(the first land law) and the 1992 forest protection and development law that 
directly regulated forests and forestry land allocation had not yet been 
formulated when the PAM programme started in 1986 (then called PAM 
2780). Therefore, the functions and responsibilities of the state organizations 
in forest land allocation at that time were still not regulated.  
In order to meet the principles of the donor to get the funding for 
planting forest and food for people, forestry land was allocated to households 
through the co-operative (as the household was a member of a cooperative) 
although the land law and the forest protection and development law did 
not specify this. In this context, implementation of forest planting and 
allocation was coordinated by the PAM programme management Board 
(with the organizational structure from central to the grass roots (commune) 
level (Thua Thien Hue Agricultural and Rural development Department, 
1998) - (See figure 6). 
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Although the report of Thua Thien Hue province DARD (August, 1998) 
said that there was a board at the commune level, the in-depth interviews 
with some commune officers in Loc Tien commune and the head of Thuy 
Duong village indicated that the role of the board at this level in the PAM 
project was not clear: 
 
There was no management board at the commune level in the PAM programme. We 
(commune and co-operative) worked for the DFPD based on the plan they assigned to us. 
(Mr. Đ., 18
th May, 2006). 
 
The implementation of the PAM’s activity at this level was mainly 
coordinated by the co-operative management board (under administrative 
management of the commune authority). As the vice head of Song Thuy 
co-operative said (26
th July, 2006): 
 
The DFPD was the owner of the PAM project. We went to ask for their help (creating 
relationship) to get the plan from them to guide people to plant and nurse the forest. 
 
And the land administrator of the commune reported (18
th May, 2006): 
 
In the PAM programme, the district transferred all the rights to the DFPD so the 
commune did not participate in anything because there was no invitation from the DFPD 
for attending. They just gave seedlings and trees to the co-operative for planting. The 
Central PAM 
Management 
Board 
Provincial PAM 
Management 
Board 
District PAM 
management  
Board 
Commune PAM 
management  
Board 
At the provincial level, the vice chairman of 
the  PPC was the head of the board. The 
director of the provincial forestry department 
(now being DARD) was the deputy head who 
is responsible for coordinating all activities and 
the three other members from the finance 
department, planning and investment dep-
artments and the food company. 
For the management board at district level, 
chairman of the board was also the chairman of 
the DPC and vice chairman of the board was 
the head of the DFPD. However, the members 
came from some units of the DPC and 
protection department who were the key 
people for implementing the PAM program 
(Thua Thien Hue DARD, August, 1998).  Figure 6. Organizational 
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documents of land allocation were not kept at the commune. We did not know where they 
were. 
 
In the stage from 1987-1991 (PAM 2780), the process of devolving forestry 
land under the PAM programme was not clear and not documented in the 
project’s documents. The local people and even the village leader and 
commune officers who were directly involved in coordinating the PAM’ 
activities in Loc Tien told that this programme came to the commune and 
village through being informed by the DFPD to plant forests for getting 
food. The implementation of the project activity followed a top-down 
approach with the target assigned from central to district levels. At that time, 
the agricultural activities in the country were still in the form of collective 
production. Devolution of forestry land to individual households was not 
clear in the process of implementing the PAM 2780 programme. This was 
also confirmed in an assessment by CARE International in Vietnam that 
there were ambiguities and disputes in land allocation accompanying the 
forest planting of the PAM programme (CARE international in Vietnam, 
February, 1994).  
In the stage from 1993-1997 (PAM 4304), after the formulation of the 
1987 land law in December 1987 (then replaced by the 1993 land law ), the 
PAM programme was implemented along with the programme 327 on the 
greening of barren land which was supported by the state budget and 
planned from the central level with a top-down approach. The budget was 
distributed to provinces and then districts like the PAM programme. The 
DFPD was also assigned to manage and use this budget for implementing the 
programme. In a study on forest land allocation in Lao, Fujita and 
Phengsopha (2008) did a comparison of the implementation process 
between the programme led by the government and the donor-led 
programme. Those authors found that the financial source of the donor-led 
programme was provided to the commune authority. This is different from 
the case of the PAM donor-led programme in Loc Tien where the financial 
resource of the donor was managed by the DFPD. This may create more 
power for the DFPD in devolution implementation. 
According to the report on the output of implementing the 327 
programme, the planted forest area by the PAM programme was about twice 
that of the programme 327 (for instance, in 1993 the planted forest by the 
PAM programme was 2000 ha while by the programme 327 was only 1033 
ha). It was also reported that the planted forest by the programme 327 was 
mainly owned by the state forestry organizations. The local people were 
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payment in cash from the state forestry organizations who were the project 
implementers. However, forestry land allocation was also one of the 
components of this national programme. The individual households that 
belonged to the resettlement component of the programme were allocated 
from one to two ha per household (Thua Thien Hue provincial people 
committee, January, 1994 ; Thua Thien Hue provincial people committee, 
December, 1994). This research, therefore wanted to explore how the 
forestry land was devolved to the households in Loc Tien through the 
programme 327. 
The information from an open dialogue with the village leader and 
household interviews confirmed that only some households who were living 
in the resettlement area of Thuy Duong village were allocated forestry land 
by the programme 327 with an area from one to two ha. The certifications 
of the allocated forestry land in this period by both the PAM and the 327 
programmes were also informal (the white decision paper of the DPC). 
However, this informal decision could be used for claiming to get the 
formal certification (the Red Book).  
For this period (1993-1997), the organizational structure of management 
for both the PAM and 327 programmes was similar in the first stage (1987-
1991). According to the report of the DFPD, the process of devolving 
forestry land (for both the PAM 4304 and 327 programmes) was imp-
lemented through two main stages: (1) preparation and (2) the stage of 
implementing at the field and completing the allocation document as 
described below:  
Step 1: Preparation stage, including three activities as follows: 
Activity 1: Establishing the co-ordination board at the district level with the 
members mainly coming from the coordination board of the PAM project 
who were officers of the district DARD, the district land administration 
department (DLAD) and the DFPD. The head of this board was the 
chairman of the DPC. (The open interviews with the officers from the 
DFPD) 
The coordination board was responsible for coordinating devolution 
activities and approving the plan of forestry land use and documents of the 
land receiver to be the basis for providing the land use rights certification. 
Activity 2: Establishing the field working group (FWG) that included three 
people from the DFPD, one person from the commune (land management 
officer), and one officer of the district DARD. The head of the group was 
from the DFPD. This group was mainly responsible for devolving forestry 
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completion of the documents of the land receivers and reporting on the plan 
and outputs of forest devolution to the district. 
Activity 3: Meeting and giving short training for the FWG 
The coordinating board organized the meeting with the officials of the 
communes in the district to disseminate objectives of the forest land 
allocation policy (the 1993 Land Law and Decree 02 of the government) to 
the commune officials and asked them to disseminate this policy to the local 
people. 
A short training on the method of allocating forestry land in the field (a 
way of dividing block, plot and identifying the border of the allocated area 
and mapping to describe the location of the allocated plot) was given to the 
FWG. After this, the FWG had to prepare maps of the forest condition, map 
of land use of the commune, and economic-social background information 
to be the basis for devolving the forestry land in the field. 
Step 2: Informing the people on forestry land allocation 
After the training, the FWG (but mainly implemented by the officers from 
the DFPD) informed the heads of the commune and village about the policy 
of devolution. Those heads were responsible for informing the people about 
the policy and asked people to submit the application form for getting land 
if they were interested in using forestry land. This activity was not carried 
out formally through holding the village meeting and it was called a short 
cut step to save the costs of the implementation.  
Step 3: Planning land use and sending to district authority for approval 
According to the regulations of the law and the decree of the government, 
before devolving forestry land there is a requirement to document the 
e x i s t i n g  f o r e s t r y  l a n d  a r e a  t o  p l a n  for use and allocation. However, this 
activity had a high cost (comments by foresters). In the period of 1991-
1997, the costs for planning forestry land in Thua Thien Hue came mainly 
from the PAM project. The budget of the programme 327 could not cover 
this and was just used for investing in forest planting. Even now, the 
expenditure for this activity also comes from the funding from international 
organizations. Therefore, the activity of land use planning before allocating 
forestry land in the PAM project and the programme 327 was based on the 
general planning of the forestry sector and the data of the commune to map 
the location of the allocated land area on paper. It was not really planned 
before allocating. 
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Step 4: Allocating in the field, including three activities 
Activity 1: Informing time and location to individuals or households: Based 
on the list of households who were approved, the FWG was required to 
inform them of the time and location to come to get the land. 
Activity 2: The FWG measured and identified the boundary of the forestry 
land area with the village’s head and the land management officer of the 
commune who was also a member of the FWG as witnesses. The minutes 
were also prepared and the representatives of the household, village, 
commune and the forestry officer signed the minutes. 
Activity 3: The FWG recorded the situation of the devolved land area and 
drew the sketch to show the location of the plot. 
Step 5: Completing the documents to send for approval and providing certification 
After finishing the activity of allocation in the field, the FWG drew the 
sketch of the allocated land position on the general forestry land map of the 
DFPD and design devolved land use plan and then submitted this map with 
the application of the households to the DPC for approval and certification. 
Copies of the documents were kept at both the DFPD and the co-
operative and were submitted to the district to get the signature of the DPC’s 
chairman. 
The process for implementing forestry land devolution under the PAM 
and 327 programmes presented above was regulated by the co-ordination 
board. This was reflected in the report of the DFPD and also confirmed 
through in-depth interview with both the forestry officers at the district 
level and commune officers who were involved in the implementation 
process at that time. However, the information from in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions with local people in the coastal commune 
showed that they did not record any step in the process. They just knew 
about the FLA through asking by the co-operative and the forest protection 
officers to go to plant the forest. The local people were interested in 
planting the forest at that time to get rice (PAM 2780) or cash (PAM 4304 
and programme 327) to feed the family because the lack of food was a 
serious problem for many households. This programme, therefore did not 
achieve sustainable objective through creating the income from the forest 
planting. 
Some people knew about planting trees or forest from their neighbours  
 
I heard from the neighbour that the forest protection officers were hiring people to plant 
forest. Those who are involved in planting forest will be paid rice. And then I followed my   121 
neighbor to plant trees to get rice for feeding my children. (Mrs. N. in Thuy Duong 
village, 17
th August, 2005). 
 
The concepts of steps of FLA in the PAM and 327 programmes were also not 
recorded by the village leaders, and commune officers. The head of the 
village who was the officer of the co-operative and was involved in 
coordinating forest planting activity of the co-operative in the PAM and 327 
programmes that time told that: 
 
For the PAM and 327 programmes, the officers from the DFPD came and asked the co-
operative to mobilize people to plant the forest that was assigned in the plan of the project 
which was managed by the DFPD. We called it by the name of "PAM or 327 forest 
planting projects. (15
th March, 2006) 
 
Or We just heard that there was a PAM project on planting forest and being paid rice or 
cash and we went to plant trees - (Mr. H.- a commune officer, 15
th March, 
2006). 
 
The interviews with farmers, village and commune officials and forestry 
officers showed that FLA  in the PAM and 327 programmes were 
implemented after planting the forest which was designed by the officers of 
the DFPD, as reported by one farmer in Thuy Duong village: 
 
We were asked to go to plant trees on the plots that were already designed for the co-
operative (PAM 2780) or for each household (PAM 4304 or 327 programme) by the 
forestry officers and after planting trees they come to check before paying rice or cash and 
then we were informed that is our plots. (Mr. S., 10
th May, 2006) 
 
Or We were asked to go to the hills to plant forest which were designed by the foresters of 
the district forest protection department. After planting they will know how large an area to 
allocate to each household. (A co-operative officer, 25
th May, 2006)  
 
As mentioned above, the steps of FLA through the PAM  and 327 
programmes were not regulated in the land law or forest protection law but 
were designed by the programme management board who was given that 
right. Moreover, implementation of the steps which regulated by the 
management board also depended on the interpretation of the FWG. For 
example, they said that because of the limitation of human and financial 
resources there was a short cut of a step of informing the people about FLA. 
Justification for the way of informing the people about the land law and the 
decree on forest land allocation through the commune officers and village’s   122 
leader or the head of the co-operative (informal way) was that this was a 
way of saving time and the budget for the allocation activity (Linh, 2001). 
The state officials hoped that the people would be well informed of the 
policy through telling by the officers at grass root level. This was also the 
result of an agreement between the project management board and the FWG 
to find a way to implement the duty with low costs. Nevertheless, the local 
people just knew that there was a forest planting activity that was organized 
by the DFPD and was called the PAM programme. They did not know 
anything about the land law and the decree 02/CP on allocating forestry 
land to household.  
All farmers who spoke with the author individually or in the group said 
that they just heard from the head of the co-operative that they were to go 
plant trees and they were paid rice or cash for their labour contribution. 
After that they were informed verbally that they are going to get 70 % of the 
planted forest’s product (PAM programme). For the 327 programme, the 
farmers in the new resettlement area of Thuy Duong village also told that 
they were asked to go to plant the forest in the hills. The foresters from the 
DFPD  marked out the plot for planting trees for each household. The 
households were asked to go to plant trees there and then they were 
provided with the decision to certify that it was their plot. 
Both examples of implementing forest planting by the PAM and 327 
programmes showed that the forestry sector’s officers (from the DFPD) and 
local authority’s representatives (officers from the DARD and the DPC, the 
commune’s officer and the head of the co-operative) implemented the 
forestry land devolution activity because of the tasks that were required by 
the state. Although the process of implementing allocation was interpreted 
and regulated by the district co-ordination board, in reality forestry land 
allocation activities in Loc Tien commune were implemented through 
activity of the PAM and 327 programmes.  The implementation processes of 
these two programmes were similar. However funds of the PAM programme 
were available for project preparation and planning.     
 
- The process of forestry land allocation through the SNV project  
At the end of 2003, thanks to the financial support of the SNV, the general 
land use planning activity with participation of the local people was carried 
out in the commune. The land use planning activity found 66.5 ha of 
ineffective
7 planted forest (belonging to the Hai Van North watershed forest 
management board and the Song Thuy co-operative or Thuy Duong village 
now) and 70.1 ha of barren hills could be used for forest planting. Those 
                                                  
7 Poor establishment.   123 
areas were planned to be allocated to households for planting forests and of 
which 75.9 ha (in a total of 136.6 ha) belong to Thuy Duong village). 
Those areas were allocated to the individual households at the end 2003.  
The strategy of the SNV is building capacity for stakeholders (forestry 
organizations and district and commune authorities) by providing of training 
and advisory services. Moreover, the donor also provided money for 
implementing all project activities without any financial contribution from 
the Vietnamese government. The fields of training and advice of the SNV 
for the stakeholders are project planning, donor fund accounting, personal 
management, data and information management (SNV & Forestry 
Development Sub-Department of Thua Thien Hue, 1999). Support for 
building capacity for the stakeholders was called technical support. The 
policy of the SNV was supporting financial and technical aspects only; it was 
not concerned with lobbying Vietnamese policy (interviewing a coordinator 
of the SNV in Thua Thien Hue, 7
th December, 2006). The central issue in 
building capacity for the local officers (from provincial to commune level) of 
the SNV was participatory planning. Therefore, the planning process used a 
participatory approach as a principle of the project that was introduced by 
the donor and was carefully monitored.  
In the process of participatory land use planning, the land use planning 
map was made and kept in the commune. Along with this planning activity, 
the plan of allocating the remaining bare hills and poorly planted forest areas 
(managed by the co-operative - mainly in the Thuy Duong village) was 
made and submitted to the DPC for approval. It was approved and according 
to a leader of the village, the remaining forest land area was allocated to 
some individual households. However, the allocation activity was not 
presented to the villagers but just decided by the commune land registration 
council (LRC). Explaining this, one of the local leaders said that the land 
area was small so it did not need to inform the villagers. Along with this 
allocation, the provincial DARD was supported with 123 millions VND 
(2003) from the budget to the individual households who were allocated 
forest land for planting forest.  
The process of FLA by SNV project emphasized participatory land use 
planning so it was called Participatory Land Use Planning and Forest Land 
Allocation  (LUPLA). At the provincial level, the provincial forestry 
development division (PFDD) (belongs to the provincial DARD) was the 
partner of the SNV Thua Thien Hue who was responsible for coordinating 
implementation of the project.  The CPC was considered as the central 
player that developed the proposal and managed the funds provided by the 
SNV.    124 
The process of land use planning along with forestry land devolution in this 
project was developed based on the methodology of the Social Forestry 
Development Project of GTZ (German international cooperation enterprise 
for sustainable development) in Son La (Anh & Doets, 2004). According to 
the report of the SNV Vietnam in 2004, this process included seven main 
steps which were summarized as below: 
Step 1: Preparation: This step had 3 activities 
Activity 1: Institutional set-up: For this activity, the district management board 
of the LUPLA, FWG and commune LRC were established.   
The structure and position of the leaders and members of the district 
management board and the FWG was quite similar to the PAM and 327 
programmes. The difference was that the establishment of the LRC which 
was headed by the vice chairman of the CPC and the members included the 
cadastral officer, chiefs of the villages and the representative of mass 
organizations. Actually, the organizational structure of LRC was regulated in 
the circulars for guiding land registration of the central land administration 
Department (the circular TT 346 in 1998 and circular TT 2074 in 2001). 
Those circulars regulated the key members of LRC only (chairman or vice 
chairman of CPC, cadastral and judicial officers, chairman of the commune 
council (circular in 1998) or representatives of the commune Fatherland 
Front (circular in 2001) and village heads, involvement of other members 
(for example mass organizations) was decided by CPC. 
Activity 2: collection of baseline data and secondary data 
The secondary data such as the maps, statistic data on land use, forest 
resources inventory, direction of social economic development of the 
commune and legal papers were also collected at the commune, the DFPD 
and some other related institutions 
Activity 3: Training on LUPLA methodology 
This training was given to the FWG (the way and content was also similar in 
the PAM and 327 programme). 
Step 2: Conducting land survey and mapping current land use 
Activity 1: organizing village meeting 
This step was started with a village meeting to disseminate legal documents 
related to land use and land allocation and to inform local people about 
LUPLA.  
Activity 2: Household survey 
After the village meeting, the house hold survey was carried out by the 
FWG with 100 % of total household to collect the data on the current and 
past land use structure, social and economic conditions and land use needs.   125 
Activity 3: mapping and develop models of land use 
The local farmers join the FWG to map location, boundary and land use 
types of the village. After mapping, a visual model (sand-table) was made to 
show land use structure to the villagers.  
Step 3: Preparation of land use plan and land allocation plan 
Activity 1: organizing the second village meeting 
The second village meeting was organized to present the land use map and 
sand-table to the villagers and to discuss about land use which was planned. 
In this meeting, the villagers were also asked to register for land. This was 
confirmed through based on their needs and then the list of registration 
household was sent to the LRC for approval. 
In the PAM programme and the programme 327, this meeting was not 
organized and it was called a short cut activity by informally telling the 
villagers by the commune and village leaders. 
Activity 2: Organizing the third village meeting 
The third village meeting was organized to finalize the land use plan and 
inform the household that are going to allocate land. In the PAM and 327 
programmes, this was also a short cut activity. 
Activity 3: Sending for getting approval of LUPLA 
The LUPLA which was agreed in the third village meeting was sent to the 
DPC for approval  
Step 4: Land allocation in the field 
This step was similar in the PAM and 327 programmes, after the land 
registration household list was approved by LRC, the FWG and the LRC 
with representatives of the households went to the field to allocate the land. 
The allocated area was decided by the labour force of households and the list 
of households who were allocated land were put in the wallboard of the 
commune (Anh & Doets, 2004). 
Step 5: completion of administrative procedure 
After allocating in the field, the documents (application of household with 
approval of the village and the CPC, map of the plot's location) was sent to 
the DPC for approval and providing certification (Red Book) 
Step 6: Issuance of land use certificate 
Base on the document was sent to the DLAD; the Red Book was issued and 
then signed by the chairman of the DPC 
Step 7: Land development support   
The information was collected in the survey was used by the CPC for dev-
eloping a comprehensive land development plan and different stakeholders   126 
were invited to a workshop at the district to discuss and call for supporting 
from the stakeholders for developing land. The SNV organizes training 
courses for farmers on land development skills. 
The above process of LUPLA was found that this was not so different 
from the process of allocation in the PAM and 327 programmes, except the 
step of land use planning with the involvement of local people through the 
household survey and participatory mapping and making visual model (sand-
table of land use). Establishment of the LRC in the institutional set up step 
of the SNV project was also not found in the PAM and 327 programmes. 
The land registration activity was also designed through the village meeting 
but this step was short cut by the PAM and 327 programmes.  
This process was reported clearly in the report on LUPLA in Thua Thien 
Hue by the SNV Vietnam. Both the villagers and village or communes 
officers who were interviewed confirmed that the household survey and 
some village meetings were organized to make the land use plan with 
participation of the local people in making the model of the land use 
practice (sand-table) and mapping. However, information from group 
discussion with both women’s and men’s groups and from the household 
survey in Thuy Duong village showed that the land registration activity was 
not presented in the village meeting. The list of households who were 
approved to get forestry land in the village was also not informed to the 
villagers or put on the wallboard of the commune. When the author asked 
the commune and village leaders why was that, the answer was that because 
that too small an area of bare hills remained for allocation to household so 
we did not present it in the village meeting. The villagers did not know that 
the poorly planted forest area of the co-operative were allocated to some 
households in the village until they were asked to sell their labour for 
planting forest in the land for the households that were allocated forestry 
land through the project of the SNV.  
The land development plan was made after land use planning and 
allocation. As with the land registration activity, this plan was not presented 
to the whole village. The villagers did not know anything about the support 
from the provincial budget for planting forest on the allocated land or the 
principle of joined contribution of the state and people (the province supp-
orted 60 % in equivalent of 2.5 million VND for planting one ha of forest).  
The decision for cutting out the steps of informing the land area to be 
allocated and the plan of land development was made by the FWG with 
agreement of the commune authority in the position of owner of the 
project.  
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¾  In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) 
Before forest allocation implementation, all the natural forest and forestry 
land areas had been managed by the state forestry organizations. All most all 
the forest areas were managed by Khe Tre forestry enterprise for timber 
exploitation and development of forest based on the plan approved by 
provincial  DARD. The remaining areas had been managed by the Nam 
Dong DFPD with task of controlling illegal logging. As with the Phu Loc 
DFPD, the main task of Nam Dong DFPD was also controlling all the 
activities of forest exploitation and punishing illegal logging. 
The  PAM and 327 programmes were also implemented in Thuong 
Quang. The finding was that implementation was quite different compared 
to in the coastal commune. The process was more short cut and there was 
no record of forestry land allocation to households. The planted forest under 
the  PAM  and 327 programmes was considered as ineffective forest (very 
poor establishment) and was managed by the commune. Until 2003, it was 
allocated to households also by support from the SNV. 
It was also different compared to the Loc Tien commune in that both 
natural forest and forestry land were allocated to individual household and 
household groups at the same time. The process was similar to the process in 
Loc Tien which was also called LUPLA and a participation approach which 
was one of principles the donor (SNV).  
The general process of forestry land allocation (FLA) in the two 
communes can be summarized by table 7. 
The process of forestry land devolution in Loc Tien commune was 
implemented through the design by the different projects (the PAM and 327 
and  SNV projects). The major steps of the allocation process of those 
projects were similar. This is in line with conclusion of Fujita and 
Phengsopha (2008) through a case study in Lao that the government-led 
forest land allocation process is mainly similar to the donor-led programme. 
However, some steps were cut short in practice in Loc Tien because of 
different interpretations of the implementers based on their context. The 
short cuts were different in different projects although they were 
implemented in the same commune. The reasons and justifications for these 
short cut steps were also different. The interpretations were not based on the 
policy papers but on thinking and opinion of the state implementers at the 
district and commune levels and the relationship between them and with 
provincial department and the donor. The issue of power relation not only 
in preparing policy papers but also in implementation supports the position 
of Shore and Wright (1997). 
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Table 7. Brief process of forestry land devolution 
Theoretical process (SNV 
project- Loc Tien & 
Thuong Quang 2003)  
Gaps in practice of 
SNV project 
Theoretical process 
(PAM & 327 – Loc 
Tien, 1993-1997) 
Gaps in practice 
of 327 
programme 
Step 1. Preparation 
Institutional set-up: 
- Collection of baseline data 
and secondary data 
- Training on LUPLA 
method 
 
  
Step1. Preparation 
-Set up co-ordination 
Board, FWG (no 
LRC) 
- No collection of data 
-Training on allocation 
method 
 
 
Step 2.  Land survey & 
mapping land use situation 
- Village meeting to 
disseminate legal documents 
related FLA 
- Household survey 
- Map & develop symbolic 
models of land use 
 
  
-Not  implemented 
in Loc Tien, no 
presentation of land 
law in Thuong 
Quang  
Step 2. Informing forest 
land allocation to people 
 
 
- No survey 
- No mapping and 
developing model 
 
 
 
- Short cut or 
informal inform 
(no meetings)  
Step 3.  Preparation of land use 
plan & land allocation plan 
- Second village meeting to 
present land use planning & 
land getting registration 
- Third village meeting to 
finalize land use plan & 
inform list of households 
were accepted to allocate 
land 
- Sending for getting 
approval of LUPLA 
 
 
-No registration 
activity in Loc Tien 
-Not inform the list 
in both Loc Tien & 
Thuong Quang 
Step 3: Planning land 
use and sending for 
approval 
- Planning the areas 
can be used & 
allocated (by foresters) 
 
 
 
 
- Sending to DPC for 
approval (by FWG) 
 
 
- Planning on 
the papers based 
on secondary 
data 
Step 4. Allocation at the field 
with Putting names of 
households are allocated at 
commune office 
- Not put up in 
both communes 
Step 4: Allocating at the 
field  
Informal 
allocation 
through 
plantation plots, 
drawn sketch in 
the office 
Step 5. Completion of 
administrative procedure 
  Step 5: Completing the 
documents to send for 
approval and providing 
certification 
- Document have to 
keep at DPC 
Document kept 
at DFPD, late 
provision & 
different types of 
certification   
Step 6. Issuance of land use 
certificate 
Late provision of 
certification  in 
both communes 
  It is included in 
step 4 
Step 7. Supporting land 
development 
- Not inform to the 
villager 
- Not implemented 
in Thuong Quang 
  Did not have this 
step 
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Although the process was designed and supported by the same donor (SNV) 
in implementation, there was a short cut in the step of informing land 
registration in the village meeting in the coastal commune while it was 
implemented in the mountainous area.  
The information from the household survey, focus group discussion and 
in-depth interviews reflected that all the activities in the process that were 
reported by SNV Vietnam were implemented in the Thuong Quang 
commune; only the list of allocated households was not put in the 
commune's wallboard. The land development plan was done in Loc Tien 
but it was not developed in Thuong Quang and this commune also did not 
get any support from the province or donor for planting forest on the 
allocated land. When the author asked the commune and village leaders of 
Thuong Quang about this issue, they said that they could not find any 
funding source for planting trees although the forestry land was allocated. 
This depends on their relationship to the province or donor.  
This does not mean that the allocated forestry land will not be developed 
(planting trees) without funding of the government or the donor. This 
showed that implementation of devolution did not depend only on the 
policy papers made but it was influenced strongly by decision of the 
implementers (including state officers and the donor). This also confirms the 
power of the state organizations in implementing of forest devolution.  
As in the discussion in the chapter IV, in theory, the forest devolution 
policy empowered people the rights of using and managing the forest land 
along with supporting capital for planting and rehabilitating forest. 
However, in the case of Thuong Quang, support for developing the forestry 
land after devolution was not followed up because the provincial planning 
department did not implement it. Power relations appeared in making and 
practice of the policy as well. The intention of the policy may be kept on 
papers only because power in making decision is still held by provincial and 
district authorities. The endowment of rights from the devolved forestry 
land may not be transformed to entitlements from the land because of 
hidden social and power relations in practicing the policy. 
It is clear that implementation of FLA in practice relied much on 
interpretation and relationship of the local actors (commune authority and 
forest protection officers). With the same policy and state management 
system and even with the same donor but the activities of the process were 
carried out differently.  
Chapter  IV showed that making forest devolution policy papers was 
influenced mainly by the state policy makers at central level (their power in 
deciding the ways of making, power in using their knowledge). In contrast,   130 
implementation of the policy in practice depended on power of the 
implementer at provincial, district and commune levels (especially at district 
and commune level). This showed that power issue is center to understand 
policy in both making and implementation processes as argued by Shore and 
Wright (1997). However, to understand how power relations appear and 
influence implementation of policy, it is necessary to explore the 
interpretation of each project’s event and examine relationship between the 
implementer groups. Each event or activity in the implementation process of 
forest devolution was influenced not only by the policy paper but also 
mainly by attitude, behavior and opinion of the implementers in a specific 
context. This confirms the thoughts of Mosse (2005) that social and project 
life are complex so in building understanding of policy there is a need to 
examine interpretations and relations between the actors who are involved 
in implementing the policy. Did this lead to the different outputs and 
outcomes? This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
5.2.1.2. Natural forest allocation implementation process  
According to the regulations in the 1993 land law, revised and amended in 
1998 and 2001, natural forests and forestry land were allocated to households 
or individuals. Communities or villages were not the subject (in both the 
land law and forest protection and development law) for FLNFA. The 
concept of community forestry is also rarely found in the forest protection 
law (DZung, 2002; Phuong, 2001). In reality, in many mountainous 
provinces, some communities have been directly managing natural forest 
and forestry land in different forms which are (1) the forests that has been 
recognized and managed by the ethnic community informally; (2) the forests 
that have been contracted by the state forestry institution to the community 
for protection; (3) the forests allocated by the local authority (the PPC or 
DPC) for managing and gaining benefits from the forest's products (Tuan, 
2001). There was no natural forest devolved to individual households 
because it was often considered that there were not enough resources for 
managing due to its large area and remote location. In both cases natural 
forest management by village or household group in the two study sites 
were allocated by the local authority (at the provincial level in Loc Tien and 
at the district level in Thuong Quang).  
 
¾  In Loc Tien (the coastal commune ) 
The 511.9 ha of natural forest in Loc Tien were allocated to Thuy Duong 
village in 2001. This allocation was supported by the UNDP through the 
project  PROFOR Vietnam with the objective of supporting the national 
forestry programme to sustainably manage the forest to achieve a sustainable   131 
livelihood. It was the result of the continuing testing of a model of a village-
based natural forest management in Thuy Yen Thuong which is a 
neighbouring community of Thuy Duong village. Warfviage and Minh 
(2002) reported that the first testing of the model of village-based forest 
management in Thuy Yen Thuong was suggested by the Phu Loc DFPD 
based on discussions with the PFDD. This sub-department was also the 
project manager or the partner at the provincial level of PROFOR Vietnam. 
Initiation of the natural forest devolution in Thuy Yen Thuong was also 
seen to be a result of the activity of the head of the DFPD who was seen as a 
person who had an impressive knowledge and was motivated.  
Similar to the natural forest devolution project in Thuy Yen Thuong, the 
natural forest allocation (NFA) in Thuy Duong village was also initiated by 
the  DFPD but according to the project report, it was based on the 
requirement of the local community: "Proposal of the local community was sent 
to the DFPD".... and "In May, 2001, PROFOR received a suggestion from the 
Phu Loc DFPD to support and help local people manage 500ha of natural forest in 
Thuy Duong village...” (Warfviage & Minh, March, 2003). PROFOR 
Vietnam agreed to support the NFA to Thuy Duong village because the 
natural and socio-economic conditions in this village are quite similar in 
Thuy Yen Thuong (Ibid.). The need of the local community in Thuy 
Duong to obtain natural forest management was described in the report of 
PROFOR Vietnam. It appeared 5 years previously but could not be 
achieved because of a lack of budget for an inventory and making the forest 
map. 
However, information from in-depth interview with the village leaders 
and focus-group discussions, household surveys and in-depth interviews 
with the villagers indicated that the idea of NFA in Thuy Duong village was 
not initiated by them although they were interested in getting the natural 
forest in managing to benefit from the forest's products, especially timber.  
 
One day a foreigner visited our village and went to the field (including the forest area in 
the elephant stream) with some people form the DFPD and some village leaders and co-
operative. On the way was back, he asked me ‘do you want to get natural forest?’ And I 
said yes, we want. (A village leader, 15
th March, 2005). 
 
We were asked if we are interested in getting natural forest when they visited our homes 
and also in the village meeting. (some villagers said in the household survey in 
July and August, 2006). 
 
The officials from the province, some foreigners and some officers form the DFPD visited 
our village and asked "do you want to get natural forest for the benefits? At the beginning   132 
we (villagers) did not want because we were afraid that if the natural forest was allocated to 
the village then we could not exploit the products so our life will be very hard because at 
that time our life relied mainly in the forest. But we discussed in the meeting and agreed to 
get the forest for management.  (Focus group discussion with the forest 
protection group in Thuy Duong, 11
th January, 2007). 
 
The reflection of local people on initiation of NFA in Thuy Duong by the 
DFPD and the foreigner was contradicted the information that was collected 
from the profile of the village-based natural forest management and the 
project's report but it did not mean that natural forest allocation was not of 
interest to the local community. However, this reflected the nature of the 
process of devolution implementation and showed how the policy was 
interpreted by different actors. Who really decided when and where to 
devolve the natural forest? The power of making those decisions on the 
practice of devolution also falls under the DFPD. Related to initiation of 
natural forest devolution in Thuy Duong village, although the proposal for 
allocating the natural forest to the village was signed by the village head with 
attestation of the chairman of the CPC but we could say that in reality the 
process was initiated by the DFPD in support of the PROFOR project. This 
was confirmed when we interviewed an officer in the DFPD: 
 
The DFPD selected Thuy Duong village to allocate the natural forest because that was a 
hot site of deforestation by the villagers so we hope that the forest will be better managed if 
it is allocated to them... We had to help the village to develop the proposal because they 
had not enough capacity to do it... (A forester at DFPD, 5
th March, 2007). 
 
The above finding is quite different from the finding from the field visit of 
the NFA in Ea H'leo district (Daclak province) by Tan (2001) which was 
that the NFA was initiated by the plan of the PPC and the budget from the 
provincial investment and planning department. In the case in Dak Lak, an 
international donor just came after NFA had been started to support and 
facilitate it (Nghi, 2002). 
In the plan of the village for acquiring natural forest to manage it is said 
that there was a long history of the custom of protecting some natural forest 
area and it has been passed down orally in the village. However, the 
interviews with both village leaders and villagers showed that because of the 
existence of a new administrative system (from 1976), this custom did not 
now have any value. This showed that the initiation of NFA to the village 
was not influenced by the traditional custom but it was influenced by an 
innovative idea of outsiders (donors and forestry institutions). It is different 
from India where the Chipko movement resisted state commercial forest   133 
management and challenged the assumptions about joint forest management 
made by the forest administration (Springate-Baginski & Blaikie, 2007).   
   PROFOR got the suggestion from the DPFD in May (2001) to support the 
NFA to the Thuy Duong village. It took the village seven months from then 
to get the decision of the PPC on the allocation of 511.9 ha of forest (the 
decision was signed by the vice chairman of the PPC on 27 December, 
2001). Almost all the steps or activities of the process of NFA in Thuy 
Duong (especially the mechanism of benefit sharing) were similar to Thuy 
Yen Thuong. It is summarized below 
Step 1: Making an agreement on NFA 
Activity 1: Organizing the first meeting to make an agreement on NFA 
This was the meeting between the commune and village leaders and some 
representatives of the DFPD who chaired of this meeting. The DFPD 
presented the objective of NFA to the village for gaining benefits from the 
forest products with the support policy for getting management and use 
rights in the long term. The DFPD also informed them about the location of 
the forest area to be allocated. The members at the meeting discussed and 
agreed that the NFA to the village should be done. 
Activity 2: Organizing the second meeting to make an agreement on allocation with 
the whole village 
All the participants who attended the first meeting (commune and village 
leaders, representatives of DFPD) were also invited to this second meeting. It 
was chaired by the chairman of the CPC. In this meeting, all the issues that 
were discussed between the commune and village's leaders and the DFPD 
were presented to the villagers by the chairman and the DFPD  further 
explained more on NFA. The villagers were asked to discuss the issues 
presented and make an agreement for getting natural forest for management 
by the village. 
Activity 3: Collection of relevant data, and doing a household survey  
The background information of the village such as land use structure, 
population and labor or economic activity was collected. The officers from 
the DFPD and the representative of the commune and village did the survey 
by using the questionnaire to interview all the households in the village to 
understand the socio-economic conditions of the individual households, 
information about forest product uses, as well as attitudes of the local people 
towards the NFA policy. 
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Step 2: Inventory of the natural forest resources 
An inventory of resources of the forest area that was to be allocated to the 
village was carried out by the Agro-Forestry Inventory and Planning 
Institute, which belongs to the provincial DARD with involvement of some 
representatives of the PFDD in the DARD, some from the DFPD, the 
commune's cadastral officer, the village's head and some villagers who often 
went to the forest to collect products. Only the Agro-Forestry Inventory 
and Planning Station signed the report of the inventory's results because it 
has legal responsibility for the forest inventory. However, the village leaders, 
especially the villagers who have experience in timber logging participated 
and contributed their local knowledge to identify the timber species and 
estimate their volume.  
The volume of the timber was also measured and calculated by the 
professional foresters and different actors in the field agreed on the volume, 
as well as species composition of the forest area. The objective of the 
inventory was to identify the borders of the natural forest area, forest 
condition (with a major focus on volume and composition of timber species) 
and to prepare a map of the area to be contracted between the state and the 
village. 
This step was consider the most important step of the process and took 
the most human and financial resources which often could not be covered 
by the government’s budget. 
Step 3: Drafting the village's plan and the village's regulations for forest management  
In this step, with the support of some foresters from the DFPD, some key 
staff of the commune and village discussed a draft of the village's plan for 
forest management (including rights, benefits, responsibility of the village 
and solutions for management). The village's regulations (called Hương Ước  in 
Vietnamese) for forest management were also drafted. The content and 
detail process of developing these regulations were discussed further in the 
section 5.4 of this chapter.  
Step 4: Holding a village meeting for approval of the drafts mentioned in step 3.  
After finishing the draft of the management plan and the village regulations, 
a village meeting was organized, chaired by the head of the village and 
attended by representatives of the commune and the DFPD. The head of the 
village presented the draft of the forest management plan and the village 
regulations to the villagers. After that a summary of the regulations was 
distributed to all villagers in the meeting to let them read and understand 
clearly the regulation and then to make any comments. Then the villagers 
were asked to make their comments and come to an agreement at the end of   135 
the meeting. Some key commune and village leaders with support of the 
DFPD revised and finalized the plan and the regulation to prepare to send to 
the authorities for approval.  
This step was also considered as an important step in the process because 
all attempts of allocating forest to them would be invalid if the community 
did not approve the plan and the regulations that were drafted by the village 
leaders with support of the commune and the DFPD. 
Step 5: Submit to the authority for approval and issue the legal documents 
In Loc Thuy commune (the first place of implementation of NFA to the 
village of the PROFOR project), a workshop was organized with attendance 
by different institutions that work on forestry issues (the PFDD, the PFPD, 
the national Park, and the forestry faculty of Hue University) before sending 
to the district for approval. The objective of this workshop was to get 
comments from different stakeholders for the village-based natural forest 
management plan and the regulations. However, this step was not 
implemented in Loc Tien. After presenting the plan and the village's 
regulations and making an agreement with the whole villagers, the drafts 
were revised if needed (if there were comments from the villagers), they 
were signed by the head of the village and the chairman of the CPC.  
In preparation for submission to the PPC for approval of the proposal for 
a village-based natural forest management, an application was also written by 
the head of the village and all the documents (the plan of management, the 
village regulations, application and the report of the natural forest inventory) 
were sent to the district for approval in consultation with the DFPD before 
sending to the province level. 
At the district level, in consultation with the DFPD, the DPC proposed 
that the PPC approve the village plan for forest management and issue a 
decision regarding the management agreement. After getting the decision 
from the province, the documents were sent back to the DPC and then the 
village regulations for forest management were signed by the chairman of 
DPC. 
At the provincial level PFPD submitted and consulted the PPC to issue a 
decision approving the plan for management and protection of the natural 
forest area. The reason for making a decision at the provincial level was 
because the natural forest was allocated to the village and not to the 
individual households (regulated in the land law).  
Dzung (2002) reported that in the process of NFA in Thuy Yen Thuong 
(the first model of NFA in Thua Thien Hue), the FWG was the 
establishment. This activity was similar to the PAM or 327 projects or like 
step 1 in the process that was designed by the SNV project and was called   136 
the step of institutional set -up. This was also similar to the case of the NFA 
in Thuy Duong village. One officer from the DFPD said that the 
establishment of the FWG was inherited from the ways of the functions of 
the programme 327. However, it also depended on the principles of the 
programmes or projects or donors and on human resources of the state 
organizations. There was no representative of the district DARD and the 
PFDD in the FWG in NFA in Loc Tien because of time and human resource 
limitations.  
Information from the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews 
with local farmers or from the household survey showed that all the steps of 
the process of NFA in Loc Tien were implemented in practice as reported 
by the DFPD. This is different from the LUPLA's implementation process 
which was designed by and supported by the SNV project in 2003. 
Although the allocation activity was carried out four years before the 
author’s visit some villagers told clearly about how the meeting was 
organized and they were impressed by the presentation of some foreigners 
and a camera recorded the village meeting. A male farmer said: 
 
It was very animated. They (outsiders- foresters from the DFPD, foreigners....) hung the 
maps, they filmed by a camera. (Mr. H. in Thuy Duong village, 2
nd July, 
2006).  
 
The question is why was informing about NFA to the village presented 
carefully with recording by camera but short circuited in forestry land 
allocation to households by the PAM and 327 programmes or the SNV 
project. Is it a requirement of the donor or lack of resources? The answers to 
this question were different in the different cases. The reason for the short 
cut activity of informing forestry land allocation in the PAM and 327 
programmes was to save time and finance for the programmes but it was cut 
in the SNV project because the allocated land area was small. In the case of 
NFA, it was implemented because that is the project principle that was 
developed and monitored by the donor. The power of the donor forced the 
state officers to do that. The reasons for keeping or cutting out the step in 
the processes were different between the projects. However, in general 
those decisions were made by the district officials (from the DPC or the 
DFPD) or by the donors. Implementation of the forest devolution process in 
the commune depended on the interpretation and power of the external 
actors.  It is clear that power and interpretation are central issues to policy 
practice because it decided how the policy was implemented (Mosse, 2004; 
Shore & Wright, 1997). This may lead to differences of endowment and   137 
differences of entitlement between the beneficiaries although the same 
policy was implemented. This is discussed further in chapters VI and VII.  
 
¾  In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) 
As presented in section 5.2.1.1., it was different in Loc Tien, both forestry 
land and natural forest was allocated at the same time in Thuong Quang 
through support of the SNV organization. The process was designed by the 
SNV based on experience with the GTZ (German international cooperation 
enterprise for sustainable development) project in Son La. Also, this process 
was developed based on the experience of the NFA in Phu Loc because the 
SNV project came later than the PROFOR project (support by the UNDP) 
in Loc Tien (the coastal commune): 
 
A declaration from Nam Dong district (officers from the DFPD, representatives from some 
communes) came to ask us to share experiences in the process (steps) of natural forest 
allocation. (an officer from the DFPD in the costal area - open discussion, 
11
th July, 2007).   
 
The support for forestry land and natural forest allocation (FLNFA) by the 
SNV in Thua Thien Hue was started in Nam Dong (a mountainous district 
where Thuong Quang is located) due to selection by the provincial SNV 
project management board in consultation with the PFDD. However, 
selection of the communes in the district was done by the DPC with 
consulting with DFPD.  
  The proposal was also signed by the chairman of the CPC but 
information from open discussions and in-depth interviews with the farmers, 
commune and village leaders and foresters indicated that it also initiated the 
following top-down approach by the provincial SNV project management 
board, the DPC and the DFPD: 
 
The DFPD got the project and they brought it to the commune and the village's leader and villagers 
asked to come to the meetings to be informed about natural forest and forestry land allocation. (the 
head of village 5, 20
th August, 2006) 
 
Or The DFPD brought the project themselves to the commune. (the head of the 
village 6, 20
th August, 2006).   
 
The foresters from the DFPD and commune leaders came to the village to inform us about 
the allocation. (the head of village 1, 21
st August, 2006).    
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People and local leaders at the commune and village levels recorded that it 
was initiated by the DFPD but actually it was a result of the directive of the 
MARD on ‘Speeding progress of natural forest and forestry land allocation’ 
and the decision of the provincial SNV project director with support of the 
SNV:  
 
There was a directive of the MARD on speeding progress of forest allocation after issuing 
the decision 178 to the district and we (DFPD) were asked to consult for the district to 
initiate. It was also come from decision of the provincial SNV project director. (An 
officer at Nam Dong DFPD, 20
th August, 2006). 
 
The above information from different sources showed that it is difficult to 
conclude who initiated forest allocation to household groups in Thuong 
Quang but we can say it was started by outsider. This is different from 
Nepal where devolution of forest to user groups was originated from the 
traditional forest management practices of the local people and then the 
district forest office persuaded them to form the Community Forest User 
Groups  (Dev & Adhikari, 2007). 
 The steps of NFA in Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) were 
designed similarly to the process of the LUPLA in Loc Tien by the SNV with 
an emphasis on land use planning. However, as noted the process of forestry 
land allocation in Thuong Quang, it was implemented at the same time with 
the NFA. Almost all activities of the process followed the process designed 
by the project (including the meeting to inform about allocation), excepted 
putting the list of the households who were allocated on the wallboard and 
developing the plan for land use after allocation (step 7). The reason for not 
implementing the activity or step of supporting land development or land 
use (planting forest on the allocated land area) was that they could not find 
any support from any state or international organization (as presented in 
section 5.2.1.1.) so they let the farmers do it themselves. 
The general process of natural forest devolution in the two communes 
can be summarized in table 8. 
The process of forest devolution implementation in Loc Tien and 
Thuong Quang was developed by the donor with the same policy of the 
state and the province. There were differences in some steps and activities of 
the process implemented at the two communes that might have influenced 
the outcome of devolution (gaining endowment by the different social 
groups).    139 
Table 8. Summary of process of natural forest devolution 
Theoretical process 
(PROFOR project- Loc 
Tien, 2001)  
Gaps in 
practice of 
PROFOR 
project 
Theoretical process (SNV 
project- Thuong Quang, 
2003) 
Gaps in practice 
of SNV project 
Step 1. Making agreement in 
natural forest allocation 
- First meeting of 
commune and village 
leaders & the DFPD to 
make agreement in NFA 
- Village meeting to make 
agreement between the 
DFPD, local leaders & 
villagers 
- Collection of relevant 
data, doing a HH survey  
Step 1. Preparation 
Institutional set-up (District 
management board, FWG, 
LRC) 
Collection of baseline data 
and secondary data 
Training on the LUPLA 
method 
Step 2 
Inventory of the natural forest 
resources 
Inventory at the field by 
Forest inventory institute, 
the DFPD, representatives 
of commune and village 
Report the result of the 
inventory by forest 
inventory Institute 
Step 2.  Land survey & 
mapping land use situation 
Village meeting to 
disseminate legal documents 
related FA 
Household survey 
Mapping and developing 
models of land use 
Step 3. Drafting the village's 
plan for forest management 
and the village's regulations 
for forest management 
 
 
Only 
devolving 
natural forest 
 
 
- Devolving 
natural forest 
to village 
All the steps & 
activities were 
implemented 
 The 
regulations for 
collective 
management 
were 
developed and 
sanctioned  
Step 3.  Preparation of land use 
plan & land allocation plan 
Second village meeting to 
present land use planning & 
land getting registration 
Third village meeting to 
finalize land use plan & 
inform list of households 
were accepted to allocate  
- Sending for getting 
approval of LUPLA 
 
 
 
 
- Devolving 
natural forest at 
the same time 
with forestry 
land 
- Devolving 
natural forest to 
household 
groups 
- Step 7 was not 
implemented  
 
- No formal 
regulations for 
collective 
management 
 
 
Step 4. Holding a village 
meeting for approval of the 
drafts mentioned in step 3 
Step 4. Allocation at the field  
Putting names of the 
households allocated land at 
commune office 
Step 5. Submit to the 
provincial authority for 
approval 
and issue the legal 
documents 
Step 5. Completion of 
administrative procedure 
(consolidating all the 
documents: maps, 
application, minute )  
  Step 6. Issuance of land use 
certificate 
 
 
Step 7. Supporting land 
development 
   140 
The natural forest in Thuong Quang was allocated to the household groups, 
not to the village as in Loc Tien. The decision on devolving natural forest to 
Thuy Duong village for management was signed by the chairman of the 
PPC while it was a Red Book that was signed by the DPC in the 
mountainous commune. The regulations for collective management of the 
devolved natural forest in Loc Tien was formulated and then sanctioned by 
the district authority but it was in an informal form without sanction in 
Thuong Quang. The implementation process of the NFA in the two 
communes was also as complex as the forestry land devolution, with 
different interpretation by the external actors (the district institutions and the 
donors). 
 In summary, looking at the steps or activities in theory and practice of 
the FLNFA in the two study sites we can say that the designed process by the 
projects with support of the international organizations (PAM, UNDP or 
SNV) in cooperation with or with participation of the state organizations at 
provincial and district level (PFDD, DFPD) were not so different. This is 
similar to findings by Fujita Y. & Phengsopha (2008) through a comparison 
between the government–led and the donor-led FLNFA process that there 
was not a significant difference in the general process although the donor-led 
FLNFA spent more time to encourage active local participation. In this 
research, a key difference between the allocation programme of the 
government (327) and the donor-led programmes (PAM, PROFOR, SNV) 
was availability of budgets for project preparation and planning. 
Analysis of the specific steps and activities of devolving natural forest and 
forestry land in the two different communes showed that they were 
interpreted differently at the district and commune levels. 
The key differences between the two study sites are summarized below:  
-  Devolution of forestry land and natural forest in Loc Tien were 
implemented separately in term of time, finance source and donor but 
they were implemented at the same time and with the same donor in 
Thuong Quang. 
- The distribution of the endowments of the devolved forestry land in 
Loc Tien was based on “capacity” and “need” of a beneficiary while in 
Thuong Quang it was based on the custom of use. 
- The land registration activity was explained in the village meetings of 
the mountainous commune but it was not implemented or was short 
circuited in the coastal area because of different ideas of the commune 
and village leaders. 
- The forestry land devolved through the PAM and 327 programmes 
were basically to provide formal land use certification (Red Book) in   141 
Loc Tien but had no meaning in claiming land use rights in Thuong 
Quang (the mountainous commune). 
- Support for developing a plantation on the devolved forestry land by 
linking with the provincial institutions for financing forest planting 
existed in Loc Tien but not done in Thuong Quang. This was because 
the district foresters and the commune officer could not contact the 
province or donor while social relationships between the commune with 
the district and the provincial authority and donor provided the 
opportunity to get funding for implementing land development activity 
in Loc Tien.  
In an overview of land allocation in Vietnam, Sikor (2004) stated that there 
has been the diversity of local processes and outcomes. Through the case 
study on land allocation in Black Thai villages in Chieng Dong, Son La 
province, this author concluded that the different processes and outcomes of 
land allocation was the result of the interpretation by local officers reflecting 
their priorities for achieving a match with villagers who had the same 
background as theirs and also pleasing higher authorities to gain professional 
advancement (Ibid. - p. 190-191).  
In this research, the reason why the commune and the DFPD officers 
interpreted things that way was not explored deeply. However, a reason for 
making decision on allocating forestry land based on the land use custom in 
Thuong Quang may also be to identify with the customs of the Ktu 
community because almost all commune officers are Ktu people. In both 
study sites, the reason for the interpretations of implementation of the forest 
devolution policy may be not to gain professional advancement because the 
main actors at higher level who were involved in the implementation 
process did not have the function or capacity to advance those officers’ 
careers. The reason seems to be that of keeping relationships for getting 
private financial benefits because the implementer can get benefit from 
payment from the projects for working beyond their monthly salary. There 
were other informal relations hidden behind professional and background 
concerns leading to the interpretations of the commune and district officers. 
It is clear that the difference of these interpretations was not only 
dependent on the interests or perceptions of the actors but also resulted from 
power (in making decisions) and relationships of the actors in the process 
(power of commune leaders to not inform about allocation, power to set up 
criteria for allocation, based on the needs and capacity in Loc Tien or based 
on the traditional use in Thuong Quang). This again shows that power 
relations are the central issue in practicing the policy. Transferring the forest 
devolution policy from papers in to practice was interpreted by the state   142 
officers at different levels from the province to the district and commune, 
and it was different from case to case as well as from place to place. This 
reflected the complexity of social and project life and requires that policy 
implementation must be analyzed for each event and understood through 
communities of interpretation (Mosse, 2005). 
  Which actors have more rights in making decisions on the 
implementation of forest devolution? This is discussed further in the next 
section (section 5.2.2.) 
5.2.2. Actors and their roles in implementing forest land and natural forest 
allocation  
Although the FLNFA activities in the two study sites were implemented at 
different times and supported by different donors, there were some key 
actors involved in the processes with different roles and decision making 
rights. The actors and their roles are summarized in the table below: 
 
Table 9. Organizations or actors involved in the forestry land and natural forest allocation in Thua 
Thien Hue 
Key organizations 
or actors 
Roles 
Donor  - Funding finance 
- Training on participatory approach and facilitating participation in 
implementation of the FLNFA 
- Monitoring use of funded financial source and techniques based on their 
own principles 
At the  provincial level 
PPC  - Overseeing the different line departments and lower level people 
committee 
- Approving and issuing the decision to allocate the forest land or natural 
forest to village or organization  
PFDD    - Consulting the provincial project or programme management board and 
donor about selecting the target district  
- Assigning the task plan of the projects or programmes for the districts  
- Training on the process of allocation for the working groups at the district 
level 
- Attending the meetings at the district level to contribute ideas for the 
forest management plan 
- Examining the profile of allocation to consult the PCP for approval and 
issue the decision 
Forest Inventory 
institution  
- Inventory natural forest resources and sign the report on the resource 
situation of the natural forest 
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At the district level 
DPC  - Overseeing the CPC and the line departments or divisions at the district 
level (DFPD, district agricultural and rural development division, land 
management division or environment and resources division (from 2005) 
and coordinate the process 
- Approving the plan of land use or natural forest management of individual 
households or village or commune 
- Approving and issuing decisions or sign in the certification of the 
allocated forest land or the allocated natural forest area that is less than 
500ha 
Approving the village forest management rules or regulations   
DFPD  - Consulting speciality for the DPC 
- Coordinating implementation of the PAM and 327 programmes 
- Managing and assigning financial resources of the PAM and 327 
programmes that was distributed from the province to the target communes  
- Attending the whole process of allocation (especially planning forest land 
use- both at the field and in-door works (mapping the location of land in 
the computer))  
- Attesting the management plan and application of households or village  
- Completing the profile or documents of the allocation process to consult 
and submit to DPC for approval 
- Issuing the decision to revoke the allocated land that was not to be used 
or be used with the wrong objective 
DLAD  - Joining with the DFPD in the process of allocation 
- Reviewing the documents of allocation process to consult the chairman 
of the DPC to approve and issue land use right certification 
At the commune level 
CPC  - Joining with the DFPD in the process of allocation (especially working at 
the field) 
- Establishing  the Land registration council (LRC) to approve application 
of land use and decide to whom it is allocated 
- Attesting to the application and plan of land use of individual households 
or village to submit to the DPC and the PCP 
- Attesting and proposing to the DPC to revoke the allocated land that was 
not be used or used with the wrong objective 
Village or 
cooperative heads  
- Joining in the approving process of the LRC 
- Joining in field works of the allocation process with the CPC and the 
DFPD  
- Developing the forest management plan and regulation or rules of the 
village with support from the CPC and the DFPD 
- Informing the villagers to attend and organize the allocation meetings at 
the village level 
People  Participating in providing information, making agreements on the land use 
and forest management plans 
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¾  The roles of the donors  
The key role of the donors in the projects of forest devolution in both study 
sites (PAM, UNDP, SNV) was funding for implementing the projects. Along 
with supporting finance (in kind or in cash), the donors also offered some 
rules to ensure participation and benefit to people, especially to the poor. 
For example the rule of the FLA to the people before planting trees for 
creating stable income from the planted forest of the PAM or involving 
people in some steps of the allocation process of the UNDP or the SNV.  
In the projects of the UNDP and the SNV, another important role of the 
donor was enhancing a participatory approach in planning use and mana-
gement of forest land through providing training and advisory activities and 
doing experiments on participatory forest devolution. However, the UNDP 
was concerned mainly with strengthening capacity in participatory planning 
at the provincial and district levels while the SNV focused on all levels from 
the province to the district and commune.  
According to a comment of an official of the provincial DARD (Mr. D.), 
forest devolution in Thua Thien Hue province followed a programme 
approach. That means that without projects, forest devolution would not be 
implemented. This is because of a lack of finances by the government for 
implementing forest allocation and explains why the forest devolution 
programmes in Thua Thien Hue as well as in Vietnam were often 
implemented by funding by international organizations. The donors set up 
the principles for involving authority at all levels and people in the process 
of forest devolution. However, the decisions on which rights, to whom and 
where the forest land is devolved were made by the state institutions at 
different levels. This means that the donors mainly play the role of 
facilitating the implementation of devolution.  
 
¾  District Forest Protection Department 
The process of implementing the FLNFA was designed to involve different 
actors from the provincial to the grass root level (commune). However, in 
reality, only the DFPD was present through all steps of the process, including 
acting as an agency to attest to the documents of allocation before sending 
them to the authority for approval. In both communes where the field work 
was done, when the author asked the farmers about initiation or 
implementation of the PAM or 327 programmes or NFA, all the people who 
were asked said that the DARD carried out the projects or programmes 
related to the FLNFA in their commune and villages. In their eyes, the 
DFPD was as a bridge between the village and commune with donors, or 
with the institutions at the provincial level: 
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The DFPD brought the project to the commune and made an agreement with the 
commune leaders and then told the villages to disseminate the information about forest 
land allocation to the villagers. (Focus group discussion with the village leader 
group in the mountainous commune, 18
th March, 2007). 
 
Or The DFPD came with some commune officers and village leaders and asked us to plant 
trees (for the PAM or 327 programmes) or ask us about getting natural forest for 
management and benefits. (Women and men focus group discussions in the 
coastal commune, 12
th January, 2007). 
 
This was also confirmed by the communal officers or leaders and foresters: 
 
“The DFPD proposed to the donor and the provincial level to allocate forest land and 
natural forest in my commune” or "We went to the field with the DFPD to measure the 
forest land, to inventory the natural forest with the DFPD" or "We had the meetings 
with the DFPD and the DFPD helped us to develop the forest management plan" or 
"The DFPD designed the land and arranged the transport of trees to the village and asked 
us to plan”. 
 
or We (PFDD) only gave the training on the process of allocation and then the DFPD 
implemented all the activities. (An official as PFDD, 5
th June, 2006). 
 
The permanent vice chairman of the FLNFA management board at the 
district level came from the DFPD and he was the person who coordinated 
all the activities of the process. The head of the FWG was also a 
representative from the DFPD which had the highest number of the 
members in the FWG (around 3 people). It is clear that the key actor in the 
process was the DFPD. This was quite different compared to the finding by 
Thanh et al. (2004) in Dak Lak that the forestry enterprise controlled and 
conducted all field activities of the FLNFA because the PPC handed over the 
rights and directed it to do that. 
 Why did the DFPD play the coordination role in the FLNFA in Thua Thien 
Hue although the allocated natural forest area in Thuong Quang was 
revoked from Khe Tre forestry enterprise as in the case of Dak Lak? Is it the 
result of regulation in the legislation papers or interpretation of the actors in 
the process of implementation? The item 1 of the article 37 of the 1993 land 
law regulated that the cadastral sub-department is responsible to assist the 
DPC in inspecting land allocation but in the item 2 of the article 14 in the 
decree 02 of the government said that preparing the documents for land 
allocation is the responsibility of both the forestry institution and land 
administration department at the same level. However, from 1999, there   146 
was no role of forestry institutions in preparing the documents for land 
allocation and providing certification was regulated in the decree 163 of the 
government in 1999. Only the cadastral department was responsible for this.  
 In practice, all the FLNFA processes in both communes from 1987 to 
2003 were mainly implemented and co-ordinated by the DFPD. The reason 
for this was that the DPCs handed over the right of coordinating the 
allocation process to the DFPDs: 
 
The chairmen of the districts assigned the DFPDs to do that (An official from PFDD, 
4
th June, 2006). 
 
This was also confirmed by some officers from the DFPDs and communal 
leaders in both study sites. A leader of the DPC and two foresters explained 
that the reason for this was because the DLAD did not have enough human 
resources and professional skills.  
 Some officers from the DLAD also commented that from 1994-1998, 
when the DLAD had just been established, its human resources were limited, 
therefore they could not join in the PAM and 327 programmes. However, 
from the year 2000, especially when the DLAD was renamed district 
"Environmental and Resources Department", the human resources of the 
DLAD were improved but their attendance in the FLNFA was still limited. 
Although the revised 1998 land law and the decree for guiding 
implementation of the FLNFA in 1999 said that preparing all the documents 
and issuing land use right certification was the responsibility of the DLAD, 
the DPC still handed over the right to the DFPD because it believed that 
only the DFPD had enough professional knowledge to co-ordinate and 
implement the FLNFA. Commenting on this, an official from the PFDD said: 
 
This was an illegal assignment because the FLNFA is the responsibility of the district 
environmental and resources department (Mr. B., 4
th June, 2006). 
 
For the PAM and 327 programmes, the DFPD not only coordinated all the 
activities of these programmes (including making decisions on the selected 
species for planting the forest) but also managed and assigned the financial 
resources from the donor and the government to the communes or co-
operatives for planting trees. The DFPD was called the project's owner. 
Therefore, the roles and power of the DFPD in implementing these two 
programmes were strengthened because all the communes or co-operatives 
were interested in implementing the programmes to get cash or payment in 
kind (rice) for contributing the villagers’ labour. The DFPD was also 
devolved the right by the DPC to sign the management plan and the field   147 
minutes before submitting to the DPC for approval. For the map or the 
sketch of the land location, only DFPD signed to attest it. This is an 
important right to identify the land in practice.   
 For the NFA activity in Thuy Duong, which was supported by the 
UNDP, the DFPD was also the organization that wrote the financial proposal 
to submit to the donor and it managed and spent that funding (including 
payment for the commune, village leaders and officers who did the field 
work with them based on the principles of the donor).  
  It was different from the PAM and 327 programmes, the finance 
resource of the LUPLA project which was funded by the SNV in 2003 in 
both Loc Tien and Thuong Quang was proposed by the commune 
authorities. The DFPD played the role of support and facilitated the local 
authorities to manage that. Therefore, for the project of the LUPLA, the 
CPC was called the project's owner and the DFPD was the partner. Why was 
this different from the PAM or the 327 programme or the UNDP? Was it 
also a result of handing over the rights of the CPC or a result of regulation in 
the legislation papers? No, this was the principle of the donor because the 
objective was to strengthen the capacity at the commune level.  
 According to the SNV donor's principle, the funds also had to be sent 
directly to the commune authority. These funds had to be managed by the 
commune and spent for the activities of the LUPLA process. In reality, in the 
mountainous commune (Thuong Quang), the commune authority made a 
contract to transfer the entire the financial source to the DFPD to spend on 
the costs in the process (including the costs for the commune and village 
representatives to do the field work with the DFPD and for the meetings). 
When the author asked a leader of Thuong Quang commune about the 
reason for making the entire contract with the DFPD, he said that:  
 
We (the CPC) had to do that because the DFPD helped us to find the project and we need 
to do this to keep a relationship with them.  
 
In the coastal commune, the CPC made a partial contract with the DFPD 
based on the activities that were carried out by the DFPD. Why did the CPC 
have to hand their rights over the DFPD? Were they interested in doing 
this? No, this was because the CPC had to do that to keep a relationship 
with the DFPDs with the expectation that the DFPD will bring other 
projects to the commune in the future.  
  In summary, the roles of the DFPD in the process of the FLNFA in the 
two studied communes changed depending on many different factors such as 
regulation of the legislation papers, the idea and power of making decision 
of the DPC, principle of donors, and also on compromise of the DFPD with   148 
the CPC. The changing roles of DFPD may lead to change of outputs and 
outcomes of forest devolution because the DFPD has been considered as a 
bridge between the commune and outsiders (district and provincial 
authorities as well as donors).  
 The regulations on the roles and functions of the state institution in 
implementation of forest devolution in the policy papers seem to have a 
very limited meaning. The process of handing over the rights to manage the 
projects of devolution also showed the power of holding the financial 
resources. The actors who held financial resources funding for the project 
will have the right to decide who can manage it. It is clear that power 
relations are the central issues that decide how forest devolution was 
implemented. This also showed in the difference between policy papers and 
practice, proving that the linear model in analyzing policy is not realistic.  
 Different roles of the DFPD and different interpretations in handing over 
the rights in the implementation of forest devolution also reflected the 
complexity of project life (including compromise of the actors).  
 
¾  District People committee 
The responsibility of the DPC in the FLNFA was regulated clearly in the 
land laws and the decrees 02 and 163. However, in practice, the DPC was 
not directly involved in implementation of the allocation. The chairman of 
the  DPC just had the duty of signing the management plan and the 
certification after they were attested by the CPC and the DFPD.  
  
¾   District Land Administration Department 
Unlike the DFPD which was managed directly by the PFPD, the DLAD has 
been managed directly by the DPC. Its responsibility which was regulated in 
the laws and the decrees in all periods from 1993 is to help the DPC to 
implement land allocation (especially in preparing the documents of 
allocation - the application and management plans), review their legal status 
to consult the DPC to approve the documents and issue the land use right 
certification. In reality, the DLAD rarely attended to allocating projects or 
programmes although in the designed process one person from the DLAD 
had to have a representative as a member of the FWG. In all the projects and 
programmes of the FLNFA in both communes (Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang), the DLAD attended a few activities.  
 However, involvement of the DLAD in the process of the FLNFA was 
different between the coastal commune (Loc Tien) and the mountainous 
area. For the NFA process which was supported by the UNDP in Loc Tien, 
the DLAD attended the village meetings as a representative of the district to 
show the interest and support of the district in forest devolution. For the   149 
LUPLA process of the SNV in Loc Tien, the DLAD played the role of 
representative of the land management institution at the district level to 
attend to comment on the commune’s land development plan in the 
commune in the workshop between different stakeholders. For all the 
FLNFA projects in Loc Tien, the documents of allocation were developed, 
prepared and also kept by the DFPD  (including the certifications- "Red 
books" which were issued through the project of the LUPLA of the SNV).  
  The process of the LUPLA of the SNV  in Loc Tien was designed 
similarly to Thuong Quang because both of them were supported by the 
SNV and guided by the PFDD. However, the task of reviewing the 
documents of allocation and consulting the DPC  to provide "the Red 
Books" were carried out by the Nam Dong DLAD. The documents of 
allocation and the Red Books were kept at the office of the DLAD before 
being given to the villagers. However, the information from the open 
discussions with the commune and village leaders and farmers in Thuong 
Quang reflected that there was no attendance of the DLAD from initiation 
of the process to completing the documents of the allocation. This was 
contradicted the report of one official of the DFPD that the DLAD 
participated in the field work of the process.  
The evidence showed non-attendance of the DLAD in the field work of 
devolution in the mountainous commune as in the minutes of the village 
meetings only representatives of the DFPD signed them. The open dialogue 
with two officers from the DLAD indicated that in the implementation 
process of forest devolution in Thuong Quang, the DLAD only attended in 
the step of reviewing and consulting DPC to provide the Red Books. This 
means that there were differences between the two study sites in term of 
assigning the tasks in the process by the DPC to the district functional 
institutions although they were implementing the same policy with the same 
donor. Differences in the assigned tasks of the DFPD and the DLAD may be 
one of reasons why many foresters in the coastal region got the devolved 
forestry land because they hold more power in implementation of 
devolution, particularly given the right of the DFPD in consulting the DPC 
to decide whether the land is devolved to beneficiaries. This is discussed 
further in chapter VI.   
 
¾   Commune People Committee 
According to the regulations of the land laws and the decrees, the CPC is 
responsible for monitoring the dynamic of land use and keeping the map of 
the commune’s land use. In the process of land allocation, the CPC was 
devolved to attesting to the application and land use plan of individual 
households after the decision was made by the LRC on who was allocated   150 
the land. The decrees also regulated that a copy of the documents of land 
allocation (application, plan of land use, a sketch of the location of the land, 
decision of allocation of the local authority, and a minute of allocated land at 
the field) must be kept at the CPC. There was no clear regulation on the 
role of the CPC in the process of allocation in the land laws and the decrees 
but it was guided in the cross ministries circular of the MARD and Central 
Land Administration Department that the CPC was responsible for 
cooperation with the DLAD and the DFPD to allocate land at the field.  
 What role did the CPC play in practice of the FLNFA in the two study 
sites? In the coastal commune (Loc Tien), for the PAM and the 327 
programmes, the CPC played an intermediate role between the DFPD and 
the co-operative or village by informing them of the plan and activities of 
the programme to mobilize local people to plant the forest to get rice or 
cash from the programme. All the activities of designing for planting the 
forest and distributing the plot of land to the households at the field were 
carried out by the DFPD although the district management board of the 
PAM and the 327 programmes regulated that representatives of the CPC had 
to be involved in the FWG. The open discussion with some commune 
leaders showed that because the DPC devolved totally rights of 
implementation to the DFPD. Some officers from the DFPD said that was 
because of the CPC’s limited human resources.  
 However,  the  CPC was given an important right of signing the 
documents to attest before sending to the DPC for approval. Even the 
certifications provided to the households in these programmes were an 
informal type (the white colour decisions paper that could not be used as 
security for a mortgage, as with a Red Book). If any document in the profile 
of allocation missed the signature of the chairman of the CPC, it would not 
be accepted by the DPC. In the case of the FLA in Loc Tien through 
support of the PAM programme, some allocation documents were signed by 
the DFPD but the CPC refused to attest because they determined that use of 
the land was not effective. These cases were rejected and not sent to the 
DPC for acquiring the Red Books.   
  It was different in the PAM and 327 programmes, in the cases of 
implementing  NFA to Thuy Duong village in 2001, and the LUPLA in 
2004, the CPC was involved in almost all the steps of the process but it was 
still in the position of a member, except with the right to attest to the 
documents.    
  
¾   Village or Cooperative 
The villages and co-operatives are not administrative units in the political 
system in Vietnam. Therefore, there was no regulation in the land laws and   151 
the decrees of assigning responsibility to the village or cooperative in the 
process of land allocation. Only in the two circulars of the Central Land 
Administration Department (the circular TT 346 in 1998 and circular TT 
2074 in 2001) are there regulations involving the village in the LRC of the 
commune, but just in the case of allocation in its own village.  
 Although the role of the village or cooperative was not recognized in 
the legislation papers, the DPC gave it the right to attend the FWG in the 
process of allocation. In reality, its role in the PAM and 327 programmes was 
also in the form of implementing the commands from the DFPD to direct 
the villagers to plant the forest as the CPC but at the village or cooperative 
level.  
 In Loc Tien, the cooperative (the manager at the village level in the 
period of collective production) was the manager of 40ha of planted forest 
under the PAM programme and kept the profile of allocation. At present, it 
plays the role of service provider of fertilizer, irrigation and managing the 
ecotourism service in the elephant stream. 
 In the case of the NFA in Thuy Duong village (Loc Tien commune), 
the head of this village was the person who drafted the management plan 
and the village rules with the support from the DFPD and the CPC. A copy 
of the allocated profile (the village rule, the village forest management plan, 
the decision of the PPC and the map of the allocated natural forest area) has 
been also kept by the head of the village. The head of the village took these 
roles because he played the representative of the forest user (village). For the 
FLA to individual household of the SNV project in 2003, the head of the 
village was in the position of the village leader to attest to land use status and 
capacity of the households in the village to report to the LRC of the 
commune to make decisions regarding who is allocated land. In the process 
of LUPLA which was supported by the SNV, the head of the village was also 
involved in the FWG in practice. 
 For the mountain commune, in the period of collective production, the 
cooperative also played the role of coordinating people to plant forest under 
the  PAM and 327 programmes. However, there was no existence of the 
cooperative any more after de-collectivization. There was also no profile of 
the FLA of the PAM and 327 programmes. The role of the villages' leaders in 
implementing the LUPLA in the SNV project was similar in Loc Tien. 
 
¾   People 
The role of people was different between the projects and programmes. 
They were involved more in the projects or programmes which were 
facilitated by the donors. In general, people played the role of providing   152 
information, making agreement on the land use and forest management 
plans. This is discussed further in section 5.3 below.  
To sum up, in general, provincial authority played a more important role 
in deciding where the natural forest and forestry land should be devolved 
while the DPC have more authority in making decisions on how the process 
of forest devolution was implemented and co-ordinated at the field. The 
DFPD and the CPC got more power in attesting to the applications and the 
field documents such as location of the allocated plots, which are the main 
basis for the DPC to decide whether to provide the certification. However, 
the specific roles of the actors in the process of the FLNFA were different 
between the projects or programmes, or between locations (districts) even 
with the same donor. This difference was not the result of different state 
policies but the interpretation of the different actors (through principles of 
the donors, power of the DPC and the DFPD) and also by their relationships.  
This reflected that the implementation process of policy in practice was 
very complex and was influenced by an interpretation community (Mosse, 
2005). These different interpretations of local actors (district and commune 
authorities) were the result of pursuing their private priorities and concerns. 
Implementation of policy in practice also was influenced by the decision 
making power of the actors. The difference in interpretation of the different 
actors may create a space for opening the door to power relations that 
influence the gaining of endowments to the devolved forestry land and 
natural forest and thus entitlements of different social groups, as well as 
management practices and conflict after devolution.  
 Output and outcomes of policy depend not only on the interpretations 
of external actors but also on the involvement and participation of the 
beneficiaries (Mosse, 2005). The next section presents attendance and the 
nature of involvement of the villagers in the process of the FLNFA. It 
provides a basis for understanding how different social groups gaining the 
endowments of forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state.   
5.3. Involvement of local people and the nature of their 
participation   
Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007) listed two aspects of participation of 
local people in the JFM (participation in planning forest management and in 
delivery of the plan). They argued that one of the key outcomes of 
participation is the impact on livelihood and hypothesized that this will be 
beneficial since a participatory process will reflect needs and opportunities 
for the poor. However the practice of participation tends to disregard   153 
existing inequalities. This section discusses how social and economic groups 
(poor and non-poor, women and men) were involved in the process of 
forest devolution. What were their roles and were they engaged in the 
process? 
 As presented in the section 5.2.2., in the PAM and 327 programmes, 
there were no any village meetings that were organized to inform the local 
people about the policy of allocation although it was designed as a step in 
the process. The villagers were also not consulted about land use planning 
which was actually made on paper based on the secondary data. For the 
PAM programme, the donor tried to sustain benefits for the local people in 
planting forest by setting up the rule of allocating forestry land to farmer 
households, especially to the poor farmers. However, the opportunity to get 
the allocated land (a type of endowment) for poor farmers was limited (this 
will be discussed further in the chapter VI). Involvement of the local people 
in the PAM and 327 programmes was passive in being asked to contribute 
labour for payment. For the farmers who got the forestry land, the selection 
of species for planting was not their decision but that of the DFPD. 
 For the devolution of natural forest to Thuy Duong village (support by 
the UNDP) and the LUPLA (support by the SNV), the villagers were more 
engaged in the process through the village meetings. They were able to 
make comments and make agreements in the forest management plan and 
the village rules. Sixty five percent of villagers (including the poor) attended 
the meetings in both coastal and mountainous communes (see table 10 
below). 
Table 10. Hearing information about the NFA and the LUPLA by economic group 
Loc Tien  Thuong Quang        Location 
 
Attendance  
Poor (n = 29)  Non-poor (n = 
30) 
Poor (n = 30)  Non-poor (n = 
29) 
1. Hearing information: 
Frequency   19  21  24  29 
Percent 65.5  70.0  80.0  100.0 
2. Attending meetings 
Frequency   23  21  23       28
Percent 79.3  70.0  83.0   96.6  
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
Note: - Poor household: an average income per capita per month equals to or less than 200,000 VND 
(equivalence of 12.5USD) 
- Non-poor household:  minimum average income per capita per month is higher than 200,000 VND. 
(Classification criteria according to the decision 170/2005/ TTg of the prime minister in 2005) 
 
More than 65 % of households from both the poor and the non-poor group 
who heard about the NFA and the LUPLA and also attended the meetings in   154 
the process of implementation of devolution. Did this reflect the fact that 
the local people engaged well in the process of forest devolution? For the 
project of the UNDP and the SNV (in both communes), the donors tried to 
build capacity for the state officers and local authority (at both the commune 
and district levels) in a participatory way by designing the process to involve 
local people in some steps of the process. What were the roles of the 
villagers in the meetings?  
 For the NFA project in Loc Tien, they were informed about the policy 
of allocation and asked to discuss their interest in getting natural forest for 
protection and receiving benefits. They were also asked to make comments 
on the forest management plan and the village rule (Hương Ước) which were 
developed by the commune and village leaders with support from the 
DFPD. What was the meaning of this in the context of very short meetings 
(maximum was 2 hours) with attendance of 150 people (according to the 
result of the household survey 90 % of total household attended)?  
 When asked about their understanding of the village's rule for managing 
the forest, most of them were told the regulations of the state that issued the 
forest protection and development law (regulations on banning exploitation 
of timber and hunting animal). These regulations were spread by the DFPD 
for along time with many replications and distributed to every household in 
the village in the form of a written paper (commit to forest protection):  
 
We are not allow to log timbers...,… everybody has to protect the forest and in the 
future.., we are going to get benefit from the forest… (most of the respondents said 
in a general form).  
 
This showed that their participation in the process was still passive because 
they came to the meetings and put up their hand to make agreement with 
the rules but did not understand about their responsibilities and benefits 
which was stated in the village's rules.   
 For the LUPLA in the SNV project, because the principle of the donor 
was to try to apply a participatory approach in planning land use, the 
villagers (especially key informants) were actively involved in the planning 
activity (building a sandtable, field survey, identifying boundary of the 
village and the type of land use of the village, etc.). The villagers were also 
invited to a village meeting to review the land use plan of the village, which 
was made by the FWG with attendance by some key informants of the 
village. The meeting was also organized in the short time (from 1 to 1.5 
hours) with attendance of around 50 persons (in the mountainous 
commune) to around 150 people (in the coastal area) who represented the 
households in the village. Why was there a very high proportion of   155 
households attending the meeting but they still did not know the poorly 
planted forest area in the PAM programme had been allocated to some 
individual households? What was the nature of their participation? Did they 
come the meeting to discuss the land use status and how to use the land of 
the village more effectively or did they just come to listen to the external 
actors (DFPD) and local leaders present land use for their village? 
  In the mountainous commune, the proportion of households who 
attended the meetings of the FLNFA was higher than in Loc Tien (see table 
10) but when asked, the villagers also confused the village's rule with the state 
regulations in the forest protection and development law. Most of 
respondents said that "We were not allowed to log timbers, or hunt animals…, we 
have to participate in preventing and stopping forest fires" which was the major 
content of the commitment to protect forests which was disseminated many 
times by the DFPD.  
 In practice, no village rule which was developed formally in the process 
of the LUPLA because the natural forest was allocated to the household 
groups. The villagers in village no. 1 also did not know that the forestry land 
which was reclaimed by them in the traditional land use system (not 
recognized by the state) was allocated to village 6 although the FWG raised 
the questions in the meetings and made agreement that the land area was in 
the location of village 6 it should be allocated to the households in village 6. 
The presence of the villagers in the meetings seems to be more about 
listening to and answering the questions of the officers from the DFPD and 
commune leaders even if they did not understand because of problems of 
communication which is discussed further below.  
 The decision of devolving natural forest to household group was also 
made by the DFPD, not by the villagers:  
 
We think that it is better if the natural forest is devolved to the village because all the 
households can get benefits and it is easier for preventing the illegal loggers but the DFPD 
decided itself to allocate to household groups (Focus group discussion with male 
group in Thuong Quang, 26
th August, 2006). 
 
In both two study sites, the villagers did not know how long the natural 
forest was allocated to their village or their groups: 
 
We heard from the officer of the DFPD in the village meeting that receiving natural forest 
for protection to get timber to construct houses or for household use but we did not know 
how long it was devolved to our village. (Focus group discussion with female and 
male group in Thuy Duong, 12
th January, 2007).  
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Or The DFPD read the paper in the meeting that getting natural forest for protection will 
provide timber and benefits for our children so we registered to get it but we did not know 
how long it was devolved to our group. (Focus group discussions with the forest 
protection groups in village 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Thuong Quang, 11
th  to 14
 th 
March, 2007) 
 
Or My group got the natural forest to protect for getting timber for our children but I did 
not know for how long it was devolved to us. (In-depth interview- Mr. T. in 
Thuong Quang, 5
th March, 2007). 
 
This comment was also found in the extended dialogue with some 
respondents in the household interview in both study sites. People also did 
not understand the type of the certification of the devolved natural forest 
(the decision or Red Book) and their understanding about the value of the 
certification which is an important issue to a land user and regulated clearly 
in the land law and the decree was more limited: 
 
We just hear about getting natural forest to protect from illegal loggings and to get benefits 
but we did not see the certification of natural forest use…, we did not know what colour it 
is…   or We want to get natural forest to protect to get timber and rattan, honey for my 
children but we have not seen the certification, we did not know it is in white or red colour 
and what  value it is… or …I thought that getting certification means that my family can 
use it for planting trees… but I do not know what is the value of the Red Book…  
(information from poor women and male and female  groups in Loc Tien 
or from forest protection groups in Thuong Quang or from in-depth 
interviews with Mr. Th. in village 1, Mr. C. in village 3 in Thuong 
Quang on 5
th July, 2007; and some respondents in the extended dialogue 
of the household interview). 
  
In a study on the influence of forest devolution in Lao, Fujita & Phengsopha 
(2008) concluded that the nature of local participation in the process of 
government-led FLA in Laos is limited. The presence of the villagers in the 
process of FLNFA in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang communes did not 
reflect their engagement. The nature of their participation in the process was 
still in the form of consultancy although the donor's objective was to try to 
involve local people and try to strengthen the capacity of the state officers 
and local authority in using a participatory approach in land use planning 
and land allocation. What reasons led to this problem? This is discussed 
below. 
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¾  Reasons for limited understanding about the forest devolution policy 
- Ways of transferring policy information 
The evidence from different sources (formal survey, focus groups 
discussions, in-depth interviews) reflected that the ways of transferring policy 
information in the process of forest devolution implementation was one of 
the key factors influencing understanding of the policy and participation of 
people in the process. 
 Dissemination of the policy content to local people before implementing 
an allocation activity is an important step for a household in making a 
decision on getting forest land and it is also important to achieve 
sustainability of forest management after devolution because the receivers 
need to understand their responsibilities and benefits.  
 The activity of informing about the state forest devolution policy was 
designed in the allocation process of all the projects and programmes 
implemented in both two studied communes. However, it was cut out or 
implemented in an informal way in some cases in Loc Tien (the coastal 
commune) such as the PAM projects, the 327 programme and the LUPLA 
(the SNV project) which trained or informed the policy to the FWG only 
and was just told to the villagers by the village leaders without a monitoring 
mechanism (as presented in section 5.2.2). What was the quality of 
information transfer in these cases? How did local people access to reports of 
the village leaders because there were about 150 households in the village 
but only one village leader attended the FWG to learn about the policy from 
the DFPD?   
 The quality of the transfer of policy information depended not only on 
the method of the dissemination but also on the ways of presenting the 
contents of the policy. For the NFA to Thuy Duong village and the LUPLA 
of the SNV project in Thuong Quang (the mountain commune), the activity  
of informing about the policy was not cut out but it was presented in the 
village meeting. How was it presented and what was was the quality of the 
information transfer? The focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and 
reviewing the meeting's minutes in both study communes showed that 
almost all village meetings that present benefits and responsibilities of the 
forest user before registration to get natural forest or barren hills for planting 
forest were organized at night (from 7.30 pm. to 8pm. - according to the 
minutes of the meetings) in both study sites. So, some poor households 
whose houses are often located far from the center of the village and 
commune could not go to the meetings:  
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My house is in an isolated location so I did not get the information of the village’s head 
and I could not attend the meeting. I just know the commune allocated the natural forest 
some days latter from reports of some villagers. (Mr. B. in village 4, mountainous 
commune, 2
nd August, 2006)  
 
or We live in the new residential area that is far from the village center so it was hard for 
us to go to the village meeting at night…, sometimes we could not hear the information 
from the loudspeaker of the village because it is located far from our houses so we could not 
go to the meeting… (Mrs. G., Mr. S. in the new settlement area of Loc Tien, 
19
th July, 2006). 
 
The way of presenting the state policy papers (the Decision 178 on 
regulations of benefits and responsibilities of land and forest users) was 
lecturing from the thick paper and in a short time (maximum time of each 
meeting is 2 hours) with attendance of the whole village (around 35 to 60 
households in the mountainous commune and about 150 households in the 
costal commune). The day time workload combined with poor facilities 
(lack of electricity and lights) in the meetings and the presentation method 
made it difficult for the people to get the ideas of the policy paper. 
Information from the in-depth interview with some villagers showed that 
they did not know about the allocation policy, they just followed the other 
villagers to vote when they were asked to make agreements for getting forest 
land or in passing the village's rule (Hương Ước): 
 
I did not understand what the allocation policy was, when I came the meetings and heard 
a commune leader and an officer from the DFPD reading something over a rather long time 
but it was noisy because the meeting was crowded and then I  heard some villagers who 
seated next me said that if you agree to get natural forest to receive timber in future, you 
have to raise your hand and I followed them to raise my hand. (A widow woman in 
Thuy Duong village, 17
th January, 2007). 
 
For the PAM programme, the villagers did not understand regulations of 
allocation before planting when they attended in planting and nursing forest; 
they said that they just knew when the cooperative asked them to go to 
plant trees. They came to plant to get rice because almost all households in 
the region at that time did not have enough food to feed the family. A 
widow woman (Mrs. S.) said that she saw the neighbours go to plant forest 
and she followed them to go to do the same to earn rice for feeding her 
children. She said that the planting activities were managed by the officers of 
the DFPD. The foresters monitored the planting process, if the person does 
not plant well or effectively, they were not allowed to plant more. This   159 
reflected the interest of the farmers at that time in planting forest to get rice 
and the needs for labour contribution to planting forest was higher than the 
capacity for creating employment for the local labourers of the PAM 
programme. However, the villagers did not get information about land 
allocation or rules of the donors. When being asked, some local officers 
answered that even they had worked for the commune at that time but they 
also did not get that information.  
 For  the  FLNFA in Thuong Quang (the SNV project), the foresters 
presented the long policy paper in a short time and in the national language. 
Although there were some local leaders who can speak the ethnic language 
attending the meetings to act as interpreters but they were often too shy to 
ask questions. Therefore, many of the villagers could not clearly understand 
the presentation. 
 When the author asked the villagers who were involved in the meetings 
of the allocation process: “Do you know the benefits and responsibilities of forest 
users?", the villagers responded with some general issues that are often 
presented by the foresters of the DFPD for a rather long time as propaganda 
activities to improve awareness of the people for protecting forest in many 
places in the province. They did not clearly understand the benefits or rights 
in the state decision 178, and they especially did not understand the land 
law. This is the consequence of the methods of transferring policy 
information in the meetings along with the fact that many villagers have a 
limited education. More than fifty percent of total households in the 
commune are ethnic people who do not clearly understand the national 
language (Vietnamese). 
     Commenting on this issue, the chairman of the CPC in Thuong Quang 
said that:  
 
We knew something about the allocation policy because we (commune and village leaders) 
joined three meetings with the DFPD before organizing the village meetings but I thought 
that people could not understand the policy because the meetings was run too fast. The 
reason was that the officers of the DFPD tried to read fast to keep on-time to be back their 
office in the district town and because they were young officers who have not enough 
experience presenting the contents effectively. (12
th August, 2006). 
 
 - Mechanism of information feedback 
Endowments and entitlements as well as management practice and conflicts 
resulting from forest devolution of the state are also influenced by the 
mechanism for information feedback between the actors. The in-depth 
interview with the village, commune leaders and officers from the DFPD 
reflected the fact that the mechanism of giving feedback in all activities of   160 
the FLNFA in both communes was a report upward to a higher authority 
level. The common way of giving feedback on implementing forest 
devolution activities was reporting from lower to higher levels (commune 
authority reported to district level and district level reported to provincial 
level or donor). There was no short circuiting on this process with for 
example the commune authority reporting directly to the provincial level 
over the district. This sometime created difficulty for people to claim their 
rights or benefits related to the devolved forest area. For example, when a 
part of the devolved natural forest area of a group in village 5 (Thuong 
Quang commune) was encroached upon for clearing for planting trees, the 
group reported to the commune authority and got the answer that this needs 
to wait for a decision from the DFPD. The group could not report directly 
to the DFPD although their forest was planted with trees by others.  
 There was also very little feedback from a higher level to the people 
although the regulations of democracy at the grass roots level have been 
developed and encouraged in the state policy paper. The problems that 
occurred in the process therefore were difficult to solve. For example when 
a group who had been allocated natural forest caught people doing illegal 
logging, they reported them to the commune authority and the DFPD. The 
result was the district department took all the illegal logged timbers without 
any feedback and explanation. Another example is that until July of 2006 
(after 3 years of allocation), they have still not given the red certifications but 
there was no feedback from the functional institutions at higher levels (in 
Thuong Quang). In Loc Tien, some villagers submitted the decisions that 
confirmed their land use right before 1995 to claim for getting the Red 
Book but they have not got any feedback from the commune and district 
authorities (information from interviewing the poor households and 
discussion with the poor women group in Loc Tien).  
 In general, the method and skills of the dissemination of policy 
information and the mechanism of giving feedbacks of the actors in the 
process of implementing FLNFA in the two studied communes influenced 
the understanding of the policy and contents of forest management practices 
(setting up rules for management, maintaining the management activities 
after allocation, security of land tenure). How did it influence endowment 
of the FLNFA, efficiency of natural forest and forestry land management or 
conflicts after allocation and the entitlements and livelihood of local people? 
These issues will be presented in the chapter VI. 
¾  Gender aspect of participation in implementation of the FLNFA 
Feminist environmentalists (Agarwal, 2001a; Agarwal, 2001b; Cleaver, 1998; 
Agarwal, 1997a) emphasize the everyday dependence of women and men   161 
on natural resources for their different interests. Therefore, the presence of 
both women and men in making decisions on natural resource management 
(especially forest resources) is very important for gaining equal endowments, 
entitlements as well efficiency and sustainability of natural resources 
management initiatives. However, there are still critical questions about 
gender equity in setting up natural resource management regime that can 
exclude women from decision making and gaining benefits (Agarwal, 
2001a). 
The absence of women in collective action for building the institutions 
of natural resources management will increase the negative influence on 
women (losses of endowments and entitlements) and reduce sustainability of 
natural forest common management regime because their interest or 
preferences in forest use are not taken into account (Agarwal, 2001b; 
Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Agarwal, 2000; Ostrom, 1999; Cleaver, 1998; 
Agarwal, 1997b)   
This sub-section discusses the attendance of women and men in the 
process of implementation of FLNFA as the basis for gaining endowments 
and entitlements from the devolved forestry land and natural forest in 
chapter VI and VII. Two aspects of participation are presented and discussed: 
the presence of women as members of the village and the presence of 
women as members of the LRC. 
 
- Attendance of women and men in the pre-aallocation meetings 
As discussed above, the meetings in the process of the NFA are important for 
helping the people to understand the state policy which is rarely presented 
on the public medium. The meetings are also organized to develop and 
make agreement on the new institutions for forest management. For the FLA 
to individual households or household groups, along with informing the 
state policy, the meeting is also the time for informing people to register 
with the LRC for getting the land.  
The field work from the study sites showed that the presence of women 
in the meetings preparing for the allocation was very limited. In Loc Tien, 
only 14 % of total female respondents attended the meetings. This situation 
is not better than in the mountainous site (Thuong Quang). There also 18.3 
% of the total of female interviewees participated in the pre-allocation 
meetings. Almost all the women who attended the meetings are widows or 
the women whose husbands are ill or have gone away or in the case of 
going went with the spouse. However, even though the women attended 
the meetings, their participation is still limited because of a common 
characteristic of keeping silent or hesitation to speak, which is a result of   162 
custom where it is thought (by women also) that men have more knowledge 
than women so their voice is more important.  
This was observed when the author did the focus group discussion with 
the mixed group: the women rarely were the first speakers in the discussion. 
Indeed, participation of the women in the meetings is still limited even 
when they attended the meetings. However, it depends on the attitude of 
the facilitator or coordinator of the meetings. In the discussion of the mixed 
group, when the author asked directly, some of them felt comfortable 
enough to speak out, but there are still some women who just smile when 
they were asked although the author tried to encourage them to speak out. 
- Attendance of women and men at the council of land allocation  
Before allocating forestry land to individual households, the application has 
to be approved by the council. There is not a separate council for approving 
forestry land, just one for all types of land (including agricultural, forest and 
settlement land). According to the government regulation, the members of 
this council are representatives of the authority and mass organizations of the 
commune and the heads of the village. The representatives who participated 
in the meeting to approve land allocation often are the heads of those 
organizations. In both communes where the author did the fieldwork, all of 
the heads and even members of local political organizations are men, except 
for the women’s union. All the heads of the villages in these two communes 
are also men. It is clear that the presence of the women in the LRC is 
limited. This can be considered the men’s council. 
Arguing about participation of women in making decision on water 
management in Nkayi district, Zimbabwe, Cleaver (1998) stated that 
although women were involved in the “Water-point Committee”, there 
was still less empowerment of women. This is similar in the case involving 
the women’s union in the LRC in the policy paper but in reality 
representatives of the women’s union were rarely invited to the meetings of 
the LRC although this was regulated by the state. 
- Reasons leading to less attendance of women 
  Almost all interviewees said that the traditional way of informing the 
household of a meeting is by invitating a representative of a household 
which is often culturally understood to be the head who is both traditionally 
and formally considered to be a man (social norms indicated that the man is 
the family’s owner and the man is also formally registered as a representative 
of the household by the authority). 
   163 
The head of the village often informs the household’s head to attend the meetings, so 
women just go when their husbands are absent or when she is a widow. (Mrs. Ti. in 
village 1 of Thuong Quang commune, 24
th July, 2006. 
 
Or Officer of the village informed that “tell the head of household to go to the meeting 
tonight”, he all way says it like that so I often go to attend the meetings. (Mr. T. in 
Thuy Duong village, 12
th July, 2006.)  
 
It is similar to the findings of many scholars that time limitations due to 
housework is another obstacle to presence of women in the meetings for 
preparing and implementing forest devolution. In both communes where 
the author did the field work, the meetings were normally organized in the 
evening when the production activity is stopped but that is the time for 
cooking meals, or taking care children or preparing food for feeding animals, 
all of which are traditionally the women’s responsibilities. 
Another reason was that the participatory approach in the FLNFA, 
introduced by the donors, was not concerned with gender aspects. The-
refore, although the proportion of households who attended the pre-
allocation meetings was around 80 % only 14 to 18 % were women. 
Devolution activities were initiated by the international donors who focus 
on promoting participation of local people but not from a gender 
perspective.  
Lack of women’s participation in the meetings and in making decisions 
of the LRC  may limit their opportunity to gain endowments and 
entitlements from the devolved natural forest and forestry land. This is 
discussed further in chapters VI and VII of the thesis. 
To sum up, in both study sites, a high proportion of people attended the 
process of forest devolution implementation supporting intentions of the 
donors and the state organizations in applying a participatory planning 
approach. However, because of limited skills and time of the policy 
implementers and mechanism of information feedback in practice of 
devolution, understanding about the forest devolution policy by local people 
was limited. Participation of local people was still in a consultant form for 
making agreements on the ideas raised by the outsiders. Their participation 
in the process of devolution implementation seems to address the concerns 
of outsiders rather than making real decision (Chambers, 1995; Chambers, 
1983). 
   Women’s participation was limited in both terms of quantity and quality. 
They were rarely present in the meetings and the LRC in implementation of 
forest devolution. The traditional norms (informing heads of households, the 
burden of housework) and the lack of participation facilitation from a   164 
gender perspective by the donors were the reasons for limited participation 
of women. This may influence inequality in getting endowments and 
entitlements from the devolved forest.  
5.4. Building the village institution or rule for managing the 
allocated natural forest area 
One of two focuses of the research was the devolution of natural forest to 
the village or household group. According to Ostrom et al. (1994), natural 
forest is a common pool resource. There is a common belief among 
institutional scholars in the importance of institution and quality of collective 
action in building institution for management of common pool resources 
(Agrawal, 2007; Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004; Agrawal, 2001; 
Ostrom, 1999). 
As presented in the section 5.2.2., the natural forests in the two studied 
sites were devolved to the village (in Loc Tien) and the household groups 
(in Thuong Quang). After devolution, the natural forest is managed by the 
village or household groups. These were collectively managed and there 
needs to be an institution for maintaining management activities, as well as 
sharing benefits and responsibilities among the members of the community 
or household groups. This institution is the center for sustainability of 
common forest management. This section presented the process and the 
ways of building the institution for managing the allocated natural forest and 
how it has been implemented and maintained by the local people. 
Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio (2004) stated that institutions for 
common-pool resource management are constructed based on collective 
action. This action is considered as voluntary to achieve the common 
interest of the group. Was the institution for the allocated natural forest 
management in the two studied sites constructed based on voluntary 
collective action? The process of building the institutions in Loc Tien and 
Thuong Quang is discussed below. 
Section 5.2.2 of this chapter described the process of the NFA in both 
studied sites. In Loc Tien, after making agreement between the DFPD, 
commune, village leaders and all the representatives of the households in the 
village and finishing preparation of data related to the resources of the 
natural forest area, the village institutions or rules (Hương Ước) were drafted 
by the head of the village with support from the commune officers and the 
DFPD. How did the DFPD support the head of the village to draft the rules?  
 
We (DFPD) gave him a form and guided him to write it (An officer from the 
DFPD, 4
th June, 2006).   165 
 
There was a circular no. 56 of the MARD in 1999 on guiding construction 
of village's regulations for protecting and developing forests. This circular 
stated that guidance for building the village regulations is the responsibility 
of the forest protection department in cooperation with the DARD and 
judicial department. However, the circular did not give a form for a village 
institution but just determined the major contents for the rules. In the case 
of Thuy Duong village, guiding the village's head to draft the village rules 
was the responsibility of the DFPD as its task which was assigned by the 
MARD and also by the DPC for the process of NFA. The officers from the 
DFPD said that they developed a form of the rules and gave to the village 
heads to draft. However, in the documents of the NFA project in Thuy 
Duong which were kept at the office of the DFPD, there was a draft of the 
village rules which was written by the DFPD. These regulations were longer 
and more complex than the rules that were formally approved by the DPC. 
In the step of drafting the village's rules, besides getting the form and 
guidance from the DFPD, the head of the village also got the comments 
from the commune officers and leaders through a meeting. After making 
agreement between the commune, village leaders and representatives from 
the DFPD, the draft of the village's rules was presented in the village meeting 
for making agreement on these rules. As presented in section 5.2.1.1, the 
head of the village read the draft of the rules and it was also summarized in 
the paper distributed to the villagers in the meeting to let them read and 
understand more and then make comments on the rules if they had any. 
After that, the villagers were asked to raise their hand to vote for making 
an agreement to pass the rules. The circular no. 56 of the MARD regulated 
that if 2/3 (66 %) of total members in the meeting agreed, the commune 
authority is allowed to attest to the rules.  It is clear that no one can force 
the villagers to raise their hand for voting to pass the rules but it is difficult 
to say this was a voluntary action or not because the ideas or contents of the 
rules were developed by the head of the village with comments from the 
commune and the DFPD officers who can be considered as outsiders of the 
village (even though a few commune officers may live in the village). The 
form of the village rules was interpreted by the DFPD from the circular of 
the MARD.  
It may be better and more voluntary if the DFPD facilitated the villagers 
to develop the rules themselves because the method of drafting the rules to 
present to the villagers created leading ideas that may not reflect the real 
context of the villagers. This suggests that setting up the regulations for 
management of the devolved natural forest in this case was influenced more   166 
by those with the power to make decisions in practice rather than by the 
formal policy paper.  
According to Poteete & Ostrom (2004b), the concept of heterogeneity 
relates to economic inequality (of income or assets) or values of knowledge 
and skills or even interest in maintaining the resource. There is a 
considerable argument about the impact of heterogeneity on efficiency of 
the institution for management of common pool resources and the strategy 
of overcoming heterogeneity in the process of building institution is needed 
to achieve sustainability of the institution.  How was overcoming hete-
rogeneity achieved in building the village rules in the coastal commune? 
The heterogeneity in this research regarded the economic status of the 
groups in the village as claasified based on income level of the villagers as 
classified by the MOLISA.  
Assuming that attendance of the villagers in the village meetings to make 
comments and agreements in passing the village rules in Thuy Duong village 
was considered as a collective action for building the rules, heterogeneity in 
term of economic difference was not difficult to overcome.  This was 
reflected through the high attendance rate of both the non-poor and poor at 
the meeting (table 10) but only in two hours (including the time for 
presenting the draft of the management plan and the draft of the village's 
rules), the rules were agreed on and passed by the villagers.  
In reality, the heterogeneity in the village was high because some 
households are very rich (with the big house and even traveling to the sea 
for a holiday) but some others were very poor with a simple house and they 
have had to withdraw children from the school. Was the creation of the 
village rules for managing the devolved natural forest area achieved by good 
negotiation of sharing benefits and costs between the villagers? In the case of 
Thuy Duong village, there was no negotiation in the village meeting to pass 
the rules. The agreement on the village rules was made based on daily 
relationships among the villagers rather than negotiation to gain equal 
sharing in the cost and benefit from the allocated forest management:  
 
We (villagers) were seated together closely and when we heard about the rule and 
somebody said agree and we followed them because we live together for along time" or "I 
saw my neighbours raised their hand to vote for passing the rule and I raised my hand too 
because we are in a neighbourhood. (Information from the in-depth interview 
and group discussion).  
 
The rules include 8 articles as follows: 
Article 1: Commitment of all villagers in volunteering to protect and get 
benefit together     167 
Article 2: Benefits from thinning to enhance the forest’s growth (for 
members or villagers who directly attended in the thinning activity only) 
Article 3: Benefits from NTFPs (every villager can collect rattan, fruits or 
other plants for household consumption and selling)  
Article 4: Benefit from timber: follow the plan was sanctioned by the PCP 
with a first priority for a common objective (restore and construct the 
village’s infrastructure, creating the village’s fund) 
Article 5: Benefits from other resources in the devolved natural forest area 
(exploiting stone, grits, etc.) according to regulations of the laws. 
Article 6: Rights to protect the forest and get support or other benefits 
(financial support for protection from the government or other organizations 
(if they have any), the village’s fund, or money rewarded from punishing for 
illegal timber logging) 
Article 7: Duty and responsibility of villagers 
Article 8: Reward and punishing for implementing the rules 
 
The distribution of costs and benefits for the natural forest management in 
the village rules was not clear and not specific:  
 
The products of timbers and firewood from the forest are distributed for the village's public 
constructions, for households who have made good contribution to protecting the forest- 
The item 2 of the Article 4- or every member of the village has to go to check the forest 
when he or she is assigned to by the village. (in the item 1 of the article 7).  
 
What is a good contribution? What is the rate of benefit distribution 
between different objectives of using the products obtained from the forest? 
Though the content of the village rules did not mention clearly or 
specifically the distribution of benefits and cost but the agreement in the 
rules was still made quickly (in one meeting with maximum time of two 
hours including presentation of the rule and management plan).  
The rules also did not address with management of firewood or other 
non-timber products. They just focus on managing timber which is mainly 
the interest of the men and non-poor. This may influence entitlements of 
firewood and other NTFPs of the women and the poor. 
Did this unspecific distribution of benefit and cost of the village rules lead 
to inefficiency in implementing and maintaining the rules? No, it did not. 
There were 80 % of the respondents in the household survey that said the 
rules were implemented well in terms of stopping illegal logging. What led 
to this? Information from the in-depth interview, household survey and 
focus group discussion reflected the fact that the illegal logging activity was 
stopped because the villagers who were professional in illegal logging were   168 
hesitant to do illegal logging when the forest was devolved to the village. 
They thought the benefit of timber from the allocated forest had to be 
distributed to all the villagers. The second reason was that the location of the 
devolved forest area required that the timber had to pass on the road 
through the village. So, it was easy to prevent the illegal loggers from the 
outside. In this case, community relations and location of the resource were 
more important for efficient management of the resource rather than quality 
of the institution.     
How did the institution for management of the allocated natural forest in 
the mountainous commune develop? As presented in the section 5.2.2., the 
natural forest in Thuong Quang was allocated to household groups. It was 
quite different compared to the coastal commune: there was no step of 
drafting and making agreements, as well as approving the rules in both 
designing and implementing the process of allocation. The rules for 
managing the natural forest based on the groups were offered by the group's 
members. This was a totally voluntary action. They were developed in an 
oral way and they just mentioned how to assign protection activity among 
the members. The rules were not recorded on any paper. There was no 
sanction for these oral rules. However, the members of the groups complied 
well with the rules. The reason for their conforming was that all the groups 
were established voluntarily based on their close relationships in daily life as 
reported by various informants: 
 
In the village meeting we were asked for registering to protect the natural forest as a group 
with a number of household is not more than 12 members and just for the household who 
have labour and capacity (health). Our houses are close to each other and we (members of 
my group) often do farming and other activities together agreed to be in a same group to 
register getting natural forest for protection to get benefits for our children. (Focus group 
discussion with protection group 1 in village 2, 11
th March, 2007) 
 
Or We talked together and agreed to make a group to get natural forest for protection and 
getting benefits, we discussed among ourselves to assign to who would go to check illegal 
logging… (Mr. T. in group 2 of village 1, 5
th July, 2007) 
 
Other forest protection groups in villages 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 also confirmed 
that they made the group themselves based on their relationships in the 
everyday life and then registered with the commune and the DFPD to get 
the natural forest area for protecting.  
In the mountainous commune, 12 groups were allocated the natural 
forest and the number of group's member was from 4 to 10 households 
(excepted one group had only two households). It is difficult to discuss the   169 
influence of heterogeneity between the members of the group on quality of 
institution building because some groups had both poor and non-poor 
members but some others had only non-poor households. Moreover, it is 
more challenge to discuss when the rules were not recorded.  
Another issue was that no formal paper to recognize agreement between 
state organizations and forest user groups in sharing benefit of the forest's 
product was issued. This was also different compared to the case of 
devolving the natural forest to Thuy Duong village (in the coastal 
commune) where commitments to sharing benefit between the state and the 
village were regulated clearly in the decision of the PPC.   
Although the members of the group complied well with the group's 
rules, after around 4 to 6 months of devolution implementation (depended 
on each group), all the groups stopped the forest protection activity which 
was regulated by themselves and implemented well. They did this because 
they could not prevent illegal logging by people from other villages and 
communes and because there was no certainty of getting benefit from the 
forest's products.      
The difference in building internal institutions for forest management 
between the two studied communes reflected that it was not dependent on 
the laws and policy papers but on interpretations of external actors (forest 
officers and donors) in the implementation process of devolution. The 
quality of the institution was influenced not only by relationships between 
members of the village or group but also by facilitation of external actors 
(foresters from the DFPD) and commitments between the state and the forest 
protection groups.  
How did this institution building process influence sustainability of 
natural forest management? This issue will be discussed further in section 6.4 
of the chapter VI. 
5.5. Summary 
The process of implementing natural forest and forestry land devolution in 
practice was different between the study cases even though it was carried out 
based on the same state policy papers and principles of donors. In theory the 
steps of implementation were rather similar between the projects and the 
sites. However, the ways for practicing each event or activity in the process 
depended on the influence of the policy implementers. The regulation in 
the policy papers was only one factor influencing implementation of forest 
devolution, challenging assumptions of rational policy approaches. The 
practice of forestry land and natural forest devolution was mainly influenced   170 
by the interpretations of commune and district officers based on their 
priorities to achieve their private objectives as argued by Sikor (2004). 
Power or influence of the outside actors determined almost all aspects of 
the process of the devolution implementation such as when and where to 
devolve the forest, ways of disseminating the policy information, as well as 
criteria for devolving to the beneficiaries. Those decisions can directly 
impact the outputs and outcomes of devolution. The influence of making 
decisions in practicing forest devolution fell into the hands of the state 
organizations at different levels, from the province to the commune. The 
provincial authority played a more important role in deciding where the 
natural forest and forestry land should be devolved while the DPC had more 
authority in making decisions on how the process of forest devolution was 
implemented and co-ordinated in the field. The DFPD and the CPC gained 
more power in attesting the application and the field documents such as 
location of the allocated plots. This showed that policy practice was 
influenced by a web of power and analysis of power relations is the central 
issue of policy analysis as argued by Shore & Wright (1997). 
Analysis of the process of implementation of forest devolution also 
showed that power relations appeared and influenced implementation of the 
project, reflected through the way of interpretation of the implementers in 
their context. This means that project life were not simple and the 
implementation of policy was influenced by different types of interpretation 
and different interpretation subjects as shown by Mosse (2005). 
The donors tried to strengthen the capacity of the state institutions 
through providing training and advice on a participatory approach. The rate 
of people attending the process of devolution implementation was high but 
their participation was still limited as the result of limited facilitation skills of 
the state officers. The involvement of the beneficiaries in the practice of 
forest devolution seemed to meet the objectives of outsiders as argued by 
Chamber (1997; 1983). Women‘s participation was more limited than men’s 
in terms of both quantity and quality of participation (presence and making 
decisions in the process of forest devolution). This was the result of the 
custom against women and the lack of gender sensitivity of policy 
implementers as well as limited attention to gender issues by the donors. 
The rules or regulations for management of the devolved natural forest in 
the two study sites were developed by different ways. In the coastal area, it 
was developed based on the draft made by the village leaders with support of 
the DFPD and regulation of the state while it was in an oral agreement in the 
mountainous area. The quality of the rules for collective management of the 
devolved forest was not influenced by heterogeneity of the group but   171 
depended on the community or group relationship and external institutional 
environment (state institution). 
How do these different interpretations and power relations in the imp-
lementation link with the endowments, management practice and then 
entitlements and livelihood of different social groups after forest devolution? 
These are discussed in the next two chapters (the chapter VI, VII).    173 
6. Endowment and its security, 
management practice and conflicts after 
devolution 
6.1. Introduction 
To understand the full implications of the forest devolution policy, it is 
necessary to investigate both the process (including policy papers and its 
implementation) and the consequences that policy has on people and resources 
(Blaikie & Sadeque, 2000). This research examined not only the devolution 
policy papers and their implementation by different institutions but also 
explored the endowments created by devolution of natural forest and 
forestry land by the state. 
Chapters IV and V discussed the intentions and objectives of the forest 
devolution policy and how it was implemented in practice. An important 
outcome of the forest devolution policy's implementation was giving 
endowments of statutory rights to natural forest and forestry land to 
beneficiaries. This chapter starts with an analysis of who gained the 
endowments through showing and comparing the forestry land area and 
natural forest which was allocated to the different groups (section 6.2.). The 
factors that affected the opportunity to gain endowments of forest are 
discussed and linked with the evidence drawn from the chapters IV and V to 
highlight how the endowment process was mapped in relation to micro and 
macro institutions (how these institutions influenced gaining forestry land or 
natural forest devolved by the state to the beneficiaries).  
Entitlements or utilities from the natural forest and forestry land devolved 
by the state can be transformed not only from statutory rights but also 
customary rights (Leach et al., 1999). This chapter examines changes of the 
endowment of customary and traditional rights to the natural forest and   174 
forestry land after the implementation of devolution by the state. 
Endowment of statutory rights and change in customary and traditional 
rights to forestry land and natural forest due to the devolution will be 
discussed in relation to entitlement mapping in chapter VII. 
According to FAO (2002), access to land allocated by the state is 
important for the security of the livelihood of local people who rely on 
farming but security of tenure of the land may also be important for 
ensuring food security and poverty reduction, sustainability of livelihoods 
and the environment. In this chapter, the author analyzes the issue of the 
security of endowment of land rights after the forestry land and natural forest 
were devolved to the individual households and household groups or village 
(section 6.3.) to see how the statutory rights of the forestry land and natural 
forest use and management of beneficiaries or groups have been exercised.  
As discussed in chapter IV, the forest devolution policy was made and 
implemented to transfer rights for managing and using natural forest and 
forestry land to the beneficiaries. The change in property rights aimed to 
improve management practices through greening the barren hills by planting 
forests, reducing deforestation and improving the natural forest's growth thus 
benefiting rural people. Section 6.4 in this chapter discusses how the planted 
forest was developed on the allocated land and the investment capacity of 
the households who received the land. For the natural forest that was 
allocated to the village or household groups, the author discusses how 
natural forest has been managed and how illegal logging and deforestation 
were controlled after devolution.  
The natural forest that was devolved to village or household groups in 
the two communes is a common pool resource, and as such the charac-
teristics or attributes of the resources and user groups and internal institu-
tions, as well as the external environment are important for maintaining and 
sustaining the management (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 1999). Section 6.4 also 
explores the influence of the quality of the institutions for village-based or 
household group-based forest management. The influence of some 
characteristics of the forest and the user groups and the state’s regulations on 
maintaining of the collective action for management of the devolved natural 
forest area is also examined. 
FAO (2002) stated that complexity and different types of land tenure 
history are causes of conflict over land use. Conflicts over land result from 
exclusion from access (due to a change of endowments) because of 
increasing resource scarcity or unequal distribution of endowments and are 
shaped by relationships between people or groups where there is com-
petition in land use (Matondi, 2001). Section 6.5 of this chapter describes   175 
some actual conflicts between individual households, villages and between 
local people and the state forestry institution after the FLNFA. 
Section 6.6 summarizes the findings of the chapter in regarding to 
endowment of statutory rights and change of customary and traditional 
rights, as well as its security issues. It also synthesizes management practices 
of the devolved forestry land and natural forest and the existing conflicts 
with a short discussion linked to property rights theories and conceptual 
framework for endowment mapping.  
6.2. Endowment of statutory rights and change of customary 
 and traditional rights   
As discussed in chapter II, Leach et al. (1999) stated that endowment of 
rights and resources of actors links to the transformation of environmental 
entitlements or utilities. The rights included statutory rights and customary 
rights (ibid.). This section presents and discusses the statutory rights and 
changes in traditional and customary rights resulting from the forest 
devolution.  
In Vietnam, people can obtain forestry land or natural forest from the 
state through the allocation process and this natural forest or forestry land is 
formally recognized by the state through the provision of the certification of 
land use right. In practice, especially in mountainous areas, people can farm 
on the state land and they can enter the state natural forest to collect NTFPs 
(but not timber or the valuable wild animals that are regulated by the forest 
protection law), and this type of utilization is called traditional rights.  
The statutory rights to natural forest and forestry land in this study were 
considered as the rights that were devolved by the state as regulated by the 
policy. The variables used to assess the devolution of statutory rights from 
the state are adapted from Sikor & Tan (2007). They include natural forest 
and forestry land areas (holding by the individual household or village), the 
proportion of the timber volume from the allocated natural forest devolved 
to village or household group, as well as types of rights to natural forest and 
forestry land devolved to the beneficiaries.     
In this research, traditional rights were assessed by qualitative variables 
through examining changes in these rights in using natural forest and forestry 
land after the state introduced forest devolution to beneficiaries.  
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6.2.1. Statutory rights to forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state 
6.2.1.1. Holding the devolved forestry land and natural forest area 
As discussed in section 5.2.2., in the coastal commune (Loc Tien), the 
forestry land was devolved from 1987 to individual households through 
different projects or programmes. However, only the forestry land that was 
allocated from 1994 (by the project PAM 4304, the programme 327 and the 
SNV project) after announcement of the 1993 land law was accepted by the 
local authority for providing the Red Book in 2004. The natural forest had 
been devolved to Thuy Duong village in 2001. In the mountainous 
commune (Thuong Quang), the allocated forestry land was formally 
recognized by the local authority through the SNV project in 2003, while 
natural forest was devolved to household groups.  
To see how two different economic groups gained endowments of rights 
of management and use of forestry land, the forestry land area of the 
individual households got from the devolution was recorded in the 
questionnaire for the individual interviews with poor and non poor groups 
in both study sites. The list of all households that were allocated land with 
the amount of land and different allocated sources (through the PAM or 
programme 327 or the SNV project) was also collected at the commune and 
the DFPD office. The sampling for the household survey was not designed 
to compare devolved forest holding between ethnic (Ktu) and Kinh group 
in the mountainous area.  
The difference in mean forestry land holding area between the two 
groups (poor and non-poor) was tested by using the T test (independent 
samples case) and showed that there was a significant difference between the 
mean forestry land holding area of the poor and non-poor groups in both 
the coastal commune and the mountainous community (p=0.05 and 
p=0.01) with the confidence level of 95 % and 99 % respectively (table 11). 
The data from the household survey found that a mean forestry land holding 
area devolved for the poor group in Loc Tien was 2.9 sao per household (1 
sao= 1,000m
2- for the central region) while that of the non-poor was 16.6 
sao. In the mountainous commune, the poor group held a devolved average 
forestry land area of 1.5 sao while the mean of devolved forestry land 
holding per household of non-poor group was 9.6 sao. This differs from 
findings of Thanh et al. (2004) in the case of forest devolution in Daclak in 
the central highland of Vietnam where there was no significant difference in 
the average size of allocated forest between poor, medium and rich groups 
and wealth had no significant influence on the distribution of allocated 
forest. However, those authors did not explore why household wealth did   177 
not decide its ability in access to forest devolved by the state to see nature of 
relation between wealth being and access to devolved forest land. Exploring 
the relationship between economic status and the opportunity of a 
household to get the devolved forestry land can highlight the influence of 
power relations on obtaining endowments in the devolution process.  
In table 11, the average forestry land area per household of non-poor the 
group (16.6 sao) in Thuy Duong village of Loc Tien commune was 5.7 
times greater than those of the poor group (mean 2.9 sao). The household 
survey was carried out in Thuy Duong village only. The result of testing the 
allocated forest land area per household between poor and non-poor groups 
in Thuong Quang also showed a significant difference in the allocated forest 
land holding (Table 11). However, the standard deviation of the mean of 
both poor and non-poor groups (especially in the non-poor group) in 
Thuong Quang was lower than in Thuy Duong (see table 11). This 
reflected the fact that the difference between forestry land area of each 
sample household in the mountainous commune was smaller than that in the 
coastal area.  
The household survey in Thuy Duong village showed that some non-
poor households got from 80 to 100 sao while some other households who 
were also non-poor households only got 10 sao (a range from 7 to 10 sao). It 
was different with Thuong Quang (also from the household survey’s data 
source). Here the largest amount of allocated land area to a household of the 
non-poor group was 21 sao and the smallest amount was 5 sao. For the poor 
group, there were two interviewed households who held 10 sao of forestry 
land devolved from the state and it was higher than the amount of allocated 
land of some non-poor households (10 sao compared to 7 sao).  
 
Table 11. The allocated forest land holding by economic groups (sao/ household) 
Economic group  N  Mean   Std. Deviation   Std. Error 
Mean 
Sig. for testing 
equality of Means 
Thuy Duong village (the coastal commune) 
Poor 29  2.9  6.66  1.24 
Non poor  30  16.6  35.76  6.53 
0.048 
Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) 
Poor 30  1.5  5.33  0.97 
Non poor  29  9.6  12.41  2.30 
0.002 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
Note: 1 sao = 1000m
2 
 
The author also got secondary data on the forestry land area devolved to 
individual households through all the projects in the two communes. This   178 
data source showed that the devolved forestry land area between the 
households in non-poor group in Loc Tien was also very different. The 
biggest area devolved to one household in Loc Tien was 746 sao and a 
smallest was only 2.4 sao (Table 12). In Thuong Quang (the mountainous 
commune), the largest forestry land area devolved to a household was 29 sao 
and smallest area was 1.3 sao. 
 
Table 12. The allocated forest land holding in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang 
Items  Unit  Loc Tien  Thuong Quang 
   Forestry land  Forestry land  Natural forest 
Total allocated 
households  
Household 201  83  80 
Proportion of non-
farmer allocated land in 
total allocated HHs 
 %  28.90  0.00  1.20 
Proportion of poor in 
total allocated HHs  
 %  3.50  6.25  12.05 
Proportion of non-poor 
got FL & NF  in total 
commune’s HHs  
 %  7.80  24.19  23.55 
Proportion of widow  
got FL & NF in total 
allocated HHs  
 %  0.05  0.00  0.00 
Largest allocated area  sao/ HH  746.00  29.00  264.00 
Smallest allocated area   sao/HH  2.40  1.30  46.00 
Source: Secondary data from DFPDs and communes' office. 
Note:  - HH: Household 
        -  FL:  Forestry  land;           -  NF:  Natural  forest 
 
From the list of all the households in the whole commune that were 
allocated forestry land, the author also found that the number of poor 
households who were allocated forestry land was limited in both communes. 
The proportion of poor in the total number of households who were 
devolved forestry land in Loc Tien was 3.5 % while it was 6.25 % (for 
forestry land) and 12.5 % (for natural forest) in Thuong Quang.  
It was found that the proportion of non-poor households that were 
allocated land was 7.8 % of the total households of Loc Tien. This pro-
portion in Thuong Quang was 3 times greater than Loc Tien in both cases 
of devolved forestry land and natural forest. Is this the result of more 
demand from the wealthier households and more pressure from local 
government to maximize production of raw materials by concentrating on 
wealthier people? No, this is result of abstract terms in the policy papers,   179 
lack of transparency in informing policy and influence of social relations that 
are discussed further in the sub-section 6.2.1.2. 
Another interesting issue was that in the list of the households who held 
forestry land in the whole commune in Loc Tien there were 58 households 
(28.9 % of total households that were allocated forestry land) contained 
someone who was or had been a forester from the DFPD, or who are 
officers working for the state organizations or the non-government 
organization with a monthly salary and such households were not involved 
in agriculture and forestry production. This is different from the statement in 
the Decree 163 that regulated to whom the forestry land should be 
devolved. In contrast, there were no non-farming individual households 
who got forestry land devolved by the state in the mountainous commune 
and only one officer from the DLAD got the natural forest. Why was that? 
This is result of respecting traditional land use system of the foresters in Nam 
Dong district and also discussed further in the sub-section 6.2.1.2.  
There were also at least seven households that have a member who was 
an official or officer of the commune, village and co-operative (this number 
was just counted for the households where the author was sure that they 
worked in the commune or the village and cooperative) of the total of 30 
households who got the forestry land in 2003. It was found that only one 
official in Thuong Quang commune was allocated 15 sao (1.5 ha) of forestry 
land. This reflected a marginalization in accessing forest land of not only 
poor households but also of the farmers in general in comparison to the state 
officers in the coastal commune. This situation is different in Thuong 
Quang (the mountainous area) where more poor people received the forest 
land than in Loc Tien.  
 
¾  Endowment of statutory rights to the devolved forestry land and natural forest by 
gender 
As discussed above, there is a distinction between poor and non-poor in 
holding devolved forestry land in both communes (Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang). A remarkable point is that in both these communities, almost all the 
widows or single women are the poor (18 of 30 poor in Thuy Duong 
village of Loc Tien commune are widows).  
The limited opportunity for a widow to gain endowments of the 
devolved forestry land and natural forest showed in table 12. In Loc Tien, 
only one widow (0.5 % of total households) got forestry land. In Thuong 
Quang, there were no widows or single women on the list of the 
households that got devolved forestry land or natural forest. Why was that? 
One widow in Thuong Quang said to the author that:   180 
 
They (the land allocation council’s members) said that because my family does not have 
any man, I will not be allocated forestry land. (Mrs. R. in village 2 of Thuong 
Quang, 15
th July, 2006) 
 
Or: I know clearly who do illegal logging because they often pass my house when they 
transported timber so I can guard the forest but they did not allocated forest to my family 
because they said I am a widow so I could not participate in natural forest management. 
(Mrs. P.- village 4, 25
th July, 2006). 
 
 In the coastal community, some widow women said that: 
 
How can people like us (the widows) get forestry land. They (forestry land allocation 
implementers) thought that our households do not have men so we could not do forestry 
production. (Mrs. S. and Mrs. T. in Thuy Duong village- 5
th January 2007. 
 
The first time the author visited a widow’s household, she said that: “who 
suggested you come to my house?” and then the author asked her why she said 
that, her next answer was that “I am surprised because the village and commune 
leaders rarely visit my house and they also do not introduce me to outsiders” (Mrs. 
G. in Thuy Duong village, 20
th December, 2005.). The author told her that 
she selected her name randomly from the list of the households of the 
village. 
There is a question of gender difference in getting endowments because 
of a position of less power for single women in the community due to the 
custom of being looking down on as a widow and the view of non-capacity 
of women in forestry production. Inequality of endowment to the devolved 
forestry land and natural forest therefore was influenced not only by 
economic status but also by gender difference.  
 
¾  Difference of endowment between Ktu and Kinh 
As discussed in chapter 3, Thuong Quang commune is a remote area and 60 
% of the total population belongs to the ethnic Ktu group. In contrast, the 
coastal commune has only members of the Kinh group. The Kinh are often 
considered to have better knowledge and experience in finding 
development opportunities. So, in the community where has both majority 
and minority population groups live together, major groups are often 
considered to have more economic and social power. This led to a 
hypothesis in this research that access to the forestry land devolved by the 
state in the coastal commune is more equal than in the mountainous area 
because it is not influenced strongly by power relations in the devolution   181 
process. However, the findings from both the household survey and the 
secondary data in table 11 and table 12 showed that the inequality in gaining 
endowments of forestry land devolved by the state was greater in Loc Tien 
(where 100 % of the population are Kinh) compared with Thuong Quang 
where 60 % of the population is ethnic people (Ktu).  
The proportion of Ktu households that got forestry land was 39 % while 
the proportion of Kinh got the land was 61 %. However, the devolved 
forestry land area of the Ktu and the Kinh was not different (11.8 sao 
compared to 11.1 sao).  
It was in contrast with the case of getting the devolved natural forest, 
only 39 % of total households who got the devolved forestry land were Ktu 
people (see table 13). The proportion of Ktu household that received natural 
forest was nearly 2 times that of the Kinh (65 % and 35 %) but the average 
holding area of devolved natural forest of Kinh was 154.4 sao while that of 
Ktu was 87.3. However, the comparison of devolved natural forest holding 
area between Kinh and Ktu is not entirely appropriate because natural forest 
was devolved to household groups for collective use and management. 
Table 13. The allocated forest land holding in Thuong Quang by ethnicity 
Thuong Quang  Items Unit 
Forestry land  Natural forest 
Proportion of ethnic got 
FL & NF  in total 
allocated HHs  
 % 
 
 
39.00 65.00 
FL & NF holding of 
Kinh group 
Sao 11.80  154.4 
FL & NF holding of 
Ktu group 
Sao 11.10  87.3 
Source: Secondary data from DFPDs and communes' office. 
 
In general, there was no clear difference in opportunities to gain an 
endowment of statutory rights to the devolved forestry land and natural 
forest between the Ktu ethnic group and the Kinh. The hypothesis of more 
limited opportunity in access to the devolved forestry land and natural forest 
of ethnic people was not correct. This is the result of behaviour of the 
commune leaders toward respecting the custom land use system in Thuong 
Quang (as presented in chapter V). The process of mapping endowments in 
this case was influenced not only by a micro institution (custom land use) 
but also interpretation in practice of macro institutions (forest devolution 
policy of the state). This is discussed further in the next section (section 
6.2.1.2).     182 
To sum up, the above  evidence from both Thuy Duong village and the 
whole commune of Loc Tien and Thuong Quang, using both the house-
hold survey and the secondary data source showed limited access of the poor 
and widows to forestry land devolved by the state as determined by the 
allocated area and the proportion of poor and widow households that were 
allocated land. Differences in getting endowments of forestry land and 
natural forest between the Ktu ethnic group and the Kinh is not clear. 
As the findings in chapter V show the proportion of poor respondents 
who heard about forestry land allocation and attended the village meetings 
in the household survey was high in both communities (from 65 % to 83 
%), and a question of the nature of participation in the process of devolution 
implementation was raised. Why did the poor know about and attend the 
meetings but the outcome in accessing to forest land was still limited? Was 
their participation formal only? What reasons lead to the limitation of 
endowments of titling to forestry land from the state for the poor? These are 
discussed in the next sub-section.  
6.2.1.2. Factors influencing the distribution of devolved forest endowment 
The evidence from the study sites showed that the reasons affecting the 
distribution of endowment of forestry land from the state for the poor are 
different between the two communes. 
 
¾  For the coastal commune 
There were some different reasons depending on the allocation period or 
projects or programmes. For the PAM 4304 project (from 1993 to 1997), 
according to the foresters who coordinated and implemented the pro-
gramme, the farmers at that time were not interested in acquiring forestry 
land as the value of forestry land and planted forest's products were low 
(when the PAM programme was being implemented). The villagers were 
still hungry so they just participated in planting forest to get the payment for 
their labour contribution. Some villagers also said that at that time they were 
not interested in getting planted forest because they did not understand the 
benefits of getting forestry land. DFPD did not inform them clearly about 
benefits or rights from the planted forest as they knew that they would have 
to take responsibility if the planted forest was burnt or deforested. Other 
villagers (Mrs. N, Mr. H, Mrs. T., Mrs. S. in Thuy Duong village whose 
comments were cited in chapter V) did not know anything about the 
programme, they just knew that they were going to plant trees and they 
would be paid for their labour contribution. The information about 
supporting all the costs (including labour cost) for planting forest and the   183 
mechanism of giving 70 % of the planted forest products' value to the 
beneficiaries by the donor were not clearly explained to the people.  
Another reason according to some village and commune leaders was that 
the regulation in the 1993 land law and the 1994 decree 02 was that if one 
wanted to get the forestry land, the applicant had to develop a plan of land 
use to submit to the LRC and had to pay 100,000 VND per ha for designing 
and planning land use that were carried out by the DFPD (regulated by the 
DFPD). So it was not easy for the farmers, especially the poor households to 
have the money to pay, although after planting, the farmer could have 
savings from the support for planting the forest: 
 
With the support of the donor for planting per ha of forest at that time, 100,000-
150,000 VND could be saved if the planter managed it well even they hired labour for 
planting and took care of the planted forest. (Mr. A. a leader of Thuy Duong 
village, 15
th July, 2005).  
 
Information from the in-depth interview with some commune and village 
leaders also showed that the amount of funding for planting forest in the 
commune or village depended on the relationship with the DFPD: 
 
The DFPD decided the amount of the plantation area that got financial support to be 
devolved in the commune and village. This depended on the relation of the commune or 
co-operative with the DFPD. ( Mr. K. - an officer of the commune, 7
th 
August, 2006”. 
 
Or The amount of financial funding for planting trees in our commune depended on our 
relation with the DFPD. (Mr. D, a commune officer, 5
th December, 2006). 
 
On the question of information about funding by the donor for planting 
trees on the devolved forestry land to the farmers, the answer was that they 
did not know anything about the funding for planting and the benefits from 
the products of the planted forest. They planted the forest individually on 
the land that was assigned by the co-operative and foresters and they were 
paid for their labour to plant and tend the forest.  
Another interesting issue was that two poor households in Thuy Duong 
village who got the land had a relationship with the cooperative or 
commune leader or the foresters in the DFPD. When the author asked 
where they got information about the programmes to decide to get the 
planted forest, they said their children or relatives who work for the 
commune and co-operative knew and told them. In this case, information 
about the programme was transferred to them based on informal channels 
(through meeting in the family or relative relationships).    184 
For the programme 327, two poor households in the formal survey got 
land because they were requested to move to the new location in the 
commune, which was close to the forest and upland area but had limited 
agricultural land through a government resettlement programme. Those 
households (including poor and non-poor) were allocated from 7 to 12 sao 
of barren hills to plant trees with support from the state budget under the 
programme. However, some foresters from the DFPD also got some plots 
through this programme. When the author asked how they could get it, an 
officer from the DFPD said that that planted area was allocated to the 
workers union (công đoàn) of the DFPD at that time and then the staff of the 
DFPD was entitled to it in 2004 when providing the Red Book (formal land 
use right certification). This was totally different in the Hong Ha commune 
where a very large forest area (more than 200ha) was planted in the 
programme 327 and had been managed by A Luoi DFPD but remained state 
land. This reflects the fact that access to the forestry land devolved by the 
state depended strongly on the interpretation of the DFPD that was 
empowered by the DPC to coordinate the programme. 
In the PAM and 327 programmes, the commune and cooperative officers 
did not own the project but they were the people who directly received the 
information, plan and activities of the programmes from the DFPD to lead 
the villagers to plant the forest. The forestry officers from the DFPD under 
instructions from the DPC directly coordinated or implemented the PAM 
and 327 programmes and they controlled information related to the sup-
porting principles, as well as the benefits and responsibilities of the bene-
ficiaries of the planted forest.  
According to the officers from the DFPD and commune and village or 
cooperative leaders, people did not want to receive the land because the 
benefit policy was not clear at that time and people were only interested in 
the short term benefit and they refused to get the land: 
 
In the stage of implementing the PAM and 327 programmes, there was no any clear 
benefit policy of the state. People were afraid to be assigned the responsibility without 
benefit so they did not want to get forestry land. (Mr. A., from the DFPD, 16
th July, 
2005). 
Or  Before the year 2000, people just wanted to get immediate benefits then they 
participated in planting trees for getting cash and were not concerned about the long term 
benefit so they did not want to get forestry land for long term management. (Mr. P., a 
commune official, 17
th August, 2005)  
 
Or People went to plant trees for getting cash or rice and they were asked to continue to 
get the planted forest for protecting it after planting but they refused to do that, they did   185 
not see the long term benefit of getting planted forest. (Mr. B. – A person used to be 
a village head and a co-operative officer, 17
th August, 2005).  
 
In practice, at that time, in Phu Loc district, there were a few farmers who 
lived close to the bare hills and who were willing to plant some sao of forest 
from both the financial support and investment by themselves (Mr. S., a poor 
household and Mr. T. in Thuy Duong village invested themselves in 
planting trees on a part of the hill close to their house from 1993). Those 
people loved the forest and planted the forest for their happiness and the 
beliefs of receiving benefits in the future.  
It is remarkable that the 1993 land law and the 1994 decree 02 for 
guiding forestry land devolution regulated that the person who can got 
forestry land is an "individual" without specifying a limitation on the area to 
be allocated. This regulation of the law and the decree allowed the state 
officers (from the DFPD) or other state organizations who were not farmers 
to get very large forest land area in 1994 (some foresters got from 600-700 
sao) through the PAM programme although the principle of the PAM was 
just to support a fund for poor households. Justifying this, some foresters 
from the DFPD said that because the farmers were not interested in getting 
the land and the foresters had a view of the benefits of planted forest, they 
had the right to do that because the land law regulated that any individual 
can get forest land for greening bare hills: 
 
At that time (when implementing the PAM and 327 programmes), people were not 
interested in getting forests. Mr. B. – an officer in the district town got more than 700 sao 
in 1994 because he saw the long term benefit of forest. He had a right to get it because the 
land law enacted in 1993 and the decree 02 regulated that any individual can get forestry 
land without limitation if he has a need and the ability to use (Mr. A. from the 
DFPD, 7
th March, 2006).  
 
Or the PAM and 327 programmes were intended to devolve the bare hills that were 
planted with trees to people but they did not want to get it because they did not see the 
benefit of forest management. Some officers in the district saw the future benefits of the 
forest so they wanted to get it and this is regulated in the policy papers that any individual 
can get forestry land for planting trees (Mr. N. from the DFPD, 12
th April, 2006) 
 
The question is why the foresters and commune, village or co-operative 
leaders who had more knowledge and more information on the state policy 
were willing to get the forestry land without certification of devolution of 
benefit from the planted forest of the state. It was found that the source of 
finance for planting the forest of the foresters and commune and cooperative 
or village leaders (as representatives of the individual households who got   186 
the forestry land) was all from the project (from the PAM, from the 
government through 327 or provincial budget in 2004) (reported in the 
profile for providing the Red Book in 2004).  
All the foresters from the DFPD who got the forest land through the 
PAM and 327 programmes were allocated land from 1994. The people who 
directly coordinated or implemented the programmes knew if they used and 
managed the budget from the donor (for the PAM programme) and from 
the government (for the 327 programme) they could save from 100,000 to 
150,000 VND (equivalent of 10 to 15 USD at that time) per 10 sao (Mr. K. 
15
th July, 2005). They also knew that they could mobilize villagers for 
stamping out forest fires while people or villagers did not know that 
protecting the forest and preventing forest fires was the responsibility of all 
people as regulated in the forest protection law. That was the reason why 
the villagers told me that they wondered why they attended to stamping the 
fires in the forest which was managed by the DFPD but now the forest was 
allocated to the foresters of the DFPD: 
 
We attended to stamp the forest fires many times because the foresters from the DFPD 
said it is the responsibility of all villagers to keep the state forest for a common benefit but 
now we heard that the forest area was devolved to the individuals from the DFPD (a 
common comment from in-depth interviews with Mr. D., Mrs. G., and 
Mrs. T. in Thuy Duong village, on the 22
nd and 23
rd of July, 2006 and a 
similar comment in the focus group discussion with mixed farmers on 
12
th January, 2007).    
 
This all reflects the fact that officers of the DFPD and some commune, 
cooperative officers who directly implemented the programmes had the 
authority to access the useful information that motivated and created the 
opportunity for them to get the forest land. As commented by two 
commune officers who are working for Loc Tien commune now but were 
not officers when implementing the PAM and 327 programmes that: 
 
Persons who accessed to the information about the programmes were the winners (in term of 
getting the forestry land) (Mr. Th. and Mr. H., 25
th August, 2006).  
 
In 2003, an area of 660 sao of poorly planted forest (planted forest but the 
survival proportion of trees was very low) which was considered as bare land 
and which had been managed by Song Thuy cooperative and North Hai 
Van watershed management board and 700 sao of bare hills were allocated to 
individual households through the SNV project. As presented in section 5.2 
of chapter V, the activity of informing people about the bare hill area which   187 
was found through a land use planning step was identified in the process of 
allocation but was not implemented in practice. So, the villagers did not 
have the information on the allocation of this bare land area. Not being 
interested in getting the forestry land devolved by the state in 2003 in this 
programme was not the reason for not gaining forestry land because every 
villager now understood the profit from planting forest and they wanted to 
get it:  
 
From 2001 we know that planting trees can bring profit then we preferred to get the bare 
hills to do that but we could not get them  because the commune and co-operative said 
that there is not any more area to allocate to people (Focus group discussion with 
women and men group on 12
th January, 2007).  
 
Now people are competing to plant Acacia because they know its profit, some people 
planted even in the scattered area of the village cemetery and this created conflict between 
planter and family who have graves in the cemetery ( Mr. H. in Thuy Duong 
village, 5
th January, 2007). 
 
The reason why they could not get the forestry land devolved in 2003 was 
they did not get information about the activity of allocating the forest land 
area to individual households. They still thought it belonged to the co-
operative until some individual households hired them to plant trees on the 
land.  
The step of informing about the allocation of the forest land in the SNV 
project in Loc Tien was cut out by a decision of the FWG because of "a too 
small allocated area so it was not presented to the villagers”, some commune and 
village leaders explained in the in-depth interview (cited in chapter V). In 
the list of the households who got the forestry land devolved in 2003, there 
was only one poor household in Thuy Duong village with 2 people more 
than 70 years old. How did he get the information to register for receiving 
the land? "from my son who is the head of the co-operative" (Mr. C., 18
th July, 
2006).  
As presented in chapter V, the manager of the SNV project was a 
member of the CPC. A total of 34 households got the forestry land which 
was devolved in 2003 through the SNV project, and four of them lived in 
Hue city or the district town. How could they get information to register 
for getting the forestry land? It was found that those people were working 
for the government organizations or non-government organizations that 
have some support in the commune:  
 
Mr. B. is working for NAV and Mr. T. is an officer who is working for Chan May 
Port but they still got the forestry land in 2003 (Mr. D., 4
th January, 2007).    188 
This is also confirmed through cross checking their names in the list of 
people who were provide the Red Book in 2004. The information about 
allocation of the forest land to those people was also obtained through their 
knowledge of the working process with the commune. This reflected the 
fact that the information about allocating forest land was disseminated 
informally through the relationships and not as regulated by the law, or the 
principles of donor. The authority of the DFPD and commune and village 
leaders, therefore, was not only in owning the information but also in 
selectively disseminating the information about the process of allocation.  
A remarkable issue was that although the proportion of non-poor 
household who got the forestry land in Thuy Duong village was much 
higher than the proportion of poor households (14.65 % of total non-poor 
of the village compared to 2.8 % of poor), it was still small proportion 
compared to the number of non-farmers who were allocated land. Some of 
those non-poor households invested themselves in planting trees because of 
their interest in planting forest and after that they were allocated and 
provided the Red Books. This was done based on the statement in the 
decree that: "A person who used the land to plant trees if it is confirmed by the local 
authority will be allocated and provided the certification" (Item 3 – Article 17, 
Decree 163 dated 16
th November, 1999). 
Economic status determined the ability of individuals to access land 
informally first (self-occupying) before getting the formal certification but it 
did not directly influence the ability of the individual to access the forestry 
land devolved by the state though the programmes or projects.  
Summing up, in the case of Loc Tien, the ability to get information 
about the allocation and benefits of the programmes or projects depended 
on relationships with the project or programme coordinators and 
implementers who decided if individual household were to get the forestry 
land. Participation of local people in the allocation programmes and projects 
was functional (the PAM and 327 programmes) or they were consulted (the 
SNV project) which influenced their ability in making decision on getting 
forestry land devolved by the state. This was not a result of the policy papers 
or principles of the donors but was the outcome of the interpretation of the 
DFPD and commune and village or cooperative officers and power 
relationships between the actors in the process of devolution 
implementation. (Thanh et al., 2004) called this the position of the 
household and he concluded that households with position may potentially 
get more benefits than households without position.   
The evidence in this research shows that the opportunity to get 
endowments to forestry land for non-farming households resulted not only   189 
from the authority of information control by the state organization but also 
from the abstract term of beneficiary in the policy papers (law and decrees). 
The marginalization of the poor in getting the endowment of statutory 
rights to forest land through the devolution programmes was the result of 
having less power which is related to the strength of social relationships, and 
not just economic capacity. 
 
¾  In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) 
As presented in section 5.2, the forestry land use planning and allocation in 
Thuong Quang commune was implemented through the financial support 
of the SNV (same donor as the project in Loc Tien in 2003). Although there 
was a significant difference in the area of forestry land devolved by the state 
between non-poor and poor groups in both communes, the inequality in 
land allocation was higher than in the coastal community. Why was this 
when the devolution policy of the state and the donor were similar in the 
two communes?    
It was found that forestry land devolution in Thuong Quang was based 
on the area that was occupied and used by the households before the 
allocation activity. This was decided by the commune authority. The 
agricultural land (mainly wetland rice area) and settlement were allocated by 
the commune authority although the Red Books may not have been given 
to many communes, particularly in the mountainous areas because of a lack 
of budget for issuing them. In contrast to agricultural land, the upland or 
forest land area was often freely occupied based on the households' labour 
and financial capacity for cultivating crops because of limited agricultural 
land in the hilly and mountainous area. This also happened in the coastal 
commune but these land areas were transferred to planted forest in the PAM 
programme from 1987 following the design of the DFPD and were not 
considered as a basis for allocating forestry land to household. However, in 
Thuong Quang the LRC formally confirmed and approved the forestry land 
that was previously used for farming by the individual households when the 
LUPLA project was implemented. Both the area and location were measured 
and confirmed by the commune authority and officers from the DFPD (as 
representatives of the professional organization) for providing the Red 
Books.  
One issue was that as with the custom of other ethnic communities in the 
mountainous areas, the custom of the Ktu in Thuong Quang is to respect 
land occupied by a household. In this custom, the first person to reclaim and 
use the plot was the owner of the land and nobody could take or use that 
land. According to the chairman of the CPC in Thuong Quang (Mr. R., 12
th 
August, 2006), the commune authority (with more than 60 % of officials   190 
and officers belonging to the ethnic group) decided that allocation was to be 
based on previous occupation of land because they respected the custom of 
the Ktu.  
The reason for the greater mean forestry land holdings of the non-poor 
group in Thuong Quang in 2003 was that they had a larger labour force and 
more financial sources to rent labour for cultivating on the upland area 
before allocation. However, the largest holding of forest land area for a non-
poor household in Thuong Quang was only 29 sao (according to the 
secondary data). There were nine households (11 %) who got from 20 - 29 
sao out of a total of 80 households. Forty-eight households (60 % of total 
households) who were devolved the forestry land got from between 9 - 18 
sao. The ability of individual households to access forestry land devolved by 
the state in Thuong Quang therefore depended on their previous land 
occupation in the traditional land use system.  
Although FLA in Thuong Quang was based on the land use custom there 
was a special case in the village no. 6. The commune authority and the 
DFPD decided to devolve both natural forest and forestry land following the 
new boundary between the villages (based on the settlement locality of each 
village) although in reality, many households (especially the households in 
the village no. 1) reclaimed and use the upland for cultivating food crops 
before (traditional use or self-occupation). The land area that was reclaimed 
by the people in the village no. 1 (Cha Rau village) was allocated to the 
households in the village no. 6 for planting trees through the SNV project. 
This was not really accepted by village no. 1. In the minutes of the village 
no. 1’s meeting, the question of agreement to allocate to village no. 6 was 
raised by foresters but it was not negotiated clearly because the villagers in 
village no. 1 did not understand that their customary land in village no. 6 
was allocated to the individual households in village no. 6. 
 However, this way of creating a new boundary between the villages was 
not implemented in some other places in the commune. For instance, the 
plots that were located in the new boundary of village no. 4 (ethnic group) 
traditionally belonged to the individual households from village no. 5 (Kinh 
people) and remain allocated to their old users. This contrasts with the 
situation in village no. 1, where many plots of the old users in the village no. 
1 were allocated to some households in the village no. 6 although their old 
users are in village 1. Explaining this, some commune and village officers 
(Mr. R., 12
th August, 2006 and Mr. H., 23 August, 2006) said that it was 
because the villagers in village no. 5 (major people’s group) did not agree to 
give their old land to village no. 4 (ethnic group). The number of Kinh 
households who got forestry land was also higher than the number of Ktu   191 
households (52 households compared to 28 households). It seems to be that 
the ability to defend access to customary land was better in the Kinh group.  
As presented in table 12, in contrast to Loc Tien commune, all 
households who got the forest land and live in Thuong Quang do farming 
full or part time for their living. When the author asked some officers from 
the  DFPD why they did not get the forest land for planting forest, the 
answer was that they could not disturb the land use custom of ethnic people 
although they knew that an informal transfer of ten sao of forestry land can 
gain 2 millions VND (from 2005) and this has been happening in the district.  
The natural forest area devolving to household groups in Thuong Quang  
was taken back from Khe Tre enterprise through the decision no. 
2430/QD-UB  (Thua Thien Hue people committee, dated 25th, August, 
2003). The foundation for allocating natural forest was voluntary registration 
by individual households. However, there were five poor households of a 
total of 30 households interviewed who said that they registered but could 
not join in the groups protecting natural forest. All of these five poor 
households are ethnic people. When this was raised with the chairman of 
the commune, he reported that the number of registered households in 
some villages was too many so the commune authority and representatives 
from the DFPD decided to select the households that have the youth and 
strong heads because protecting the forest is hard work. There were some 
poor and non-poor households, especially the Kinh people that did not want 
natural forest although they are young and have good health because they 
did not see the commitments of the state forestry institutions for getting 
benefits from the natural forest. The local people were more interested in 
getting forestry land for planting trees because of the high profit of planted 
forest and it was easy to transfer.  
As presented above, only one outsider who has worked for the district 
land management department got natural forest. Why did an officer from 
the DLAD get the natural forest in the same group as an official from the 
commune? A head of a village said that this was decided by the DFPD after 
the field activity because of the large natural forest area of a group in the 
village no. 5:  
 
I was surprised because a total of 1710 sao (171 ha) was measured and allocated to my 
group based on our registration in the village meeting. However, in the list of the groups 
who were allocated natural forest there appeared one more group who was the user of 52.8 
ha which belonged to my group when allocated at the field. When I asked the DFPD, an 
officer said that because the natural forest area of your group was too big so we (DFPD) 
cut it out to allocate to another group. (A village head, 23rd August, 2006). 
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However, a head of a village also said that this group cleared the allocated 
natural forest (it was recognized by the DFPD as poor forest) for planting 
Acacia hybrid although this forest was devolved for protection only. Access to 
natural forest devolved by the state in this case also resulted from the relation 
of the beneficiaries to officers from the DFPD. Examining the impacts of 
forest devolution in Daclak (Vietnam), Thanh et al. (2004) concluded that 
the position of the household influenced holding forest land devolved by the 
state. However, the farmers in the mountainous commune (Thuong Quang) 
had more opportunity to access the forest devolved by the state compared 
with the villagers in the coastal area because only one state officer and one 
commune official got natural forest in Thuong Quang (out of a total of 83 
households) while 65 officers were among 201 beneficiaries in Loc Tien.  
In summary, in contrast to Loc Tien, the ability of individual households 
to occupy land based on the land use custom in Thuong Quang, along with 
the commune leaders’ behaviour toward respecting the customs of the 
people determined their opportunity for gaining endowments of the forestry 
land devolved by the state. Marginalization of the poor in access to allocated 
forestry land resulted from their labour limitations in occupying land for 
farming before the implementation of devolution. However, the 
interpretation of the commune authority and the DFPD in making a new 
boundary along with unclear negotiation in the process, partly influenced 
inequality of endowment to allocated forestry land of some villagers 
including the poor (in village no. 1).  
For natural forests, some poor households were marginalized because 
they were considered to lack labour and health by the commune authority 
and the DFPD. This may also have resulted from the terms of the land law 
and the decree that "the state allocated forest to individual households based on 
their needs and ability". The current position and relationship of individuals 
has a small influence on his or her ability to access natural forest which was 
quite different compared to the situation in the coastal commune. The issue 
of equality in access to forest land devolved by the state in Thuong Quang 
where 60 % of total population belongs to the ethnic group was better than 
in Loc Tien. It resulted in confirming the land use custom of the ethnic 
community through the attitude of local leaders who considered the land 
use custom as a basis for endowing the state’s forestry land to households 
although demand for getting forestry land for planting trees has increased for 
both the Kinh and ethnic groups.  
Endowments of forestry land and natural forest by the state through 
implementation of devolution in Thua Thien Hue depended not only on 
micro institutions (individual well-being, social relationships and gender   193 
relation in the locality) but also on a macro institution (state’s policy), as well 
as on interpretation of external actors (state officers) in the implementation 
process of devolution.  
6.2.1.3. Statutory rights to forestry land and natural forest devolved by the 
state to beneficiaries 
Environmental entitlements or utilities from environmental services such as 
forestry land and natural forest depend not only on holding the title and the 
devolved area but also on the rights awarded by the state policy to the 
holders. The statutory rights (another type of endowment) awarded to land 
beneficiaries in Vietnam were regulated in the land law and the decree for 
guiding implementation of the land law. However, the benefit of rights to 
the products from the forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state 
also depended on specific principles of the programme design by the state or 
the donors. Those rights are summarized in table 14. 
Before titling natural forest to village and household groups, under 
management regulations of the state, people were not allowed to cut timber 
for selling. People who live near the forest can ask permission of the DFPD 
with attestation by the commune authority then they could be allowed to 
log for building a house. NTFPs collection was also allowed (except the 
valuable wild animals). In practice, people (both inside and outside the 
villages) still did illegal logging to sell for cash (40 % of total households in 
Thuy Duong village did this). (Focus group discussion with man’s group in Thuy 
Duong village, 11
th, August, 2006).  
What statutory rights have been devolved to Thuy Duong village when a 
natural forest area of 511.9 ha was titled to the village? The village’s benefit 
in term of timber product was regulated in the allocation decision made by 
the Thua Thien Hue PPC that a portion of 10 % to 50 % of timber volume 
of the allocated natural forest area will be rewarded to the village based on 
the increase in timber volume per ha (from 0.5 to >1 m3 per ha) (item a of 
the article 8 of the decision no. 3205/2001/QD-UBND TTH).  
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Table 14. Types of statutory rights devolved to beneficiaries 
Forestry land  Natural forest  Type of 
statutory right  For both communes  Loc Tien  Thuong Quang 
Use Yes  Yes  Yes 
Transfer, 
mortgage, 
inherit, lease 
Yes  Not clear  Not clear  
Rights of 
benefit 
- Support finance, 
technology from the 
state 
- Getting all products 
from the land devolved 
if self- investment 
- Getting from 60 % to 
70 % of product’s 
revenues depended on 
regulations of the state 
or donors if investment 
for planting forest from 
the state or 
international donors 
- From 10 % to 50 % 
of growth timber 
volume for whole 
village 
- Collecting non-
timber forest plants 
and dead timbers 
without any tax 
payment 
 
- Right to manage 
and exploit eco-
tourism (one kind of 
non-timber forest 
products) 
- Around 60 % of 
growth timber volume 
(no record handling by 
beneficiaries: 83 
households) 
- Collecting non-
timber forest plants and 
dead timbers without 
any tax payment 
- Right to manage and 
exploit eco-tourism 
(one kind of non-
timber forest products) 
 
It was quite different in Loc Tien, the benefit of timber (according to the 
Benefit Regulation Decision no. 178/2001/QD-TTG of the prime minister 
dated 12
th November, 2001) was verbally informed in the village meeting 
before registering to get land. The natural forest beneficiaries groups 
remembered that the foresters from the DFPD said that the receivers can 
collect NTFPs and can cut timber later on: 
 
The foresters from the DFPD went to my village to organize the meeting and informed to 
us (villagers) that our immediate benefit from the allocated forest is the collection of NTFPs 
(rattan, “la non”- the leaf for making traditional hat and bamboo) and after eight to ten 
years of protection we can ask for cutting timber with the benefit of 60 % of growth timber 
volume (Mr. M. in village 6 told, 12
th, August, 2006). 
 
And: During the meeting at night, the forester from the DFPD publicly announced that 
receiving natural forest for protection will give the right to cut timbers. (Mr. H. in village 
1, 25
th July, 2006). 
 
How was this commitment recorded? In both the plan of forest land use 
planning no. 02/KH-LN of the commune approved by the DPC and the 
decision of forest land allocation of the Nam Dong DPC no. 536/QD-UB 
there is no mention of any regulation for getting benefits of timber from the   195 
allocated natural forest area. The land use certification (Red Book) noted the 
type of natural forest that was categorized based on the regulations stipulated 
in Decision no. 682B/QĐKT QPN 6-84 on 1
st August, 1984. 
A study of the case of decentralization of collective forests and household 
forests in China, Dachang (2008) (p. 96-97) reported that the quota of 
timber harvested by the forest owners had to be approved through obtaining 
a logging permit. This is similar to the case of natural forest devolution here. 
The state awarded the right of cutting timber based on a proportion of 
timber growth as presented in table 14 to the household groups or village, 
not to individual households. Moreover, the right to log timber in the 
devolved natural forest could be implemented only when the forest is 
managed well and the plan of timber exploitation also had to be submitted 
to get approval of the state agency (the DFPD or the PFPD).  
The forestry land and natural forest beneficiaries were not allowed to 
convert those areas for agricultural production because the areas were 
planned for forestry production before devolution. Those statutory rights in 
the case of natural forest and forestry land devolution in both coastal and 
mountainous areas in Thua Thien Hue were found to be different from the 
experience of Sikor & Tan (2007) in their case study on the effects of forest 
devolution in Daclak, Vietnam. There the forest beneficiaries were awarded 
rights to convert a portion of the forestry land to agricultural production and 
also the right to exploit the timbers in the devolved forest if they submitted 
a management plan for approval by the state agency. Different interpretation 
by the state agency in the process of forest devolution influenced not only 
the holding of the forest land but also the statutory rights of timber logging 
in the devolved forest.  
6.2.2. Change of customary and traditional rights  
According to (Leach et al., 1999), endowments related to entitlements from 
an environmental resource include not only statutory rights but also 
traditional and customary rights. This sub-section discusses change of those 
rights due to forest devolution by the state to highlight how implementation 
of forest devolution influenced obtaining entitlements from the natural forest 
and forestry land by people. 
As discussed in chapter V, the custom of previous land occupation for 
farming by households in Thuong Quang was a basis for them to gain access 
to the formally allocated forest land although their land was fallow when 
implementing the allocation project. For Loc Tien commune, according to 
Mr. K. in Thuy Duong village, some households reclaimed and invested in 
remote areas that were difficult to access for planting the trees. According to   196 
the land law and Decree 02/CP and Decree 163/CP, people who used bare 
hills for planting forest with attesting by commune authority will be 
allocated the forestry land by the state. In practice, some households in Loc 
Tien gained the allocated forestry land from their previous occupation as in 
Thuong Quang but only for a small area from one to two sao. This is a chan- 
ge from the custom and traditional forestry land use right to statutory rights  
but it did not change the endowments. 
For the firewood in the bare hills devolved to individual households, the 
owners no longer allowed collection of firewood because they were afraid 
that the collector would destroy their trees. Free access to firewood before 
devolution (when the bare hill had not been titled to individual households) 
was now stopped. However, in some cases, non-beneficiaries in the village 
could still collect firewood (cutting the small brush) in the planted forest 
which was distributed to the individual households but only when the forest 
matured (around three to four years after planting), but this still depended 
on permission of the owners: 
 
I still can collect the brush for firewood in the private planted forest but the owners just 
allow me when the trees are grown because they are afraid that I will damage their trees. 
But I can just go to the planted forest area of the owners who are acquainted with me. But 
the firewood in the planted forest can be used for cooking only because it is too small so 
people do not like to buy (Mrs. S. in Thuy Duong village, 12th July, 2006). 
 
This means that endowment of traditional rights in accessing the firewood of 
non-beneficiaries was stopped or became dependent access. Implementation 
of forestry land devolution by the state, therefore influenced gaining 
entitlements (utility of firewood) from the forestry land of the villagers 
group whose livelihood relies on collecting firewood. According to the 
villagers, collecting firewood for both cooking and selling is women’s work 
(especially poor women). Change from free access in the traditional use 
system to non-access or dependent access after devolution of forestry land 
may influence more entitlements and thus the livelihood of poor women, 
especially the widow because their endowment of statutory rights to the 
devolved forestry land and natural forest was very limited as discussed in 
section 6.2.1.1 above. This is discussed further in chapter VII. 
   Because of irregular collection, non-market value and the non-destructive 
harvesting methods, the non-beneficiaries still can collect medicinal plants in 
the plantation that was titled to individual households. 
For the natural forest which was allocated to Thuy Duong village, the 
villagers and people in other villages can still go to collect the dead brush for 
selling as firewood. They are also allowed to collect rattan, the leaves for   197 
making hats (lá nón) or for roofing the kitchen or the tents in the ecotourism 
area (đùng đình). All interviewees (in the coastal area) responded that they are 
still allowed to collect NTFPs  in the natural forest area devolved to the 
village. However, they are not allowed to collect in the area that is close to 
the ecotourism service area because the co-operative wanted to protect it for 
better service doing.  
After allocation, access to NTFPs was also regulated in the village's rules 
that the villagers are allowed to collect botanical NTFPs but have to follow 
the plan of the village. In reality, the villagers freely collect medicinal plants, 
dead firewood or rattan without asking permission from the village. All the 
people who collect botanical NTFPs are poor and most of them are women. 
This is understood as informal access to NTFPs because it ignores the need 
for permission of the village. It is as result of low value of the botanical 
NTFPs at present and sympathy among villagers for the poverty of the 
collectors.    
In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune), the local people have 
also collected NTFPs in the forest area within the administrative boundary of 
the commune for a long time. Before implementing devolution, the forest 
belonged to the management of Khe Tre enterprise but people still can go 
to collect NTFPs (rattan, lá nón leaves, honey, bamboo shoots and hunting 
non-valuable wild animals). This has been a popular activity, especially for 
ethnic people. According to the estimation of the villages head group (focus 
group discussion 18
th March, 2007), at present 30 % of total households in 
the commune still maintain this activity for their living. For poor households 
that belong to the ethnic group, this is still a main income source: 
 
"Some poor ethnic households collect "lá nón" leaves all year, their living relies on "lá 
nón"- (Village heads group discussion, 18th, March, 2007). 
 
The natural forest in Thuong Quang was devolved to household groups but 
there were 229 households in the Thuong Quang commune who did not 
get the natural forest. Nevertheless, those families can still collect NTFPs in 
the forest that was allocated to the household groups in the commune. 
While conducting the household surveys in Thuong Quang (July and 
August 2006), all interviewees also reported that they are still allowed to 
collect NTFPs in the devolved natural forest area. There were no commune 
or village rules or commitment papers from the state for management of 
NTFPs from the allocated forest. This traditional access to the allocated 
natural forest area depended on permission of the household groups that 
were devolved rights of management. However, this traditional right of the 
non-beneficiaries to NTFPs  in the natural forest allocated to household   198 
groups in Thuong Quang may be stopped soon because there were four 
beneficiary groups that said they do not want to allow non-beneficiaries to 
collect NTFPs in their forest. For the present they have not stopped them 
because they sympathize with their difficult life. For example, a group in the 
village no. 3 said that: 
 
This is my group's forest. We have to spend the time to protect it so we need to collect 
products to sell to earn money (3rd May, 2006).  
 
Or Those who go to my group's forest to collect rattan, "lá nón" and honey, they have to 
pay cash or have to give one-third of total products to us (Group in the village no. 
6, 4th August, 2006). 
 
However, a group in the village no. 5 just forbidad other households from 
collecting rattan, but for some other products they are allowed because they 
sympathize with the poor ethnic households who rely on collection of 
honey and lá nón for their living. 
  Similarly in Loc Tien, the households that were not allocated natural 
forest in Thuong Quang still have informal access to NTFPs. However, this 
access is not supported by the village or commune's rules or state legal papers 
but it was influenced by the perception of the groups who got natural forest. 
Access to NTFPs  (including firewood) of non-beneficiaries in the 
mountainous area after titling the forest to household groups depended on 
the forest users group. This is similar to the change in access to firewood on 
the devolved forestry land in Loc Tien; endowment of traditional rights to 
NTFPs changed from free access before devolution to dependent access after 
devolution of natural forest by the state. Collecting NTFPs is the job of the 
poor (especially the ethnic poor). Therefore, this may influence more 
entitlements and livelihood of poor and ethnic group in Thuong Quang. 
This is discussed further in chapter VII. 
To sum up, the statutory rights to forestry land and natural forest devol-
ved in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang were influenced by the household 
positions, custom institution related to gender relations, as well as the state’s 
policy and external actors’ interpretations of the devolution implementation 
process while individual relationships and sympathy in every day life decided 
traditional rights of access to forestry land and natural forest of local people. 
The households that got forestry land (in Loc Tien) or got natural forest (in 
Thuong Quang) did not prevent the non-beneficiaries from collecting 
firewood or NTFPs that was done before devolution because the relationship 
between them in normal life forced them to do that. The change in 
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free access to dependent access may influence more on women and the poor 
(especially the ethnic poor). 
6.3. Security of endowment after devolution 
Land tenure is defined as a legal right (access, manage, exclude, transfer, 
getting benefits) and obligations of the person who gets the land (Schlager & 
Ostrom, 1992) or rights to limit access to land as well as the duration of 
these rights Devlin (2001, cited in Ellsworth (2004). Land tenure includes 
the rights to land that are customarily defined (FAO, 2002). 
There is agreement among many researchers that land tenure security is a 
defensible claim of rights or the certainty of the rights that are recognized 
and protected. It includes both “bundle of rights” and the matter of 
defending or securing those rights (FAO, 2002; Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 
1994).  
In this research, land tenure was understood as the rights rewarded to 
land users. It includes both land tenure rewarded by the state legislation 
(statutory rights) and customary tenure (recognizing by the rules of the 
community). Security of land tenure in this study is the ability of the land 
user to claim or protect their rights to the land. According to Leach et al. 
(1999) and Sikor & Tan (2007), endowments that can influence the 
transformation to environmental entitlements are statutory and customary 
rights to a resource. According to a combination of ideas from scholars on 
land tenure and environmental entitlement, in this research security of 
tenure can also be understood as similar to security of endowments. 
This section discusses how rights to the devolved forestry land and 
natural forest were protected. The author also explores what traditional 
rights of land use were recognized by the ethnic community and how they 
were kept when the state management system was introduced. Discussion of 
security of endowments here is a basis for examining entitlement mapping 
(transformation from endowments to entitlements) in chapter VII. 
Understanding security of endowments also helps to highlight contributions 
and limitations of change in property regime from state property to private 
property (for forestry land) and common property (for natural forest) when 
the state implemented forest devolution. 
As presented in section 6.2.1.2, the 1993 land law regulated that "Land 
user has the rights of use, transfer, heritage, mortgages and lease land". This 
regulation was still kept in the revised 1998 and 2001 land laws and the 
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provided certification or a Red Book to identify their rights to the land. 
The security of endowments in practice is discussed below. 
6.3.1.  Security of endowment to  the devolved forestry land 
In practice, when forest land was allocated to individual households, the 
certification provided to the land users in Loc Tien commune through the 
PAM and 327 programmes was a white colour decision. In 2004, it was 
replaced by a Red Book. From 1994 (when implementing the PAM and 327 
programmes along with the allocation of forestry land in the coastal 
commune) to 2003, the households that were allocated land could use it for 
planting trees but the financial sources for planting the forest came from the 
donors and the government and selection of the species for the forest was 
decided by the DFPD. The white colour decision was used as a claim for the 
Red Book in 2003 but it could not be used for transferring or mortgaging 
land. For the households who got the Red Books, their rights were ensured 
as regulated in the laws and the decrees. 
 There was no regulation in the land law or the decrees of the state on 
the type and value of the land use certification that was not based on a Red 
Book. However, the Phu Loc DPC (the coastal area) interpreted the 
ownership of a white colour decision as the basis for providing the Red 
Book in 2003. However, there were 11 households in Thuy Duong village 
that received the white decisions in 1994 but they were taken back by the 
CPC and the DFPD (Information from the focus group discussion with poor 
women in Thuy Duong village on 12th June, 2006). Security of their 
endowments or land tenure, therefore was influenced by interpretation in 
the process of providing the formal certification (Red Book), not by the 
state policy or regulation on the papers.  
In the mountainous commune, three years and four months after 
allocation the Red Books were given to land users. From August 2003 to 
October 2006, although the households who were allocated forestry land 
had not yet received the Red Books, they could plant forest. In contrast to 
almost all planted forest areas in Loc Tien, the species that were planted on 
the allocated forestry land in Thuong Quang were selected by the farmers 
themselves. The reason the villagers in Thuong Quang had the right to 
select species for planting forest on their land was that the financial source 
for the investment came from their own families.  
The rights in the land laws and the decrees to the households who got 
the forestry land in all the villages (except some plots in village no. 6) in the 
mountainous communes were ensured. There were no complaints and the 
land users could plant trees, transfer and bequeath to their children.   201 
However, because of the creation of new boundaries without clear 
negotiations in the process of allocation between village no. 6 and village 
no. 1, endowment of statutory rights of the households who got the plots 
that were reclaimed and used by the village no. 1 could not be ensured, 
even though the households had Red Books. The villagers in the village n.o 
1 who were the old users of the plots still came to plant trees or food crops 
and the new users could not stop them. The complaint between the new 
user and the old one were sent to the commune authority but the response 
was that they should negotiate themselves.  
In the customary land use system practiced by the ethnic group, the first 
person who reclaimed and used the plot will be its owner forever. When the 
Kinh people migrated to the commune, they also followed this custom. 
Although the new forestry land use system in Thuong Quang was set up by 
the state through the allocation project, it could not replace traditional 
custom. As found in the case of Thuong Quang, individual title did not 
ensure the rights to land and the customary land tenure system was not 
eroded. This is quite different from conclusions about land tenure drawn 
from the case studies in Africa that the introduction of private titling to land 
made the customary land use system weaker (Bruce & Migot-Adholla, 
1994).   
What about the security of statutory rights to the products from the 
natural forest area devolved to household groups or village? This is discussed 
in the following section. 
6.3.2.  Security of endowment to  the devolved natural forest 
For the natural forest devolved to the village in the coastal area, the village 
was free to collect NTFPs. A special NTFP from the allocated natural forest 
area in Thuy Duong village is an ecotourism service at the foot of the hills 
with a stream locally named “Suối Voi” (Elephant stream). Titling natural 
forest to the village was not the reason for the appearance of the ecotourism 
service because it was formed before the allocation. However, it enhanced 
and strengthened the service through awarding the rights to protect the flora 
for maintaining the water in the stream and the landscape to attract tourism. 
Ecotourism was considered a non-timber product from the forest but its use 
was not mentioned in the village’s regulation. Access to this resource was 
awarded to 12 households and the board of the cooperative only. Because of 
the limitation of the stream area, the service was not enough for all 
households to join, not every non-poor who has the capacity to invest in 
providing service can get permission to do this. There was also a hidden 
factor of social relationships that dectermined the opportunity to access this   202 
product by the villagers. Security of statutory rights to this special and high 
profit product for more than 160 households in the village was not ensured 
because of unclear regulation for distributing benefit of this product in the 
village’s rules. It was influenced by decision of village and co-operative 
leaders although the statutory rights stated that all villagers have the right to 
access this NTFP. 
The tenure right of timber in the natural forest area devolved to the 
village was stated in the decision of the PPC to be based on growth of the 
timber volume per year (table 14) with the first claim allowable after three 
years of devolution. However, by 2008 (after seven years of devolution) no 
timber had been logged because of the complexity of the claim process and 
rights of the village head (it will be discussed further in chapter VII). This 
reflected the fact that security of statutory rights to timber from the devolved 
natural forest in the coastal commune depended not only on the title in the 
decision approved by the state, but also on the institutional implementation 
process and the power of the village head. 
In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune), although all the names 
of household groups who were allocated were titled in the profile at the 
district, when a group in the village no. 6 caught some illegal loggers in 
their forest and sent the illegal loggers with the timbers to the commune and 
the DFPD they did not get any feedback. This situation has also happened in 
the village no. 2 and no. 3 when illegal loggers ignored the showing of the 
Red Book by the forest beneficiaries. Security of statutory rights to natural 
forest devolved by the state was not ensured because of a lack of support 
from the commune authority and the DFPD. It is clear that holding a title 
was not enough for securing the statutory rights to the devolved natural 
forest. Exercise of the state institutions that were implemented through the 
authority and the state organizations had a stronger influence.  
The findings here are similar to the case of forest devolution in Daclak 
(Vietnam) where the statutory rights to the forest beneficiaries did not work 
in practice after two years of allocation because the non-beneficiaries 
claimed their customary forest use before devolution and they did not accept 
exclusion from the allocated forest area (Sikor & Tan, 2007).  
   For NTFPs, the households that were devolved the natural forest have rights 
to collect although this was not stated specifically in the devolved decision. 
However, the non-beneficiaries in Thuong Quang said that they still 
continue to go to collect NTFPs because they are common resources, 
nobody can prevent them:  
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Natural forest is a common asset, excepting timber which is prohibited by the state. We 
can go to collect rattan, honey, bamboo, firewood as we used to do it before…Nobody can 
prevent me… (Mr. C. in Thuong Quang, 19
th, March, 2007). 
 
Security of statutory rights to NTFPs of the forest beneficiaries in Thuong 
Quang may also be challenged by claims of their traditional use rights of 
non-beneficiaries.    
To sum up, in the cases of Loc Tien and Thuong Quang, holding the 
title or the statutory rights devolved by the state did not ensure security of 
tenure on forestry land and natural forest product devolved by the state. 
Security may be challenged by exercising the institutions of the state 
organizations and local authority, as well as the existing custom of traditional 
land use systems.  
Transferring of property right of forestry land and natural forest from the 
state to individual households and villages or household groups still 
challenges the beneficiaries in getting security of endowment or security of 
tenure. How did this transferring of rights influence management practices? 
The next section discusses this issue. 
6.4. Forestry land and natural forest management practices after 
devolution 
The forest devolution policy in Vietnam was made and implemented for 
objectives of conservation and development. Devolution of forestry land and 
natural forest to beneficiaries aimed to encourage people to invest in 
developing and protecting the forest to improve productivity of land use and 
to reduce deforestation as well as improving people’s livelihoods through 
rewarding the users with a bundle of rights. The extended environmental 
entitlement approach developed by Leach et al. (1999) and adapted by Sikor 
and Tan (2007) is very useful in discussing how forest devolution brings 
endowments and then entitlements from the devolved forest to different 
social actors. However, it does not pay attention to the influence of 
devolution on change in management practice which is one of the key 
concerns of the forest devolution policy.  Therefore, in this research 
management practice of the forestry land and natural forest after devolution 
is discussed based on the theoretical framework of property rights. 
This section discusses how the allocated forestry land has been used and 
how people invested in planting trees and protecting the natural forest area 
after devolution. The situation of infringement upon the forest protection 
law in the allocated natural forest area is also discussed to argue whether 
devolution of the natural forest to village or household groups has helped to   204 
reduce illegal activities or whether collective management (by a village or a 
group) has improved protection compared to state management before 
devolution. 
6.4.1. Development of plantation and preference of investment in planting 
trees on the allocated bare hills 
The secondary data showed that there was an increase of planted forest area 
after devolution was implemented in the bare hills in the mountainous area 
and the coastal area (see table 15) 
In Son La, a mountainous province of Northern Vietnam, after allocation 
of forestry land in 1994, 400 ha of forest were planted between 1995 and 
1997 (Sikor, 2001). However, the author concluded that implementation of 
forestry land allocation was not the reason for the expansion of the forest 
plantation, but it was the result of the keenness of farmers to obtain cash 
payments and the interest in intercropping in the planted forest. Research in 
Cam Xuyen Ha Tinh by McElwee (2003) found that all the bare hills of 13 
households that were allocated forestry land were replanted with trees 
(Acacia, Eucalyptus) but he did not explain why the bare hills were planted 
with trees. Was the expansion of planted forest in Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang the result of forestry land allocation?  
 In both coastal and mountainous communes, almost all allocated forestry 
land areas (barren hills) have been planted with single species such as Acacia 
hybrid, Eucalyptus camaldulensis or Aquaria crasinna (mainly Acacia hybrid). Of 
the 60 households interviewed in the coast commune, there were only 20 
sao of the total of 256 sao of allocated forestry land that had not yet been 
planted with trees. According to the household, this area was not used for 
farming crops but it has been fallow because he got a rather large parcel of 
forestry land area (50 sao) so the family did not have enough capacity to 
invest in planting the whole allocated area. However, the allocated fallow 
forestry land area in Thuong Quang was 62 sao. It occupied 21.7 % of the 
total allocated area of 60 interviewed households and belonged to both poor 
and non-poor groups.  
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Table 15. Planted forest area by household in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang. 
Thuong Quang  Loc Tien              Commune 
    Year 
 
Planted forest area (ha per year) 
1996 -  17.5 
1997 -  25.5 
1998 -  31.5 
1999 -  37.8 
2000 -  59.0 
2001 -  107.0 
2002 -  107.0 
2003 37.2  677.0 
2004 82.9  787.8 
2005 82.9  787.8 
2006 108.5  - 
Source: Statistical data from the commune offices, 2006 and 2007. 
The reason for fallowing the allocated land of ethnic people in Thuong 
Quang (four among six interviewed households have been fallowing the 
land) was similar in Loc Tien that local people did not have enough capacity 
to invest in planting trees although the allocated area was not large (from 10 
to 20 sao). For two households that belong to the Kinh people, the reason 
for fallowing allocated forestry land was that they had not received the Red 
Book.  
The allocated forestry land in Thuong Quang was the farming area for 
upland crops which was prohibited by the DFPD for protection purpose. 
However, this area was planned for planting trees and formally allocated to 
the individual households in 2003 through the SNV project. Among the 60 
interviewed households, there were only two ethnic poor households 
farming cassava and beans in the allocated forestry land but they said that this 
was only temporary cultivation while they waited to have money to buy 
seedling for planting forest. 
Before implementation of the forest planting activity by the PAM 
programme, the upland was also used mainly for planting cassava by local 
farmers in Loc Tien. However, there was no encroachment on the upland 
area for farming but it was replaced by the other activities that were 
discussed further in chapter VII. Using forestry land for farming at present is 
also no problem for the local people in Loc Tien although some very poor 
households have been planting cassava in spaces of the planted forest. It was 
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crops production just for subsistence purposes and food security did not 
bring any profit or they may even have a loss because the costs were higher 
than the benefits for some kinds of crops such as rice. This is different from 
findings by Ohlsson et al. (2005) through investigation of forest land use 
changes in Ban Lau of Lao Cai in Northern Vietnam, that the farmers still 
continue to do farming in the upland area.  
What about the preference of investing in planting trees after titling 
forestry land to individual households? It is difficult to analyze this because 
almost all the planted forest areas in Loc Tien were funded by the PAM 
Programme or the national programme 327 and partly by the provincial 
budget. However, not all the households that have forestry land had access 
to the support of the international and national projects or programmes. 
Therefore, some areas are still unused because some households do not have 
enough financial capacity to invest in planting trees as mentioned above. 
There were only fourty sao planted by household's self-investment in the 
coastal commune (Loc Tien). This is in line with conclusion by Ohlsson et 
al. (2005) in a study in Northern Vietnam that there are opportunities for 
expanding forest-based land use because the farmers are establishing the 
plantation based on market information. However, the plantation esta-
blishment is still dependent on government resources.  
There was a sudden growth of the plantation area in Loc Tien from 2003 
and in Thuong Quang from 2004 (see table 15). Information from 
discussion with farmers and local leaders in both commune suggested that an 
increased price and a good market for timber because of the appearance of 
paper chips processing in Chan May Port were the major reasons that led to 
greater attention in planting trees by local people. Profit from forest planting 
has increased since 2004, and is 10 times greater compared to rice 
production (comments from a villager in Thuy Duong village).  
However, interviews with the farmers in both communities confirmed 
that being awarded the rights of use and clear benefit by the land law and 
the decision 178 of the state were also important reasons for them to be 
willing to plant trees because they could be protected from encroachment of 
others or prohibition by the foresters: 
 
When I got the Red Book, I fully feel security to invest in planting trees because others 
could not take my land and my trees and officers of the DFPD will not prevent me 
because the authority confirmed that is my land. (Mr. T. in Thuy Duong village, 
19
th July, 2006.) 
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Or If I am not provided the Red Book, I will not feel certainty to plant forest because 
other may encroach on my land or the forester from the DFPD can take it back. (Mr. V. 
in village 6 of Thuong Quang, 2
nd August, 2006.) 
 
In Thuong Quang, there were two households whose devolved forestry land 
was still fallow because they have not yet got the Red Book. 
At present, the local people know that is their land and they have the 
right to sell timber so they are willing to plant trees. Both the high profit of 
planting trees and awarding land use rights with a clear benefit accounted for 
why all the plantation area in Thuong Quang was grown by household's self 
investment. This showed that individual title is one of the factors that lead to 
the expansion of planted forest area and to enhancing the preference for 
investment in planting trees. The claim of the private property right school 
is not fully appropriate in this case.   
For quality of the plantation, all interviewed people, local leaders and 
foresters reflected that the Acacia hybrid plantations (a major species planted 
in the area) have grown well. This species is a legume species that can 
improve soil fertility.  
   Considering the environmental improvement to the plantation with the 
change from bushes was not investigated in this research. However, 
according to comments by the people, local leaders and foresters, all the 
plantation in both study sites were planted by clearing the vegetation to 
plant trees and this can cause soil erosion in the two first years after planting. 
Another issue is mono-species plantation (Acacia or Eucalyptus) that may raise 
a question of biodiversity conservation, although this is similar to the 
plantations of Cam Xuyen and it was believed by many people in Hanoi 
who were working for the 5MHRP that greening the bare hills by mono-
species plantation is a good outcome (McElwee, 2003). This research could 
not examine this aspect and further study is needed.  
To sum up, there was an increase of planted forest area after allocating 
forestry land to individual households in both coastal and mountainous 
communes. In a comparison study on forest land use between Lao and 
Vietnam, Ohlsson (2009)  concluded that the conversion of shifting 
cultivation areas to forestry plantation in Doan Hung and Ham Yen of 
Vietnam is results of various factors such as existing wood market, land 
availability, allocation policy and skills and knowledge of the farmers while it 
is still infancy in Lao because the farmers do not have market knowledge so 
they continue to do shifting cultivation as before. Development of the 
plantation in Thua Thien Hue was also a result of different factors including 
increased price of the product from the land, financial support from the 
international organizations and the state and the certainty of land rights and   208 
benefits of the land. The title to land is only a part of encouraging land 
investment. Individual title is not enough to ensure efficient use of the land, 
as concluded by the private property right school if there is no financial 
support and market for the products. Efficiency of forestry land use also 
depends on the politics of access, not only of access to land resources (as 
discussed by the institutionalist school) but also of access to other resources 
to support use and management of the land. 
6.4.2. Investing in managing natural forest after allocation 
¾  In Loc Tien commune 
As presented in chapter V, 511.9 ha of natural forest were allocated to the 
Thuy Duong village in Loc Tien with the White decision of the Thua 
Thien Hue PPC. A regular protection activity was implemented by a group. 
The forest protection group members were appointed by the commune and 
village leaders. The group has 12 members who were people who made a 
living based mainly on exploiting forest products before the devolution. 
They know well the ways of detecting signals of illegal logging and where 
they have to go to control the forest. The forest protection group of the 
village was divided into three sub-groups that have a head and a plan for 
checking activity regularly every month (two days for each checking time) 
(Information from the focus group discussion in Thuy Duong village, 25th Feb., 
2007).  
 Currently, the labour investment of the group for protection of the 
forest has been reducing after lasting for six years (from 2001 to 2006) 
because the members have not yet received any benefits or even 
compensation for the accidents they had when they entered the forest area 
to control illegal logging. The group complained that:  
 
We do not have enough time and manpower to go to protect more because the protection 
activity has lasted five years already but we still have not got any benefit yet (Focus 
group discussion with the forest protection group, 25th Feb., 2007).   
 
Why is that? It was found that the village’s rules paper stated that they will 
be compensated for their labour contribution for protecting the forest 
through payment that is taken from selling timber logged in the forest after 
three years of allocation (Item 2 of Article 4 in the village rules). However, 
by 2007, logging timber in the allocated forest area for receiving benefits 
from management activity has still not been initiated. Explaining this, the 
head of the village said that it takes a lot of time and expense to ask   209 
permission of the forest protection department and PPC to log timber as per 
the statement in the allocation decision:  
 
To get permission for logging timber we have to write an application and go to the DFPD 
to get it attested and then submit to the PCP to get approval. This takes a lot of time and 
costs at least five million VND (Mr. K.- a village leader, 25
th Feb., 2007) .  
 
The head of the village also explained that the reason why logging timber to 
distribute the benefits of forest management to the villagers has not yet been 
carried out (beginning of 2007) was because the village has not needed to 
exploit timber yet and the functional organizations of the district and 
province just allowed harvesting of timber when there is construction in the 
village, but the village does not have any construction:  
 
My village still has no need to exploit the timber yet and if we want to log timber, we 
have to have construction to show the DFPD as a reason for needing timber (Mr. K., 
18
th May, 2006).  
 
From the accounts of the villagers and observation, the author knew that the 
village had been reconstructing the village’s pagoda. Those are formal 
reasons to ask permission to exploit timber. However, timber logging from 
the protected forest is still not organized. Different from the ideas of the 
head, the forest protection group wants to exploit timber to pay for their 
labour contribution for the protection activity but they could not make 
decision on that and they also do not know how to start. It seems to the 
author that decision making related to asking permission of the authorities 
for exploiting timber is made by the head of the village only. What is the 
role of all villagers in making decision on when to ask permission for 
logging timber in the allocated forest? Is this collective action for managing 
the common or village forest? It seems the devolved natural forest was not 
really managed as a common property resource. 
Along with the protection activity of the group, the villagers also 
participated in allocated natural forest management through formal and 
informal means (talking directly to the protection group or some villagers 
talked together when they saw timber was transported through the village 
although they have not yet received any direct benefit from the forest).   
Similar to the thinking of the protection group, the villagers have forgotten 
their responsibility for protecting the village's forest because they felt that it 
had no practical meaning for their livelihood. They do not actually feel they 
have resource tenure from the forest.  
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¾  In Thuong Quang commune 
The natural forest in Thuong Quang was allocated to household groups. 
The forest recipient group size was from five to ten households (except one 
group that registered after the village meeting was organized has two 
households only) with a forest area from 45.7 ha to 115.4 ha.  
In July 2005, the land use right certifications were issued. Although they 
were issued and signed by the chairman of the DPC from July 2005, almost 
all the households and household groups that were allocated forestry land 
and natural forest have not yet got the Red Book. Until June of 2006, the 
household groups in villages 5 and 6 (Kinh groups) received the Red Book 
because they went to the commune authority to claim while almost all the 
household groups (in villages 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7- mainly the Ktu groups) got 
their at the end of 2006.  The point of time for getting the Red Book 
depended on the claim of the group. 
Investing labour in managing the allocated natural forest has been 
different among the household groups and by time. In the first year after 
allocation (2004), all groups who were allocated the natural forest organized 
and assigned responsibility among the group’s members to control and 
promote regeneration (clearing creepers) of the forest. Some groups went to 
check the forest two or three times per month (villages 5, 2 and 6) while 
some other groups do the checking activity monthly (villages 4 and 7) or 
every two months (villages 1 and 3). Most of groups were verbally assigned 
the responsibility for protecting the allocated forest. The activity of checking 
illegal logging was stopped from four months to one year after allocation 
(from the beginning to the end of 2004 depending on each group: see table 
16).  
Table 16. Time investment in protecting the allocated natural forest by household group in Thuong 
Quang 
Household group  Rotating cycle for 
checking forest 
Duration of stopping the checking 
activity 
Groups in village 1, 3  every two months  April, 2004 to Sep. 2006 
Groups in village 5, 2  every 10 days   November, 2004 to June 2006 
Groups in village 6  every two weeks  December 2004 to January 2006 
Groups in village 4 and 
village 7 
every month  June 2004 to July 2006 
Source: Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
The major reason for stopping the protection activity was the lack of 
capacity of the groups to prevent illegal logging because of not having the   211 
Red Book. They stopped control of the forest because their efforts for 
protecting the forest got no result.  
Investing man-days in protecting the allocated natural forest started again 
in 2006 when the groups got the Red Books. The frequency of checking of 
the forest was still different among the groups because of a difference in 
quality of the allocated natural forest and intensity of illegal logging activity. 
This is discussed further in section 6.4.3. 
To sum up, the titling of the natural forest is only one reason to be 
willing to invest labour in protecting the allocated forest. Investing labour in 
protection also depends on clear responsibility assignments or commitment 
of benefits from contributing to protection, direct benefit to protectors as 
well as the intensity of illegal logging activity. 
6.4.3. Situation of preventing forest fire, illegal exploitation in natural forest, 
and encroaching for planting trees 
¾  Preventing forest fires, illegal exploitation in natural forest 
Preventing forest fires and illegal logging are two of the objectives of 
improving forest management practices through devolution. According the 
report of the DFPD in Phu Loc and Nam Dong, forest fires stopped in 2000. 
However, this was the result of not only devolution of forestry land and 
natural forest to households and villages but also of the state’s regulation on 
responsibility of all people in preventing and treating forest fires because of 
the common benefits of the forest. 
The number of cases of illegal exploitation after allocating forest land and 
natural forest declined from 2003 in Loc Tien (after two years of allocation) 
while it increased in the mountainous commune (table 17)      
Reduction of illegal logging in the coastal commune was also confirmed 
by the interviewees in the household survey (85 % of total interviewees said 
that illegal logging was stopped or reduced) or in the focus group dis-
cussions: "in the first two years illegal logging activity had been happening rather 
frequently, but now we rarely see it".  
Frequent control by the village protection group due to their experience 
in the location of logging was one of the reasons for the reduction of illegal 
logging. In the first two years, the village protection group caught 10 cases 
of illegal logging but they were mainly from other communes or a few from 
other villages. The illegal loggers in the village stopped cutting timbers and 
tried to find other jobs. However, this did not result from fear of control of 
the village protection group but from the hesitance of the illegal loggers 
who live in the village because of their relationship with the whole village in   212 
daily life. The illegal loggers in the villager felt shy if they cut timber from 
the village's forest.       
Table 17. Illegal logging and forest fire situation in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang (Unit: case) 
Forest fire  Timber illegal logging           Items 
 
    Year 
Loc Tien  Thuong Quang  Loc Tien  Thuong Quang 
2000  0 0  1 - 
2001  0 0  1 - 
2002  1 0  2 - 
2003  0 0  0 - 
2004  0 0  0 2 
2005  0 0  1 4 
2006  - -  - 5 
Source: DFPD of Phu Loc and Nam Dong, 2006 and 2007. 
 
Another reason was that there was only one way to transport timber and that 
was way the illegal loggers would have to pass the village, so it was not 
difficult for the village protection group and villagers to detect illegal timber 
loggers. However, at present (from 2007), there are few villagers who 
sometimes go to the allocated forest to cut small timber to do something at 
home or to sell to pay for their children's tuition fee. The village forest 
protection group and the villagers do not want to prevent them because of 
sympathies for their difficulty. Those small illegal timber loggers are 
compelled to do this because other livelihood activity outcomes could not 
meet their basic needs (food and dress, health care, and education). An 
officer from the DFPD said that: "illegal logging has been reoccurring because the 
village could not control the allocated forest area" (Mr. N., 24
th July, 2007). This 
was contradicted by comments of the villagers and commune leaders that the 
forest has been managed well but their interest has been reduced because 
they hadn’t received any benefits from the allocated natural forest for seven 
years.  
 What about illegal logging in Thuong Quang? Forty-five percent of the 
interviewees in the household survey in the mountainous commune 
responded that illegal logging in the area has been reduced. However, they 
just said in a general way that people now understood the usefulness of 
keeping forest for maintaining water resources for their life so they do not 
want to cut timber:    213 
All the households in my village stop cutting timber now because if we cut forest, water will 
be exhausted. Or Almost all people stopped cutting timber because they are afraid of a lack 
of water (Household survey, 2006).  
 
In the household survey in 2006, some respondents said reduction of illegal 
logging was a result of executing the state policy and they are afraid to be 
arrested by state forest protectors:  
 
We have to stop cutting timber because that is the state regulation or We have to 
implement because that is the directive of the state, if cutting timber, we will be arrested by 
state forest protectors.  
 
The comments of the respondents were similar to the statements of the state 
forest officers in promoting forest protection. Reasons for stopping illegal 
logging were not a result of devolving natural forest to households groups, 
but they came from efforts of the DFPD in publicizing the forest protection 
law for a long time (from 1993 up to present). 
Consistency with the data of the Nam Dong DFPD (table 17), 40 percent 
of total respondents said that illegal timber cutting was still happening
in Thuong Quang. When commenting on the reasons for that, some  
villagers did not know why it was:  
 
I do not understand why the natural forest has been allocated to household groups but some 
people still cut timbers" or "I still saw some people cut timber although the forests were 
allocated but I do not know why that is (Mr. C. in village 2, 20
th August, 2006)  
 
While some others said "They (illegal loggers) were not afraid of the state 
forest protectors because they are professional loggers" (Mr. Ch. in village 1, 
12
th August, 2006).  
Are they poor people as in the case of Loc Tien commune? No, they are 
rich and belong to the Kinh but they still want to do illegal logging because 
of the high income of this activity:  
 
I saw that timbers have been still logged, they are Kinh people who have chain-saws and 
buffalo (Ms. N. in village 1, 25
th July, 2006)  
 
or The minority people implemented the state regulations well but the Kinh people are 
daring (Mrs. T.R in village 1, 25
th July, 2006). 
 
or  Some rich people still go to cut timbers because they have buffalo and a good 
relationship with outsiders (Mr. B.  in village 2, 25
th August, 2006).  
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The head of the villagers also confirmed that illegal loggers are mainly from 
villages 5, 6 and 7 where the Kinh people live. One person in village 6 said 
there are about 30 logging machines in villages 5, 6 and 7 that have been 
used for cutting timber. The illegal loggers in the allocated natural forest 
areas also were not the recipients of the devolved natural forest. This is 
different compared with the findings of Thanh et al. (2004) that the allocated 
natural forest had been cleared for farming and the timber harvested by its 
beneficiaries.  
The continuation of illegal logging after allocation was also confirmed by 
the forest recipient groups:  
 
They still cut timbers in my group's forest but we could not stop them because we have no 
evidence to show our right group in village 5 or Timbers in the forest allocated to my 
group has still been logged, we caught one case in 2004 and two cases in 2006 (group 
one in village 6).  
   
The logging activity still occurrs in the allocated forest area of all groups. 
Why could illegal logging not be stopped in the mountainous commune? Is 
it lack of protection activity of the groups who were allocated the natural 
forest? As noted in section 6.4.2., all the devolved forest protection groups 
invested their labour in protecting the allocated natural forest but their 
efforts faced resistance by the illegal loggers due to lack of support from the 
DFPD and the commune authority. For example, in 2004, a group from 
village 6 caught some people who did illegal logging and informed the 
district forest protection. The timber (2 cubic meters) that was logged 
illegally was transported to the DFPD for treatment (because the forest 
protection law regulated that only forest protection departments can punish 
the illegal loggers). However, there was no feedback from the department. 
In some other cases in village 1 or 2 or 5, some groups could not stop illegal 
logging because the thieves said that: 
 
This is common forest, do you have any evidence to show your right to prohibit me to log 
timber? (Heads of the groups in villages 5 and 6; Mr. H. and Mr. V., 23rd 
August, 2006). 
 
The late provision of the Red Book to show the rights of protectors is 
another reason to be not able to prevent illegal logging: 
 
Outsiders still cut timber in the forest area of my group but we have not got the 
Red Book yet so we could not prevent them (Mr. Th. from village 7, 23
th, 
August 2006)   215 
In the first two years after allocation, some people still cut timber in my group's forest but 
we did not have the Red Book so we could not ban them Mr. Th. From village 2, 
20
th August, 2006) 
or My group knows somebody has logged timber in our forest but we could not catch them 
because we have not got the Red Book yet (Mr. V., village 1, 22
nd, June, 2006).  
 
Difficulty in banning outsiders from logging timber because of no 
certification of devolved rights was also confirmed by the households groups' 
heads in villages 1, 5 and 6.  
The forest recipient groups reflected that illegal logging was reduced after 
they got the Red Book (after 2006). However, this situation still occurred 
but with lower frequency because of lack of support from the DFPD when 
the villagers caught illegal loggers.   
Frequency of illegal logging also depended on the devolved natural forest 
conditions: 
 
The forest in my village is poor forest with low value species so illegal logging happens only 
sometime. Therefore my group just goes to check every two months. Some members also 
check it when they go to collect NTFPs in the forest (In-depth interview a member 
of a group in village 1, 1
st December, 2007)  
 
or The forest of my group is richer than others and it is easier for transporting wood so 
illegal logging occurred more often, therefore we have to go to check every 10 days (a man 
in the group of village 5, 2
nd, December, 2007). 
 
Another reason why the forest beneficiaries group could not prevent the 
illegal loggers from the same commune was hesitation because of every day 
life's relationship: "We caught some illegal loggers but we knew them so we freed 
them because we were hesitant to take the timber"- the head of a group in village 
2 said. Fear of violence by the illegal loggers also prevented the forest 
beneficiaries from banning cutting timber: "W e  w e r e  a f r a i d  t h a t  i f  w e  p u t  
pressure on the illegal loggers, they will take revenge on us" (Mr. R., 2
nd December, 
2007). This also reflected the limited support from the legislation 
implementation institutions.  
Similar to the coastal commune, the forest beneficiaries groups allowed 
the non-beneficiaries to collect NTFPs or log small timber for household 
consumption. This permission also comes from sympathy toward the 
difficulty of non-beneficiaries based on every day relationships. NTFPs are 
still exploited without planning. This was also not considered in the process 
of devolving the rights of forest management to the beneficiaries. This may 
lead to a reduction of biodiversity even if illegal logging is stopped.    216 
¾ Clearing allocated natural forest for planting trees 
Eight ha of the total of 53.9 ha of the natural areas were allocated to group 1 
in village 1 of Thuong Quang that had been encroached by some villagers in 
village 7 for planting Acacia hybrid. About 15 ha belonging to the allocated 
forest area of village 5 were also cleared for planting trees. Those areas have 
been classified as type "Ic" which is called "natural forest rehabilitating after 
stopping shifting cultivation". This is very poor forest with low-value timber 
species.  According to the government regulation, this type of forest must be 
conserved for rehabilitating naturally.  
In the author’s field works in the summer of 2006, the beneficiaries said 
that, like the case of preventing illegal timber logging, they could not 
prevent clearing the natural forest to plant trees by encroachers since they 
had nothing to show their right to stop the encroachers. When the author 
came back to the commune in the summer of 2007, the Red Book certified 
rights of the forest user had been given to all the recipient groups in Thuong 
Quang. However, the villagers told that some allocated poor natural forest 
areas were still being cleared for planting Acacia. The beneficiaries informed 
the commune authority but nothing was done to stop the encroachers. 
When the author asked an official from the DFPD that "Do you know the 
natural forest has been cleared for planting trees?", he answered that "Yes, I 
heard some poor forest areas have been cleared but we are too busy now so we have 
not gone there to check yet". This reflected that support from the local 
authorities and the DFPD for preventing clearing poor forest for planting 
trees is also limited. 
Analysis of the practice of managing the devolved natural forest above 
reflected that devolving the rights of managing natural forest to villages or 
household groups improved prevention of illegal logging activity. Efficiency 
of management of the devolved natural forest area is influenced by different 
factors such as location of the resource, experience of the protectors, 
legislation sanctions, every day life relationships as well as support of the 
authority and the state’s functional organizations. It is too early to draw 
conclusions about the role of internal institutions because distribution of 
benefits has not yet happened but it seems that the forest beneficiaries are 
rarely mentioned in the village’s management rules or the group’s 
agreements in the discussions about their management process and its results. 
Maintaining collective action for management depends mainly on the 
expectation of getting direct benefits from the resources and strong support 
from the local authority and the state’s functional organizations. 
As noted earlier, both group size and the allocated natural forest area, in 
the coastal commune area are bigger than in the mountainous area but   217 
efficiency of forest management is the reverse. Agrawal (2001) argued that 
small groups and resource size is one factor that enables conditions for 
sustaining the common property regime. However, the evidence from this 
research showed that a group of 170 members with a resource size of 511 ha 
is still achieving more efficient management compared to a group size of 
from two to ten members with the resource size from 40 to 80 ha. This 
research was not designed to answer the question of how large the size of a 
group and resource should be to best sustain common resource 
management. However, from the two case studies in the research we can 
conclude that the relationship between the group and resource size and 
sustainability of common management is not universal. This research case 
may challenge the hypothesis of Agrawal (2001) that a small group and 
resource size may always lead to better management. 
To sum up, there was expansion of the plantation after allocating forestry 
land (bare hills) to individual households in both communes (Loc Tien and 
Thuong Quang). That is not only a result of devolving land use rights to 
households but also the result of supporting tree planting by the state and 
international organization as well as an increase in timber prices.  
Titling to natural forest encouraged beneficiaries to invest labour in 
protecting the allocated forest area. However, the protection effort has 
tended to decree because of limited support from the DFPD and the 
commune authority in exercising the rights and lateness of gaining of direct 
benefit from the forest. Efficiency of allocated natural forest management 
depends on the organization of collective action, support by the law on 
paper and in practice as well as relationships in every day life rather than size 
of the group, resource and internal institutions. 
6.5. Conflicts over forest land access and use 
Although there is no violence yet related to conflict over forest land in Thua 
Thien Hue, latent discord appeared in Thua Thien Hue some years ago as 
was clear from open discussions with some people in different districts of the 
province. Matondi (2001) commented that conflicts are usually related to 
competition over land to achieve better results for the contenders and their 
families. In the case of Thua Thien Hue, there was no concept of contender 
but the dissatisfaction appeared among the villagers or between the people 
and local leaders or foresters who used to be close neighbours. There were 
some different types of conflict that appeared after titling forest land in both 
Loc Tien and Thuong Quang communes. However, they have common 
characteristic in that they related to competition in accessing and using   218 
forestry land or natural forest products for profiting from planting forest or 
gaining security of livelihood. Types of conflicts in Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang are summarized in table 18. 
Table 18. Summary of conflicts over forest land and natural forest products use in Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang 
Type of conflict  Causes  Major characteristics  Most affected 
Limitation of grazing 
area 
- Change from bare hills 
to planted forest by the 
state initiation 
- Grazing cattle in the 
planted forest which is 
considered cause of 
damage of planted trees 
- Cattle raising 
farmers 
Boundary disputes  - Setting up new 
boundaries when 
implementing allocation 
project with unclear 
negotiation 
- Developing of land 
selling market 
- Residents in one 
village but must do 
farming in another 
village 
- Catching opportunity 
to getting land legally.  
- Landless old 
user 
Encroaching land for 
planting trees and 
crops 
- Shortage of land for 
planting trees and crops 
- Some scattered plots 
are unused 
- For making profit on 
planting trees 
- Landless farmers 
planted trees or grow 
crops on the unused 
small plots 
- Being considered as 
illegal encroachment 
and prevented by DFPD 
- Landless farmers 
- Forest 
protection 
receivers 
Dissatisfaction of 
villagers with the 
receivers  
- Unequal allocation  
- Gabbing opportunity 
of position persons 
- Getting large size of 
forest land and high 
income for allocated 
forest land 
- Villagers who 
make a living 
from farming 
 
Historically all the bare hills and forest in Thua Thien Hue belong to the 
state, but there was still an area that is considered a common resource for 
grazing cattle or collecting firewood and other NTFPs. When the bare hills 
were planted with trees and titled to individual households or to state 
organizations, the grazing area was reduced while people still wanted to raise 
cattle for earning income. This created conflicts between planted forest 
owners and cattle grazers.  
Profit from planted forest comes along with increased need of farmers for 
developing planted forest, leading to competition in land use. In the context 
of land scarcity, unequal distribution of forest land created dissatisfaction of 
the people who did not have an opportunity to get land. Existence of 
customary land tenure along with unclear negotiations in the process of the 
new land use system setting resulted in conflict between old and new users. 219
The reasons, evidence and characteristics of those conflicts are discussed 
further below. 
6.5.1. Conflicts over grazing area
In both study sites, when the forestry land areas (barren hills) were still 
managed by the state organizations it was actually considered as an open 
asset and every household could graze cattle or plant cassava. When the land 
was allocated to the individuals for planting trees, it became a private asset. 
The grazing and farming area was reduced day by day because of the 
increasing area of Acacia plantating along with development of rubber 
production (in Thuong Quang only).
In the Loc Tien commune, before 1985 the barren hill had been used for 
planting cassava for subsistence purposes of local villagers. When the PAM
programme was implemented, many those areas were distributed to plant 
trees (mainly Acacia and Eucalyptus). From 1986 (when the PAM programme 
was started), the barren hills for grazing cattle were also reduced. The local 
people had to herd cattle around the paddy field or even home garden and 
go to cut wild grasses for added feed for the cattle.
In areas where the planted forest’s age was more than four years, some 
grasses are generated, so the households who do not have enough labour to 
find feed could graze cattle in the forest. However, the forest owners did not 
allow the grazing of cattle because they were afraid that the cattle would 
damage the trees. Therefore, when they saw the cattle in the forest, they 
caught them and punished the owner. This problem often occurs in the 
winter season (closed to Tet, a Vietnamese traditional holiday) because the 
wild grass source is scarce at that time. A lot of cattle of the villagers were 
caught and punished by the officers of the DFPD and some households had 
to sell the buffalo. However, because of lack of grazing area they still had to 
graze the cattle in the planted forest. According to the report of the DFPD,
from 2002 to 2005 the DFPD caught and punished 15 cases of grazing cattle 
in the forest of the officers from the DFPD. Since 2002, the number of 
punished cases on cattle grazing in the planted forest increased year by year 
(three to five cases in 2004 and 2005 compared to two cases in 2002). 
The cattle grazers were not satisfied, as before, when the bare hills 
belonged to the state, they could graze there and allocate labour power for 
doing other activities. Why did the state give this area to some individuals? 
The villagers were especially angry when the owners were foresters because 
they are not farmers, they work for the state with a monthly salary, but they 
had land while the farmers have to try to raise cattle for their living which is 
considered harder than the work of state officers. The dissatisfaction of the   220 
villagers came from the thought of why some have many things but some 
others have to struggle for their livelihood:  
 
Before we could graze cattle in the bare hills now the area belong to some foresters. Our 
cattle sometimes went to the forest area of the foresters because of the cattle’s owners 
sometime could not keep them carefully. The foresters caught and punished. This is not 
fair because the state land that we can freely graze cattle on before became private land and 
why they can got 70ha but we do not even have a place for raising cattle (Mr. T., 22
nd 
July, 2006). 
 
Or: It is unreasonable! Why did somebody get a large area but someone did not have any. 
We do not have any place to graze cattle now, some households had to sell all their cattle 
but some others still have to continue to raise them to get income for living (Mr. H., 20
th 
July, 2006) 
 
The conflict related to grazing cattle in the private planted forest (mainly 
belonging to the forest area of the foresters because these areas are closed to 
settlement area) is also confirmed by 40 % of respondents in the household 
survey. This conflict in the coastal commune originated from lack of grazing 
area after titling the state land to individual households along with the 
inequality of its distribution.  
In the mountainous commune, there was also conflict over grazing area 
between the non-beneficiaries and forestry land beneficiaries. Titling the 
bare hills to individual households for planting trees also led to a lack of land 
for grazing cattle. Households without forestry land had to tie the cattle in 
the garden or sometime graze them freely around the forest. The cattle are 
prohibited from grazing in the devolved forestry land. If the forest owners 
catch the cattle, they will be punished. The farmers who did not hold the 
forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state felt inequality and were 
angry because they are excluded from the benefit of getting products from 
the land at the same time with more costs for raising cattle: 
 
It is not fair because some households got many benefit from the allocated forestry land 
(timber, firewood, and place fore grazing cattle) but my family (non-recipient) did not have 
any place for collecting firewood or grazing cattle. Sometime we are tired or do not have 
enough time to take care the cattle and then have to graze them freely so they went to the 
devolved forest and the owner was fined 50,000 VND per head (Mr. Th. in village 4, 
26
th  December 2006.)   
 
Or Allocating forestry land to some households limited the area for grazing cattle so it 
created conflict between the cattle grazers and the forest owners because that area belonged   221 
to the state before and every household could graze cattle there but now it became private 
land and the cattle that went there were punished so we felt angry (Mrs. T.R. in village 
1, 25
th December, 2006). 
 
Or The commune had some areas for grazing cattle before but from 2002 some households 
occupied it to plant trees and then they were devolved the title through the SNV project. 
Now we have to graze cattle around the garden and have to collect grass to feed them, it is 
not fair because titling the land to some households take us more time and energy to raise 
our cattle (Mr. H.V., 27
th July, 2006). 
 
As in Loc Tien, the conflict over cattle grazing area in Thuong Quang also 
originated from competition for land use and the difference in holding the 
forestry land devolved by the state. 
To sum up, the nature and origin of the conflict over grazing area in this 
case was different from the case in Shamva of Zimbabwe found by 
(Matondi, 2001) where villagers resisted new takeovers to protect their land 
rights. In Thua Thien Hue of Vietnam, grazing cattle in the others' planted 
forest resulted from a lack of alternatives to maintain the livelihood security 
of the farmers in the context of unequal distribution of forestry land. 
6.5.2. Conflict between traditional land tenure custom and new boundary 
This type of conflict happened in Thuong Quang where traditional land 
tenure customs of the ethnic group (Ktu people) are established. According 
to the traditional land tenure custom in the commune, each village had its 
own area and the boundary between the villages was committed and marked 
by the big trees, large rocks or the streams or the hills. Another custom was 
that in the area of the village, each household could find themselves the 
plots for farming. When one was found, a temporary boundary was made 
and nobody could use that plot. The traditional land tenure custom formally 
recognized the encroached plots of the individual households. Nobody 
inside and outside the village could occupy the plots of land. If they did, 
there would be a punishment by the village (In-depth interview an old man- 77 
years old in Thuong Quang, 5th July, 2006).  
 In 1976, the government implemented the policy of setting up a new 
economic area by moving people from the lowland to the upland and land 
use practice has been subject to the state regulations. The natural forest was 
managed by the state organizations. Agricultural land was managed by the 
commune authority and the cooperative for collective production. When 
the collectivization movement was stopped, the agricultural land was 
allocated to individual households. However, in the mountainous area as 
Thuong Quang, only the wetland rice area and settlement land that were   222 
reclaimed by the commune were allocated equally based on the size of the 
household. It was not enough for local people for even subsistence purposes. 
Therefore, the local people, especially ethnic groups who were familiar with 
farming on the upland had to reclaim the upland themselves to do farming.  
Although the new management regulations had been set up by the state, 
the traditional customs of land tenure for the upland are still maintained. 
The upland area that was reclaimed and encroached by the ethnic individual 
household was their land. The Kinh who came from the lowlands to live in 
the commune also reclaimed some upland areas and also followed the 
traditional rules of the ethnic group.  
 In 2003, when the forestry land allocation was implemented, the 
commune authority and foresters who were responsible for planning forestry 
land (upland) use decided to make the new boundary between the villages of 
the commune when allocating the natural forest and forestry land to the 
individual households. The new boundary was made based on the 
settlement location of each village. However, the upland plots of the 
individual households before planning were scattered between the villages. 
Therefore, many plots that belonged to some households were in the new 
boundary of another village and have been allocated to other households. 
Some villages (for example village no. 6) got a large area when the new 
boundary was set up. The farming area of some other villages (for instance 
village no. 1 (Cha Rau) was narrowed in the new boundary.  
 From 2004, because of development and the profit from forest planting 
and lack of farming area, the households in village no. 1 have turned back 
their own traditional farming plots to plant upland rice or mungbeens or 
Acacia although they were allocated to the others. It is clear that in the 
thinking of the ethnic people in Thuong Quang, the whole commune area 
was their village before the Kinh people moved to live there and the villages 
at present were set up by the commune authority in the state political 
system. So, in their mind (Ktu people), there was no physical boundary 
between the present villages. The plots that are close to village no. 6 now 
were reclaimed and farmed by the villagers in village no. 1, and their own 
land has been recognized by the community.  
At present, both agricultural and forestry land area of the households in 
village no. 1 are limited because some areas that are in the location of the 
village were given to Thuong Long’s neighbouring commune and some 
forestry land areas in the traditional use system were given to village no. 6. 
From 2006 to the present, some households in village no. 1 planted forest or 
crops in their old land which was allocated to village no. 6. This created 
conflicts between the old and the new land users. The new land users stated   223 
that it was their land that was confirmed by the commune authority but they 
could not stop or prevent the old users from planting crops or forestry trees 
because they had not got the Red Book. The old users still believeded that 
they reclaimed the area, so it was still their land, they had the right to do 
farming or planting trees in the area if they wanted to and nobody could 
stop them. The old users also stated that they did not know their land have 
been allocated to others although they attended the meetings that were 
organized by the commune authority and foresters informed them about 
forest land allocation. They understood that the meeting just talked about 
getting natural forest to assure that their children’s generation would have 
timber. 
 When the author visited Thuong Quang again in March 2007, the Red 
Books were given to all the beneficiaries in the area. However, the new 
users in village no. 6 still could not take the forestry land from the old users. 
So they reported to the commune authority to claim their land use rights. 
The commune could not solve the issue and asked the new and old land 
users to negotiate themselves because the leaders thought both legal and 
customary rights should be respected (In-depth interview with an official in the 
CPC- Thuong Quang, 10th March, 2007).  
 As with the conflict over grazing area discussed in the section 6.4.1, the 
root of this conflict was also not resistance of old users to new land users 
because the old users did not want to do that, but it was their struggle to 
earn a living. The cause of this type of conflict is an unclear negotiation in 
the process of allocation and the unaccountability of the status of lack of land 
of the villagers in village no. 1. 
6.5.3. Encroaching land for planting trees and crops 
¾  Conflict over land encroachment for cultivating crops 
In both communes, before allocating the barren hill to individuals for 
planting forest, the local people had been planting crops (mainly cassava). 
However, the need for using the upland area for farming in the ethnic 
community is greater than the need in the coastal commune because of 
limited agricultural land in the mountainous area. At present, some poor 
households in Loc Tien still need barren hills for planting cassava. However, 
all the barren hill areas had been allocated to the individual households. So, 
some households tried to find empty land close to the private planted forest 
area to plant cassava. When the owners of the planted forest did some 
activities in their forest, they damaged the cassava without compensation. 
This created the conflict between the forest owners and the cassava planters.  224
In Thuong Quang, almost all households in the commune have a few 
rubber plantations (being classified as agricultural land) or planted forest. At 
present, almost all those rubber plantations and planted forest are still at 
around one or two years old, therefore, the local people can intercrop cassava
or upland rice or maize in the plantations. However, according to the 
discussion of the poor women group (20th, August, 2006), the issue of lack 
of land for crop production will occur in the commune in the near future 
(in the next one or two years). In that case, the local people, especially the 
poor who need to cultivate crops for subsistence, have to find spare land that 
is scattered in the plantations to plant cassava or upland rice. This is similar 
to the current situation in Loc Tien commune and it may create a conflict 
between forest planters and crop cultivators because of devolution of forestry 
land along with development of rubber plantation. 
¾ Conflict over land encroachment for planting trees 
In Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune), although some natural 
forest areas were allocated to individual households, some who have good 
financial capacity (better off households) have started to clear for planting 
Acacia because since the end of 2004 (after around six months of forest 
allocation in the commune), they have seen the benefit and profit of forest 
planting. This situation occurred in almost all the villages of the commune 
but it was more popular in the area of village no. 1 and no. 5. For example 
some people who live in village no. 7 occupied some natural forest areas that 
have been allocated to group 1 in village no. 1. One person in village no. 7 
occupied 20 ha of poor natural forest area that was devolved to group 1 in 
village no. 5 to use for planting Acacia. However, the natural forest 
protection group in village no. 5 could not stop them, although this 
encroachment was illegal activity in terms of both taking the assets of 
another and in term of clearing rehabilitation natural forest which was 
banned in the forest development and protection law. The household group 
in village no. 5 complained to the commune authority but the issue related 
to natural forest was over the remit of commune authority. The commune 
leaders reported to the DFPD but they said that they have been too busy and 
do not have time to come back the commune since the allocation project 
finished ((In-depth interview with an official in the CPC- Thuong Quang,10th 
March, 2007).
This type of conflict was not caused by lack of land for cultivation to 
secure of livelihood but it resulted by virtue of economic or political 
position to grab land for profit making because the type of land 
encroachment was only done by the better off households in the commune.  225 
There was encroachment of forest land before planting trees in Loc Tien but 
it was quite different in Thuong Quang. This was done by some poor 
households in the commune for planting Acacia with a small area (from 2 to 
5 sao). The poor found some empty spaces in the planted forest of the 
foresters and they planted some Acacia on the scattered small plots because 
they wondered that why should some land was unused while they have no 
land for planting trees. It will be a waste if the space is not with planted 
trees. This encroachment leads to a small amount of violence between the 
foresters who are users of the planted forest and some poor villagers (see a 
case study in the box 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This type of conflict was not caused by resistance among the poor illagers 
with the forester, but it resulted from the struggle for security of livelihood 
of the poor households in the commune, in the context of unequal 
distribution of forestry land. 
6.5.4. Dissatisfaction of villagers with the people who got forest land 
As a result of unequal allocation, many farmers in Thuy Duong village were 
dissatisfied with the beneficiaries who got a large area of forestry land even 
though some beneficiaries were poor household before and their situation 
was changed after harvesting planted forest which was allocated when they 
were requested to move to the new settlement area:   
 
When I hired some neighbours to harvest my forest which was allocated through 
programme 327 when my family requested to move here (the new settlement area) but I 
observed that they were not happy and they did not do it enthusiastically. (A woman in 
Thuy Duong village, 25th, February, 2007). 
 
Some other villagers in both Thuong Quang and Loc Tien also complained 
to the author when she came to do the household interviews. They said that 
people who got forestry land now can make a lot of profit from the planted 
Box 1. Mr. Q.'s family is a poor who was one of households moved to settle 
in the area under the foot of the hills of planted forest. Those forest plantations 
were allocated to the individual households. His family is holding only paddy 
fields and small area for planting water melon that is not enough even for 
domestic consumption. He want to plant trees for selling to earn cash and he 
found some blanks in the planted forest area to plant Acacia (about 1000m2 
with scattered small plots) but some foresters pull up his trees. He felt sorry and 
tried to plant again and then he was seized the tools for planting. He was very 
angry and wondered why some area is wasted but he could not plant tree 
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forest while their family did not have any, so they are going to be poorer 
than the others. This type of conflict originated from the competition over 
land to achieve better results of the users and their families as commented by 
Matondi (2001) .  
However, there was another type of dissatisfaction by many villagers (90 
% of the respondents in the household survey) because some village and 
commune leaders and some foresters got too large an area of forestry land. 
This conflict appeared in the coastal community only and disseminated in 
the community but is a type of unexposed conflict. Villagers did not 
understand the reason but they were angry that some leaders got from 50 to 
100 sao. This dissatisfaction came from villagers losing the opportunity to 
use the state land as a common resource before titling forest land to 
individuals. 
To sum up, forestry land (bare hills) and natural forest allocation has 
created four types of conflicts. Some types of conflict have been revealed 
formally (conflict over grazing area, competition between new and old users 
or encroaching land for planting crops or trees) while some others were 
unexposed such as dissatisfaction of the villagers with the beneficiaries. The 
nature and origin of the conflicts was not resistance of villagers with new 
takeovers to protect their land rights but it was the results of struggle for 
security of livelihood of the farmers in the context of unequal distribution of 
forest land and competition over land to achieve better lives for the users 
and their families.  
6.6. Summary 
This chapter has shown that there were inequalities between the poor and 
the non-poor in gaining endowment to forestry land and natural forest 
devolved by the state. The opportunity of the poor is more limited in 
relation to smaller holding areas and the proportion of poor in the total of 
those allocated land. The abstract terms in the policy papers (law and 
decrees) contributed to marginalization of the poor in access to allocated 
forestry land and natural forest, but the interpretation of external actors 
(officers of the DFPD and commune authority) has a stronger influence. 
Even within the same policy paper and even the same donor, the 
endowments of forestry land and natural forest by implementation of forest 
devolution varied according to the context and depended strongly on the 
interpretation of external actors and local authorities.  
In the coastal commune, the ability to get information about allocation 
and benefits of the programmes, relationships with the project or   227 
programme coordinators and implementers determined the opportunity of 
individual households to gain endowments of the forestry land. For the 
mountainous area, marginalization of the poor in access to allocated forest 
land resulted from their labour limitation to a previous occupation of 
farming before implementing the devolution. New boundary settings along 
with unclear negotiation in the process partly influenced gaining 
endowments (the forestry land holding). However, the issue of equality of 
access to forest land devolved by the state in the ethnic community (Thuong 
Quang) was better than in the coastal area. Behaviour of local leaders toward 
transparency and respect of land use custom in the implementation process 
of devolution minimized marginalization of the poor in gaining 
endowments to forestry land devolved by the state.   
In a study of the private plantaion in Vietnam, Ohlsson (2009) reflected 
that the poorer strata had smaller and farther plantation that they received 
from the devolution compared to the wealthier (but not ascertained). The 
reasons for this unequal distribution were better access to market 
information, seeing potential in plantation and capacity of taking initial risks 
of the wealthier strata. It is different with the findings in this thesis that 
intepretations of policy implementers had stronger influence. 
There was not a big gap between the Ktu ethnic and Kinh groups in 
gaining endowments of forest due to an attitude of respect toward the 
customary practice by commune officers. 
Endowment of the statutory rights to the devolved forestry land and 
natural forest for widows was very limited because of the custom of 
considering forestry production as a men’s job and a lack of concern of 
policy implementers toward women. Endowment of traditional rights to 
collecting firewood changed from free access to dependent access after 
devolution of forest. That may have more influence on women’s 
entitlement and livelihood, especially for the poor women. 
The process of mapping endowments to the devolved forest was 
influenced not only by the state and customary institutions but also the 
implementing institutions and their attitudes and behaviour. This is hardly 
discussed by Leach et al. (1999). 
The implementation processes of devolution tried to involve people but 
their participation was still in the functional form or consultant form (as 
discussed in chapter V) which influenced their ability in making decisions on 
getting endowments to forestry land from the state. This was not a result of 
policy paper or principles of the donors but was the outcome of the 
interpretation of external actors (the DFPD) and local authorities (commune 
and villages or cooperatives) in the process of devolution implementation.   228 
Better economic status did not ensure an opportunity of access to allocated 
forest land. Poor households having good social relationships may have 
opportunity in gaining endowments to forestry land. This finding challenged 
the assumption of Bruce & Migot-Adholla (1994) that a weaker power 
position leads to marginalization in entitling land. It seems to be just relevant 
in term of power of social relationships, not economic capacity. 
There was also a change of traditional rights to wild products on the 
devolved forestry land and natural forest area. Gaining endowments of 
statutory rights to forestry land and natural forest was influenced by the legal 
papers and interpretations of the external actors in the implementation 
process of devolution while individual relationships and sympathy in the 
every day life decided access based on traditional rights.    
Related to the land tenure issue,  security of endowment depended 
specifically on the context through interpretations of external actors (the 
DFPD) and local authorities rather than on the policy papers.  There was no 
regulation in the land law or the decrees on the types and value of the land 
use certification that are not a Red Book but who can use it as evidence for 
claiming the Red Book was decided by state actors in the implementation 
process. For the ethnic community, setting up a new forestry land use 
system by the state through allocation activity was challenged by regulations 
of the traditional custom. Individual title did not ensure security of tenure to 
land and the customary land tenure system was not worse. This is quite 
different from the arguments drawn from the case studies in Africa (Bruce & 
Migot-Adholla, 1994). This also means that private title to land is not a best 
choice as concluded by the private property school. 
   Security of allocated natural forest tenure was still a problem due to lack of 
support from the commune authority and the DFPD. It is clear that under 
the context of the natural forest management institution in Vietnam, holding 
a title was not enough to secure the rights to the allocated natural forest. 
The state institutions, which have been implemented by the authority and 
the state organizations, have stronger influences. The argument of the 
Institutionist position on land tenure security (Ellsworth, 2004) is more 
appropriate in this research case.  
The bare hills have been greening by the plantation after allocating 
forestry land to individual households. It was the result of not only certainty 
of land right and benefits on the land (created by the allocation policy) but 
also the result of increased prices for the products of the land, financial 
support from international organizations and from the state. Title to forestry 
land in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang is only part of encouraging investment 
in land and this is not enough to ensure efficient use of land as concluded by   229 
the private property right school if done without promotion of financial 
support and a market for products on land. Efficiency of forestry land use 
also depends on politic of access, nevertheless not only on access to land 
resource (as discussed by the institutionalist school) but also on access to 
other resources to support land use. 
Titling to the natural forest encouraged beneficiaries to invest labour in 
protecting the allocated forest area. However, the protection effort tends to 
decline due to the delay in receiving direct benefits from the forest and the 
lack of support from executive bodies (the DFPD and local authority) in 
practice. The efficiency of allocated natural forest management depended on 
the organization of collective action, supported by the law on the papers and 
in practice as well as relationships in every day life rather than the size of 
group, resources and internal rules. Agrawall’s (2001) assumption that a small 
group and resource size may lead to better management is challenged in this 
research case.  
The devolution of forestry land and natural forests created conflicts over 
cattle grazing area, over land use by the old and new users. Titling of 
forestry land to individuals also leads to competition in land use and 
encroaching for planting trees or crops and dissatisfaction of the villagers. A 
common characteristic of the conflicts is competition in accessing and using 
forest land or natural forest products for profiting from planting forests or 
securing a livelihood. The nature and origin of the conflict over grazing area 
or conflict between new and old users or encroaching forest land for 
planting crops and trees was not due to resistance of villagers to new 
takeovers to protect their land rights but a result of lack of alternatives for 
security of livelihood or the farmers’ struggles (mainly by the poor) to earn a 
living in the context of unequal distribution of forest land. However, 
dissatisfaction of many villagers with some local leaders and foresters who 
got too large an allocated area was an unexposed conflict. It may be a kind 
of resistance of villagers to new takeovers but because of losing their 
opportunity to informally use the state land as a common resource before 
devolution rather than for protecting their rights.   231 
7. Entitlements and rural livelihoods 
7.1. Introduction 
Improved livelihood outcome is one of the objectives of rural development. 
Outcomes depend not only on changing livelihood assets but also on 
changes in structures and processes (Pain & Lautze, 2002; Ellis, 2000; 
Hobley & Shields, 2000). Bhatta et al. (2007) and Reddy et al. (2007) used 
indicators of changes to household assets (including title to collective assets), 
changes in income, vulnerability, and sustainability of these changes to assess 
the impact of joint forest management on the livelihoods of people. 
Examining influences of forest devolution on people’s livelihood in Son La 
and Nghe An (Vietnam), Vien et al. (2005) did not use these indicators but 
the authors analyzed change in the sectors of the household economy such 
as crop and livestock production. This way of looking at sectors of the 
household economy simplified the analysis but did not link to the internal 
and external factors that influence the household economy. Exploring the 
impact of forest devolution to benefit the poor in Daclak (Vietnam),  Sikor 
& Tan (2007) used an extended entitlement approach to analyze the process 
of transforming endowments into entitlements from the devolved forest and 
then examined its consequences for livelihoods for the poor. 
This research also adopted an extended entitlement approach to examine 
the effects of forest devolution. The mapping process of entitlements from 
devolved forestry land and natural forest area is based on an analysis of the 
linkage between gaining endowments of statutory rights and effects on 
customary rights to forestry land and other resources of the household. 
Analyzing entitlements is useful to show what utilities from the devolved 
forestry land and natural forest beneficiaries gained after devolution and why 
gaining an endowment may or may not lead to getting entitlements from   232 
the devolved forest. Household’s livelihoods are complex and influenced by 
different factors (Pain & Lautze, 2002; Ellis, 2000). Change in individual or 
collective rights through endowment of rights to forestry land and natural 
forest influenced not only the entitlement but also livelihood options 
(extended entitlement) of local people. The research explores the livelihood 
alternatives of different economic groups in the community in their response 
to changes in endowments and entitlements after forest devolution.  
The process of mapping entitlements (tracking the conversion of 
endowments to entitlements) depends not only on gaining endowment of 
statutory rights or keeping traditional rights but also on the resources of local 
actors (Leach et al., 1999). This chapter started with examining the resources 
of households (another type of endowments) that relate to the transforming 
of endowments of land rights to utilities from the devolved forestry land and 
natural forest (section 7.2).   
Section 7.3 discusses the gaining of entitlements from the allocated 
forestry land and natural forests in relation to gaining endowments (the 
statutory rights and traditional rights) and owning resources of household 
groups, as well as entitlements by gender. The reasons why those 
endowments to forests were or were not converted to utilities for the 
different economic groups is also discussed. The section starts with 
examining the income of household groups from the devolved land. Unlike 
Reddy  et al. (2007), this research did not look at the change of total 
household income but examined the direct contribution of gaining new 
endowments to household income. It explores not only direct incomes 
(utilities from the products on the devolved forest land) but also indirect 
income (cash from selling labour for planting trees on the devolved forestry 
land). 
Section 7.4 discusses extended entitlement through examining the 
changes in livelihood activities of different socio-economic groups due to 
implementation of forestry devolution. In this section, changes in livelihood 
activities of different economic groups will be analyzed through examining 
how those groups use their resources and the entitlements that resulted from 
forest devolution and existing resources to decide on what type of income 
generation activity they should have or how to achieve their goals. The 
“trend of livelihood activities”
8 was also explored to examine how the 
groups adapted to changes in livelihood resources (endowments) and the 
entitlements due to forest devolution. The section finishes with a general 
                                                  
8 The combination of assets, opportunities and constraints imposed by institutional 
environment influencing the decision on what types of livelihood activities to be 
undertaken to achieve an objective.   233 
analysis on sustainability of livelihood alternatives for the poor group. 
However, due to time limitations, this research just analyzes the issue of 
livelihoods of the poor in relation to the change of forest property regime 
introduced by the state. It was not designed to deepen the livelihood issue 
through applying the theoretical framework, but just to raise a question 
about the sustainability of livelihoods of the poor. 
7.2. Resources of household 
In the extended entitlement approach developed by Leach et al. (1999), 
resources are considered a type of endowment that influence the process of 
mapping entitlements (process of transforming endowment into entitlement) 
and then the consequence on household livelihoods. Resources are also 
called “capitals” and divided into different types (investment, stores and 
claims or physical, natural, finance, human, and social capitals) by different 
researchers (Ellis, 2000).  
Examining the process of conversion of endowments of land rights by the 
state to gain utilities from the devolved forest land, Sikor & Tan (2007) 
considered the variables of household resources such as labour capacity 
(number of adult labour), wealth (ownership of major assets), and political 
position (whether a household members worked in the local state 
administration) and using both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
analyze this. These authors looked at some variables of resources that 
influence decision making by households in the process of converting the 
endowment of forest land rights to the utilities gained from the devolved 
land.  
Household resources considered in this thesis included agricultural land, 
knowledge of techniques for planting trees (measured through attendance at 
the short trainings in the process of forest devolution because according to 
the villagers this helped them to know the way to plant and tend planted 
forest) since this is important for local people to manage the devolved forest 
land, wealth (measured by the number of buffalo and motorcycles), labour 
size and political position (measured by whether a household member 
worked in the local state administration). Those resources were used to 
examine the factors influencing whether households could gain utilities from 
the devolved forest land in combination with information about gaining 
endowments of land rights (statutory or traditional rights) in chapter VI. The 
process of mapping entitlement based on household resources and the 
endowment gained is discussed in a qualitative way only.   234 
7.2.1. Agricultural land holding of household groups 
Land is considered as a natural resource that is not static and can be 
strengthened by human control (Ellis, 2000). This resource may not be used 
directly for mapping entitlements from the devolved forestry land, but it can 
influence the decision making of households in the process of transforming 
endowments of forest land rights in combination with other household 
resources into utilities. Examining agricultural land holding will support the 
discussion on why the endowment of forest land rights may or may not 
transform into utilities.    
Average agricultural land area per household of economic groups is 
presented in the below table (table 19). 
Table 19. Average agricultural land holding by economic groups in the studied communes 
(sao/household) 
Loc Tien  Thuong Quang  Land holding 
Poor (n=29)  Non-poor 
(n=30) 
Poor (n=30)  Non-poor 
(n=29) 
Wetland  rice  5.39 8.50 1.76 4.06 
Upland rice  -  -  0.19  0.00 
Upland rice in 
rubber plantation 
- - 0.22  0.00 
Cassava  0.74 0.60 0.84 1.86 
Cassava in rubber 
plantation 
- - 1.74  0.97 
Mungbean  0.26 0.91 0.21 0.32 
Mungbean in 
rubber plantation 
- - 0.13  0.67 
Peanut 0.17 0.30 -  - 
Water melon  0.26  0.59  -  - 
Rubber -  -  21.00 35.92 
Pond  0.12 0.12 0.16 2.03 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
 
Crop production is still an important activity for the local people in both 
communities (discussed further in the section 7.4 of this chapter). The 
cultivated crop land area in table 19 is the current household land holdings 
(in the interviewing year). However, all interviewees in the coastal area said 
that a part of the new forest plantation area were their cassava fields before. 
At that time (15 years ago), cassava was an important crop to feed their 
family because of lack of food, and was widely grown although less so now. 
At present, people in the coastal commune plant cassava for feeding pigs   235 
only. How cassava upland areas were replaced by Acacia plantation under the 
implementation of the PAM programme, its effects on people’s livelihood 
and how they coped with this is discussed further in section 7.4.  
The current plantations in Thuong Quang (the mountainous commune) 
were also previously upland crop fields of the local people before (confirmed 
by the people, local leaders and foresters from the DFPD) but this change 
was a result of the policy of banning shifting cultivation (from 1997) by the 
state rather than of forestry land allocation. Crop cultivation was not allowed 
on the steep hill areas and they were fallowed for rehabilitation of the forest. 
Those areas were planned as bare hills (type Ia and Ib- see appendix I) for 
planting trees and then allocated to individual households in 2003 through 
the SNV project.  
Since the implementation of the ban on shifting cultivation, people in 
Thuong Quang focused on farming crops in the upland areas that had less 
slope, but the quality of the land was not good because they had been used 
for farming for a long time (about 20 years). From 2002, this area was 
transferred to planting rubber through a “small-scale farmer rubber 
programme” of the government (cao su tiểu điền) with loans from the state 
and provincial budget. Fourty-five of 59 households interviewed in the 
commune have planted rubber with an average area from 10 to 20 sao (10.5 
sao of the poor and 18 sao of the non-poor - table 19) because it was easy to 
get a loan with a requirement of repaying the loan step by step through 
selling the resin from the rubber plantation (after seven years of planting). 
Stopping the shifting cultivation in the high steep upland areas by the state 
along with the development of rubber plantation from 2002 quickly reduced 
the crop farming area (reported by the interviewees in the household 
survey). At present, local people intercropped cassava, mungbean or peanuts 
or maize in the rubber plantation (see table 19). Lack of land for growing 
crops was not an urgent issue now as reported by the poor women: 
 
At present we can plant cassava or mungbean in the rubber plantation. It is no problem for 
us because we had a large rubber area (Discussion with poor women’s group in 
Thuong Quang on 15
th, August, 2006.) 
 
However, the poor women’s group felt that they do not know where to 
plant cassava when the rubber trees’ canopies are closed. This is discussed 
further in section 7.4 of this chapter. The wetland rice area of both poor and 
non-poor groups is the greatest of all crop areas. Cassava is the crop that 
occupies the second largest area, even in the coastal community. The 
cultivated area of the remaining crops of poor group in both communes 
ranged from 0.17 to 0.26 sao while that of the non-poor from 0.30 to 0.91   236 
sao. All types of agricultural land (including rubber land) of non-poor groups 
in both communities were larger than that of poor groups. How did existing 
holdings of agricultural land of the poor and non-poor groups influence 
mapping of entitlements from the devolved forestry land and natural forest 
of the poor and on-poor people? This is discussed in the next section 
(section 7.3). Holding agricultural land also contributes to the discussion on 
livelihood alternatives (expansion of entitlements) of the local people in 
relation to forest devolution in section 7.4.  
7.2.2. Knowledge of forest planting and management, labour capacity, wealth 
and political position of household  
7.2.2. 1. Knowledge of forest planting and management 
Knowledge of forest planting and management is an important resource for 
transforming endowment of rights to forestry land into entitlement from the 
land (timber and NTFPs). According to the villagers, attending the training 
on farm helped them to know how to plant and tend the forest. Therefore, 
in this research, knowledge of forest planting and management is measured 
through attendance at the short trainings on the techniques of planting trees 
in the process of forest devolution. 
More than 60 % of the interviewees in both coastal and mountainous 
communes (both poor and non-poor groups - see figure 7) said that they 
attended the training on techniques for planting and tending forestry trees.  
        
Figure 7. Attending training on forestry techniques 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
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Forestry land allocation through the PAM programme that involved almost all 
the villagers in the coastal commune in planting trees:  
I saw my neighbours went to plant trees to get rice or cash and I followed them. All 
people in my village went to plant trees because lack of food was a common problem of my 
village at that time so we were very interested to plant trees for getting rice (Mrs. S. in 
Thuy Duong village, 11
th March, 2006).  
 
This was confirmed by the vice head of the cooperative:  
 
The cooperative heard that there was a forest planting programme with payment by rice so 
leaders of the cooperative went to the DFPD to ask for planting. The cooperative directed 
villagers to plant trees that were distributed by the DFPD for the main purpose of getting 
rice (Mr. T, 20
th July, 2006)  
 
Or The objective of the PAM programme was planting trees to green the bare hills and for 
getting rice from the donor so we (foresters) mobilized people to plant trees. That was the 
point of time to start to involve people formally in forest planting in the province (Thua 
Thien Hue) (an officer from the PFDD who was a person directly involved 
in coordinating the PAM programme, 5th, June, 2006).  
 
The training on techniques of planting and tending trees was presented at 
the field by the foresters from the DFPD:  
 
The officers from the DFPD showed us how to make a hole (size of the hole), how to put 
the seedlings into the holes and then earth them up. They also showed us how to clear 
small brush and weeds to help the trees to grow. If I do not plant well, the forester from the 
DFPD won’t allow me to do more. ( Mrs. G. in Thuy Duong village, 10
th, 
August, 2006).  
 
Transferring the forest land allocation policy from the paper into practice 
was done through implementation of the projects and programmes as 
commented by Mr. D. who was the vice director of Thua Thien Hue 
provincial DARD that, “Forest land allocation in Thua Thien Hue followed the 
programme approach”
9. Almost all villagers in Thuy Duong village knew the 
ways to plant and tend trees through implementation of the forest allocation 
programme (PAM and 327). This way of training can be called “learning by 
doing in the field”, it was not a training course with lectures and learning 
material. However all the villagers in the household survey said that they 
knew the ways to plant and tend forestry trees. 
                                                  
9 If having funding program or project, there will be forest allocation, when funding project 
or program is finished, there is no more forest land allocation.    238 
There was no training on planting and nursing trees through the forest 
land allocation project funded by the SNV in 2003 in the mountainous 
commune although more than 60 % of respondents said that they got the 
training on forest planting and tending. The heads of the villages told me 
that knowledge and experience of the villagers in forest planting and tending 
the forest at present came from doing activities of the PAM and 327 
programmes in the past: 
 
In the PAM and programme 327, the officers from the DFPD went to the field and 
showed the way to dig hole and then they transported seedlings to the village and asked 
villagers to carry them to the hills and they demonstrated the way of planting. People 
followed their guidance to plant trees on the plots and the foresters came back to check 
before agreeing to pay people based on the area was planted. The way of demonstration of 
the tending technique was similar to planting the plantation. (Mr. H. in village 5 in 
Thuong Quang, 10
th March, 2007) 
 
The commune leaders confirmed training on forestry technique through the 
PAM and 327 programmes with guidance of the foresters from the DFPD at 
the field: 
 
Thanks to the PAM and 327 programmes, people now know how to plant and tend trees 
so they can buy seedlings and plant on their plots themselves. Some households hired some 
villagers to plant trees. Most villagers know how to plant and tend trees at present because 
they used to do that for the DFPD before (Mr. H. R., 19
th March, 2007). 
 
For natural forest devolution funded by the SNV in 2003, the household groups 
were guided in the ways of cutting creepers and small brush to create space 
for the growing of valuable timber species. However, this guidance was 
given in only in a short time (one to two hours) for each group after the 
allocation of the natural forest in the field.  
In general, technical knowledge on planting and tending forest by local 
households was improved through the implementation of the forest 
devolution. How this new household resource links to transforming 
endowment of forest land rights into utilities from the land is discussed 
further in section 7.3.   
7.2.2.2. Labour capacity, wealth and political position of households 
Transforming of endowments of rights to forestry land and natural forest is 
decided not only by holding agricultural land and knowledge of forest 
planting and tending, but also on other owned household resources. The   239 
following table (table 20) presents labour capacity, wealth and political 
position of economic groups. 
Table 20. Labour capacity, wealth and political position of economic groups. 
Thuy Duong (Loc Tien)  Thuong Quang  Type of resource    Unit 
Poor 
(n=29) 
Non-poor 
(n=30) 
Poor 
(n=30) 
Non-poor 
(n=29) 
Household size  person  6.34  6.26  5.57  5.74 
Labour size  Person  2.79  3.20  2.93  3.38 
Education level of 
HHs’s head 
Year 4.17  6.30  2.17  5.66 
Attending in 
commune or village 
administration 
 % of 
respondent 
6.9 10.0  6.6  17.2 
Number of cattle  Head  0.62  1.37  0.60  3.10 
Owing motorcycle   % of 
respondent 
0 47  0  58 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
Note: Political position is measured by attending commune or village administration organizations that 
have the right to participate in decision making at the commune and village levels.  
 
The size of households in poor and non-poor groups in both communities 
is, on average, the same but the labour resources of the non-poor were 
higher than the poor by, on average, 0.5 people. The education level 
(number of years) of the non-poor in Thuy Duong village (Loc Tien 
commune) was on average 6.30 while that of the poor was 4.17 years. 
Similarly in Thuy Duong, the average education level of the non-poor was 
also 3.4 years greater than that of the poor.  
The proportion of households who had a member in the commune and 
village management was 2.6 times greater in the non-poor group compared 
to that of the poor group in the mountain commune and 1.45 times in the 
coastal area. Ownership of cattle of the non-poor group was also greater 
than that of the poor group in both communes by two to five times. None 
of the poor in either location (Loc Tien and Thuong Quang) owned a 
motorcycle, a desirable resource to travel to the field for planting and 
managing forests.  
How did the different economic groups use these resources to obtain 
benefits from the devolved forest based on the endowment of land rights 
from the state? This is now discussed. 
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7.3. Utilities from the devolved natural forest and forestry land 
Applying an extended entitlement approach to examine the influence of 
forest devolution in Daclak (Vietnam), Sikor & Tan (2007) analyzed the 
benefits for household groups from the devolved natural forest by using 
three variables (agricultural land area, timber and agricultural harvests) to 
measure and compare benefits between the different economic groups. In 
this research, the author did not use agricultural land and harvest when 
identifying benefits or utilities from the forest because all the devolved 
forestry land and natural forests were planned for forestry production by the 
state institution. Transforming the endowments of forest land rights into 
utilities on the land is investigated through analyzing the benefit of timber 
and NTFPs for the economic groups. 
7.3.1. Benefits from the devolved forestry land 
¾ Income from timber on the devolved forestry land 
Forest plantation is a long-term production, so it is difficult to determine 
when income from the plantation is calculated at the year of harvesting 
because the product of the plantation is the result of a long-term investment 
(around six to eight years in the case of Acacia plantation). Nor can it be 
excluded when the plantation has not been harvested at the time of the 
household survey. In this research, income from the plantation was 
estimated based on an average net income per ha per year based on the 
research results of Ha and Tinh (2005) on the economic efficiency of 
plantations in Thua Thien Hue for specific districts and devolved forestry 
land area held by the households. Another source of income came directly 
from development of the plantation on the allocated bare hills through 
villagers providing labour for planting and harvesting trees.  
Titling forestry land to households created net income from timber 
produced on the land. It brought an average of 3,879 million VND per 
household of the non-poor group per year in Loc Tien and 2,112 million 
VND in Thuong Quang. The poor group also benefited from the allocation 
of forestry land but with a smaller net income from timber (0.681 million 
per household per year in the coastal community and 0.308 million in the 
mountainous commune) (see figure 8). 
Before implementing the forest devolution policy, people obtained 
income from contracting with forestry institutions to plant trees for cash, as 
planting forest in programme 327 or programme 5 million ha of forest 
(Quan et al., 2005). This was simply employment without any benefit from 
the plantation’s product. The endowment of rights to forestry land by the 
state created a potential sustainable income source because people could   241 
decide themselves on investment in the land and benefit from the products 
of plantation. However, the decision on what kind of trees to plant on the 
allocated land area was still made by the DFPD. The entitlement of timber 
value from the devolved forestry land was also influenced by the state 
regulation.  
 
 
Figure 8. Net income from allocated forestry land and selling labor for planting trees 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
 
At present, the plantations in Thua Thien Hue brought good profit: 
 
Profit from forest plantation is 10 fold compared to rice production now (Mr. Kh. in 
Thuy Duong village, 15
th, July, 2005. 
 
Or At present, forest planting brings high profit. The price of one ha of intensive farming 
forest is 58 million VND and it is 48 million VND for extensive farming plantation 
(Mr. Ng., a forester, 24
th June, 2006.  
 
In the mountainous commune, the plantations on the allocated land are two 
to three years old while the plantations that were allocated by the PAM and 
327 programmes in the coastal commune have been harvested since 2004. 
Income from selling timber changed the economic status of one household 
from poor to non-poor (see box 2).  
As discussed in chapter VI, almost all planted forest area on the devolved 
bare hills in the coastal commune was established with financial support 
from international and state projects and programmes. Therefore, it is 
difficult to analyze the influence of household resources in relation to 
gaining endowments of forestry land rights on income from timber from the 
devolved planted forest. From 1987 to 1997 (time for implementing the 
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PAM and 327 programmes), people were concerned with planting forest for 
getting cash and food. Endowment of rights to forestry land (bare hills) at 
that stage would not have been transformed to entitlements of timber 
harvest without financial support from international donors and the state 
although the labour resources of local households were available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From 2001 to the present, both the poor and non-poor have had the 
capacity to buy seedlings to plant in the bare hills because an average cost for 
buying seedlings to plant is only 415,000 VND (27 USD) per ha. So the 
households that did not get the forestry land devolved by the state tried to 
find the scattered plots in the hills to plant Acacia hybrid. However, 
investment for planting forest may be a challenge for households who hold a 
large forestry land area (more than three ha) because planting forest is a 
labour intensive activity and seasonal.  
As discussed in chapter VI, the household survey in the coastal commune 
showed that there were only 20 sao (2 ha) of 256 sao (25.6 ha) of forestry 
land devolved to households that had not yet been planted. This area was 
still fallow because the households had received 50 sao (5 ha) of forestry land 
and did not have enough financial resources to hire labour to plant the 
whole allocated area. The allocated forestry land area fallowed in Thuong 
Quang was 62 sao (6.2 ha) although the labour size of both poor and non-
poor groups in Thuong Quang was bigger than in Loc Tien (table 20). The 
fallow area occupied 21.7 % of total of allocated area of 60 interviewed 
Box 2. Move out of poverty thanks to the plantation 
Mr. D. S. lived in Thuy Duong village, his house located at the foot of the 
hills with the plantations allocated to individual households. This was a poor 
household in 2006. His family was allocated 1.5 ha of Acacia ariculiformis through 
the 327 program; 0.85 ha was confirmed by the commune authority and he was 
provided a Red Book. He harvested the plantation in 2006 and sold to the 
wood chip processing factory in Chan May port. His family income from selling 
0.85 ha of planted forest at the end of 2006 was 35 millions VND after 
deducting the cost for renting labour for the harvest. The costs supported by the 
327 program was exempted (did not have to return to the government) because 
of a support policy for the area influenced by the serious typhoon. He used that 
income to build a new house because his family had been lived in a temporary 
house for 20 years. A part of the income from the plantation was used to 
reinvest in the allocated land and buy a buffalo to raise. His family moved off the 
list of poor houses in the commune and it also now considered as a non-poor 
household by the villagers.    243 
households and belonged to both poor and non-poor groups. This 
commune did not get any support from international or state organizations 
to invest in planting forest after the devolution of rights. The reason for 
fallowing the allocated land area for four ethnic households in Thuong 
Quang was lack of the cash to buy seedlings. 
In the coastal area as well as the mountainous commune, the better-off 
households did not even use family labour because forest planting is hard 
work and they often hired labour to plant forest. The evidence from both 
communes indicated that although a household’s labour size is a basis for 
developing the plantation on the devolved forestry land, it appeared not to 
be an important factor affecting income from timber. The financial resources 
of the households were more significant because it could be used for buying 
seedlings or to hire labour to plant forest. For two other households in 
Thuong Quang (Kinh people), the reason for fallowing allocated forestry 
land was that they were afraid to invest labour and cash in planting trees 
without certification of land use rights (Red Book).  
Transforming the endowment of forestry land rights to gain utilities on 
the devolved land depended on different factors including internal resources 
of household (financial and labour capacity), support from outside (financial 
supports from international organizations and the state) and the certainty of 
the statutory rights.  
 
¾  Income from selling labour to plant and harvest the trees on the devolved forestry 
land 
Along with generation of cash income from the plantation for the 
households, forestry land devolution also created the new employment of 
selling labour to plant and harvest planted forests for the local people since 
that had not occurred in the local labour market for forestry activities before 
allocation. Along with labour capacity, knowledge of planting and tending 
forests obtained from the forestry land devolution programmes allowed 
households to join in the local labour market to get this income. In Loc 
Tien, the poor group earned on average 708.000 VND per household per 
year from selling labour for planting and harvesting trees while the non-poor 
group got 494.000 VND per household from this source only (figure 8). In 
contrast, the poor group in Thuong Quang got only 230.000 VND per 
household while the non-poor group earned 539.000 VND. Did poor 
households in Thuong Quang not want to sell their labour for planting trees 
or do they do not have enough labour to join in the labour market? It was 
found that the opportunity for earning cash from forest planting was still 
limited in the mountainous commune. The labour source was still available   244 
in the local market so the forest land owners selected the non-poor 
households that were thought to have better capacity: 
 
They (forest land owner) did not ask me to plant their trees. They just call strong healthy 
and non-poor people (Mr. D. a poor in village 3 in Thuong Quang, 21st 
August, 2006). 
 
Were the poor households in the coastal area considered as having more 
capacity by the forest owners to be hired in planting forest? No, the reason 
why the non-poor group in Loc Tien got a lower average amount of 
income from selling labour for planting trees was that they had other 
alternatives (doing small business or other off-farm activities) to earn money 
for their living. Planting and harvesting forest is still considered hard work, 
so it is an alternative only when there are no other employment 
opportunities. However, selling labour for planting and harvesting forest was 
also not enough for local people, especially for the poor households who do 
not have enough jobs all year. The opportunity of getting this labour 
income for the poor depended on the relationship with the forest owners: 
 
Do you thing that it is easy to sell labour for planting and harvesting trees? The forest 
owners just want to ask their friends or relatives to plant or harvest trees. They just call me 
when they need a lot of labour (Mrs. G. a widow, 17
th March, 2007). 
 
Owning a motorcycle also created opportunity for villagers in the coastal 
commune to sell labour for planting and harvesting trees because some 
planted forest areas are far from the settlement area so the forest owners just 
want to hire people who have motorbikes. None of the poor households 
own a motorcycle (table 20), so they could not work on the distant planted 
forest areas. Gaining income from selling labour to plant and harvest trees 
for the forest owners, therefore, depended on both owing a motorcycle and 
the social relationships of households.  
As the finding in chapter VI, the political position of the household 
influenced gaining endowments of forest land rights. However, this was not 
mentioned in the discussion with villagers about getting support after 
devolution to gain entitlement or benefits from the land. This may have 
created more benefits for the forest owners because all the forestry land 
devolution programmes in Loc Tien came with financial support to plant 
and tend trees. It means that gaining more endowments of forestry land led 
to receiving more benefits from the devolved land. The political position of 
the households did not have any meaning in the mountainous area because   245 
endowment of forestry land rights was based on traditional land use and 
there was no financial support after the devolution of land rights.  
 
¾  Entitlement of income from selling labour to plant and harvest the trees on the 
devolved forestry land by gender 
In both communes where the author did the fieldwork, income from selling 
labour for planting and harvesting trees on the devolved forestry land for 
women was lower than that for men. A woman in Loc Tien got an average 
income of 100,000 VND per year from this job while a man earned 441,000 
VND per year. Similarly in Thuong Quang, where income from selling 
labour for planting and harvesting trees on the devolved forestry for a male 
labourer was 3.8 times greater that of a female labourer (300,000 VND 
compared to 79,000 VND) (see figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Income from selling labor for planting & harvesting the devolved plantation by 
gender 
Source: Household survey, 2006. 
Is the difference between men and women in entitlement from selling 
labour for the planted forest owners in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang the 
result of differences in their personal capacity? No, this is an issue of gender 
discrimination in the local labour market.  
According to the villagers in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang, the payment 
for selling labour for forest planting per day to men is higher than to 
women. In Loc Tien, although a male famer is an old man, he still gets 
40,000 VND (2.5 USD) per day while the payment to a young women for 
planting tree is also only 35,000 VND (2.1 USD) per day. It is similar in 
Thuong Quang, the payment per day for women planting forest is also less 
than that for men (only 30,000 VND (1.9 USD) to women but 35,000 VND 
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(2.1 USD) to men). The men also had more opportunities to sell their labour 
for planting forest for the better-off households than women. The forestry 
land owner wants male labourers and will pay a higher rate because the 
traditional thought is that a man (even if he is an old man) is stronger and 
has higher capacity than a woman (even she is a young woman). For 
planting trees, a comment from Mr. Kh. in Thuy Duong village that women 
even plant trees better than man: “Women often plant trees fast and carefully so 
the seedlings will survive more than if they are planted by men” (Mr. Kh., 17
th 
March, 2007). 
Why does the forest owner pay more to a man than to a woman? Is it 
man’s labour quantity and quality higher than the woman’s? That is not true 
when we compare labour capacity between an old man and a young 
woman. This difference is a product of social preconception, not scientific 
counting. It will be fairer if the payment is counted base on the quantity and 
the quality of products (for example, based on the amount of trees planted 
and the quality). This is the decision of the forest owners but it is a product 
of the custom that considered that a man’s capacity in doing forestry 
production is better than that of a woman. Entitlements from the devolved 
forestry land of women and men therefore did not depend on capacity but 
on the customary discrimination against women. 
7.3.2. Entitlements from the devolved natural forest 
¾  Utility of timber from the devolved natural forest 
How did devolution of the natural forest lead to the gaining of utilities? As 
discussed in section chapter VI, statutory rights to timber in the natural forest 
were devolved to the village or households groups in both communities as 
stated in the allocation decision (for Loc Tien) and verbal commitment (in 
Thuong Quang). However, the benefit of timber in the devolved natural 
forest was still on paper only and still in question in practice. The 
endowment of rights to timber of the village was not transformed to 
entitlements (utility of timber) although the devolution already been 
implemented for six years (in Loc Tien) and four years (in Thuong Quang) 
ago (up to 2007).  
The reason for this is the complexity of the claim process. In the coastal 
area, the process of getting permission to exploit timber of the village has to 
be based on permission of the CPC, the DFPD and then the PPC. This 
required high transaction costs and the village head has not yet wanted to do 
it. In the mountainous commune, exploitation of timber in the devolved 
natural forest has to be claimed from the CPC and the DFPD. The forest 
protection groups also felt the difficulty of making a claim and they hesitated   247 
to do it. The gaining of entitlements from the devolved natural forest area in 
these cases depended not only on holding the statutory rights but also on the 
state institutions and the mechanism of making decisions in practice after 
devolution. 
In studies on the influence of forest devolution in Daclak (Vietnam), 
Sikor & Tan (2007) concluded that timber extraction from the allocated 
natural forest is influenced by household wealth. The better-off households 
owned more tractors, chain saws and capital to hire workers and got more 
timber from the allocated natural forest. In the case of this research, when 
exploiting timber in the allocated natural forest area (even for family 
consumption) must ask for permission of the DFPD. The opportunity for 
getting timber to build house is the same for the poor and non-poor 
villagers.  
As discussed in section 6.4.3 of chapter VI, from 2007 some poor 
households in Loc Tien started to exploit some small amounts of timber to 
sell in the commune. In terms of getting the benefits of timber from the 
natural forest devolved to the whole village, those households may have got 
more benefit compared to even better-off households. This difference of 
entitlement was not a result of gaining more opportunity in holding a 
statutory right or having more labour capacity. It was also not because of 
being wealthier or having a higher political position, but it was a cause by 
the pressure of lack of cash to cover school fees that forced the poor to draw 
on the sympathy of the villagers and the forest protection group. 
In Thuong Quang, some better-off households who had chain saws and 
buffalo also logged timber in the devolved natural forest although they did 
not hold statutory rights. As presented in section 6.4.3, most of the illegal 
loggers are Kinh (around 30 Kinh households) because they have chain saws, 
buffalo and social relationships with some outsiders so that they can sell their 
illegally logged timbers. In this case, the wealth of household (owning chain 
saws and buffalo) created an opportunity for them to gain the benefit of 
timber from the forest. However, their logging timber is an illegal activity 
which could only be done because of lack of capacity to protect the 
statutory rights of forest beneficiaries.  
The above discussion shows that the process of transforming the 
endowment of rights to entitlement from the natural forest devolution was 
influenced by practicing law or regulations of the state and everyday life 
relationships rather than holding a statutory right and the household’s 
resources. 
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¾  Utility of non-timber products from the devolved natural forest 
As reflected in section 6.3, at present access to NTFPs in the allocated forest 
of the beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries did not change after the devolution 
of natural forest to the village (in Loc Tien) or to the household groups (in 
Thuong Quang). Currently, income from collecting NTFPs in the natural 
forest still provides a portion of the total income for even the non-poor 
group (1.53 % in Loc Tien and 2.4 % in Thuong Quang). Especially for the 
poor group, it was a very important income source, providing 10.62 % of 
mean household income of the poor in Thuy Duong village and 32.6 % of 
mean household income of the poor in Thuong Quang commune (see the 
figures in section 7.4.1. below). This proved that the livelihood of the poor 
is more dependent on the natural forest than the non-poor. However, there 
were only 10 poor households (of 73 poor households of the commune) 
who were allocated natural forest. 
In both communes, income from NTFPs of the poor group was higher 
than that of the non-poor. An average annual income from NTFPs of the 
poor group in the mountainous commune (Thuong Quang) was 1,662,000 
VND per household (100 USD) per year while that of the non-poor was 
469,000 VND (28 USD) per year. The difference in income from NTFPs 
between the poor and non-poor in the mountainous commune is larger. 
The poor group got 876,000 VND (52 USD) per household per year while 
the non-poor household got 193,000 VND (12 USD) per year (Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As presented in chapter VI, the natural forest in Loc Tien was devolved to 
the village and all the villagers were still free to collect NTFPs.  
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Figure 10. Value of NTFPs from the devolved natural forest  
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Why did the poor in the coastal commune  benefit  from  NTFPs 
from the natural forest devolved to the village? Do they have more labour 
capacity or better technology to extract NTFPs? Household labour size of 
the poor in Loc Tien was less than that of the non-poor (2.8 compared to 
3.2). The poor in this commune also do not have any motorcycles and they 
own a smaller number of cattle than the non-poor (0.62 compared to 1.37 
cattle) (see table 20). Although both the poor and non-poor are free to 
exploit NTFPs, poor households were more interested in doing this activity 
because they do not have a better alternative. Extraction of NTFPs in the 
natural forest is considered hard and low return work, so the non-poor do 
not like to do it. The households in the non-poor group who are still doing 
this activity are often close to poor and their income from farming and other 
off-farm activities is limited, so they must collect NTFPs to cover their 
family’s expenditures.  
A special NTFP from the allocated natural forest area in Thuy Duong 
village (the coastal commune) is ecotourism service at the foot of the hills 
with a stream named locally Suối Voi (elephant stream). According to the 
head of Thuy Duong village (also a member of the cooperative management 
board), it attracts about 500 people per day in four months in the summer 
time (April to July) from Da Nang and Hue city, to come there for relaxing 
by taking baths in the stream and sightseeing. There were 12 households 
who could pay 500,000 VND per year to the commune authority and 1 
million VND per year to the cooperative board (all are non-poor) to provide 
service in the areas.  
The village supported this service through preventing the villagers from 
collecting plants or even the dead brush in the area for rehabilitation of the 
forest for ecotourism purposes. Because of the limitation of the stream area, 
the service is not enough for all households to join. Not every non-poor 
who has the capacity to invest in doing service can get permission to do this. 
There was also the hidden factor of a social relationship that determined the 
opportunity of access to this entitlement of the villagers. This service was 
formed in 1997 (after four years of allocating the bare hills and four year 
before the titling of the natural forest area to the village). It has been 
managed by the cooperative but the main benefit actually goes to the Board:  
 
The cooperative management board has been responsible for selling the tickets for entering 
the area. Income from selling the tickets and fees from the servers are used to pay for the 
members of the cooperative after deducting 10 % tax for the state, 2 % fee for management 
of the commune authority and the cost for labour (only 2 workers per day) (Mr. K. – a 
member of the co-operative, 15
th, July, 2005.    250 
 
The households that have done the service got benefits through providing 
tents for rent or selling food and drinks for tourists. The titling of the natural 
forest to the village was not the reason for the appearance of the ecotourism 
service because it was formed before implementation of devolution. 
However, it enhanced and strengthened the service through awarding the 
rights to protect the flora, for maintaining the water in the stream and the 
landscape to attract tourists. Ecotourism was considered as a non-timber 
product from the forest but its use was not mentioned and regulated in the 
village’s rules. Benefits from this product from the devolved natural forest 
area were awarded to twelve households and the officers and leaders of the 
cooperative only. There were six households who were performing the 
ecotourism service who have members working for the commune or the 
co-operative. Of the six remaining ecotourism servers, there were four 
households who are relatives of the officers or officials of the commune and 
two others are better-off households. The utility of ecotourism from the 
natural forest devolved to Thuy Duong village in this case depended on 
political position as well as wealth of the household.  
What about in Thuong Quang? Although the natural forest was devolved 
to household groups at present all villagers can still access to NTFPs in the 
forest area. Is the higher income from NTFPs of the poor a result of greater 
labour resources or wealth? Labour size of the poor in Thuong Quang is also 
smaller than that of the non-poor (2.93 and 3.38 labourers). They (the poor) 
also did not own any motorcycles and keep an average of 0.6 cattle while 
the non-poor owned 3.1 heads (table 20). This reflected that labour capacity 
and wealth of a household did not determine the gain of NTFPs from the 
natural forest in Thuong Quang. What reasons lead to a bigger gain of 
income from NTFPs in the natural forest? It is similar to Loc Tien in that 
better-off households did not do this activity any more because this is very 
hard work. Low income from farming activity forced the poor to do this to 
earn cash for buying food. This employment is still one of the major income 
generating activities of the poor (see figure 12).  
As discussed in chapter VI, the poor in Thuong Quang still claimed their 
free traditional access to NTFPs as before the forest devolution. However, 
there were four recipient groups said they do not want to allow non-
beneficiaries to collect NTFPs in their forest and they will restrict the access 
of non-beneficiaries in the near future. Utilities of NTFPs of non-
beneficiaries (especially 63 poor households) in the mountainous commune 
will be stopped or limited in the near future. At present, non-poor 
beneficiaries still sympathized with the difficulties of the poor so they did   251 
not stop extraction of NTFPs from the devolved forest. Gaining entitlement 
to  NTFPs in this case did not depend on holding a title or household 
resources but was more influenced by traditional rights and behaviour of the 
beneficiaries.  
In summary, devolution of forestry land and natural forest is one of the 
factors influencing the gaining of utilities from the land. Holding the title to 
forestry land created utilities for getting income from timber for individual 
households. The non-poor group had higher income from timber from the 
planted forest because they gained more endowment of statutory rights 
(holding a larger devolved land area). Non-beneficiaries (especially the poor) 
gained utilities from selling labour to plant and harvest the trees on the 
allocated land.  
Devolution of statutory rights to the natural forest has not yet brought 
any utility of timber to the beneficiaries. Both the poor and non-poor in 
both communities obtained income from NTFPs in the allocated natural 
forest. The poor got more income from this source but it is a low return and 
hard work. If the natural forest is managed as common property rather than 
privatised, it will benefit the poor given the importance of common 
property to the poor (Jodha, 1995; Ostrom, 1990). 
Transforming the endowment of statutory rights to utilities from the 
devolved forestry land and natural forest depends on a variety of factors. 
Support of external institution (financial support and execution of the state’s 
regulations) and every day relationships among the recipients and non-
beneficiaries seems to have a stronger influence than holding statutory rights 
and the household’s resources. 
In the extended entitlement approach developed by Leach et al.  (1999), 
they noted the non-inherent characteristic of entitlement or endowment. 
This means that an entitlement may be considered as an endowment at other 
points in time. Therefore, entitlements can be used as a resource to 
strengthen people’s or household’s capacities and thus contribute to 
improving livelihood outcomes (Ibid.). For example, income from timber in 
the forest is an entitlement at a point of time, but it can also be considered as 
a financial resource of household (an endowment) to invest in production 
for improving household’s well-being.  
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this research was interested not 
only in the entitlements (utilities) that were converted from the endowments 
to the devolved forestry land and natural forest but also in rural livelihoods 
(broadening entitlement analysis). How did the endowments to and the 
utilities (entitlements) from the devolved forestry land and natural forest 
influence the livelihoods of the poor and non-poor? This is discussed next.    252 
7.4. Changes in livelihood activities and trend of options  
A broadening entitlements perspective of forest devolution needs to look at 
the livelihood outcomes of rural people. The extended environmental 
entitlement approach was very useful for the author in examining the 
process of mapping endowments (chapter VI) and the transforming of the 
endowments to entitlements to see the influence of devolution of forestry 
land and natural forest. However, this approach could not help to see the 
broader influence of forest devolution on rural livelihoods. This section, 
therefore, is discussed in combination with the livelihood analysis 
framework presented in chapter 3 (the research methods). However, there 
was not enough time for the author to deepen this issue by finding another 
suitable approach. So, this section is just discussed based on the livelihood 
analysis framework in combination with the entitlement approach to 
questions about the sustainability of the poor’s livelihood due to the 
introduction of forest devolution. 
In the sustainable livelihood model of the DFID in Pain and Lautze 
(2002) or the analysis framework of Ellis (2000), the outcome is stated as a 
livelihood strategy, seen to be the result of a combination of owned assets 
and opportunities and restrictions created by the institutional environment. 
The author agrees with the concept but it seems to her the word of strategy 
is not suitable because, in reality, the activities undertaken by the poor 
households may reflect a lack of choice or alternatives rather than a 
preference. Therefore, in this research, the term of “trend of livelihood 
activities” is used to replace the term of “livelihood strategy”. 
Evaluating the impact of participatory forest management to livelihood in 
Nepal, Bhatta et al. (2007) and Reddy et al. (2007) analyzed changes in 
livelihood assets and entitlements but there was little discussion about 
changes in livelihood activities. The lack of analysis of linkages between 
changing assets and entitlements to changes in livelihood activities makes it 
more difficult to see the sustainability of a household’s livelihood.  
Examining the influence of community forestry on a household’s 
livelihood in Nepal, Seeley et al. (2003) presented key assets and analyzed 
the influence of the restriction of access on livelihood of five different 
groups (fuel-wood collectors, livestock based households, traditional artisan 
groups, communities residing on the border and the Tharus group who are 
typically poor) in relation to the key assets. However analysis of off-farm 
activities was limited. Research on livelihoods needs a combination of both 
the “circumspective approach”, i.e., looking around all activities or sectors 
of household that are engaged in at a moment of time, and a “retrospective 
approach”, i.e., looking for change of livelihood activities and trends over   253 
time (Murray, 2002). This research not only looked at the livelihood 
activities of the household groups in the year of doing the field work but 
also looked at the activities they undertook before. In the process of 
collecting information about a household’s livelihood, the author also 
examined activities or employment of all household members in the locality 
and outside of it. 
Seeley (2003) argued that if in livelihood analysis labels are applied by 
occupation to a household group (for example forest protection group or 
rice production group), this may lead to overlooking what people actually 
do because of the diverse and complex characteristic of household activities. 
Looking at changes in livelihood activities as a response to the titling of 
forests to beneficiaries therefore was analyzed based on change of specific 
livelihood activities of the poor and non-poor groups or recipients and non-
beneficiaries and not on the basis of occupational groups. Ellis (2000) made 
the distinction between on-farm (“income generated from own-account”), 
off-farm (“income refers to wage or exchange labour” and non-farm 
incomes (“income refers to non-agricultural income sources”) and this is 
followed here.  
7.4.1. Livelihood activities of the poor group and their trends  
7.4.1.1. Livelihood activities of poor in Loc Tien 
The income structure of poor household in Loc Tien (figure 11) showed 
diversity and complexity of activities that they pursue.     
   Income structure also reflects the trend of the livelihood activities of 
household. The activities based on forestry land and natural forest resources 
are still important for the poor in Loc Tien contributing 33.1  % of annual 
household income (including three types of activities: collecting NTFPs, 
planting trees on the devolved forestry land and selling labour for planting 
and harvesting the forest). 
Characteristics of the livelihood activities and reasons why poor 
households do those activities are discussed below in relation to household’s 
resources, endowments and the entitlements gained from the devolved 
forestry land and natural forest discussed earlier.  
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¾ On-farm activities 
- Crop production 
Wetland rice area was a major land resource for crop production of the poor 
in Loc Tien, with an average area of 5.39 sao per household (table 19.). 
Although rice production was considered not profitable, all households 
(including non-poor households) have maintained this activity. The reason 
for maintaining this activity was security of food: 
 
The main agricultural product in the commune was rice for eating only. This is a non-
profitable production activity, just for food security purposes. Self-investment of family 
labour was considered as a profit of rice production ( Mr. Ph. – chairman of 
commune people committee, 17
th April, 2006). 
 
Or: I have been planting rice to have milled rice for eating. It was very hard work and no 
profit but I still have to do it (Mrs. S. in Thuy Duong village, 17
th March, 
2006). 
 
Or: Cost for rice production (seed, fertilizer, tilling, and pesticide) occupied 80 % of the 
output’s value. If including labour cost (family labour), there was no any profit but every 
household still has to do it to get rice to eat (Focus group discussion with male 
farmer group in Thuy Duong, 2
nd August, 2006). 
 
Before 1987, rice cultivation was collective with very low productivity and 
almost all households lacked food. From 1989, rice production followed the 
“Contract 10” and from 1994 rice cultivation land was distributed to 
individual households for private production. During all of this time, all 
13.34
20.53
3.63
10.49 8.48 7.84 
18.23 
3.53  1.4 
14.08
Crops Animals Farming labor selling 
NTFPs  Forest planting labor selling Remittance
Off-farm  Social support Local management wage 
Forest production 
Figure 11. Income structure of poor group in Loc Tien (% of annual household 
income) 
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households in the village still maintained this activity for subsistence 
purposes. However, with the poor group, sometimes rice was sold for cash 
to buy necessary things such as note books for children, or medicine.  
Before the implementation of the PAM programme (1987) cassava was 
planted on the bare hills that are now forest plantations. Cassava production 
at that time was also used for eating because rice was not enough. A part of 
the cassava crop had been used for feeding pigs. When the forest planting 
programme (PAM) came, people (including the poor) were involved in 
planting trees to get rice for eating. Since 1990, cassava production has been 
limited because there were no more bare hills for planting and due to the 
“Contract 10” that increased rice productivity.  
Agricultural land (mainly wetland rice) was distributed to individual 
households from 1994 based on the household’s size. Households that were 
established after 1994 were distributed agricultural land from the reserved 
land area. However, this land source has not caught up with the population 
growth. Therefore, the households who registered after 1994 often lack land 
and they are often poor. As discussed in chapter 6, the poor in Loc Tien got 
a limited endowment of the devolved forestry land. Therefore, they were 
influenced more by loss of entitlements from cassava cultivation on the 
state’s bare hills before forest devolution. At present, the poor households 
who lack land have still been planting cassava in the bare land scattered in 
the plantations of the forest owner (mainly for feeding pigs and partly for 
eating). This created the conflict presented in chapter 6. The land area for 
other crops (mungbean, watermelon, peanut) of the poor group was only on 
average one sao (excluding the cassava area), so these crops were just planted 
for family consumption or selling if needed. 
 
- Animal production 
The poor wanted to raise cattle, especially a buffalo for draught power 
although it is a very labour intensive activity at present because of limited 
grazing area due to the establishment of plantations. However, the poor do 
not have money to buy livestock. Therefore, the poor tried to raise one 
head of buffalo by using their family’s labour. For the poor who could not 
buy the breed, they herded the buffalo of the non-poor who have the 
capacity to invest in cattle raising but they do not want to raise them 
because of labour costs. Cattle are therefore given to the poor to raise on a 
share basis of 50 % of production (nuôi rẽ). Pigs and chickens raised in the 
form of extensive farming by using by-products of the family’s crop 
production has been considered as a saving activity. 
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-  Planting tree on the devolved forestry land 
As discussed in chapter 6, the poor in Loc Tien got very limited endowment 
of statutory rights to the devolved forestry land both in terms of small 
forestry land holdings (2.9 sao per household) and the number of households 
(only 3.5 % of total households got forestry land). Forest planting on farm 
activity of the poor therefore is not a common livelihood activity. However, 
the poor in Loc Tien have become interested in planting Acacia hybrid 
because it is a profitable activity. This was a new activity after devolving 
forestry land. As discussed in chapter 5, the investment in the plantations was 
supported by the government and international organizations through the 
PAM and 327 programmes. The poor households who got the devolved 
forestry land harvested timber and reinvested in planting trees.   
Thanks to the forest planting activity, there were poor who moved out 
poverty (as a case study presented in section 7.3). The poor in Loc Tien do 
this activity based on the family’s labour force. Investment in buying 
seedlings is only around 30 USD per ha so it is not too difficult for the poor 
to invest to cultivate from 10-15 sao of trees. Devolution of forestry land, 
therefore, contributed to improving the livelihood of the poor. The issue 
was that they just got very limited endowments of the devolved forestry 
land. Limited endowments to forestry land for the poor lead to limited 
income from the plantation’s timber and thus the capacity to save financial 
resource for production investment. 
 
¾  Off-farm activities 
- Exploitation products from natural forest and forestry land  
Illegal logging in the natural forest was a common activity of the poor when 
the forest was owned by the state. When the natural forest was devolved to 
the village, the poor households replaced this logging with different 
activities.  
 
Before the allocation of natural forest to the village, 40 % of the poor households did 
illegal logging to get cash to buy food. When the forest was allocated to the village, this 
activity was stopped. Those households had  to do different activities such as seasonal 
migration to the city, or those with motorbikes moved to another area to do illegal logging 
(there are four people in the village that have been gone to Da Nang (next province) to do 
illegal logging) (Male focus group discussion, 2
nd August, 2006).  
 
Making charcoal was a popular activity of the poor before the plantations 
were established: 
 
When the bare hills had not yet been planted tree, 50 % of the poor households in the 
village made charcoal to sell to buy food. Those bare hills have been transformed to   257 
plantation since 1987 (by the PAM programme) and then titled to individual households, 
so the charcoal activity was stopped (Poor women group, 1
st August, 2006). 
 
However, according to the poor women’s group, from 2006, 30 % of the 
poor returned to make charcoal illegally. Why was that? Do they prefer to 
do that or was it highly profitable? According to the villagers, this is a low 
return job and hard work but the poor have to do it because of failure of 
rice production. In 2002 the CPC allowed the Chan May Port Management 
Board to construct a water system to take water from the stream that 
provided irrigation of the paddy fields of the village to sell for the port. This 
led to a shortage of water from 2006 and the productivity of rice reduced by 
a half. This forced the poor to make charcoal illegally to earn cash to buy 
food. However, of the poor interviewees none reported this income source 
because it is illegal, so it was not calculated in the income source of NTFPs.  
Thirty percent of poor households collected firewood from the bare hills 
before they were planted forest. This has been a women's activity only 
because it was considered a low income activity. At present, firewood 
availability has been reduced because the wild bushes were cleared for 
planting trees. It could be replaced by the by-products from the plantation. 
However, the plantation mainly belongs to the non- poor group (as 
discussed in chapter VI and in section 7.2 of this chapter). Collection of 
firewood from the plantation by the poor women, therefore, depends on 
permission of the plantations' owners. Women from about 20 % of the poor 
households in Thuy Duong (also in other villages of the commune, 
especially it is a permanent job for a group of ten women in Thuy Tu, a 
neighbouring village) continue this activity primarily to earn cash to buy 
food or for paying for school fees.  
According to the women in Loc Tien, when the forestry land was 
devolved to the individual households to plant trees, women have to go 
further to the natural forest or the state forestry land area, where it is both far 
and steep, to collect firewood. It takes the women about two or three hours 
to go to the new areas to collect firewood. The cost of collecting firewood 
has increased more because of both the reduction of availability of the wild 
brush and farther distance to travel for collection. The women told the 
author that before allocating the forest land, they could collect four bundles 
of firewood in a half day (about 4 hours), but at present, in the same time, 
they can only collect two bundles.  
In general, a reduction in entitlement to firewood because of transferring 
from the state’s bare hills to the private plantations had a greater influence on 
women’s livelihoods, especially for a poor women’s group in Thuy Duong   258 
and Thuy Tu village who earn their living from collecting firewood but 
have limited endowments to the devolved forestry land.  
Collecting rattan was a common activity for the poor group before but it 
stopped three years ago (from 2004). Stopping rattan collection was not the 
result of devolution of natural forest to the village, but it was a consequence 
of overexploitation leading to a decline in rattan. In the 29 households 
interviewed, there was only one household that did it. 
 
- Selling labour 
The devolution of forestry land to individual households created a labour 
market for planting and harvesting trees. Technical knowledge and skills 
gained from the PAM and 327 programmes were human assets for the poor. 
Forest planting is not a new activity in the village but it is quite new in 
terms of its amount and value compared to planting trees for the state 
organization. The forest devolution therefore contributed to improving 
income and thus the livelihood of the poor through providing the 
techniques of planting and tending trees and it created employment in the 
local market. 
 
- Collecting grit, stone and doing masonry work  
There were about 30 % of the poor (information from discussion of poor 
women’s group) in the village that have been collecting grit to sell. This has 
also been women's work and a very low income source (only 15,000 VND 
(1 USD) per day). However, it still continues because there are no 
alternatives. This activity was increased when entitlement from firewood 
reduced due to development of the private plantation after forestry land 
devolution. 
The 25 % of total poor interviewed (7 of 29 interviewees) have been 
doing other off-farm activities such as quarrying stone or masonry work. 
These activities need skill and good health so they have been done mainly 
by young men.  
 
¾  Non-farm activities (Migration) 
Migration started after the devolution of forestry land and natural forest. 
Thirty percent of the 29 poor households interviewed have from one to 
four members who have migrated to Hue or Ho Chi Minh city to earn 
money. Those who migrated are young people from the age of 14 to 22. 
However, only five households out of this 30 % received remittances 
because some migrants got small salary that was only enough for them to 
live on. Thus the proportion of income from the remittance was only 7.84 
% of the total income of the poor (see figure 11). The emergence of   259 
migration resulted not only from a lack of employment after the titling of 
forest land but also the development of the labour market in the cities.  
Changes in livelihood activities of the poor group in Loc Tien are 
summarized in table 21. 
Table 21. Changes in livelihood activities of the poor group in Loc Tien due to devolution of forest 
Livelihood 
activity & 
resources used 
Before 1988  1988 to 1994  1995 to 2000  2001 to present 
Wetland rice 
cultivation 
Collective 
wetland rice 
production 
Wetland rice 
with “contract 
10” 
Wetland rice on 
private land, 
intensive farming 
Rice intensive farming 
Cassava 
planting 
Planting on 
the bare hills 
of the state 
On remained 
part of bare 
hills-narrower 
area 
Scattered area in 
the private 
plantations 
Scattered area in the 
private plantations and 
home garden  
Peanut & 
water melon 
cultivation 
On the 
cooperative 
land 
On the 
cooperative 
land 
On the private 
food crop land 
On the private food 
crop land 
Cattle raising  No  No  Keeping 1 for the 
non-poor (get 50 
% of output) by 
herding or 
feeding grass 
Keeping for the non-
poor (get 50 % of 
output) or raising 1-2 
heads by herding or 
feeding grasses 
Pig and 
poultry raising 
Keeping 1 pig 
& 2-3 
chickens by 
using agr. by-
products  
Keeping 1 pig 
and 2-3 
chickens by 
using agr. by-
products 
Keeping 1 pig 
and 2-3 chicken 
by using agr. by-
products 
Keeping 2 pigs and 5-
7 chickens by using 
agricultural by-
products 
Illegal logging  In the state’s 
natural forest 
In the state’s 
natural forest 
In the state’s 
natural forest 
Stopped after 
devolving forest to 
village, 4 HHs moved 
to do illegally in Da 
Nang 
Making 
charcoal 
On the state’s 
bare hills 
Making 
charcoal 
illegally on 
remaining part 
of bare hills 
Stopped because 
of low income 
and frequency of 
checks by the 
owners 
Started to make 
illegally again from 
2006 because of rice 
productivity reduction 
(drought because of 
flowing water for the 
port) 
Collecting 
firewood for 
selling  
Collecting in 
the state’s bare 
hills 
Collecting in 
the remained 
part of the bare 
hills 
Collecting in NF 
& some areas of 
private plantation 
Collecting in the 
natural forest and 
some areas of private 
plantation 
Selling labour 
to plant and 
harvest trees 
No  For the DFPD, 
through 
contracting by 
the cooperative 
For the DFPD  
through contract 
& for forest 
owners (used 
knowledge & 
skills got from 
devolution) 
 
Plant & harvest for 
forest owners through 
local labour market 
(used knowledge & 
skills got from 
allocation programme)   260 
Exploitation 
stones  
No  No  Started when an 
enterprise 
occurred, exploit 
on the hills of the 
state 
Continue to exploit 
Collecting 
grits 
No No  Start  when 
occurring 
demand for 
construction, 
exploit in village 
‘s stream 
Exploiting in the 
stream of the village 
Seasonal 
migration 
No To 
neighbouring 
provinces or 
cities to do 
masonry (men 
got married) 
To neighbouring 
provinces or 
cities to do 
masonry (men 
got married) 
To the neighbouring 
provinces or cities to 
do masonry (men got 
married) 
Full migration  No  No  To HCM city 
(coming back in 
TET- (girls from 
14 to 20 years old 
or male from 17 
to 20 years old)  
To HCM city or go 
abroad (young people) 
Source: focus group discussion, in-depth interview in 2006, 2007. 
In summary, livelihood activities of the poor group in Loc Tien were very 
diverse. This trend of diversification was not their preference but resulted 
from low output from the key resources (land, cash) and limited 
entitlements from the forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state. 
One third of the livelihood activities of this group still depended on the 
natural resource base such as collecting firewood or grit, exploitation of 
stone and making charcoal. The shifts in livelihood activities of the poor 
group in Loc Tien could be considered an "adapted strategy" (Pain & 
Lautze, 2002) to reduce the risk by diversification.  
7.4.1.2. Livelihood activities of the poor in Thuong Quang  
Livelihood activities of the poor households in the mountainous area are also 
very diverse (including different types of activity), that is reflected through 
income structure in the figure 12, which is constructed based on the data on 
income sources from the households.     
Income from NTFPs collected in the natural forest area provided the 
greatest single source of total income of the poor in Thuong Quang (32.6 
%, see figure 12). If income from forest planting and selling labour for 
planting trees is included, the income from forestry production contributed 
more than half of the total income of the poor (55.3 %). The two second 
biggest income sources were from crop and animal production.  261
Characteristics of the livelihood ac tivities  and  reasons why the poor 
households in Thuong Quang were more interested in collecting NTFPs
from the devolved natural forest rather than other activities are discussed 
below in relation to the household resources and entitlements. 
  Source: Household survey in 2006.
¾ On-farm activities 
- Crop production 
Wetland rice production is an activity of all households (including poor) in 
Thuong Quang although again as an unprofitable crop. As in Loc Tien, 100 
% of the interviewed households said that wetland rice was the crop they 
want to plant for food security purpose. However, wetland for rice 
production in the mountainous area was limited because of lack of flat land 
and irrigation. Wetland is often scattered in small plots. The commune had a 
wetland rice area irrigated by a dam constructed through the resettlement 
programme of the government. This area was allocated by the local 
authority based on household size. The poor in Thuong Quang holds on 
average of 1.76 sao of wetland rice per household while the non-poor hold 
4.6 sao on average. The reason was that the area of the non-poor households 
was often larger because they have labour and the financial capacity to 
occupy the land and to hire labour to cultivate the scattered wetland areas.  
Upland rice was often planted by ethnic groups in the upland areas that are 
now allocated for planting forest. However, the shifting cultivation of crops 
on these upland areas was stopped in 1997 by a government ban meant to 
protect the forest. At present, there are three households of 30 interviewed 
poor households that still cultivate upland rice in their home gardens and 
five others planted in the rubber plantation, although it was considered as a 
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Figure 12. Income structure of poor group in Thuong Quang (% of 
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low productivity crop and more risky because it is dependent on the 
weather. This reflected the fact that meeting food requirements was still a 
critical issue for the poor group. 
Cassava  is also commonly cultivated by the poor group in Thuong 
Quang, especially by the ethnic group. In the 30 interviewed households, 
there was only one household, a disabled single woman who did not plant 
cassava. The cassava area of the poor ranged from was from 0.5 to 4 sao per 
household. The poor plant cassava mainly for eating although its by-product 
(small roots) was used for feeding pigs. Cassava was a major food of for all 
the ethnic villagers before 1997. It has been replaced step by step by rice 
since the wetland rice area was expanded due to the construction of the 
irrigation system and the reclamation of some areas to distribute to the 
households. Because of holding on average only 1.7 sao of wetland rice, this 
was not enough to feed an average number of 6.4 people per household. So 
cassava is still used for eating by all ethnic poor household (92 % of the total 
poor of the commune) for two to three months per year (in the duration 
between the two crops). Cassava is also a crop that is suitable for the land 
conditions in the area and it requires only labour and seedlings which are 
home grown. 
A remarkable issue was that in the 30 interviewed poor households there 
were 12 households that had to plant cassava in the young rubber plantation 
and only 18 households had an area from one to two sao in the upland for 
planting cassava. Converting from upland crop farming to rubber and Acacia 
hybrid plantations reduced the cassava cultivation area. This made difficulties 
for the poor who lack crop land: 
 
I have a little land, only one sao of cassava, so even eating cassava for food is still not 
enough for all year. The upland area that was reclaimed by my family is now allocated to 
another household in village 6 for planting trees (Mrs. T.R. in village 1, 2
nd August, 
2007). 
 
This will especially challenge the poor when the rubber plantations close 
their canopy. The discussion of the poor women on 15
th August, 2006 
reflected their worries about lack of land for cultivating crops in the near 
future: 
 
We do not know where to plant cassava when the rubber plantation grows up. We think 
that after two more years we will have to find small spaces scattered in the Acacia hybrid 
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Or When the rubber grows up I do not know what I will do because my family has only 
one sao of wetland rice and I cannot intercrop cassava in the rubber plantation any more 
(Mrs. B. a widow in village 2, 2
nd, August 2007). 
 
As the above discussion, 92 % of the poor in Thuong Quang are Ktu ethnic 
people and most of them have been using cassava for eating. Loss of 
entitlement from cassava output due to devolution of forestry land in 
combination with development of rubber trees had more influence on food 
security for the poor Ktu ethnic group. 
According to the villagers in Thuong Quang, cassava cultivation is 
mainly the responsibility of women. From a gender perspective, reduction 
of cassava cultivation areas due to devolution of forestry land in combination 
with rubber development challenged more women’s livelihoods as seen in 
their complaints in the group discussion presented above. 
In contrast to cassava cultivation, only six of the 30 poor households 
interviewed planted mungbean. These areas were mainly scattered in the 
stream’s side, so only the households who settled close to the stream had 
land for cultivating mungbean. The area for planting mungbean for the poor 
group in Thuong Quang was only 0.21 sao per household and where it was 
intercropped in the rubber plantation with an average area of 0.13 sao only 
(while the cassava area intercropped in rubber was on average 1.74 sao). 
Why didn’t the poor expand the mungbean area? It was found that this crop 
could not replace rice in the case of limited food supplies as cassava could. 
Therefore, mungbean was cultivated just as a food supplement or for sale. 
The area for planting mungbean in the upland area was from one to two sao 
per household before this land was converted to rubber and Acacia hybrid 
plantations. So, the rubber and Acacia hybrid plantation did not strongly 
influence mungbean cultivation of the poor in the mountainous commune 
because it was not a prioritized activity of the poor group.  
Rubber planting started in 2002 in the commune through the “Small scale 
farmer rubber plantation programme” (Chương trình “cao su tiểu điền) with a 
budget from the local and central governments. The programme provided a 
loan in kind of seedlings, fertilizer and part in cash for labour investment. 
The Red Book for the rubber plantations to record titling to households 
were also provided after the villagers planted the rubber trees. This 
encouraged people, including the poor, to plant rubber. Seventy percent of 
the interviewed poor households planted rubber from 6 to 20 sao (one 
household had only 3 sao and another 30 sao). Discussion with poor 
women’s and men’s groups indicated that rubber planting was a priority 
activity for the poor group at present, because of direction by the commune   264 
authority and good support from the government with a long term loan and 
good returns from the rubber resin: 
 
The state provided loans through seedlings, fertilizer and through money for buying rice to 
eat to plant and nursing rubber so almost all households in the commune planted rubber 
(Male group discussion, 26
th August, 2006). 
 
Or: They (commune authority) asked us to plant so my family planted two ha (Mrs. D., 
25
th, August, 2006). 
 
Or: From 2003 we focused on planting rubber because this was a movement in the whole 
commune thanks to the providing of a loan from the state (Female group discussion, 
25
th August, 2006). 
 
In the 30 interviewed poor households, there were nine households that did 
not have rubber plantations. Reviewing the questionnaires of the 
interviewed poor households the author found that the households who did 
not plant rubber were either landless (young couples), having health 
problems, or old widows or widowers with young children (15 to 17 years 
old). 
   
- Animal production 
Pig raising: It was quite different from the poor group in Loc Tien, this was 
not a common activity of the poor in Thuong Quang. There were only five 
of the 30 interviewed poor households who raised one or two pigs either 
extensively or by using the by-products of crop production. Why did the 
poor in Thuong Quang not raise pigs? Primarily for reasons of disease 
possibly reflecting limited technical knowledge or experience: “Poor in the 
commune do not know the way to raise pig yet”- (Mr. B. an officer from CPC- 
11
th April, 2006) so they stopped raising them although they wanted to keep 
them for the family’s consumption when building a house or organizing a 
wedding for the children or for the new year traditional holiday (TET): 
 
We tried to use small roots of cassava or sweet potato to raise pig for the children’s wedding 
or a constructing a house or for “TET” (traditional new year) but could not because they 
often got diseases and died. We did not understand why the better-off households raise 
more successfully (Female group discussion, 25
th August, 2006). 
 
Cattle raising was considered an activity for the better-off only:  
 
If you do not keep buffalo, you will be poor forever or if you want to build a house you 
have to be Vietnamese overseas or have to raise cattle (Mr. Th. in village 1, 21st, 
June, 2006.    265 
When the cattle grazed freely, this activity brought high profit to the raisers 
in the commune: 
 
Before planting Acacia and rubber, cattle were grazed freely so we had to invest only 
money to buy breed and it was not labour intensive so it was high profit production (Mr. 
Ng. a better-off farmer in village 7, 21st, June, 2006).   
 
However, at that time, the poor group did not have the money to buy 
breed, so cattle raising was not an activity of the poor group before the 
plantations were developed. Similar to the coastal area, although titling 
forestry land and rubber plantation to individual households reduced the area 
for grazing cattle, the poor in Thuong Quang still wanted to raise cattle for 
tilling and earning income. In 30 interviewed poor households, there were 
12 households that have been raising from one to two cattle. All the 
interviewed households who are raising cattle said that they had to lead 
them around the paddy field or home garden and had to cut grasses to feed 
them because they could not graze freely: 
 
If I graze my cattle freely in the plantations, they (forest owners) will cut my cattle’s legs or 
tie them up so I have to lead my cattle around my garden and cut grasses to feed them 
(Mrs. R., 25
th August, 2006). 
 
Livestock rearing also resulted from support by the government’s loans for 
the poor:  
 
My family had a little land and I was trained in techniques of cattle raising and 
provided a loan to buy a calf  so I am raising one cow now (Mrs. H in village 3, 
26
th, August, 2006). 
Or At present, the poor in the commune can raise cattle because it is not difficult to get a 
loan from the state to buy a breed (Mr. V. head of a village, 19
th March, 2007).  
 
Labour intensive cattle raising because of the restricted grazing area has also 
created the opportunity for the poor group to sell labour for leading cattle 
for the better-off to get money or cassava for eating: 
 
They (the foresters) did not allow crop planting in the upland area that was reclaimed by 
my family before. My households lacked food because the land area for cultivating crops 
was small so two of my sons had to go to keep cattle for them to get money to buy rice, 
sometimes they (cattle owners) paid in cassava (Mr. D. in village 4, 26
th, August, 
2006). 
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In general, devolution of forestry land to individual households reduced the 
grazing area but more labour intensive cattle raising was still an alternative 
for the poor because crop production did not provide enough work for 
them (limited wetland rice and cassava areas) and lack of income forced 
them to take hard work. Reducing the grazing area also created opportunity 
for the poor group to sell their labour for herding the cattle of those better-
off to earn income in cash or in kind.  
 
¾  Off-farm activities 
- Harvesting products from the natural forest 
Illegal logging is not an activity of the poor in Thuong Quang. Before and 
after allocation of forest to beneficiaries, the poor in the commune did not 
do illegal logging. The reason was that to do illegal logging, the logger has 
to have a chain saw to cut and buffalo to carry timber, and have contacts 
with business men to sell the timber. The poor in Thuong Quang did not 
have these resources or any logging experience. In 2006 there were only 12 
poor households that had a buffalo and there was only one household that 
carried timber for an illegal logger for two days and earned 500,000 VND 
(30  USD). The buffalo have been raised by the poor in Thuong Quang 
mainly to use for cultivation and sale. Prevention of illegal logging after 
forest devolution did not affect the poor group in terms of getting 
entitlements from timber in the natural forest. Loss of benefits from timber 
from the devolved natural forest area affected the illegal loggers who are 
better-off households in the commune.  
In contrast, collecting NTFPs such as rattan, the leaves for making a 
traditional hat (lá nón), and honey have been very common activities of the 
poor in Thuong Quang. Before the development of rubber and Acacia hybrid 
plantations, collecting NTFPs was the main activity of the poor group: 
 
Before 2002 (the start of planting rubber and Acacia hybrid), our life mainly relied on 
rattan and "lá nón". We went to the forest frequently (about 10 times a month) to collect 
rattan and "lá nón" to sell to get money for buying rice. There were people had to stay in 
the forest from four to five days (Focus group discussion of poor women, 25
th 
August, 2006).  
 
Since the appearance of rubber and Acacia planting, collection of NTFPs was 
not the first prioritized activity of the poor group because time was needed 
for planting rubber for their own families and new opportunities for selling 
their labour to plant rubber and Acacia for the better-off. According to the 
women’s group, at present, NTFPs collection became a minor activity to 
supplement a deficiency of cash for buying food:   267 
When rubber and Acacia planting were developed, we still go to the forest to collect rattan 
and "lá nón" but not frequently! Just one to two times per month and just go when we 
are free from the production works or when we need money to buy rice or food (Female 
poor group discussion, 25th, August, 2006). 
 
However, the poor women’s group commented that "the poor who have 
little wetland rice area or rubber plantation still go to the natural forest 
frequently".  
General comments of people in the commune also reflected that in 2006 
the poor in Thuong Quang reduced their dependency on NTFPs in the 
natural forest. So it was quite a surprise from the results of household 
interview. There were 20 households out of the 30 poor households 
(occupying 70 %) that still collect NTFPs frequently and income from this 
source provided 32.6 % of the total average annual income per household of 
the poor group (figure 12). According to the villagers in Thuong Quang, 
ethnic people still collected NTFPs not only due to lack of income but also 
for traditional reason of their experience in using forest for along time. 
As discussed in section 7.2, at present (2006) the natural forest recipient 
groups still allow the villagers to come to collect NTFPs in the devolved 
forest areas but the NTFP entitlement of the villagers who were not 
devolved endowment of statutory rights to natural forest have become 
dependent on the attitude of the beneficiaries. Fourteen percent of poor 
households of the commune were members of groups who got natural forest 
from the state. Entitlements from collecting NTFPs in the devolved natural 
forest of the remaining poor households (86 % of total poor) in Thuong 
Quang was challenged by their dependency on permission of the forest 
beneficiaries. Also remarkable fact was that 92 % of the poor in Thuong 
Quang belong to the Ktu ethnic group. Devolution of natural forest 
therefore challenged the livelihood of the poor, especially the ethnic poor 
because of the change from free access to the state forest to dependent access 
to the devolved natural forest. 
Before the rubber and Acacia hybrid plantations were developed, firewood 
in the commune was used for cooking by all households. The expansion of 
rubber and Acacia hybrid plantations lead to a scarcity of firewood, the 
villagers had to move further to collect it and the quantity of firewood 
collected per day was also reduced. This encouraged some of the better-off 
to start buying firewood and this had never happened in the commune 
before. It opened a new opportunity for the poor to sell firewood: 
 
At present, many areas were planted to rubber and Acacia so firewood was scarce and it 
took a longer time to collect. Some better-off (mainly Kinh people –a major group) buy it   268 
now from some poor ethnic women collected to sell (Focus group discussion of 
women poor, 25
th August, 2006).  
 
However, buying firewood is still limited in the area. In 29 non-poor 
interviewed households, there were only two households (Mr. R. in village 
2 and Mr. G. in village 3) that bought firewood at a cost of 500,000 VND 
(30 USD) per year (per household). There was only one household of the 30 
poor interviewed households that sold firewood earning 500,000 VND per 
year.  
Similarly in Loc Tien, collecting firewood was mainly done by women. 
Reduction of the firewood source because of development of rubber and 
Acacia plantation took more time and enerty for the women to collect fuel.  
Returning back to the above discussion, most of the poor in Thuong 
Quang are Ktu ethnic group. Changing from free access to dependent access 
to  NTFPs (including firewood) in the devolved natural forest because of 
gaining limited endowments to forest, challenged entitlements to income 
from NTFPs and thus the livelihood of the poor (especially the ethnic poor 
group) and women since their livelihood still depended more on natural 
forest resources. 
 
- Selling labour 
Selling labour for planting rubber and Acacia hybrid was also a new activity in 
Thuong Quang. Titling forestry land to individual households along with 
the development of a planted timber market encouraged local people to 
invest in planting trees, including hiring labour: 
 
From the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, many Kinh households who have 
money hired ethnic people to plant Acacia, some Kinh people planted a lot of Acacia 
(Poor women’s group discussion, 25
th August, 2006). 
 
Development of Acacia hybrid plantation brought a new opportunity for the 
poor in the commune to sell labour to the better-off.  Thirty percent of 
poor households sold labour for planting trees. This contributed to their 
income. However, it was only short duration work and limited in amount. 
This income source therefore occupied only 4.5 % of the total average 
income per household in the poor group (figure 12). 
Besides selling labour for planting trees, the poor in Thuong Quang also 
sell labour for on-farm work such as weeding in the paddy field or in garden 
or harvesting wetland rice. This activity was done mainly by poor women to 
earn additional money for buying food (information from discussion of poor 
women’s group on 15
th August, 2006). Six poor households from the sample   269 
sold labour for agriculture work. This activity was also not regular work and 
contributed only 1.1 % to total income per household of poor group.  
 
¾ Other off-farm activities 
There was only one household (a young couple - the husband 35 years old 
and the wife 32 years old, belonging to Kinh group) amongst the poor who 
worked off-farm (as a mason). Lack of land (holding only three sao wetland 
rice and cassava) forced  him to find an off-farm job given the decline in 
value of collecting NTFPs resulting from over exploitation (according to Mr. 
C. in village 7). This brought in 400,000 VND per month but required skills 
that ethnic people do not have.  
 
¾ Non-farm activity (Migration) 
In contrast to Loc Tien, migration to the city was not common among the 
poor in Thuong Quang. Only three of the 30 poor interviewed households 
sent children to Ho Chi Minh and Da Nang city to work. The appearance 
of a broker to take young people to the city started in the area in 2004. 
Living in the city still seems strange to the ethnic young people because they 
have never seen it before. There was the household who was afraid to send 
their children to the city to earn income: 
 
There was a person that came to the village to ask my daughter to go the city to 
work but I was afraid because I do not know what will happen with my daughter 
so I did not agree to let my daughter go although my family needs money (Mrs. 
L. in village 1, 26
th,Januarry, 2007).   
There was a difference in remittance received by the Kinh and ethnic 
migrants. A Kinh family got remittances from two to four million VND 
from their children while an ethnic household got 300,000 to 500,000 VND 
per year. The low income of the ethnic migrants constrained them from 
visiting their family: 
 
My daughter got only 300,000 VND per month and three years passed but she could 
not come back to visit me (Mrs. T., 25
th, January, 2007). 
Or Mr. D. who lived in my village before brought my daughter to Da Nang to do 
housework and he said that the owner will pay for my daughter 200,000 VND per 
month. Until now (10 months) my family still has not got any money from my 
daughter’s work (Mr. Gi., 26
th, January, 2007).  
 
It seems there was discrimination against ethnic migrants in the labour 
market because of their limited education, little experience in the city and 
cultural differences. Another remarkable issue was that the ethnic female 
migrants in Thuong Quang commune were very young (from 12 to 16   270 
years old). They were still school age. This was not a choice, but reflected 
no alternative to supplementing the income deficiency of their family: 
 
I love my daughter and miss her since she has gone to the city to earn money but I must 
ask her to go because my family needs money (Mrs. T., 25
th, January, 2007). 
 
Migration to the city resulted from demands of the labour market and lack 
of employment for the poor in the local area. 
Changes in the livelihood activities of the poor group in Thuong Quang 
are summarized in the table below (table 22). 
To sum up, similar to the poor group in Loc Tien, livelihood activities of 
the poor in the mountainous area were very diverse, especially for the 
landless poor. NTFPs were still important resources for the livelihoods of the 
poor group because income from NTFPs of the natural forest represented 
one third of the total income. Devolution of natural forest to household 
group may challenge future entitlements of income from NTFPs and thus 
livelihoods of the poor (especially Ktu ethnic people) and women. The poor 
group was also interested and willing to invest labour in long-term 
production (for example rubber) if long-term support is provided.   
However, food crops were still a priority of the poor for meeting their basic 
needs. The livelihood activities reflected an “adaptive strategy”
10 by doing 
whatever they could to earn enough money for everyday expenditures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
10 “A strategy seek to spread risk by adjusting livelihoods or diversifying income” (Pain & 
Lautze, 2002).   271 
Table 22. Changes in livelihood activities of the poor group in Thuong 
Quang 
Livelihood activity 
& resources used 
Before  2003 (Before forest 
devolution) 
2003 to present (After forest 
devolution) 
Wetland rice 
cultivation 
Wetland rice on private land, 
intensive farming 
Rice intensive farming 
Upland rice  Some areas in the low steep 
hills of the state 
In home garden and intercrop in 
private rubber plantation  
Cassava planting  Some areas in the low steep 
hills of the state 
Some scattered areas in the private 
natural forest area and in home garden 
and intercrop in private rubber 
plantation  
Mungbean   On the river side and a part 
in the low steep hills 
On the river side or intercrop in 
rubber plantation or home garden 
Cattle raising  Grazing freely with limited 
head because of lack of 
capital  
Raising 1-2 cattle by herding on the 
garden or hills and feeding grasses 
Pig and poultry 
raising  
Keeping 1 pig and 2-3 
chicken by using agricultural 
by-products 
Keeping 1 pig and 2-3 chicken by 
using by-products, few household 
because risk of the disease 
Rubber planting  No  New livelihood activity on private 
land (state land before) 
Collecting firewood 
for cooking & 
NTFPs for selling 
In the state natural forest and 
the state bare hills with high 
frequency  
In the private natural forest with 
lower frequency, but for the poor 
landless is still common 
Collecting firewood 
for selling  
No  New cash earning activity but 
demand in the market is still limited. 
Collecting in the private natural forest  
Selling labour for 
planting rubber & 
Acacia hybrid 
No  New livelihood activity on private 
forest land 
Migration to city  No  New livelihood activity from demand 
of labour market and lack of 
employment in the commune 
 
7.4.2. Livelihood activities of the non-poor group and their trends  
7.4.2.1. In the coastal commune (Loc Tien) 
Income structures (proportion of different income sources of households) of 
the non-poor households in the coastal area are reflected in the following 
figure (figure 13). Income of the non-poor in Loc Tien also came from 
different sources, but it focused mainly on forest production, off-farm jobs 
and animal raising.   
In contrast to the poor group in the same commune (Loc Tien), income 
from  NTFPs in the natural forest provided only a very small proportion 
(only 1.5 %) of the average total income of the non-poor households (see   272 
figure 13). It is remarkable that income from NTFPs of the non-poor did 
not come from collecting firewood or making charcoal but from doing 
ecotourism services as discussed in section 7.3. 
The non-poor group focused mainly on planting trees on the devolved 
forestry land. The characteristics of the livelihood activities and the reasons 
why non-poor households in Loc Tien focused on forest planting and did 
not collect NTFPs from the devolved natural forest are discussed below in 
relation to their resources and entitlements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¾  On-farm activities 
- Crop production 
Rice was also a common crop of the non-poor households in Loc Tien. 
The average household size of non-poor was smaller than the poor, but the 
average area of wetland rice per household of this group was 1.5 times larger 
than that of the poor group (table 19). As with the poor group, the non-
poor group (including better-off households) also maintained rice 
production for food security purposes:  
 
The land was not fertile and there was no water to irrigate but I still have to cultivate to 
get rice for eating (Mrs. M., 7
th, January, 2007).  
Or My family had 10 sao of wetland rice. I have to hire tilling and buy fertilizer and 
pesticide so I did not get any profit but I still must cultivate rice for eating (Mr. D., 8
th, 
January, 2007. 
 
14.29
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Figure 13. Income structure of non-poor group in Loc Tien (% of annual household income) 
Source: Household survey in 2006.   273 
As discussed in section 7.4.1.1., rice cultivation of the non-poor group in 
the coastal commune also changed from collective production (before 1988), 
to the “Contract 10” system (1989 to 1993) and then to private production 
from 1994. According to the discussion of the male group (2
nd, August, 
2006), in the period of food shortage under collective production, the non-
poor group had the inherited resources to cope with the deficit. In contrast 
to the poor group, the non-poor just used rice for eating and did not sell it. 
Cassava production was also commonly cultivated by the non-poor in 
Loc Tien before the PAM programmeme (1987). When the bare hills were 
converted to plantations from 1987 to 1995, the non-poor stopped planting 
cassava and also joined in planting forest to get rice and cash from the DFPD. 
At present, 12 of the 30 non-poor households planted cassava in their home 
gardens, but not in the plantation, only for feeding pigs. Loss of entitlement 
for cassava due to devolution of forestry land was not a problem for non-
poor in Loc Tien because their land holding of wetland rice and other crops 
was two times compared to that of the poor. 
The land areas of other cash crops (mungbean, watermelon, peanut) of 
the non-poor were double that compared to the poor (0.91; 0.59 and 0.30 
compared to 0.26; 0.26 and 0.17- see table 19). Those areas located in the 
food crop land area (đất màu) are mainly for income generation purposes.  
 
- Animal production 
At present, the non-poor households in Thuy Duong (Loc Tien) also want 
to raise cattle because this activity can generate more profit compared to 
crop production. However, devolution of forestry land to individual 
household made this activity very labour intensive because of the limited 
grazing area that resulted from the bare land conversion to plantation. The 
non-poor households, therefore, have given their livestock to the poor to 
raise for a share of production on a proportion of 50 % (nuôi rẽ) or they had 
to sell about a half of the herd because they do not have enough labour to 
manage the herd.  
Cattle grazed in the forest were caught. Those grazing on the path at the edge of the rice 
field and they were also caught. I can not sleep well when raising cattle. I have to lead 
them to feed on grasses, this was very labour intensive (Mr. T., 7
th, January, 2007).  
Or There was no grazing area, it was very hard work to cut grasses to feed cattle so 
raising cattle is low profit now. Before planting trees, my family raised 10 cattle but at 
present I am raising five cattle only ( Mr. C., 6
th, January, 2007). 
How, cattle raising is still considered as profitable so the non-poor maintain 
it because they have enough financing to invest in this activity. In 2006,   274 
income from animal production per household still provided 23.6 % of the 
total income per household of the non-poor in Loc Tien. 
   As with the poor, pig and chicken raising has been a common activity of 
the non-poor. Twenty-seven of the 30 non-poor households keep pigs. 
The number of pigs per non-poor household was only 2.27 heads while that  
of the poor was 2.86 heads. The non-poor group raised pigs for the purpose  
of saving through using the by-products of crop production. 
 
- Forest planting 
Holding 16.5 sao of the devolved forestry land per household along with the 
development of plantation timber market, the non-poor group has become 
interested in planting Acacia hybrid. This was also a new activity of the non-
poor after the devolution of forestry land and provided the largest single 
income source (32.16 % of household income) of the non-poor (see figure 
13). The investment in the plantations was supported by the government 
and international organizations through the PAM and 327 programmes (from 
1990 to 1998) and the SNV project (2003). From 2004, after the first 
harvest, the forestry land beneficiaries invested themselves in planting trees. 
Because of the seasonal characteristic of Acacia hybrid planting and their large 
forestry land holdings, the non-poor often have to hire local labour to plant 
trees. This activity of the non-poor group was seen to generate significant 
income and was considered as a way of building capital to use for large 
expenditures (building a new house or buying a motorcycle) rather than 
meeting basic needs: 
 
Non-poor households who have forestry land want to plant forest to get a big amount of 
income in one time. It’s like a way of saving (Group discussion of male group, 
2
nd August, 2006.  
 
Or My family planted crops for short term consumption purposes and I invested in forest 
planting for long-term purposes to get a big income source, as my family’s stored asset 
(Mrs. H.- 7
th, January, 2007). 
 
This can be called an “accumulation strategy” (Pain & Lautze, 2002). The 
entitlement to timber from the plantations resulted from gaining an 
endowment of rights to the forestry land, financial support from the 
government and international organization as well as using their own 
financial resources and became a source of accumulation for the non-poor 
households.   
  The non-poor who did not get forestry land from the devolution benefited 
from selling labour for planting trees (discussed in off-farm activity section 
below).    275 
 
¾  Off-farm activities 
- Exploitation of products from natural forest and forestry land  
Illegal logging in the natural forest of Loc Tien was an activity of some non-
poor households that had been poor households when the forestry landwas  
still owned by the state. According to the comments of the male non- 
poor group, collecting NTFPs is only an activity of the poor only. However,  
in the 30 interviewed non-poor households, there were still three households 
collecting firewood, one collecting both firewood and charcoal and one 
collecting rattan for selling. Those households also just changed from being 
the poor and they still have limited income from agricultural production. 
Income from NTFPs provided only 1.5 % of the total income per household 
of the non-poor group (figure 13) 
 
- Selling labour  
Forty percent of the interviewed non-poor households in the Loc Tien sold 
labour for planting forest while only one household of this group sold labour 
for farming. The reason for selling labour for planting trees of the non-poor 
group in this commune was not seen as equivalent to selling labour for 
farming activities of the poor. Non-poor households were still interested in 
doing in planting forest because this is rather high income job (40,000 to 
50,000 VND per labourer per day) and it was not looked down on by the 
community. However, the better-off households rarely do this because it is a 
hard job. This is a more common activity of medium income households 
who are categorized as non-poor in this research.  
As discussed in section 7.3, the size of the local labour market for this 
activity was limited so income from this source provided only 3.9 % of total 
income per household of the non-poor group. This was also a new activity 
for the non-poor and was a result of devolving forestry land to households 
and some non-poor households who owned motorcycles had more 
opportunity to benefit from this entitlement. Forestry land devolution 
therefore brought more benefit to non-poor from the devolved land in 
terms of both timber and the opportunity to sell labour for planting and 
harvesting plantation. 
 
¾  Other off- farm activities 
- Doing service 
The number of non-poor households who undertook off-farm activity was 
nearly double that of the poor group (11 compared to seven). A major off-
farm activity of the non-poor households was operating a small business, 
which required investment of financial capital and skills. There were five   276 
households in 30 non-poor interviewees that operate a small business and 
two others provide the service of tilling and harvesting rice. Ecotourism 
service at the "Suối Voi" was also a high income off-farm activity and only 12 
non-poor households accessed this activity (as discussed in section 7.3).  
 
- Collecting grit or stones and working in Chan May port 
The off-farm activities that rely on natural resources and generate low 
income such as collecting grit or stone are not undertaken by the non-poor 
group at present. There were no non-poor interviewee collecting grit and 
only one did stone exploitation, but that is a household who just moved out 
of being poor.  
The development of a wood processing factory in Chan May Port 
created jobs for the people in the area aged from 20-35 years. There were 
only 20 households in the village that had members doing this and all were 
young men and belonged to non-poor households. Opportunities to access 
this activity were also determined by social relationships (the households 
who have members working in the factory were also the families who have 
members that worked in the commune or district authority and they have 
work relationship with the people who work for Chan May port). Off-farm 
activities provided 16.5 % of the total income per household of the non-
poor group.   
 
¾  Non-farm activity (Migration) 
As with the poor, at the beginning of the titling of forest, seasonal and full 
time migration to city or other provinces was a common activity of the 
non-poor group in the coastal commune. Of the 30 non-poor households, 
12 households had from one to two members that had migrated to the city 
to earn money. These households were medium income households (but 
belonged to the non-poor group as categorized by the author). At present, 
this was not of interest to better-off households because living in the city 
and labouring was not a good environment for their children. The better-off 
tried to invest in the education of children hoping that they could get a 
stable wage job with a certain social position.  
Changes in the livelihood activities of the non-poor group in Loc Tien 
are summarized in table 23. 
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Table 23. Changes in livelihood activities of the non-poor group in Loc Tien due to forest devolution 
Liv. activity & 
resources used 
Before 1988  1988 to 1994  1995 to  2000  2001 to present 
Wetland rice 
cultivation 
Collective 
wetland rice 
production 
Wetland rice 
with “Contract 
10” 
Wetland rice on 
private land, 
intensive farming 
Rice intensive 
farming 
Cassava 
planting 
Planting on 
the state bare 
hills  
Scattered area 
in home garden 
Scattered area in 
home garden 
Scattered area in 
home garden  
Peanut & 
watermelon 
cultivation 
On the 
cooperative 
land 
On the 
cooperative 
land 
On the private food 
crop land 
On the private food 
crop land 
Forest planting  No  No   Forest planting on 
own farm 
Forest planting on 
own farm 
Cattle raising  Grazing 2-3 
heads on the 
state bare hills 
Collective 
keeping and 
private grazing 
partly in the 
state hills  
Keeping 5-7 heads 
by grazing partly on 
the hills or renting 
poor to keep or 
feeding grass 
Keeping 3-5 heads by 
feeding grasses or hire 
poor to keep 
Pig and 
poultry raising  
Keeping 2 
pigs & 5 
chickens by 
using 
agricultural 
by-products  
Keeping 2 pigs 
and 5 chickens 
by using 
agricultural by-
products 
Keeping 2 pigs and 
5 chickens by using 
agricultural by-
products 
Keeping 2 -3 pigs and 
5-7 chickens by using 
agricultural by-
products 
Illegal logging  In the state’s 
natural forests 
In the state’s 
natural forest 
No No 
Making 
charcoal 
On the state’s 
bare hills 
Making 
charcoal 
illegally on bare 
hills 
Stopped because of 
low income 
Stopped because of 
low income 
Collecting 
firewood for 
selling  
Collecting in 
the state’s 
bare hills 
Collecting in 
remaining part 
of bare hills 
Stopped because of 
low income 
Stopped because of 
low income 
Selling labour 
to plant forest 
No  For the DFPD 
through the 
cooperative 
For forest owners 
(households who 
have income close 
to poverty line)  
For forest owners  
(households who have 
income close to 
poverty line) 
Salary works  No  No  No  Work for wood 
processing factory or 
the port 
Full migration  No  No  To city (young 
people of 
households who 
have income above 
poverty line)  
To city or go abroad 
(young people of 
households who have 
income above poverty 
line) 
 
To sum up, because food insecurity was not a problem of the non-poor in 
Loc Tien, they were able to invest in long-term production activities for the 
purpose of building capital. Devolution of forestry land brought entitlement 
of timber and thus became a good opportunity for the non-poor to   278 
accumulate capital to reinvest in production. Investing in the education of 
children to gain labour skills and improve wages through employment 
opportunities was also an alternative for the non-poor households.   
7.4.2.2. Livelihood activities of the non-poor group in Thuong Quang and 
their trends 
The income sources of the non-poor household in Thuong Quang (the 
mountainous commune) were also rather diverse (figure 14). The greatest 
single income source (28.3 %) came from animal production. 
 
 
Figure 14. Income structure of non-poor group in Thuong Quang ( % of annual household 
income) 
Source: Household survey in 2006. 
 
It is quite different compared to the poor in the same commune, income 
from  NTFPs in the natural forest area provided only 2.4 % of the total 
average income of non-poor household in Thuong Quang. Income from 
selling labour for planting trees is also small (2.7 %). However, income from 
forest plantation provided 15.9 % (the third highest income source) resulting 
from holding large area of forestry land devolved by the state.  
Activities based on forestry land and natural forest resources (collecting 
NTFPs, planting forest, selling labour to plant trees) provided only 20 % of 
the total income of the non-poor in Thuong Quang in comparison with 
55.3 % of the poor, indicating how much more dependent the poor in the 
mountainous commune were on the forest resources. The activities and 
reasons why non-poor households in Thuong Quang do not rely strongly 
on forest resources for earning a living are discussed below in relation to 
household resources and entitlements.  
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¾  On-farm activities 
- Crop production 
Wetland rice production is a common activity of the non-poor households in 
Thuong Quang and was done primarily for food security. The cultivated 
area of wetland rice of the non-poor households was double that of the poor 
in the commune but it was still limited compared to Loc Tien commune 
because of topography. As with the poor group, all non-poor interviewees 
planted wetland rice. 
Upland rice was also a common crop of the non-poor before, especially 
for the ethnic group as discussed earlier. However, at present none of the 
interviewed non-poor households planted this crop because of its low 
productivity. In contrast, eight of the poor interviewees still cultivate it, 
indicating that food security is not an urgent need of the non-poor in 
Thuong Quang. 
  Cassava is a common crop of the non-poor in Thuong Quang both 
before and now (90 % of the non-poor households still plant this crop). The 
cultivated area of cassava of the non-poor is double that of the poor in the 
commune (1.86 sao compared to 0.84 sao). Evidence from the group 
discussion indicated that the non-poor cultivate it mainly for feeding pigs. 
Only households who had graduated from poverty still sometimes eat 
cassava (Male and female non-poor group discussion, 10
th March, 2007). The 
cassava cultivated area among non-poor households ranged from one to 10 
sao depending on the number of pigs. There were only four households (in 
29 non-poor interviewees) intercropping cassava in the young rubber 
plantation while 12 poor practice this.  
Mungbean is a cash crop with high market demand and eight non-poor 
interviewees (of 29 interviewed) planted it for sale. The mungbean 
cultivated area of the non-poor group was one sao per household (including 
the intercrop area in rubber plantation), double that of the poor in the 
commune. However, it is not a popular crop because it requires rather high 
fertility soil and needs fertilizer so only 30 % of the non-poor interviewees 
cultivated it.  
Rubber planting is now a first priority of the non-poor households in 
Thuong Quang (reported by non-poor female and male focus group discussions on 
10
th March, 2007). Eighty-two percent  of total non-poor interviewees 
planted rubber with an average area of 36 sao per household (1.7 times 
greater than that of the poor in the same commune). The primary reason for 
its cultivation was profit and the opportunity to help build income and 
capital (Reported by non-poor female and male focus group discussion on 10
th March, 
2007). As discussed earlier, rubber production was supported by the   280 
provincial government through giving long term loans partly repaid through 
the harvest of the rubber’s resin. However the non-poor had more 
opportunity because they occupied more land, which helped with financing 
the initial investment before getting a loan. Households had to pay labour 
costs to plant first and then got a loan based on confirmation of the district 
extension worked that the area had been planted. 
- Animal production 
For pig raising, in contrast to the poor group in the same commune, pig 
raising was a common activity of the non-poor group. Twenty-six of the 29 
non-poor households interviewed in Thuong Quang have been raising from 
two to 10 pigs; 12 households keep 5-15 heads under intensive management 
using their cassava in combination with adding commercial animal feed. The 
non-poor raised pigs for cash while the poor kept them for the family’s 
consumption. 
Cattle raising was considered an activity of the better-off. Although the 
area for grazing cattle has been reduced because of the development of forest 
and rubber plantation, the non-poor in Thuong Quang still want to invest 
in cattle for earning income. They often hired the poor to manage the cattle 
or feed them through a 50 % share basis.   
The non-poor in Thuong Quang have invested in animal production 
because it is a profitable activity and they have financial capacity to invest. 
Animal production therefore was the most important single income source 
(28.3 %-figure 14) for the non-poor. 
 
- Forest planting 
A non-poor household in Thuong Quang holds an average of 9.6 sao of 
devolved forestry land that created a new livelihood activity that has 
attracted the non-poor because it is considered a high profit production. 
Income from tree production occupied 16 % of the total annual household 
income. 
Along with the development of rubber plantation, the non-poor in 
Thuong Quang are interested in planting forest aiming to accumulate capital 
although they did not get any funding from the government or any 
international organization. Some better-off even encroached the devolved 
poor natural forest to clear for planting Acacia. T h i s  s h o w e d  t h a t  f o r e s t  
planting has been an attractive investment for the non-poor. Getting 
endowment of statutory rights to the devolved forestry land has brought 
new livelihood opportunities for the non-poor in Thuong Quang.  
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¾  Off-farm activities 
- Exploitation of products from natural forest 
Illegal logging was an activity of about 20 non-poor households in the villages 
5, village 6, and 7 in Thuong Quang before the allocation of natural forest 
to household groups. All these households are Kinh who have buffalo and 
chain saws. In 2007 they were still going to log timber in the forest area 
devolved to the groups in villages 5 and 6 because of high income from 
timber logged in the natural forest. This is a result of the limited support of 
the  DFPD and the commune authority in executing the regulations (as 
discussed in chapter VI).  
Collecting non-timber forest products is also undertaken by the non-poor 
group in Thuong Quang. Nine households of the 29 non-poor interviewed 
collected NTFPs for sale. However, those households are ethnic people, and 
were from the medium income group or just above the poverty line, but are 
characterized as non-poor:  
 
Better-off household do not collect NTFPs any more because it is very hard work with a 
low return. Mostly poor and medium ethnic households do this. The Kinh people have 
other jobs to do such as planting rubber, forest or raising fish or pigs and cattle” (Mr. V. 
and Mr. H., 19
th March, 2007).  
 
This activity contributed only 2.4 % to the total income of the non-poor in 
Thuong Quang in contrast to the 32 % of total income it provided for the 
poor in the same commune. The non-poor households considered 
collecting NTFPs as an additional income source while it is the main income 
source for the poor in the commune.  
 
- Selling labour 
Selling labour for planting rubber and Acacia hybrid is a new activity for the 
non-poor in the mountainous commune because of development of forest 
and rubber planting. Twenty percent of the non-poor interviewees 
undertook this activity. However, this is also often done by the households 
who have medium economic status, but it is hard work and the better-off 
allocate their labour elsewhere: 
 
The better –off do not have to sell labour because they have large rubber land area and a 
lot of other works to do such as raising fish or pigs or doing small business… (Male and 
female non-poor group discussion, 10
th March, 2007). 
 
This activity provided only 2.7 % of the total income of the non-poor 
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There was only one household in 29 non-poor interviewees in Thuong 
Quang also selling labour for farm work. This household was just above the 
poverty line so it still lacks cash income. 
- Other off-farm activities (mason, carpenter, small business) 
In contrast to the poor group, there were 10 of the 29 non-poor households 
(34.4 %) that undertook off-farm activities (as masons, carpenters and doing 
small business). These off-farm activities contributed 9.8 % to total income 
of the group (the fourth biggest income source).  
The reason for being a mason or carpenter or doing small business for the 
non-poor in Thuong Quang was not lack of land or opportunity in forest 
production. These activities of the non-poor were a result of a strategy to 
earn cash income through investment of the household’s financial resources 
and skill. Carpentry and doing small business are considered as high profit 
employment in the rural area. However, they require skills and financial 
capacity to invest in buying tools and materials. Although Thuong Quang is 
located at the end of the district, business services are rather developed 
compared to other neighbouring communes. All daily needs (meat, fish, 
vegetable, rice) or agricultural inputs (fertilizer, pesticides) are provided by 
the private sector. All the households who do small business are better-off 
and belong to the Kinh group because this job required not only financial 
resources but also the capacity to make contact with people in Hue city.  
In ten non-poor households doing business interviewed, there were five 
households doing small business, one of them doing both small business and 
carpentry, and four working masons. The off-farm activities of the non-poor 
in Thuong Quang are not based on natural resources but require financial 
and skills investment; for the poor often the off-farm works is based on 
natural resources but does not require professional skills for adding income 
to meet basic needs. 
 
¾  Non-farm activity (Migration) 
As with the poor group, migration to the city was not common for the non-
poor group in Thuong Quang. Only three of the 29 non-poor households 
had children who had migrated to Ho Chi Minh city to work in a factory 
(one ethnic minority family and two households are Kinh people). As 
discussed earlier the appearance of migration in Thuong Quang started in 
2004 through an agent, so local people, especially non-poor of Kinh group 
have not believed in it. With more opportunity for on-farm and off-farm 
jobs and a fear for the safety of their children in the city, non-poor 
households were reluctant to send their children to earn money in the city. 
All better-off Kinh sent their children to Hue city for higher education   283 
because they thought that education can help their children find better 
employment. Migration to the city for earning income was an activity of 
medium income households only.   
   Change in the livelihood activities of the non-poor in Thuong Quang are 
summarized in table 24. 
To sum up, the activities of the non-poor in Thuong Quang were rather 
diversified but aimed at accumulation. This group focused on the activities 
that need financial capacity and skills with the expectation of getting profit 
and cash income. Food crops were not their interest but they are cultivated 
just for family consumption. Long-term investment in rubber and forest 
planting (a result of getting endowments to the devolved forestry land) for 
getting big capital is also an opportunity for the non-poor in the 
mountainous commune. Investing in education of their children to gain 
better employment is also an interest of the better-off households in Thuong 
Quang.  
Table 24. Changes in livelihood activities of the non-poor group in Thuong Quang 
Livelihood activity 
& resources used 
Before  2003 (Before forest 
devolution) 
2003 to present (After forest 
devolution) 
Wetland rice 
cultivation 
Wetland rice on the private 
land, intensive farming 
Rice intensive farming 
Cassava planting  Some areas in the low steep 
hills of the state 
At home garden and intercrop in 
private rubber plantation  
Mungbean   On the river side and partly 
on low steep hills 
On the river side and intercrop in 
rubber plantation  
Cattle raising  Grazing freely on the state 
hills 
Herding in the garden or hills in 
combination with feeding grasses or 
hire poor to raise 
Pig raising   Keeping 2-3 pigs by using 
agricultural by-products 
Keeping 2-10 pigs for selling by using 
agricultural by-products and extra-food 
feeding 
Rubber planting  No  New livelihood activity on  private 
land (state land before) 
Forest planting  No  New livelihood activity on  private 
land (state land before) 
Collecting NTFPs 
for selling 
In the state natural forest 
and the sate bare hills with 
low frequency  
No  
Selling labour for 
planting rubber and 
Acacia hybrid 
No  New livelihood activity on private 
forest land (Households who have income  
just above the poverty line)   284 
7.5. Vulnerability and questions for the livelihood sustainability of  
the poor  
“Vulnerability means the characteristics of a person or group and their 
situations that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and 
recover from impact of natural hazards (Wisner & Blaikie, 2004) (p. 11). 
However, those authors did not specify the meaning of “characteristics” and 
“situation”. In this research, vulnerability is understood as the 
disadvantageous characteristics of a household or group that can negatively 
influence their capacity to cope with natural calamities such as droughts, 
floods or typhoons. The disadvantaged characteristics can be understood as 
limitation of livelihood capital for the poor that is influenced by the social, 
economic or political environment. This research did not look at 
vulnerability and livelihood of a person or individual household but tries to 
discuss the livelihood sustainability
11 of the poor group given the hazards 
they face.  
This section started with a synthesis of the disadvantageous characteristics 
of the poor group in relation to the endowments of forestry land and then 
discusses the natural calamities that often occur in the study sites. It closes 
with an analysis and questions about the sustainability of the livelihood of 
the poor in relation to their disadvantaged conditions and capacity (linked to 
endowments, resources and entitlements of the forest devolution) to cope 
with the natural calamities. 
7.5.1. Disadvantageous characteristics of the poor 
¾  Limited education 
In both communes, the education level of the poor household’s head is 
limited; the average number of school years was four years (in Loc Tien) and 
two years in Thuong Quang. It was remarkable that there were 24 
households of 30 poor households interviewed in Thuong Quang that had 
from one to four members who are illiterate. In Loc Tien, 45 % of the total 
poor interviewed (thirteen households) have one to three people who could 
not read and write. In Thuong Quang, the proportion of the interviewed 
households that had at least one illiterate member was 86 %. The proportion 
of the illiterate people who are aged from 19 to 33 years old in Loc Tien 
and Thuong Quang was 30 % and 35 %. The limited education level makes 
                                                  
11 “A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, 
maintain or strengthen its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural 
resources base” (Scoones, 1998) (p. 5). 
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it difficult for the poor to join in the labour market, especially for the jobs 
requiring skills. 
 
¾  Limitation of health  
The evidence from the household survey showed that limitations of health 
are one of the disadvantages of the poor. In the mountainous commune, 
there were nine households in 30 poor families interviewed that had from 
one to two members who are disabled or frequently ill. According to the 
villagers in Thuong Quang, the area was affected by dioxin in the American 
war and this was the cause of disabled children. This situation is also a 
problem of the poor in Loc Tien. There were three families of the 29 poor 
households interviewed in Loc tien having two to three disabled children. 
This is a big difficulty for the poor because of the high expenditure for 
health care and the dependency of those children for their whole life.   
 
¾  Low income 
An average annual income per person per year is 915,000 VND (57 USD in 
2006) in Thuong Quang and 1,300,000 VND (87 USD in 2006) in Loc 
Tien. This income level of the poor in both communes was lower than the 
national poverty line (2,400,000 VND per person per year) and is not 
enough even for meeting basic needs. The poor in Loc Tien often lack food 
for one month between the two crops of the year while the poor in Thuong 
Quang lack food for one to two months. This limits the capacity of the poor 
to accumulate capital for investing in production and providing services. 
 
¾  Limited land holding  
The household size of the poor and non-poor is the same but agricultural 
land holdings of the poor was two times lower than that of the non-poor in 
both communes (for all types of crops, except cassava in Loc Tien) (see table 
19). The limitations of agricultural land make the poor rely more on 
common natural resources such as NTFPs (including grit or stone). This also 
makes the poor more dependent on the labour market for earning income.  
As presented in chapters VI and VII, in both communes, the poor also 
received limited endowments to the devolved forestry land and natural 
forest. Limited holding of both agricultural and forestry land indicates that 
the poor in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang lack the key resource for making 
a living based directly on natural resources. This may make their livelihood 
depend more on others’ resources.  
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7.5.2. Probable natural calamities 
¾  In Loc Tien (the coastal commune) 
Floods occur annually from the beginning of October to the beginning of 
December (around two months). This annual flood does not destroy the 
houses and infrastructure, but influences crop and animal production. For 
the wetland rice production, when the floods come 30 ha of wetland rice 
cultivation area in Thuy Duong village can not be used because the water 
level in the fields was too high; these areas can cultivate only one crop a 
year. The floods also affect the area used for planting watermelon and 
peanuts, forcing the farmers to harvest earlier thus reducing the quality and 
value of production. Pig and cattle production were also influenced by the 
annual floods. When the floods come, the pigs have to be moved to other 
places. This takes time and energy of farmers and slows the pigs’ growth.   
Drought is another natural calamity affecting production of the local 
people’s production. It has been become more serious since 2005 when the 
PPC decided to construct a pipe system for Chan May port. This system 
took water from the main stream, which is a major water source for 
agricultural irrigation of the village. In 2006, 60 ha of a total 111 ha of rice 
in Thuy Duong village did not have any output. Normally, the villagers do 
not have to buy rice but in 2006, traders provided approximately 0.5 ton of 
rice per day to the village (The head of the village -Mr. K, 17
th March, 2007). 
 
¾  In Thuong Quang (the mountainous area) 
Flash floods (water flows with high levels and fast speed from upstream) are a 
natural calamity that often occurs in the rainy season in Thuong Quang. It 
destroys the wetland rice and other crop cultivation area, especially in the 
areas along the river and the streams in the commune. The paddy fields are 
buried by stones brought from the sheet washes. If it is not too serious, 
farmers can recover the fields, but sometimes (for example in 1999), 20 % of 
paddy field areas in Thuong Quang were buried by the stones after the sheet 
wash and these area could not be recovered (Women and men non-poor group 
discussion, 10
th March, 2007.). 
Droughts often occur with every two to five years. They have occurred 
more frequently since 2006, which may be a consequence of clearing all the 
vegetation for planting rubber and forest (according to Women and men non-
poor group discussion, 10
th March, 2007). 
   Diseases of crops and animals reduced the productivity of crop and animal 
production. Insect attacks on the paddy fields often occur every year, but it 
became more serious since 2006 and the farmers could not prevent it. This 
reduced rice yield and lack of rice was more serious for the poor. The “Heo   287 
tai xanh” disease and bird flu of chickens also occurred in the commune 
since 2006, making the income of the villagers unstable (Women and men 
non-poor group discussion, 10
th March, 2007).  
How do these disadvantaged conditions of the poor link to their 
livelihood’s sustainability in the context of frequent natural calamities and 
change of access to forestry land through the devolution process?  This is 
discussed in the next section. 
7.5.3. Questions for sustainability of poor’s livelihood 
In this research, the author does not intend to analyze sustainability of 
livelihoods of the poor because it is a complex term and needs more 
evidence and theoretical framework to discuss. This section, therefore just 
explores the linkage between disadvantaged conditions and the change of 
statutory and customary rights to forestry land and natural forest due to the 
devolution process by the state in the context of probable natural calamities 
and its affect on the livelihoods of the poor. 
 
¾  In Loc Tien (the coastal commune)  
As discussed in section 7.4.1.2, crop and animal productions, are the main 
income sources of the poor in Loc Tien. However, they are still not enough 
to meet food or expenditures requirements. The endowments of forest 
created opportunities to obtain income from selling timber and labour to 
plant and harvest trees for the forest owners. However, the entitlement from 
timber from the devolved forestry land just benefited seven of the poor 
households (2.5 % of total poor households) in the commune. The benefits 
from selling labour to plant and harvest planted forest were also not enough 
to cover the expenditures for food, education and health care. This benefit 
also depended on the relationship with the planted forest owners because 
this job is not readily available on the local labour market. 
Along with bringing benefits to a number of the poor, the devolution of 
forest to individual households in the coastal area stopped cassava cultivation 
on the hills. It also reduced income from firewood collection that was a 
common employment of the poor. Devolution of natural forest to the 
village also removed an income source from illegal logging that was also a 
common activity of the poor. Adapting to the circumstances, the poor in 
Loc Tien try to diversify activities to earn income.  
As discussed in section 7.4, off-farm activities of the poor in Loc Tien 
still rely on natural resources such as grit and stone. These resources are non-
renewable and have been reduced more and more through over 
exploitation. Migration to the city is an alternative income source but skill 
requirements for this activity have increased in the labour market, especially   288 
in the context of entering World Trade Organization of Vietnam making if 
difficult for the poor in Loc Tien with limited education to compete in this 
labour market. Migration to the city may also have created social 
consequences for the rural areas including Loc Tien, as a report presented on 
Hue television indicated that 80 % of women who got AIDS were infected 
by the husband who brought it from their migration to the city.  
What will happen to the poor in Loc Tien if the crops are destroyed by 
the flood or drought and given the limited endowments of forest they have 
gained and the decline in off-farm resources such as grit and stone? What 
can provide compensation for the loss of income from crop production 
affected by the flood for the poor when employment through selling labour 
to plant and harvest planted forest depends on social relationships with the 
forest owners? In the context of increasing the requirement of labour skills 
along with the disadvantaged condition of limited education, can migration 
to the city help the poor in Loc Tien to compensate for the loss of income 
from crop production affected by the floods or droughts?  
 
¾ In Thuong Quang (the mountainous area)  
Endowments of forest land to individual households for planting trees leads 
to a decrease in the areas for farming crops in general and this may become a 
problem for the poor in Thuong Quang in the near future. At present 
(2006-2007), there were no restrictions on collecting NTFPs in the natural 
forest areas devolved to household groups. Income from NTFPs was still a 
main income source for the poor, especially in Thuong Quang especially, 
when the crops were damaged by the calamities. In that case, the poor in 
Thuong Quang often go to collect NTFPs in the natural forest to earn 
money to buy food. This is in line with the argument of the common 
property scholars that the common property regime can reduce the risk of 
livelihoods when other means fail by providing wild resources. However, 
this benefit for non-beneficiaries from the forest depends on the attitude of 
the forest recipient groups.  
Endowments of forestry land brought entitlements of timber and NTFPs 
to the poor but only five poor (6.8 % of the total poor households of the 
commune) held a statutory right to forestry land. Devolution of natural 
forest to household groups may also bring utilities of timber and NTFPs to 
the poor as well as non-poor forest protectors (as a commitment of the 
state). However, this entitlement is challenged by the quality of the exe-
cution of the state regulations. Another important issue was that only 14 % 
of the poor in the commune gained endowment of rights to natural forest.  
   Titling forestry land to individual households in Thuong Quang has also 
opened opportunities for the poor to sell their labour for planting and   289 
harvesting forest. However, it may not stabilize the income of the poor 
because of their poor health and limited skills in the local labour market.  
Migration may be a new alternative but this also requires skills and 
cultural integration in the city where its population is nearly 100 % Kinh 
people.  It is not easy for the poor in Thuong Quang (with 90.4 % of total 
poor households are ethnic people) to migrate to the city to earn income.  
Rubber production is a new activity in the commune and the poor also 
owned an average area of one ha but there is a tendency of the poor to sell 
this plantation because their difficulty forced them to do so.  
How can the poor in Thuong Quang cope with crop damage if the 
floods or droughts or diseases occur in the context of limited endowments of 
forestry land from the state and dependence on access to NTFPs in the nat-
ural forest? What can ensure compensation for the loss of income from crop 
production of the poor when they have limited competitive capacity to sell 
labour to plant forest in the labour market? How can the poor in Thuong 
Quang enter migration employment to earn income to compensate for loss 
of crops when their education and skills are limited and their cultural 
characteristics are different from people in the city? These questions may be 
reached if the state supports them to manage the rubber plantation well.  
7.6. Summary 
This chapter investigated the resources of the poor and non-poor groups as a 
basis for discussing transformation of endowment of rights to entitlements 
and gaining benefits from forestry land and natural forest. Endowment of 
statutory rights to the devolved forestry land brought utilities from timber 
and selling labour for planting and harvesting trees for both poor and non-
poor households. The non-poor have the potential to get more entitlement 
of timber from the plantation than the poor because the non-poor gained 
more endowments of statutory rights and they had more financial capacity to 
invest in developing plantation. The beneficiaries of devolved forestry land 
in Loc Tien (the coastal commune) had more opportunity to convert 
endowment of forestry land to entitlement of timber on the land than the 
beneficiaries in Thuong Quang because they got financial support from the 
government and international organizations for developing the plantation.  
In both communes, men received more entitlements from selling labour 
for planting and harvesting the forest than women. Differences in entit-
lements from selling labour for planted forest production between men and 
women were not the result of differences in their own resources, but it was 
the result of gender discrimination in the local labour market due to the 
influence of custom.   290 
The poor and ethnic groups still received more entitlement from NTFPs 
in the devolved natural forest because they are still allowed to access those 
resources. However, this entitlement of the poor (especially the ethnic poor) 
is uncertain because they did not get endowment of statutory rights to the 
natural forest, so their access became dependent on the attitudes and 
behaviour of the forest owners.  
Devolution of forestry land and natural forest lead to the loss of 
entitlement from firewood and output of cassava production that influenced 
more the women and the poor, since collecting firewood and planting 
cassava are often the responsibility of women and interest of the poor. 
     In general, entitlements from the forestry land and natural forest devolved  
by the state depended not only on the household’s resources and holding  
of statutory right, but also social custom, as well as on the financial support 
from outside and legislative execution by state organizations.   
The poor in both Thuong Quang and Loc Tien hold limited agricultural 
land area (half that of the non-poor group). Income from agricultural 
production is not enough to meet their basic needs so they have to diversify 
their activities to earn a living. The devolution of forest brought entitlement 
of timber and cash income from selling labour, but it reduced income from 
selling firewood and the stopping of illegal logging. Adapting to these 
circumstances, the poor in Loc Tien engaged in off-farm activities based on 
non-renewable common resources such as collecting grit and stone or 
migrating to the city to work in the factories, while the poor in Thuong 
Quang still have a main income source from collecting NTFPs in the natural 
forest. In the context of frequent floods and droughts, there is a question of 
the sustainability of livelihoods of the poor in Loc Tien because of natural 
resource degradation, limited education and skills for migration, as well as a 
dependency on the better-off for selling labour. The recovery capacity of 
the poor in Thuong Quang when the floods and droughts occur should be 
questioned because of their dependency on forest owners as well as limited 
opportunities for migration.  
However, to answer the questions on whether sustainability of livelihood 
of poor in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang was influenced by introduction of 
new forest property regime, there is a need to have a further study with a 
suitable theoretical framework. As noted in the introduction part of this 
chapter, this research was not designed to analyze livelihood sustainability of 
poor but just to raise the questions on the issue.   291 
8. Discussion and general conclusions  
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings of the research. The 
study explored how forest devolution policy was made and implemented in 
Thua Thien Hue, Vietnam and its influence on endowments, entitlements, 
management practice and conflicts after devolution. The chapter starts with 
a discussion about the process of making and implementing forest 
devolution policy to highlight the complexity of policy making and 
implementation, differences between policy papers and practice, as well as 
power relationships evident in the process.  
The nature of devolution is also discussed and concludes by exploring to 
whom and what rights of forest management were devolved. It is followed 
by a reflection on limitations of forest devolution in terms of unequal 
distribution of endowments, insecurity of tenure or endowments, conflicts 
after devolution and gender gaps. The chapter also discusses and concludes 
on the contribution of forest devolution to forest conservation and creating 
entitlements to alleviate poverty and support the livelihoods of rural people.  
This chapter also argues and concludes on the methods of the research. It 
finishes with a reflection on the theoretical frameworks of the thesis. 
Arguments and conclusions on both practical and theoretical issues aim to 
highlight some contributions of the thesis.   292 
8.2. Making and implementing forest devolution policy 
8.2.1. Making forest devolution policy 
The research investigated the process of making forest devolution policy. As 
shown in chapter IV, the idea of devolving natural forest and forestry land to 
beneficiaries in Vietnam was initiated by the Central Party. It produced a 
resolution that stated that people and other social organizations should be 
involved in forest management, consistent with the “Đổi Mới” institutional 
reform. However, development of the regulatory framework for forest 
devolution was carried out by different political bodies (including the Party, 
Assembly and Government). Those bodies have different functions on 
policy making that have been assigned according to the structure of the 
political system.   
The outcomes of making forest devolution policy were different types of 
policy papers that talked about forestry land and natural forest allocation for 
use and protection. It is very difficult to answer exactly the question of 
“what is the Vietnamese forest devolution policy” because there were so 
many types of papers (the resolutions, the laws, decrees, decisions or 
circulars, directives) that were developed by political bodies (the Party, 
National Assembly and Government) to address the issue of forest 
devolution. The resolutions developed give the general direction and they 
are often made by the Party. However, in some cases, the resolutions were 
also developed by the National Assembly or Government or even by 
provincial Party or People’s Council. The law was approved by the National 
Assembly while the decrees, decisions, directives or circulars that are called 
“under law documents” were signed by the prime minister and have been 
developed by a ministry or several ministries. It was a challenge to classify 
the resolutions, decisions, directive or circulars. 
The different types of the forest devolution policy papers are mainly 
developed by the central institutions with limited involvement of lower 
levels of government (province, district and commune, as well as people) 
and other sectors. This reflected the key role of the Central Government 
and the use of expert knowledge in making this policy.  
The major content of the forest devolution policy was to involve people 
in forest management by devolving to them the endowment of land rights. 
These regulations were revised and changed over time. The change and 
revision of a paper brought changes to other related papers. For example, 
when a law is revised, the related decree, circulars, decisions or directives 
have to be changed to adapt to the new law. This means that it requires time 
to match the related policy papers. The policy papers that were revised over   293 
time based on ideas of the experts reflected adaptation of the policy to the 
new circumstance. However, the frequent revisions of the major policy 
papers combined with the slow revisions between the related papers makes 
understanding policy difficult. 
The forest devolution policy was developed to increase efficiency of 
forest land use, maintain and improve the existing forest areas for 
environmental purposes, as well as contribute to poverty reduction and 
improve people’s lives. Those objectives are not stated directly in any policy 
paper but are described in an indirect way in different policy papers. 
Devolving forest to people for stabilizing their lives was mentioned and 
repeated in the policy papers. However, the regulations regarding to whom 
the forest can be devolved were not transparent. The presence of the 
disadvantaged groups (poor, women and ethnic people) were not mentioned 
specifically in the policy papers so the objective of devolving forest to 
contribute to poverty reduction may not be addressed. The forest 
devolution policy was vague and may open the door to power relationships 
in the implementation process and then influence the distribution of 
endowments and entitlements from the devolved forest. 
8.2.2. Implementation of the forest devolution policy 
As with the process of making the policy, implementation processes also 
involved different state organizations and donors. The steps of the 
devolution implementation also differed between the study sites and the 
programmes or projects depended on decisions of the provincial authority 
and the donor. Roles and functions of those organizations in the 
implementation of forest devolution were not regulated clearly in the policy 
papers but they were assigned and arranged by the provincial or district 
authority. The influence and role of the state organizations that were 
involved in the process of forest devolution implementation differed from 
place to place. This is in line with the argument by Sikor (2004) in a study 
on land allocation in the northern mountain of Vietnam that the practice of 
land allocation reflected a diversity of local processes.  
The different roles and power of the various state organizations created 
room for them to interpret policy implementation. Some factors that 
determined the opportunity for gaining endowments to the devolved forest 
were changed by the DFPD and the commune authority based on their 
powers assigned by the state and their own independent interpretations. For 
example, the criteria used to identify to whom the forest should be devolved 
varied between the study sites although the basis for allocating forest to the 
beneficiaries was regulated by policy. This was also the result of unclear   294 
concepts and categories in the policy that lead to different interpretations by 
actors in the process of forest devolution implementation. The method of 
disseminating the policy information and devolution programme to the 
beneficiaries differed from project to project as well as from place to place. 
These changes strongly influenced the gaining of forest endowment by the 
beneficiaries.   
The difference in the tasks and roles assigned along with nontransparent 
statements in the policy papers created different interpretations and 
modifications by local authorities (from province to district and commune), 
especially at district and commune levels. The research indicated that the 
central level held more power in the policy making process while the district 
and commune authority got more rights in practicing the policy. 
Participation of the people in both making and implementing the 
devolution was still limited. This is similar to the  making of environment 
and livestock sector policy that also lacked public participation and followed 
central planning methods (Vu, 2003; Phuong, 1996). 
8.2.3. Conclusion 1 
The power of making and implementing the forest devolution policy in 
Vietnam is in the hands of the state. The central level institutions have more 
power in making policy while local state organizations (provincial to district 
and commune, especially district and commune levels) have more influence 
on implementation of the policy. 
Shank et al. (2004) concluded that the health sector policy making in 
Vietnam is muddled. The forest devolution policy in Vietnam is also 
muddled and vague in both the policy making and implementation 
processes.  Local processes of implementing forest devolution were not 
uniform. Transparency, accountability and public participation is still limited 
in making and implementing the policy. The muddle, lack of transparency 
and accountability lead to different interpretations of the actors that create a 
gap between contents of the policy papers and practice as well as room for 
exercising power relationships. These may strongly and directly influence 
the opportunity of gaining endowments of natural forest and forestry land of 
people.    295 
8.3. Nature of forest devolution in Vietnam 
8.3.1. The nature of the involvement of people in the process of devolution 
implementation 
In both the study sites, people were involved in the process of devolution 
implementation. They were asked to plant and tend the forest based on the 
design of the foresters. They were also invited to attend the meetings of the 
forest devolution implementation. However, their participation in the 
meetings was in the form of providing information and agreeing to the 
decisions that were already made by the state organizations (e.g. building the 
institutions for management of the devolved natural forest of in Loc Tien, 
the villagers had the role of making agreement about the institutions that 
were developed by the foresters and commune leaders).  
An important issue in determining the opportunity of receiving the 
allocated forest is establishing the criteria as to whom the forest should be 
devolved. These criteria are regulated in the policy papers by the state but 
are general. In the implementation process of forest devolution, those 
criteria were specified through the decisions made by the state organization 
or commune and district authority. In the framework of forest devolution, a 
regulation applied for gaining the endowments was a requirement to prepare 
an operational plan to demonstrate effective use of the devolved forest. 
Making decisions on the issues that related to distribution of endowments 
therefore was also done by representatives of the state (foresters, commune 
and village leaders)  
8.3.2. Responsibility, obligation and rights of the forest’s users 
For allocating forestry land for planting trees, people were given the 
responsibility of planting and tending the planted forest, as well as the 
obligation of using the land for a particular purpose (planting forest). Along 
with assigning the responsibilities, people were also rewarded with the rights 
of land transference, use, inheritance, and mortgage. Devolution of forestry 
land to individual households for planting trees and getting benefits of 
forest’s products was accompanied with meeting the objectives of 
environmental protection of the state. Therefore, making decisions on what 
species should be planted in the devolved forestry land was made by the state 
forestry organization. Moreover, the state forestry organizations made the 
decision not only on selection of planted species but also on designing and 
tending the forest, as well as the time for harvesting and proportion of 
shared benefits (the case in Loc Tien through the PAM  and 327 
programmes). If the investment in the devolved land was made by the   296 
household, they just needed to meet the requirements of selected species 
decided by the DFPD for the objective of environmental protection. They 
themselves had the rights to make decisions on when to plant, to tend and 
to harvest timber.  
For the devolution of natural forest, the beneficiaries were assigned the 
responsibility to protect the forest against encroachment and illegal logging. 
They also had an obligation to enrich the forest. The beneficiaries were 
devolved the rights of collecting NTFPs and a part of timber. The forest 
protectors are just rewarded the benefit of timber when the timber volume 
of the devolved forest is assessed as increased compared to before 
devolution. The rewarded timber amount also depended on the growth rate 
of timber in the devolved forest. The benefits of forest protectors (collecting 
NTFPs, a part of growth timber volume) as well as the duration for getting 
timber from the devolved natural forest were also set up by the state. 
Although the benefit sharing mechanism was stated in the decision signed 
by the provincial or district authority, in reality, to get the timber from the 
devolved natural forest, the forest protectors still have to come to the DFPD 
or PFPD to ask for permission because of the requirement of the certification 
that the timber can be logged. The decision on how to log the timber in the 
devolved natural forest area was also made by the DFPD. For implementing 
the responsibility of forest protection against encroachment by outsiders, the 
forest protectors were devolved the rights to catch them but the decision on 
how the illegal logging timber was to be treated and how the illegal loggers 
to be punished were also made by the DFPD.  
8.3.3. Conclusion 2 
A study of the policy of land and forest allocation in Lao, Fujita and 
Phengsopha (2008) concluded that the land and forest allocation programme 
devolved management responsibility to village organizations, but the rights 
of local people were still uncertain. In the cases in Loc Tien and Thuong 
Quang, the rights of the beneficiaries were not uncertain but incomplete. 
For both natural forest and forestry land allocation, the beneficiaries were 
devolved some rights and benefits. Those rights and benefits go along with 
the responsibilities assigned to them by the state. The process of getting the 
benefits and implementing the obligations in reality also required agreements 
and decision making by the state forestry organizations. Devolution of rights 
and giving benefits to forest managers go along with requirements of other 
regulations of the state.  
In their study of the case of natural forest devolution in Dak Lak 
(Vietnam), Sikor and Thanh (2007) concluded that forest allocation   297 
followed an exclusive approach that largely relied on the authority of the 
state; it failed to reduce the gap between state and customary regulations and 
it created conflicts among local actors and contributed to loss of forest.  
In the cases of Loc Tien and Thuong Quang, the implementation of 
devolution also strongly relied on the authority of the state as concluded by 
Sikor and Thanh (2007). However, the reasons for creating the conflicts in 
using forest resources and the inability to control illegal logging were not 
due to the exclusion of some local actors, but the result of the interpretation 
of state forestry organizations and local authorities in setting up the criteria 
for allocation, incomplete devolution, as well as dilemmas because of every 
day life relationships.  
In an overview of the concepts of devolution in Asia and the Pacific, 
Fisher (2000) concluded that one of the basic problems of devolving 
responsibility to implement policy is that devolution of responsibility is not 
or is rarely accompanied by devolution of authority to make decisions 
required for implementation. He calls this misapplied devolution and it 
identifies the need to support authority to devolved responsibility for 
effective devolution. This is similar to the issue of devolution in Loc Tien 
and Thuong Quang; the nature of forest devolution was a partial or 
conditional devolution. This conclusion suggested a need for an extended 
approach to give more rights to forest users to perform their responsibilities 
as well as to get the benefits, especially in the case of natural forest 
devolution.  
8.4. Forest devolution: Limitations and Contributions 
8.4.1. Limitations of forest devolution 
 
¾  Distribution of endowment  
There were significant differences in holdings of the devolved forestry land 
between poor and non-poor groups. In both communes (Loc Tien and 
Thuong Quang), the non-poor held an average forestry land area of 16. 5 
sao and 9.5 sao (in Loc Tien and Thuong Quang respectively) while the 
average forestry land holding area of the poor was only 2.9 sao and 1.4 sao. 
The proportion of non-poor households who got land was respectively 
twice and four times that of the poor in the two communes. There were the 
ethnic poor who wanted to get natural forest to protect and get benefits but 
they could not because the DFPD officers and commune leaders thought 
that they did not have enough capacity to do the job. There seems to be a   298 
contradiction between the poverty reduction objective and the regulations 
for devolution in the policy paper.  
Why these differences? The reasons for this were the abstract terms in the 
policy papers (“need” and “capacity”; “land use plan”, etc.), the 
interpretation by the DFPD and the commune authority, the ability to get 
information or to occupy the land before devolution and social relationships. 
The power of social relationships seems to be a key factor influencing 
opportunity in gaining endowment to the devolved forest. 
However, the gap in acquiring endowments to the devolved forestry land 
between the poor and non-poor in Thuong Quang (where more than 60 % 
of the population are the ethnic group) was more limited compared to the 
coastal area. There was also no difference in the devolved forestry land area 
between the Ktu people (ethnic group) and the Kinh (major group) in 
Thuong Quang. This may be the result of behaviour of the local leaders and 
their transparency toward respecting land use customs in the implementation 
process of devolution of forestry land to household. Sikor (2004) concluded 
that local officers in Chiang Dong (northern mountains of Vietnam) 
supported traditional local land use and were against the national legislation 
on the land allocation process because they wanted to keep relationships 
with the villagers for achieving their private benefits. The behaviour of the 
commune officials in Thuong Quang toward respect for custom land use in 
implementation of forest devolution was not against the legislation but just 
interpreted it in their own way. This behaviour may be a shared interest 
with villagers who have same their cultural background since almost 
commune officers are ethnic people. It may not be for the reason of gaining 
private benefit. 
  
¾  Security of devolved natural forest and forestry land tenure 
As the findings and discussion in chapter VI show, tenure rights or 
endowments of statutory rights to both the forestry land and natural forest in 
both communes have not been secured. In Loc Tien commune, 11 
households that were devolved the forestry land could not use it for getting 
the Red Book, which is recognized formally by the land law. In Thuong 
Quang, (ethnic community), the households in villages 6 and 7 could not 
use and claim the forestry land area that was devolved because of 
overlapping claims between the traditional land use and new forestry land 
use systems set up by the state through the allocation activity.  
In the case of natural forest devolution, entitlements over timber from 
the devolved natural forest of the village after seven years (in Loc Tien) or 
five years of devolution still has not been given because of complex 
procedures for claiming the rights to cut timber. Illegal logging activities in   299 
the devolved natural forest area have been difficult to control. This activity 
has tended to continue because of lack of support from the local authority 
and the DFPD and sympathy in everyday relationships. Holding a title, 
therefore, was not enough to secure the tenure or the endowment to the 
allocated natural forest.  
 
¾  Conflict 
Devolution of forestry land and natural forest limited the grazing area in 
both Loc Tien and Thuong Quang. This has created conflict between the 
forest users and the grazers. The conflict also appeared after devolution of 
forestry land through competition in forestry land use because of the poor 
encroaching on state forest area devolved to household groups to plant trees. 
This was also the result of the unequal distribution of endowment and 
unclear negotiations between the old users (in the traditional system before 
devolution) and new users (in the devolution programme).  
Replacement of the bare hills by the planted forest restricted the crop 
farming area especially in the mountainous area (Thuong Quang) for the 
poor who still gave priority to crop cultivation. This is a cause of conflict 
between the forest planters and crop cultivators. Losing or limited 
opportunity in gaining endowments of forestry land led to the dissatisfaction 
of villagers who did not get or received only a small land area with both 
households who got more land, and especially the foresters who, as state 
officers, received a salary from the state  
In evaluating the influence of forest devolution in the central highland of 
Vietnam, Thanh (2003) found that conflicts among the villagers and 
between the villagers with the foresters increased after devolution because of 
unequal distribution of upland fields and timber harvesting in the devolved 
forest. The conflicts that occurred after the devolution in Thua Thien Hue 
were also a result of unequal distribution of endowments to the devolved 
forest. The conflicts arose from competition for security or for improvement 
of livelihood, and dissatisfaction of the villagers with the unequal 
distribution of endowments that brought benefits to some local leaders and 
foresters while creating loss of endowment of traditional rights to use of the 
land they had informally accessed before devolution. 
 
¾  Gender issues 
As the findings in the chapters V, VI and VII show the presence of women 
was limited in the implementation process of forest devolution. The highest 
proportion of women who attended the pre-allocation meeting and the 
training activities in forest devolution programmes was only 18 % and 26 % 
(of the total respondents) in Thuong Quang and Loc Tien. The limited   300 
presence of women was also reflected in their attendance in joining decision 
making on how the forest land was to be devolved or managed after 
devolution. There was no woman involved in making decisions on 
implementing forest devolution at the commune level in any of the 
organizations except the women’s union. Women are still not involved in 
making decisions because of the ignorance of the commune authority in the 
meeting of the LRC. 
Widows and single women had less opportunity to gain endowments to 
the devolved forestry land than households who have the presence of a man. 
Forest devolution brought both men and women cash incomes from the 
products of the planted forest and selling labour for planting, tending and 
harvesting the plantation. However, there was a tendency toward unequal 
distribution of this entitlement between men and women because of 
discrimination in labour wage rates against women.  
Forest devolution reduced entitlements from firewood (for both cash 
income earning and cooking). Women suffered more than men from this 
loss of entitlement because it increased the time and energy it took for 
collecting firewood, which is women’s responsibility.  
The replacement of the use of commons of forestry land and resources 
from natural forest by discretionary access based on the attitudes of the land 
receiver has been a challenge to women, especially to those who are poor 
and whose livelihoods still rely on forest resources.  
The customs and social norms such as traditional views (forest production 
as men’s work), the workload of housework of women, as well as the 
limited attention paid by forest officers and state management officers, were 
the causes leading to a limited presence of women in implementing of forest 
devolution as well as the limited gain of endowments and entitlements from 
the devolved natural forest and forestry land.  
 
Conclusion 3.1.  
The outputs and outcomes of forest devolution showed unequal distribution 
of endowments between poor and non-poor as well as between women and 
men. This inequality was a result of not only abstract concepts in the written 
policy papers but also of the interpretation by the policy implementers. 
Unequal distribution of the endowment is less in the ethnic community due 
to the behaviour of commune leaders toward respecting the traditional land 
use system. 
Endowment of forestry land and natural forest devolved by the state is 
still insecure because of different interpretations by the DFPD and the 
commune authority and as a consequence of vague and muddled policy 
papers. This insecurity of tenure also resulted in incomplete devolutions of   301 
rights to the users, as well as lack of support from the authority to exercise 
the rights in practice. Security of tenure of the devolved forest land goes 
beyond holding a title of the land.  
The forest devolution created conflicts in land use for planting trees and 
cultivating crops that were a result of unequal distribution of endowment 
and struggles for security and improvement of livelihood in the context 
limited land.  
There was still a gap between women and men in attendance and making 
decisions in the forest devolution implementation, as well as in gaining 
endowments to and entitlements from the devolved forest. This was a result 
of not only traditional customs, but also views and behaviour of policy 
implementers. 
These limitations indicate a need to improve empowerment of the poor 
and women through clear and more precise targeting in the policy papers, 
setting up clear and more participatory monitoring mechanisms, building 
capacity and improving ethics of the state officers in the implementation of 
devolution. There is also a need to extend the rights of the forest users with 
respect to tenure security. 
8.4.2. Contribution of forest devolution  
¾  Contribution to forest management improvement 
In both communes (Loc Tien and Thuong Quang), the forest plantations 
were developed on the bare hills after devolution to households. The bare 
hills were used to create economic value from the timber through increasing 
land productivity. However the development of the planted forest was 
influenced by different factors including getting certification, market 
opportunity and financial support from outsiders. The efficiency of the 
devolved forestry land use was the result of various elements beyond the 
endowment of rights to the users. 
For natural forest devolution, measurement of forest conditions was not 
undertaken before allocation. Examination of forest condition after 
devolution was not done fully in this study due to time limitations and this 
was not a major objective of the research. The research instead tried to 
understand the change of the forest management as influenced by devolution 
of natural forest through measuring some indicators that reflected changed 
management practices such as protection activity against illegal logging and 
encroachment for planting trees, and interest in activities of tending the 
forest of the users.   
   The devolved natural forest area in Loc Tien has been well controlled over 
the area of 511.9 ha with 180 households. Devolution of forest to the village   302 
contributed to preventing and stopping the illegal logging activities. The 
forest protectors also invested their labour in tending the devolved forest. In 
the case of Thuong Quang, the household group (from two to 10 
households) that was devolved the natural forest invested labour in 
controlling the forest against illegal logging and encroachment for planting 
trees. Investment of labour for tending the devolved forest through creating 
space for development of the valuable trees was also done by the forest 
protectors. However, preventing the illegal logging in this commune 
(Thuong Quang) was not effective because of the late provision of 
certification of the devolved rights and limited support of the state 
organization to implement the rights. The relationship between the 
efficiency of preventing illegal logging and group and resource sizes did not 
appear to be significant. 
But in both communes there has been a reduction of interest in 
controlling and tending the devolved forest. This has been a result of 
complex processes and unclear mechanisms of support by the state against 
illegal loggers and in implementing a commitment to receive benefits from 
the timber.  
 
Conclusion 3.2.a. 
Devolution of forest has the potential to contribute to improvement of 
forestry land and forest management practices in terms of increasing land 
productivity and stopping illegal logging. However, the endowments of 
statutory rights to individuals or communities have not been enough to 
support the beneficiaries to effectively use and protect the devolved forestry 
land and natural forest. Efficiency of use and management of the devolved 
forestry land and natural forest goes beyond property rights. It depends on 
the politics of access, not only on access to land resources but also access to 
other resources (including services to claim the rights) to support for using 
the land and protecting the forest. This suggests an extension of the rights to 
the forest users and better support from the state to implement the rights in 
practice.  
 
¾  Contribution of forest devolution to rural livelihoods 
As found in chapter VII, devolution of forestry land to households brought 
both poor and non-poor households an entitlement from timber. The non-
poor got an average of 3,879 million VND per year (in Loc Tien) and 2,112 
million  VND (in Thuong Quang). The poor got net income of 0.681 
million VND per household per year (Loc Tien) and 0.308 VND million 
(Thuong Quang). Devolution of forestry land also created new jobs for 
selling labour for planting, tending and harvesting trees. This job brought a   303 
cash income source for the villagers (602,000 VND per household per year 
in Loc Tien and 384,000 VND in Thuong Quang). Entitlements of cash 
income from timber in the devolved planted forest has been important for 
the villagers to build other resources such as saving money to reinvest in 
planting forest or to build a house (as seen in the case study in Loc Tien). 
However, gaining the entitlements from the plantation depended on 
household financial capacity and the opportunity of access to outside 
funding. 
There was also unequal distribution of entitlements of cash income from 
selling labour for planting and harvesting planted forest between men and 
women because the men were preferred and paid more in the local labour 
market.  
It is different with the devolved forestry land as entitlements from the 
devolved natural forest were still in the decision paper (in Loc Tien) or in 
the form of verbal commitment between the DFPD and the protection 
groups. After seven years of devolution (in Loc Tien) and five years (in 
Thuong Quang) (up to 2008), the natural forest protectors have not  yet 
harvested any timber from the devolved forest. This is the result of the 
complexity of the claim process to get timber. However, if the commitment 
of the state is implemented, the forest protectors will get entitlements from 
the devolved natural forest. In the case of Loc Tien, 12 households got cash 
income from the ecotourism service in the devolved natural forest area. 
As presented in chapter VI, after devolution of the natural forest, all the 
villagers (including the household, who did not get the devolved natural 
forest) were still free to collect NTFPs. In both communes, income from 
collecting NTFPs of poor was higher than that of non-poor (1,662,000 VND 
compared to 469,000 VND in Thuong Quang and 876,000 VND compared 
to 193,000 VND in Loc Tien). However, entitlements from NTFPs in the 
devolved natural forest area of non-beneficiaries in Thuong Quang 
depended on the permission of the household group who got the forest. 
Collection of NTFPs is often an activity of the poor because it is considered 
as a low return and hard work so it was not preferred by the non-poor. 
Entitlements from NTFPs of the poor in Thuong Quang, therefore, are 
challenged by devolution of natural forest to household groups. Only the 
households who were devolved the natural forest get entitlements from 
NTFPs if the devolved rights are exercised in practice.  
   The research looked at not only the contribution of forest devolution to 
entitlements from the devolved forest land but also explored its broader 
outcome in relation to rural livelihoods with an emphasis on the poor. 
Implementation of the forest devolution policy created new livelihood   304 
activities (planting and tending planted forest, selling labour for cultivating 
trees, protecting the natural forest). However, it also stopped illegal logging 
and reduced entitlements of the firewood from the bare hills that were used 
as common resources before devolution. Replacement of the bare hills by 
the plantations limited grazing area requiring more time and energy of 
people to raise cattle. Adapting to these circumstances, the poor in Loc Tien 
tried to diversify income sources with a focus on non-farm activities based 
on non-renewable common resources such as collecting grit and stone or 
migrating to the city. The poor in Thuong Quang still relied on collecting 
NTFPs in the natural forest.  
 
Conclusion 3.2.b. 
Devolution of forestry land and natural forest has the potential to contribute 
to creating entitlements from timber, selling labour for doing forest 
production, NTFPs, as well as cash income from ecotourism. There was a 
tendency for an unequal distribution of entitlements from the devolved 
forestry land and natural forest between poor and non-poor and between 
women and men. These were a consequence of unequal distribution of 
endowment of the land, capacity in access to funds as well as gender 
discrimination because of traditional customs. Forest devolution, therefore, 
had limited contribution to poverty and gender gap reduction, or may even 
have a cost to the poor and women because of changes in use rights from 
common land to private planted forest.  
The potential contribution of forest devolution can be fully achieved 
only if the beneficiaries get added support of external institutions (in terms 
of financial sources and execution of regulations). Holding a statutory right 
and existing household resources are not enough to provide the benefits of 
forest devolution as hoped for by the policy. 
 Implementation of the forest devolution policy in Thua Thien Hue 
created new employment opportunities for rural people, especially for the 
households who were devolved the forestry land. However, change of the 
state property regime to private and common property closed or limited 
opportunities of the poor in common use of the state land. Forest 
devolution, therefore, brings the challenge for the poor in securing their 
livelihood since they had less access to the devolved forestry land and natural 
forest and limited internal resources to cope with the change. In the context 
of frequent floods and droughts, as well as limitation of their own resources, 
the poor’s livelihood in both Loc Tien and Thuong Quang seem to be 
vulnerable and unsustainable because they still rely on the degraded natural 
resources for earning a living.    305 
8.5. General conclusion 
The Vietnamese forest devolution was developed along with the special 
institutional reform (Đổi Mới) in Vietnam. The policy papers stated the 
objective of achieving sustainability in forestry land and natural forest 
management in order to respond to economic, social and environmental 
issues. However, the devolution policy is muddled and vague because of an 
excess of policy documents, frequent changes, inconsistencies between the 
various documents and limited transparency and accountability. These issues 
have lead to different interpretations in implementation of the policy and 
then lead to different endowments and entitlements, as well as management 
practices and conflicts. Achievements of the environment and livelihood 
objectives of the forest devolution programmes, therefore, are not easy to 
predict. These are consistent with the conclusion of Sunderlin (2006) that 
although there is the potential for community forestry to contribute to 
poverty reduction in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, there was no 
fundamental objective of poverty reduction in community forestry 
programmes in all these three countries. 
Forest devolution has the potential to contribute to improving 
entitlements from the devolved forest of rural people and their livelihoods, 
as well as efficiency of forest management. However, because of incomplete 
devolution and differences in interpretation in the implementing of policy, a 
door is opened to influence by implementers. This limits the impact of the 
policy, especially in the case of natural forest devolution, and seems to bring 
no meaning in practice for both improvement of forest conditions and rural 
livelihoods. The contribution of the forest devolution policy to poverty 
reduction and rural development is still far away because of incomplete 
devolution and unequal distribution of endowments and entitlements. This 
is in line with argument by Sikor & Tan (2007) that forest devolution may 
not bring significant benefits to rural poor because of unequal of distribution 
of different resources between the local actors. 
The findings of the research also indicated different outcomes of forest 
conservation and poverty reduction through introduction of forest 
devolution. This support arguments of Prakash & Adhikari (2007) and 
Sunderlin et al. (2005). 
   The findings from this research also indicate a need to extend the rights to 
the forest users with respect to endowments and entitlements. This research 
also strongly suggests development of a clear mechanism to ensure 
participation of the people in making and implementing policy (especially at 
district and commune levels) to achieve equal distribution of the 
endowments and then entitlements and improvement of rural livelihoods. It   306 
also suggests more clear pro-poor targeting in forest devolution policy and 
programmes. 
8.6. Theoretical reflections 
8.6.1. Enquiry in policy analysis 
Looking for and analyzing the forest devolution policy in Vietnam showed 
its complexity in terms of different types of policy documents, which makes 
it difficult to say what the policy actually is. This reminded the author of the 
statement of Cunningham (1963), cited in Keeley and Scoones (1999) that 
“Policy is like the elephant, you know it when you see it but you can not 
define it”. 
The research applied two different approaches in policy analysis to 
examine the process of making and implementing the forest devolution in 
Vietnam.  
The findings of the research showed that the making of forest devolution 
policy in Vietnam was largely top-down and mono-sector with limited 
involvement of the implementers at the district and commune levels, and 
with no involvement of the beneficiaries. This showed the power of the 
central state in deciding whose knowledge and interests are taken into 
account in policy making. Analysis of roles in making decisions and the 
interpretation of the actors in the process of implementing the forest 
devolution policy in Vietnam also indicated the importance of 
understanding the influence of rights in making decisions on the outputs and 
outcomes of forest devolution. This research, therefore, supports the critical 
anthropology approach in paying attention to power relationships in 
analyzing policy. Consideration of power relationships as a central issue in 
analyzing policy is useful not only for understanding the process of making 
policy but also its implementation.  
Exploring both processes of making and implementing the forest 
devolution policy in this research reflected the fact that power relationships 
influenced objectives, contents, outputs and outcomes of the policy. The 
terms and languages used in the forest devolution papers showed the power 
of using expert knowledge for making policy. Analyzing terms of the forest 
devolution policy papers in Vietnam also helped to understand the hidden 
power relationship in the language of the policy. This supports the argument 
of Shore and Wright (1997) that analysis of language and use of expert 
knowledge is a key to understanding the power relationships in the policy. 
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The critical anthropology approach seemed limiting in helping to deal with 
this. Understanding how the policy is implemented in practice could not be 
achieved fully by applying the thoughts of the critical anthropologist.  
The ethnographical view of Mosse (2005) helped to understand the 
nature of power relationship through exploring the social or project life and 
for each specific activity in a certain context. The complexity of the 
interpretations in implementation of the forest devolution in Loc Tien and 
Thuong Quang supports the argument of Mosse (2005) that implementation 
of policy or project is based on an interpretation by a given community. 
These interpretations created difficulty for controlling the project and so lead 
to the different outcomes of the policy. Therefore, an important issue in 
implementing policy is the capacity to monitor those interpretations. An 
ethnographic approach also helps to have a broader view in analyzing the 
nature of power relationships through looking at the compromises of the 
actors in implementing policy. However, it is a special challenge for the 
researchers who were not really engaged in implementing policy to enquire 
about this aspect. Mosse examined the compromises made between the 
project implementers and the beneficiaries in doing project activities and 
analyzed how this influenced the project’s outcomes. Only a person who is a 
member of project as David Mosse was can fully investigate and understand 
this aspect.  
The above discussion indicates that understanding the whole process of 
the policy from the papers to practice could not be achieved by applying a 
single approach in analyzing policy. Enquiry in policy analysis, therefore, 
needs to have a combination of different approaches as suggested by Keeley 
& Scoones (1999) and Sutton (1999). 
8.6.2. Property rights for forestry land and natural forest management 
As introduced in chapter I, this research explored the process and 
consequences of both devolution of forestry land to individual households 
and natural forest to villages or household groups. This is a change from the 
state property regime to private and common property rights. Two 
approaches of property rights were used to examine the relationship 
between devolution of rights to forest and management practice as well as 
the conflict brought by the devolution implementation. Following are some 
discussions about these two theoretical approaches. 
 
¾  Private property right school 
Devolution of forestry land to an individual household is transference from 
the state property to private property. As discussed in chapters VI and VII, 
after titling forestry land to individual household, the forestry land users   308 
invested labour in planting and tending forest on the devolved land. The 
planted forest area was expanded in both Loc Tien and Thuong Quang after 
devolution. The plantation brought entitlements of cash income for the land 
users. The productivity of the land in terms of income from timber planted 
on the land was improved compared to the bare hills that had been managed 
by the state before devolution.  
However, there was still a part of the devolved forestry land area has not 
been planted because the land user did not have enough capacity to invest in 
farming the land. Moreover, almost all the planted forest areas on the 
devolved land were developed based on the financial sources funded fully or 
partly by international organizations or the government. Investment in 
developing the forest on the private forestry land is a result of not only 
holding a land title but also of development of the market for timber 
products. This showed that individual land titling is one of the factors that 
encouraged land users to invest in the devolved land. Titling forestry land to 
individual households also created conflicts between the land users and non-
beneficiaries that are rarely discussed in the literature of the private property 
scholars. This indicates that private property rights are not the best as 
claimed in this school. Private property right holding is not enough to 
secure tenure.  
 
¾  Common property rights school and common pool resource theory 
Devolution of natural forest to village or household groups is transference 
from the state property to common property. The findings in both 
communes (Loc Tien and Thuong Quang) showed the importance of 
commons management of the natural forest resources for the livelihood of 
the poor as claimed by the scholars of the common property school. After 
devolution of natural forest to villages in Loc Tien or to household groups 
in Thuong Quang, the forest areas were managed by investing labour in 
protecting and tending the forest. This supports the arguments of the 
scholars of common that common property is not open access but it is 
managed collectively.  
For examining maintenance of the village or household group-based 
natural forest management, this research looked some variables such as 
building the institutions (rules) for collective management (Varughese & 
Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 1999), and some enabling conditions, offered by 
Agrawal (2001) such as location of the resource, size of group and resource, 
clearly defined boundary, past experience, and supportive external 
sanctioning institutions.  
The evidence from the study sites showed that the quality of the 
institutions for managing the village-based natural forest was influenced 309
mainly by facilitation of external actors (foresters from the DFPD) because it 
was developed based on the guidance of the government and support of the 
DFPD. This challenges the conclusion of Varughese & Ostrom (2001) that 
heterogeneity of community is a key factor influenced quality of the 
institutions for managing common resources. Here, the state’s interventions 
influenced more quality of the insitutions for the devolved natural forest 
management.
In the coastal community (Loc Tien), the efficiency of the devolved 
natural forest management was improved thanks to its location that allowed 
easy policing of the illegal loggers and the experience of the forest protector 
group. In the mountainous area (Thuong Quang), prevention of illegal 
logging was limited because of lack of support from the commune authority 
and the DFPD although the size of forest area and size of the group are 
smaller than that in Loc Tien (size of the forest area from 45 to 115 ha 
compared to 511 ha; the size of groups from two to 10 households 
compared to 178 households). These forest protection groups also have long 
experiences of where and how the illegal loggers log timber in the forest. 
This evidence also questions the hypothesis of Agrawal (2001) that the small 
size of resources and groups is one of the principles for maintaining 
collective action for management sustainability of common pools resources.
In both communes, the boundary of the devolved natural forest area was 
clearly definded based on topography and resource characteristics but results 
of preventing illegal logging were not similar between two study sites. The 
variable of clear boundary definitions offered by Agrawal (2001) seems to 
have less meaning in improving management activity. Dilemmas due to 
everyday life relationships prevented the forest protectors from prohibiting 
illegal loggers in the village in both Loc Tien and Thuong Quang. 
Management efficiency of natural forests, therefore, depended also on 
everyday life relationships, which is not mentioned in the commons 
literature.
Efficiency of village or household group-based natural forest management in
Thua Thien Hue, Vietnam, depends on the organization of collective 
action, support by enacting and executing the law, as well as relationships in 
every day life. The size of the group, resource and internal institutions 
seemed to have limited significance. 
The evidence from examining the contributions and limitations of 
devolved forestry land to individual households and natural forest to villages 
or household groups in Thua Thien Hue indicated that private property or 
common property did not help to achieve full efficiency of forest land use 
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Institutionist school that efficiency of land use and management as well as 
security of tenure depend on the politics of access and control rather than a 
title or the common (Ellsworth, 2004). However, for the objective of pro-
poor rural development, this research supports the idea of introducing 
common property regimes in natural forest management with complete 
devolution from the state along with cooperation of the state’s authority in 
exercising legislation.
8.6.3. Environmental entitlement framework in analysis of impact of devolution 
As discussion in chapter VI, gaining an endowment of statutory rights to 
forestry land and natural forest was influenced by the legal papers and 
interpretations of external actors in the implementation process of 
devolution while individual relationships and sympathy in every day life 
determined access based on traditional rights. This supports the argument of 
Leach et al. (1999) that the process of mapping endowments is influenced by 
both statutory and customary systems.
In chapter VII, the evidence indicated that transforming the endowment 
of forest land rights to gain entitlements (benefits) from the devolved land 
depended on financial resources and labour capacity of households, support 
from international organizations and the state, as well as the security of the 
statutory rights.
In the case of devolution of natural forests, there is no utility of the 
timber for the forest protectors yet because of the complex process of getting 
timber and lack of support to exercise the commitments between the state 
and the forest protectors. Execution of the regulations of benefits 
determined the gaining of entitlement to timber for the beneficiaries. 
Therefore, transforming the endowment of statutory rights to utilities from 
natural forest is influenced by the support of external institutions (in 
execution of regulations set up by the state) as well as holding statutory 
rights and the household’s resources. 
The findings in chapters VI and VII indicated that processes of mapping both 
endowment of statutory rights and entitlements depended on interpretations 
and the exercise of the regulations in practice rather than the regulations in 
the policy papers, again in line with the conclusion of Leach et al. (1999) 
that endowments  are outcomes of negotiation between the actors rather 
than the result of fixed rules in the law, and power relationships are 
important issues in analyzing mapping processes, an aspect missing in Sen’s 
argument as Leach et al. (1999) stated.
This study found that distribution of endowments to and entitlements 
from the devolved natural forest and forestry land were decided mainly by   311 
the rights of state actors in the process of devolution implementation. 
Although in the extended environmental entitlement approach, Leach et. al. 
(1999) emphasized importance of institutions at all levels (from macro to 
micro level) the discussion mainly focused on micro level (social differences 
between local social actors or social groups in the community that influence 
endowment and entitlement mapping). Arguments on the influence of the 
executing state institutions on endowment and entitlement mapping process 
seem to also be limited in this approach. 
This research also found that it is a challenge for researcher to specify 
variables of entitlement. This may be the reason for the abstract term of 
entitlement “effective command…” that makes analysis of the entitlement 
mapping process difficult to achieve. 
Mulvaney  (2003) has argued that the extended environmental enti-
tlement approach of Leach paid limited attention to the heterogeneity of the 
ecological process. In this thesis, the author did not have enough evidence 
to comment on this aspect and did not look deeply in the change of forest 
conditions. However, this research supported the point of view of Leach et 
al. (1999) that outcomes of the environment (forest in particular) depended 
very much on the institutions and their execution in society rather than 
characteristics of ecosystems.  
A strong point of the extended environment entitlement approach of 
Leach et al. (1999) is pointing out the relationship between endowment and 
entitlement in evaluating impacts of devolution. This helped to understand 
outcomes of the forest devolution policy in relation to endowment of rights. 
However, this approach does not help to see broader outcomes of 
devolution such as analysis of sustainability of livelihood because it did not 
help to look at relationships between different sectors as well as the history 
of the household economy. This may be a limitation of Leach et al.’s 
approach. 
8.6.4. Feminist environmentalism  
The findings on gender issues crossed over chapters V, VI and VII of this 
thesis and support the arguments of Agarwal (2001b) that common resources 
are important for poor women. Forest devolution programmes limited the 
participation of women. The absence of women in the process of forest 
devolution was a result of the customs and social norms such as the thought 
that forest production is male work, the workload of housework, again 
consistent with the findings of Agarwal (2001b; 1997a) in South Asia. These 
influenced a smaller gain of endowments of statutory rights and loss of some 
entitlements from the devolved forest for women. However, gaining less   312 
endowment of statutory rights to the devolved forestry land by women in 
this research also results from a lack of attention by external actors (forest 
officers, state management officers). This aspect was not discussed by 
Agarwal (2001b; 1997a) in South Asia.    
8.7. Reflection of methodology and methods 
8.7.1. Methodology 
It is a good idea to start research from an observation of practice. The 
research issue in this thesis was recorded to be the critical issue in Vietnam 
in practice by the researcher’s community and the policy makers who 
attended the workshops organized by RDViet project network. This was 
reflected through the presentations on the research issues and its primary 
findings in the scientific workshops of the RDViet project with attendance 
of the researchers from the agricultural and forestry universities in the whole 
country, with representatives of some ministries and some national and 
international organizations who are working in rural development in 
Vietnam.  
From the initiation of this study to the day of writing this reflection, the 
author learned that when the research idea originated from practice, it is 
useful in terms of achieving the objective of making a change in practice. 
However, it is very challenging for the researcher to interact with the 
theoretical frameworks to achieve both academic objectives and solve the 
practical problems at the same time.  
Starting the research from the issue observed in practice also makes the 
study difficult to link with a single theoretical framework. This is in line 
with the statement by Phillips & Pugh (2000) that the research that comes 
from practical observation, often requires different theoretical frameworks. 
 
8.7.2. Reflection on the methods  
¾  Combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
The research applied both quantitative and qualitative methods. It indicated 
that quantitative methods were very useful to give the evidence for 
supporting the claims of the author and it is easy to generate the findings. 
The analysis of quantitative data is also not complex and took a short time 
with the support of computer software. However, a quantitative method 
seems to be difficult to achieve given the nature of the research issues.   313 
A qualitative method was quite useful and interesting for the researcher to 
understand the social and human aspects of the research. However, this 
method required a longer time in the field and it also challenges the patience 
of the researcher. Qualitative data requires not only the skills of researcher 
but also their enthusiasm. It is also a challenge to analyze and generate the 
findings using qualitative methods, especially when the data is rich and 
comes from different sources. However, qualitative methods should not be 
absent in the research that focuses on social human aspects. It is a good idea 
to combine both quantitative and qualitative methods in research. 
 
¾  Lesson learned 
The first lesson learned by the author through doing the research was the 
way of selection of the policy papers for analyzing. It should focus on the 
key papers only. With the extreme number of policy papers related to forest 
devolution in Vietnam, it was very hard for the author to do analysis of the 
policy. They should be filtered by discussion with the stakeholders to select 
the key papers before coming up with an analysis.  
The second lesson learned was the ways of discussion in the dialogues 
with the interviewees when talking about the sensitive issues related to 
implementation of forest devolution, such as unequal distribution of forestry 
land devolved by the state. This needs to have not only skills but also the art 
of dialogue to understand the issue.    315 
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Appendix I. Norms for Classifying Forests in Vietnam
(Decision No. 682B/QĈKT QPN 6-84 on 1
st August, 1984) 
The forests in Vietnam are classified as 4 groups as followings 
Group 1: Non-forest, including 4 types 
Ia. Specific characteristic of this type is covered by grass, wild banana and “lau lach”
Ib. Specific characteristic of this type is covered by brushes, and some scattered 
small timber and bamboos 
Ic. Specific characteristic of this type is covered by the timbers that are generating 
and their tall are higher than 1metter with the density is 1000 trees/ ha.
Group II: Rehabilitation forest with small trees 
IIa. The forests are rehabilitating after shifting cultivation with the trees which 
prefer sunlight, growth fast, are at the same age and there is only one layer. 
IIb. The forests are rehabilitating after exhausted exploitation with the fast growth 
trees which prefer sunlight relatively. The spicy component of this type of forests is 
complex and not at the same age.
Group III: Secondary forests which are affected by human and the structure of the 
forest was changed 
IIIA. The forests were exploited strongly. The forest structure of the forest was fully 
broken.
IIIA1. The forest was exploited exhaustedly. The forest canopy is broken. There 
are many creepers and bamboos in the forest. This type is divided into two types 
(IIIA1.1. incomplete rehabilitation and IIIA1.2 – complete rehabilitation)
    IIIA2.  The forest was overexploited but it is rehabilitating well. Specific 
characteristic of this type of forest is that its middle layer occupies upper hand with 
almost all the trees having diameter about from 20 to 30 cm. The forest has al least 
2 layers. This type is divided into two types (IIIA2.1. incomplete rehabilitation and
IIIA2.2 – complete rehabilitation)
IIIA3. The forest was exploited moderately or is developed from the forest type 
IIIA2. The forest community is rather closed with two or more than 2 layers.
Specific characteristic of this type of forest that is different compared to IIIA2 is 
having bigger timbers (diameter is higher than 35cm) can be exploited for use.
IIIB. The forest community is exploited by the selected method (extracting some 
high value timbers) but the forest structure has not been changed yet. The timber 
providing capacity of this type of forest is still high and its timber volume is rich 
with the big timbers.
Group IV.: Primary forest. This forest is not exploited yet. The structure of the 
forest is stable with many layers and levels of diameter. However, this type of forest 
may lack of middle and lowest layers. 
IVA. Primary forest 
IVB. Rehabilitated secondary forest 